The long-term potential of an interim-solution : an assessment of the EU's bilateral competition cooperation agreements in context by Demedts, Valerie
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The long-term potential of an interim-solution  
An assessment of the EU’s first and second generation bilateral competition 
cooperation agreements in context 
 
 
 
VALERIE DEMEDTS  
 
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law of Ghent University  
In fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor in Law 
2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. INGE GOVAERE 
      
  
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
  
                                                          
Wordcloud created in NVivo, based on the text of a selection of EU bilateral competition cooperation agreements. 
ii 
 
  
iii 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
This study would not have been possible without the steady support, trust, and encouragement of 
professor Inge Govaere and the members of the Doctoral Guidance Committee, professor Philip 
Marsden and professor Jacques Bourgeois. I am thankful for their patience, and the time and energy 
they have devoted to this project. I would also like to thank the people of Unit A5 of DG 
Competition of the European Commission who have welcomed me for a traineeship, offering 
invaluable insights in international competition law enforcement and policy development in practice. 
I am grateful to the various public officials and private practitioners who kindly agreed to grant non-
attributable interviews as part of the research on which this study is based, as well as the lawyers who 
have participated in the survey for taking a moment of their precious time. Their comments 
significantly helped shape the ideas in this dissertation.  
 
I am deeply grateful to my colleagues and friends for making this endeavour a less solitary 
experience, and for so much more. They are invaluable. I would also like to thank my brother Bruno 
and his girlfriend Silke, and my parents, Regina and Piet, for their continued care. My dear 
grandparents, those who are still in my life and those who have passed, deserve my heartfelt gratitude 
as well.   
 
Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the strong women in antitrust who will always 
remain a source of inspiration. Thank you.  
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Rajah.  
May the perseverance and optimism that have led to the completion of this study inspire you.  
  
vi 
 
 
 
  
vii 
 
English Summary 
 
The international business environment is characterised by an international marketplace, regulated, 
however, by a plethora of national rules. Companies and transactions have become increasingly 
global in nature, but the (competition) rules governing their behaviour have not followed suit. The 
globalisation paradox entails that globalisation creates collective problems that should be addressed 
internationally, while at the same time the centralization of decision-making power and coercive 
authority (or a ‘world government’) which this would require is infeasible and undesirable. Other 
solutions to govern the global market are therefore needed. In the field of competition law, 
international cooperation can take many forms. This study focuses on one particular type of 
cooperation, namely bilateral enforcement cooperation via formal agreements that focus solely on 
competition matters. Bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements are often portrayed as being a 
mere ‘interim-solution’ awaiting a global agreement. This study therefore develops and applies 
benchmarks to measure the potential of these agreements to be more than just that, and to 
determine whether further development of such agreements is warranted.  
 
Early proposals to create a global code were multilateral in nature, and integrated competition issues 
in a trade-context. These (overly) ambitious initiatives did not succeed, however, due to a lack of 
consensus within the international community, caused in part by a lack of understanding of the 
inherent complexities of the topic, as well as external factors. At the same time, however, the 
problems of unilateral extraterritorial enforcement became more apparent. Efforts were therefore 
aimed at creating informal multilateral guidance rather than hard international treaties. Such 
guidance, in turn, was then solidified in bilateral agreements. The EU’s first generation cooperation 
agreements merely allowed cooperation to occur, rather than stimulating or requiring it. While they 
created momentum and in this manner played a valuable role, currently, the cost to negotiate such 
agreements is larger than the added benefits they would offer. The inherently unenforceable 
obligations ‘imposed’ by these agreements do not require a formal treaty. ‘First generation’ 
agreements can only resolve conflict when no true conflict is present, and do not create any 
cooperation discipline, thereby also limiting the efficiencies and rationalisations that could be 
achieved via cooperation. They can regain in importance if flesh is added to the bones of such 
agreements, their scope expanded, and more detailed follow-up of their implementation takes place. 
The EU has only recently concluded its first ‘second generation’ agreement, with Switzerland, which 
allows for the exchange of confidential information. Scrutiny of this agreement reveals significant 
flaws. Again transparency and cooperation discipline constitute areas of concern. The EU-
Switzerland second generation agreement has overly addressed certain concerns in the form of 
excessively restrictive safeguards, as is the case with the protection of the leniency system, while 
remaining opaque on other crucial aspects, such as the delineation of the concept of confidential 
information and due process.    
 
The EU’s bilateral agreements do not operate in a void, and should be seen in their international 
context. They operate alongside many other diverse instruments of international cooperation. To 
determine the relative value of the EU’s bilateral cooperation agreements, the ‘dedicated’ approach 
of agreements focusing solely on competition matters is contrasted with an ‘integrated’ approach, 
both substantially in the form of competition chapters in free trade agreements, and geographically, 
in the form of multilateral agreements. This study finds that competition chapters in free trade 
agreements have a useful role to play, in particular with regard to their reach and their potential to 
push for and lock-in domestic reforms. Competition chapters can therefore complement dedicated 
cooperation agreements since both serve inherently different goals. Caution is in place, however, as 
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trade and competition are two distinct policy fields pursuing different aims. Competition chapters 
may moreover be reduced to pawns in the game of issue-trading, and become subject to the 
challenges that come with concluding comprehensive trade agreements, such as the delays and 
obstacles paired with concluding a mixed agreement, and increased politicisation. With regard to 
geographical integration, this study advocates that the different multilateral forums should take 
advantage of their respective strengths by cooperating more, and the interplay between the 
multilateral and the bilateral spheres should be reinforced so that it becomes mutually reinforcing. 
While networks such as the OECD, UNCTAD, WTO, and the ICN can be considered as an exciting 
new form of global governance, issues of democratic accountability and transparency should not be 
ignored. Each forum has its demonstrated value, but this study also identifies particular challenges 
for each of them.   
 
This dissertation shows that dedicated competition cooperation agreements are more than simply an 
interim solution. However, as they exist today their aptitude to become worthy tools of international 
cooperation is not realised. This dissertation concludes with some concrete suggestions to fulfil that 
potential. In implementing these suggestions lessons can be drawn from cooperation in other policy 
fields, such as tax policy or criminal law enforcement cooperation via mutual legal assistance 
agreements. Most importantly, additional empirical information is needed on the implementation of 
cooperation instruments, benchmarking reviews should become a standard aspect of the cooperation 
process, and more ambition is needed in the conclusion of bilateral agreements, as they form the 
ideal environment for testing novel approaches. Finally, international cooperation in a competition 
law context is in dire need of a grand strategy.   
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
 
De internationale economie wordt gekenmerkt door een mondiale markt, die echter gereguleerd 
wordt door een overvloed aan nationale wetten. Bedrijven en transacties hebben in toenemende mate 
een internationaal karakter, maar de (mededingings)regels die deze economische activiteit regelen zijn 
niet mee geëvolueerd. De globalisatieparadox houdt in dat terwijl globalisatie geleid heeft tot 
collectieve problemen die een globale oplossing vereisen, de centralisatie van beslissingsbevoegdheid 
en dwingende macht (een ‘wereldregering’) die hiervoor vereist zou zijn zowel onhaalbaar als 
onwenselijk is. Andere oplossingen zijn daarom noodzakelijk teneinde de globale marktplaats te 
ordenen. Internationale samenwerking binnen het mededingingsrecht kan vele vormen aannemen. 
Deze studie focust op één bepaald type samenwerking, namelijk bilaterale handhavingssamenwerking 
via formele akkoorden die enkel toegelegd zijn op mededingingsrecht. Bilaterale 
handhavingssamenwerking wordt vaak afgeschilderd als slechts een ‘interim-oplossing’, in afwachting 
van een globaal akkoord. Deze studie ontwikkelt daarom standaarden om het potentieel te meten van 
deze bilaterale akkoorden om meer dan een interim-oplossing te zijn, en past deze ook toe, teneinde 
te bepalen of het verder ontwikkelen van dergelijke akkoorden de moeite waard is.  
 
De eerste inspanningen tot internationale samenwerking waren multilateraal van aard, waarbij 
mededingingsregels in een handelscontext geïntegreerd werden. Deze (over-)ambitieuze pogingen 
om een globale code te ontwikkelen slaagden echter niet in hun opzet, omwille van een gebrek aan 
consensus binnen de internationale gemeenschap, deels veroorzaakt door een gebrek aan inzicht in 
de inherente complexiteiten van dergelijke onderneming, alsook externe factoren. Tegelijkertijd 
werden de gebreken van de unilaterale extraterritoriale toepassing van nationaal recht duidelijk. 
Verdere inspanningen tot internationale samenwerking gingen daarom naar het creëren van 
informele multilaterale richtlijnen eerder dan bindende internationale verdragen. Deze richtlijnen 
werden dan op hun beurt opgenomen in bilaterale akkoorden. De ‘eerste generatie’- akkoorden van 
de EU lieten samenwerking toe eerder dan het te stimuleren of vereisen. Ze creëerden momentum 
en speelden op deze manier een belangrijke rol. Momenteel ligt de kost van het onderhandelen van 
dit type akkoorden echter hoger dan de voordelen die deze bieden. De inherent onafdwingbare 
verplichtingen vereisen geen formeel bindend akkoord. Bovendien lijken eerste generatie-akkoorden 
enkel conflicten te kunnen oplossen wanneer er geen echte conflicten zijn, en creëren ze geen 
discipline in het samenwerkingsproces, waardoor potentiële efficiënties en besparingen worden 
beperkt. De akkoorden kunnen aan belang herwinnen indien de principes die ze nu bevatten meer 
uitgewerkt worden, hun inhoud wordt verruimd, en hun implementatie meer wordt opgevolgd. De 
EU sloot pas recent een eerste ‘tweede generatie’- akkoord af met Zwitserland, dat toelaat om 
vertrouwelijke informatie te delen. Nauwkeurig onderzoek van dit akkoord legt significante zwaktes 
bloot. Opnieuw vormen transparantie en discipline in het samenwerkingsproces problemen. Het EU-
Zwitserland tweede generatie akkoord is teveel tegemoet gekomen aan bepaalde zorgen via 
overmatig restrictieve vrijwaringsmaatregelen, bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot de bescherming van 
de clementieregeling, terwijl het vaag blijft met betrekking tot andere cruciale aspecten, zoals 
bijvoorbeeld de definiëring van het concept ‘vertrouwelijke informatie’ en de procesrechten van de 
betrokkenen.    
 
De bilaterale akkoorden van de EU functioneren niet in een leemte, en moeten daarom in hun 
context bekeken worden. Ze gelden naast verschillende andere samenwerkingsinstrumenten met 
geheel andere eigenschappen. Om hun relatieve waarde te bepalen wordt de ‘gespecialiseerde’ 
benadering van akkoorden die zich enkel op mededingingsrecht toeleggen gecontrasteerd met een 
‘geïntegreerde’ benadering, zowel inhoudelijk – in de vorm van mededingingshoofdstukken in 
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vrijhandelsakkoorden, als geografisch – de multilaterale fora. Mededingingshoofdstukken in 
vrijhandelsakkoorden vervullen een nuttige rol, voornamelijk wat betreft hun bereik, en het 
potentieel om binnenlandse hervormingen te promoten en te verzekeren. Op deze manier kunnen 
deze hoofdstukken bilaterale gespecialiseerde akkoorden aanvullen, aangezien beide verschillende 
doeleinden nastreven. Desalniettemin is voorzichtigheid op zijn plaats, want handel en mededinging 
zijn twee verschillende beleidsvelden met eigen doeleinden. Mededingingshoofdstukken riskeren 
bovendien gereduceerd te worden tot een extra pion in het onderhandelingsspel, en een slachtoffer 
te worden van de uitdagingen die gepaard gaan met het sluiten van een comprehensief 
vrijhandelsakkoord. Hierbij kan gedacht worden aan de vertragingen en obstakels die bij het sluiten 
van gemengde akkoorden kunnen komen kijken, en toegenomen politisering. Voor wat de 
geografische integratie betreft, pleit deze studie ervoor dat de verschillende multilaterale fora gebruik 
maken van elkaars sterktes door meer samen te werken, en de interactie tussen het multilaterale en 
het bilaterale niveau intensifieert, zodat een wederzijds versterkende relatie wordt gecreëerd. 
Netwerken zoals de OESO, UNCTAD, WTO en de ICN zijn veelbelovende vormen van globaal 
bestuur, maar problemen met democratische verantwoording en transparantie mogen niet genegeerd 
worden. Elk forum heeft aangetoonde waarde, maar wordt ook geconfronteerd met eigen 
uitdagingen zoals geïdentificeerd in deze studie.    
 
Deze studie toont aan dat gespecialiseerde mededingingsakkoorden meer zijn dan louter een interim-
oplossing. Hun potentieel om volwaardige instrumenten van internationale samenwerking te worden 
is vandaag echter niet vervuld. Deze dissertatie concludeert met enkele concrete suggesties om dit 
potentieel te verwezenlijken. Hierbij kunnen lessen getrokken worden uit samenwerking in andere 
beleidsvelden, zoals belastingbeleid of samenwerking via overeenkomsten betreffende wederzijdse 
rechtshulp. In ieder geval is meer empirische informatie nodig over de toepassing van 
samenwerkingsakkoorden, en vergelijkende analyses zouden een standaard-aspect van het 
samenwerkingsproces moeten worden. Bovendien moet er meer ambitie zijn bij het sluiten van 
bilaterale akkoorden, aangezien dergelijke akkoorden de ideale omgeving vormen om te 
experimenteren met nieuwe samenwerkingsvormen. Tenslotte is een overkoepelende strategie met 
betrekking tot internationale samenwerking in het mededingingsrecht hoogstnodig.    
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Preface 
 
When embarking on this research, the goal was not to write a theoretical piece on an ideal situation. 
When doing this research, input from ‘the field’, those actually creating and ensuring competition – 
be it companies, enforcers, or rule-makers – was as important as the underlying theories.  
 
This work has been updated until 31 June 2017.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience.”2 
  
                                                          
2 O. Holmes Jr., The Common Law , Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1881.  
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Introduction: ready, willing, and able?  
 
“I want to start […] with the question of why we are committed to international cooperation. It is the why, of course, 
that should inform the practice.”3 
 
In 1998, DOUGLAS MELAMED, principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the United States’ 
Department of Justice (DoJ) at the time, started his speech before the 25th Annual Conference of the 
Fordham Law Institute with the words: “We live in a global economy, but we do not live in a global state.”4 
This phrase sums up the root of the issues under scrutiny in this study, which is centred around the 
paradox that while companies and businesses are becoming increasingly global in nature, the 
(competition)5 rules governing their behaviour are not following this pattern.6 This is generally 
known as the ‘paradox of global governance’ or the ‘globalisation paradox’, in that globalisation 
creates collective problems that should be addressed on a global scale, while at the same time a world 
government in the form of a supra-national body is infeasible and undesirable, as it would fail to 
provide meaningful democratic representation and threaten individual freedoms.7 Indeed, while more 
global governance may be needed to address global concerns, such centralization of decision-making 
power and coercive authority would give rise to fears of unduly curtailed liberty and unaccountability 
of decision-makers.8 In the field of competition law, the emergence of international rules is limited. 
Instead, the international community is characterized by an expanding extraterritorial application of 
national and European laws.9 This multiplicity of legal orders governing competition issues has 
resulted in horizontal conflicts of jurisdiction. Such jurisdictional conflicts, resulting from a pluralism 
of sources of law, create a problem with regard to the legal paradigm applicable to how these legal 
sources should interrelate.10 
 
In Europe, the discussions on the legal and practical issues that originate from this paradox began 
long before the EU’s competition rules were inscribed in the Treaty of Rome, and took place in a 
diverse range of forums. The difficulty of having to operate in a multitude of legal orders was further 
complicated by the variety of cooperation instruments that arose across the globe in response to this 
particular environment, resulting in “a complex web of differing levels of possible engagement between 
                                                          
3 J. Wayland, “International cooperation at the antitrust division”, remarks as prepared for the International Bar 
Association’s 16th Annual Competition Conference, Florence, 14 September 2012. 
4 A. Melamed, “Antitrust enforcement in a global economy” in B. Hawk, (ed.), 1998 Fordham Corporate Law Institute 
International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference, New York, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1999, 1. He reiterated this 
statement in A. Melamed, “International Cooperation in Competition Law and Policy: What can be Achieved at the 
Bilateral, Regional, and Multilateral levels”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1999, 424.  
5 In this study, the terms ‘competition’ and ‘antitrust’ are used interchangeably.  
6 M. Gal, “Review Essay: New Perspectives on International Antitrust”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 106, 
2012, 401.  
7 A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004, 8, as explained in Pierre-Hugues 
Verdier, “Regulatory networks and their limits”, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business 
Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 22, 9/2008, (Later published as “Transnational Regulatory 
Networks and Their Limits”, The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, 2009, 119.) 
8 J. Fingleton, “Competition Agencies and Global Markets: The Challenges Ahead”, in P. Lugard (ed.), The International 
Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 188. 
9 M. Blauberger, “The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions. How International Cooperation Enhances the 
Autonomy of Competition Authorities”, Transtate Working Papers, No. 102, Bremen, 2009, 1. 
10 R. van Gestel, H.-W. Micklitz & M. Poiares Maduro, “Methodology in the New Legal World”, EUI Working Papers 
LAW, 2012/13, 15.  
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authorities.”11 Even jurisdictions such as the US and the EU have difficulties proceeding towards true 
international cooperation on competition matters, despite the similarities in their (legal) culture, their 
advanced competition systems, and the existence of several formal and informal cooperation 
agreements.12 This observation incites a certain curiosity and raises several questions with regard to 
the perceived difficulty to advance in this field. 
 
While cooperation between antitrust authorities is taking place to a considerable extent, incentives to 
further engage can and must be improved. It is not a revolutionary statement that current 
cooperation instruments, such as Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), bilateral agreements, 
free trade agreements with competition provisions (FTAs), regional agreements, or multilateral 
forums, while useful to a certain extent, are not optimal, and do not adequately address some 
common obstacles to advanced international cooperation.13 Results of a recent survey jointly 
undertaken by the OECD and ICN on international enforcement cooperation indicated that what is 
needed to increase incentives to cooperate are a clear legal and institutional setting for international 
cooperation, and increased awareness of the benefits of such cooperation.14 Additional clarity 
surrounding the necessity of cooperation and the legal framework is particularly valuable considering 
that the world today is characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. What is 
needed to address the challenges of this environment are vision, understanding, clarity, and agility.15  
 
Research question 
 
BRETHERTON and VOGLER as well as others identified three dimensions of EU global actorness: 
capabilities, presence, and opportunity.16 The demands expressed above can, however, also be 
translated into three other necessary and strongly interlinked elements for effective and efficient 
international cooperation: readiness, willingness, and ability. Readiness in this context indicates 
owning the right capabilities as a state and as a competition agency to engage in effective competition 
law enforcement.17 A competition authority in particular will need a certain degree of maturity, as 
well as sufficient budget and trained staff, before it can engage in cooperation. Willingness refers to 
the relevant (political) actors having the right mind-set to engage in voluntary forms of cooperation 
or to comply with harder forms of law. Ability, finally, is interpreted as the availability of instruments 
allowing to engage in cooperation, and the absence of legal and practical obstacles.  
 
                                                          
11 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 13. Also see M. Błachucki and S. Jóźwiak, “Exchange of 
Information and Evidence between Competition Authorities and Entrepreneurs’ Rights”, Yearbook of Antitrust and 
Regulatory Studies, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2012, 150.  
12 D. Wood, “Is cooperation possible?”, Luncheon Speech, New England Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 109.  
13 See, for instance, OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 55. 
14 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 15. Further referred to as ‘the OECD/ICN Joint Survey’.  
15 On the VUCA-concept, see N. Horney, B. Pasmore, & T. O’Shea, “Leadership Agility: A Business Imperative for a 
VUCA World”, available at http://www.ibicity.fr/blog/public/Leadership_Agility_--
_HRPS_Reprint_Permission__revised_.pdf (accessed May 2015) and P. Kinsinger & K. Walch, “Living and Leading in a 
VUCA World”, available at http://www.powerofunderstanding.net/pdfs/living_leading_small.pdf (accessed May 2015).  
16 C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 2nd ed., New York, Routledge, 2006, 273 p. Also see D. 
Bouris, T. Schumacher (eds.), The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy, London, 
Palgrave Mcmillan, 2017, 306 p.  
17 In this study the terms ‘competition authority’, ‘competition agency’, ‘antitrust authority’, and ‘antitrust agency’ will be 
used interchangeably.  
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It is on this final aspect of ‘ability’ that this study wishes to elaborate. International cooperation in 
the field of competition law takes many forms. It can happen on a bilateral, regional, or multilateral 
level. It can be formal or informal. It can focus on substantive harmonisation or on operational 
coordination. This multiplicity of forms and scopes renders an assessment of the usefulness of such 
instruments difficult. This study will attempt to do so by focusing on one small, yet prominently 
present aspect of cooperation, namely cooperation between the European Commission and 
competition authorities from third countries through dedicated competition cooperation agreements. 
Some choices have therefore been made in delineating the field of research.  
 
A first choice that has been made is to focus on bilateral agreements, as opposed to multilateral and 
regional ones. The multilateral and regional cooperation efforts in the field of competition law are 
important developments worthy of analysis. However, this study chose to focus on bilateral 
initiatives, due to the observation that the diversity in legal instruments for bilateral cooperation does 
not coincide prima facie with the rather similar goals that are pursued by such tools, contrary to 
multilateral initiatives that have more outspoken distinct roles. Roughly put, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) focuses mainly on developed countries, The 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) work is centred around 
developing countries, the International Competition Network (ICN) is a virtual network at agency-
level, focusing on ‘all competition, all the time’, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is a 
binding platform dealing mainly with trade issues. Conversely, MoUs, dedicated competition 
cooperation agreements, competition law provisions in FTAs, policy dialogues, etcetera are used in 
parallel to attain bilateral competition law enforcement cooperation. The added value of each legal 
instrument and the ways in which their objectives differ is less apparent and it is therefore unclear 
why such a wide array of instruments is used in international competition cooperation. Apparently, 
the Commission itself is aware of this issue. According to one Commission official “[t]he Directorate-
General for Competition of the European Commission (‘DG Competition’) is now [2010] adopting a more strategic 
approach towards international agreements tailoring the instrument to the real needs of the relationship and to facts 
such as the size and importance of the country’s economy, the intensity of the trade and investment relationship with the 
country concerned and the degree of maturity of its competition regime.”18 This seems to imply that the 
diversification of previous instruments was not caused by the need to tailor the agreements to the 
real needs of the relationship, raising questions on what the deciding factors were in such cases. 
Another remark that comes to mind when reading this statement is who defines the ‘needs’ of the 
relationship, what are these ‘needs’ and from who’s perspective are they seen? Again, a detailed 
analysis of dedicated cooperation instruments may provide some clarity. Multilateral forums for 
cooperation will be briefly discussed in Part III of this study, as bilateral agreements function in 
parallel with them, but they will not be the main focus of this work. Regional cooperation, 
understood as multilateral cooperation between countries that are geographically close, while 
generally valued highly, is left out of the scope of this study as well. The specific legal framework in 
which it occurs, as well as the important role played by the geographic proximity of the parties 
                                                          
18 E. Valle Lagares, “International Agreements Regarding Cooperation in the Field of Competition: The New Strategy of 
the European Commission”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2010, 155-156. 
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involved,19 does not make regional cooperation a suited subject of this study as experiences with it 
are diverse and difficult to generalise.20 
 
Cooperation in the field of competition law can relate to enforcement cooperation, but also to 
competition advocacy, joint attempts to design competition laws, or policy convergence.21 While 
cooperation on all these fields is valuable, a second choice that has been made is to focus on 
operational or enforcement cooperation rather than joint efforts on substantive matters (the latter 
relating to the actual content of the antitrust rules rather than their implementation). This 
cooperation was defined by the ICN and OECD as “co-operation between international enforcement agencies 
in specific enforcement cases[…].”22 This covers international cooperation in the detection, investigation, 
prosecution and sanctioning of specific anti-competitive behaviour and the review of mergers.23 
Enforcement cooperation can range from policy discussions, to discussions on general orientations 
regarding investigations, consultations on the timeline of the investigation, the theory of harm, or 
potential remedies, the coordination of searches, raids or inspections, the exchange of (confidential) 
information, or even actively gathering information on behalf of another agency.24 It often starts at 
an early stage in the investigation.25 Other options are the sharing of leads or general discussions 
about investigative strategy, market information or witness evaluations. These actions contribute to 
the streamlining and focusing of an investigation.26 Employing a middle-term perspective, 
enforcement cooperation appears to be a more realistic and urgent objective than deep substantive 
convergence (see below, Part I, 2.2). Moreover, harmonisation of substantive laws will have 
essentially no effect, if it is not accompanied by effective coordination of enforcement proceedings.27 
As FIRST put it: “It is all well and good to speak of the general theories of antitrust, or to incorporate those theories 
in guidelines or in declarations, or even to put them into treaties or laws. But nothing gets attention like actual 
enforcement. Corporations are economic actors, run by people who respond to incentives, both positive and negative.”28 
Enforcement cooperation is therefore at the heart of international competition law.  
 
Third, emphasis is put on dedicated competition agreements, being agreements that focus solely on 
competition matters. Agreements which have as their main goal general approximation with the EU 
acquis are left out of the scope of this study. Examples of such agreements are (Stabilisation and) 
                                                          
19 Geographic proximity often implies a resembling socio-economic culture, as well as similar market players taking 
advantage of scale and scope economies in marketing, transport, technical service, etc. See M. Gal “International 
Antitrust Solutions: Discrete Steps or Causally Linked?” in J. Drexl, W. Grimes, C. Jones, R. Peritz, & E. Swaine (eds), 
More Common Ground for International Competition Law?, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, 258.  
20 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 58. On regional integration agreements, also see J.P. Trachtman, “International trade: regionalism” in 
A. Guzman and A. Sykes (eds), Research handbook in international economic law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007. 
21 See OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 39.  
22 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 7, fn 1.  
23 Ibid.  
24 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 5.  
25 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 7.  
26 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 13.  
27 D. Wood, “Is cooperation possible?”, Luncheon Speech, New England Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 109.  
28 H. First, “The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law”, Antitrust Law 
Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2001, 730.  
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Association agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, or Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements. These agreements may also contain competition provisions, but due to their very 
specific nature and aim, will not be analysed in the framework of this study. The choice to focus on 
dedicated competition agreements also results in the de facto exclusion of cooperation with 
developing countries in this study, as such agreements are not concluded with countries lacking an 
advanced competition law system. Another reason to focus on dedicated agreements, is that the ICN 
was widely applauded for dealing with ‘all competition, all the time’.29 These agreements do more or 
less the same, but are less (publicly) applauded for doing so. Agreements that do not only deal with 
competition matters, but also with trade issues, are analysed in Part III of this study, due to their 
increasing relevance in the management plans of Directorate-General Competition of the European 
Commission (DG COMP) (see below, Part III, 1). As demonstrated by the graphics below, bilateral 
competition agreements are among the cooperation instruments most available to states (figure 1) 
and are used rather frequently (figure 2). The OECD/ICN Joint Survey showed that competition-
specific instruments are valued as most relevant for cooperation, while noncompetition-specific 
agreements were perceived as least relevant.30  
 
 
 
Figure 1: availability of legal bases for international cooperation (collecting data until 2012). Source: OECD, Report on 
the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 38. 
 
                                                          
29 ICN Factsheet and Key Messages, April 2009, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc608.pdf (accessed 12 May 2015).   
30 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 39, 42.  
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Figure 2: average score for ‘Frequency of Use’ of legal bases of co-operation (1: never to 5: frequently). Source: OECD, 
Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 
February 2013, 40. 
 
A final choice has been to focus on agreements concluded by the EU. The EU has developed one of 
the most mature competition regimes in the world. EU insights in international competition law 
cooperation are useful because competition law in the EU itself is applied transnationally. The EU 
has been very active in international negotiations on competition law and the internationalisation of 
competition law and policy.31 Finally, it is interesting to analyse the existence of a possible strategy of 
the EU with regard to dedicated competition agreements, as the EU has long been at the forefront 
of promoting the inclusion of competition matters in the framework of the WTO, but this has 
proven unsuccessful to date. This does not mean, however, that non-EU agreements will be 
completely ignored, as they form a rich source of inspiration. An example is the US-Australia second 
generation agreement allowing for advanced forms of cooperation.   
 
In sum, this study examines whether and to what extent one particular type of legal instrument, so-
called bilateral dedicated competition cooperation agreements, has contributed to the enhancement 
of international competition law enforcement. It is analysed whether bilateral enforcement 
cooperation agreements are useful, and whether they are more than just a ‘stepping stone’ to 
multilateral cooperation. The study analyses the main benefits and flaws of such agreements, in order 
to determine whether the EU should further invest in the negotiation and conclusion of such 
agreements. The aforementioned OECD/ICN Joint Survey revealed that while the legal basis for 
inter-agency cooperation can be twofold – either a direct legal basis for cooperation is provided by 
national laws, or these laws merely provide a mandate to enter into cooperation agreements – 
bilateral agreements are often concluded even by jurisdictions with laws directly permitting 
cooperation, suggesting that such have further utility.32 This study intends to clarify where this 
additional utility lays. By looking into the added value of dedicated competition cooperation 
                                                          
31 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 3-4. 
32 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 37.  
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agreements, a partial answer is provided to the question whether competition law enforcement is 
indeed ‘broadening and deepening’, as some suggest.33  
 
Methodology    
 
The study departs from specified ‘research models’. Certain agreements were selected as research 
models for the type of agreement they represent, based on the importance of the concluding 
jurisdictions and/or the fact that they were the first of their kind and subsequent agreements only 
differed slightly from the original. It concerns first of all the 1991 EU-US first generation 
Agreement, which was the first ‘first generation agreement’ of the EU, secondly, the 1998 US-
Australia second generation Agreement, being the first second generation agreement concluded by 
the US, and finally, the 2013 EU-Switzerland Agreement because it was the first (and so far only) 
second generation agreement concluded by the EU.34 A functional comparative approach was 
employed by investigating how different jurisdictions, mainly the EU and to a certain extent the US, 
have reacted to the problem of existing in a global economy but not in a global state. As international 
competition consists of economical, legal, as well as political considerations, the study is necessarily 
interdisciplinary, combining elements of international relations studies, economics, and law, with a 
focus on the latter. 
 
It is frequently acknowledged that it is difficult to assess international cooperation in a scientific 
way.35 This is nevertheless the objective of this study, albeit focussing on only a particular aspect of 
international cooperation, namely enforcement cooperation via bilateral dedicated instruments. This 
study first of all employs the classical critical-analytical doctrinal approach. The classical approach 
consists of desk research of primary legal sources, case-law, and doctrine. In the taxonomy of 
international competition cooperation provisions that was developed by HOLMES et al. in the context 
of the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission, the authors recognised that their 
study - based on the text of the agreements – needed to be supplemented by studies of what is done 
in reality.36 In order to answer to this call, qualitative research methods were applied in this study to 
complement the doctrinal research.37 Observation and analysis of how the text of the law translates 
in practice was considered an important addition to the analysis of the ‘law on the books’. The aim of 
the qualitative research was to gather information on how competition officials and competition 
lawyers experience the usefulness of the dedicated competition agreements in their daily life when 
                                                          
33 H. Dieckmann, “The Benefits of Cooperation between Competition Authorities”, presented at the Inaugural 
Symposium of the Competition Policy Research Center, Tokyo, 20 November 2003, 1-2, at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/DP/CPDP-9-E.pdf (accessed December 2011).  
34 For the distinction between first and second generation agreements, see below, Part II, 1.1.  
35 See, for instance, F. Jenny, “International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and Perspective”, The Antitrust 
Bulletin, Vol. 48, Winter 2003, 984.  
36 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 1.  
37 Sources used to gain background information on this methodologic approach include: J. Evers & F. de Boer, The 
Qualitative Interview: Art and Skill, The Hague, Eleven International Publishing, 2012; http://www.statpac.com/surveys; 
http://www.surveysystem.com/sdesign.htm; J. Billiet & H. Waege (eds) Een Samenleving Onderzocht – Methoden van Sociaal-
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, Antwerpen, Uitgeverij De Boeck nv, 2003; J. Hochschild, “Conducting Intensive Interviews 
and Elite Interviews”, contribution to the Workshop on Interdisciplinary Standards for Systematic Qualitative Research, 
National Science Foundation, Arlington Virginia, 2005, available at: 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/ISSQR_workshop_rpt.pdf (accessed 8 May 2012); D. Richards, “Elite Interviewing: 
Approaches and Pitfalls”, Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1996; R. van Gestel, H.-W. Micklitz & M. Poiares Maduro, 
“Methodology in the New Legal World”, EUI Working Papers LAW, 2012/13. 
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handling international cases, whether cooperation is truly as developed as it is presented to be, and to 
what extent this is due to the existence of such agreements. The goal was to gather depth and detail 
about the practical cooperation processes of the European Commission, and to nuance in which 
cases cooperation goes awry and where it is successful. The study gathers insight on how the officials 
of competition agencies interact with their international counterparts on a day-to-day basis and how 
dedicated competition agreements facilitate or obstruct this in the short and long term.  
 
The qualitative approach was rather pragmatic. The methodological choices were guided by the 
research question, rather than theoretical considerations. Three separate methods were used. First, 
surveys were sent out to international law firms to gather information on their experience with 
international cartel cases, unilateral conduct cases, and merger cases.38 Law firms were selected 
through theoretical sampling. The selection was based on the listing of the Legal 500 website. The 
top 25 competition law firms were contacted. Geographically the scope was limited to international 
law firms having an office in Brussels.39 Within each law firm, surveys were sent to the partners 
specialised in competition law, asking them to fill out the survey or forward it to those whom they 
considered most suited to contribute to the survey. Social sponsoring was used where it was 
available: acquaintances and friends in the law firms were asked to spread and promote the survey. 
They were helpful in creating a cooperative environment. The survey and cover letter are included as 
Annex I to this study. It proved difficult to gather responses from law firms. Of the 25 law firms 
repeatedly contacted via e-mail and phone, responses were collected from five firms only. As this 
cannot be considered a representative sample, the data collected are used in a mere illustrative way. 
Rather than a lack of willingness, it was indicated by some firms that data gathering within the firm, 
so called ‘mapping’ of firm activities, either did not happen, or is kept secret.  
 
The second source of qualitative information consisted of elite interviews.40 The choice of 
respondents occurred via criterion based sampling. European Commission officials (within DG 
COMP) that were involved in either the negotiation or implementation of the dedicated competition 
agreements, as well as participants of relevant OECD bodies and officials from national competition 
authorities were interviewed. Gatekeepers blocked access to these people to a certain extent, but the 
so-called snowball method did facilitate contact (by not only asking respondents whether they might 
know other people that may be relevant for this research, but by also asking for an introduction). 
Within DG COMP, a distinction was made between the actual case handlers, and their direct and 
indirect superiors. This approach informed not only about the implementation of the agreements, 
but also about how the vision of implementation might differ according to the step on the 
professional ladder: are the ones negotiating the agreements aware of the same problems as those in 
the case-teams? In total 17 officials were interviewed. While this number is not statistically 
significant, it does provide a credible image of international competition cooperation in practice.  
 
Inspired by the grounded theory method, some open and explorative interviews were held.41 Only 
individual interviews were conducted, considering the sensitivity of the topic, to create an 
                                                          
38 The survey was designed to be as user-friendly as possible, and respondents were given the choice as to which manner 
of response they preferred (orally or in writing).   
39 http://www.legal500.com/.  
40 ‘Elite’ in this context refers to respondents that were chosen due to their particular function, rather than anonymously 
or randomly. See J. Hochschild, “Conducting Intensive Interviews and Elite Interviews”, contribution to the Workshop 
on Interdisciplinary Standards for Systematic Qualitative Research, National Science Foundation, Arlington Virginia, 
2005, available at: http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/ISSQR_workshop_rpt.pdf (accessed 8 May 2012), 124.  
41 The grounded theory method is a qualitative data analysis method, often used in social sciences. 
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atmosphere in which respondents feel they can speak freely. Interviews were thematic as it was not 
the complete day-to-day experience of a competition official that was relevant, but only their 
international cooperation habits. The structure of the interviews followed the tree-and-branches 
model. This approach takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of the interviewer, while also 
preventing the interviews to get off track or to reach deadlock. In other words, a directive type of 
interview was used, in order to avoid having the interviewees lead the interview and talking about 
their preferred topics too much, staying away from the sensitivities that this study wishes to uncover 
(without of course cutting off the possibility to discover new issues brought up by the respondents). 
An interview according to the opening-the-locks method might carry this risk, especially as elite-
interviewing implies that often a single chance and little time is granted. The interviews conducted 
were a mix of both formal and informal interviews. During the formal interviews an interview 
protocol – the main questions written down verbatim - and an interview schedule were used, in order 
to keep focus. Questions are included as Annex II. Recording was not allowed or possible in the 
majority of cases. Jottings were therefore used during or right after the interview and impressions 
and answers were written down more elaborately as soon as possible after the interview took place. 
With regard to the form and place of the interview (in person/by phone/via Skype) respondents 
were offered the choice, in order to encourage participation, catering to the agendas of the 
respondents. Interviews conducted face-to-face occurred most. The interview questions were mostly 
of an open nature. Care was given to the neutrality of the questions, although some more 
provocative questions were used in order to trigger a reaction. Elicitation techniques were not used. 
As preparation is essential the interviews have only taken place after the desk-research was in an 
advanced stage. Evidently interviewees provide a subjective account of certain events and are no 
guarantee to establishing a positivist kind of ‘truth’.42 This was, however, not the goal of the 
interviews, its function is was to provide some insight into the mind-set of the actors dealing with the 
scrutinised legislation in practice and to draw from their experience.  
 
The final qualitative method used for the research was the ethnographic method. By participating in 
the daily life of EU competition officials via a stage atypique at the European Commission, it was 
experienced first-hand how the European Commission cooperates with other agencies. The stage 
took place from the 5th of January until the 31st of March 2015 within the International Relations 
Unit (A5) in the Policy Directorate of DG COMP. Many of the interviews took place during the 
internship. Three months proved sufficient to be involved in a variety of tasks within the Unit and to 
gain a clear understanding of the daily work.  
 
Relevance 
 
Importance of international competition cooperation  
 
The relevance of this research naturally draws from the relevance of international cooperation on 
competition matters as such. Judge DIANE WOOD described international antitrust as “dealing with the 
future of the world economy itself.”43 Today, effective enforcement of national competition rules often 
depends upon assistance granted by foreign agencies or states.44 The emergence of the global market 
                                                          
42 D. Richards, “Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls”, Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1996, 200. 
43 D. Wood, “Is cooperation possible?”, Luncheon Speech, New England Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 103. 
44 For final decisions adopted by the EU in the period 2010-2011 international cooperation took place in 50% of merger 
cases where cooperation could be reasonably expected, 60% of cartel decisions, and 33% of unilateral conduct cases. 
(Internal Commission document, 2013, on file with author.) More generally recent OECD data showed that from 2007 
to 2012, international cooperation has increased by 15% in cartel cases, 35% in merger review cases, and 30% in 
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necessitates the creation of rules adapted to a globalised context, detached from territorialism. As 
protectionist influences often obstruct this type of evolution, cooperation to simplify ‘international’ 
enforcement of ‘national’ rules is necessary.  
 
Bilateral agreements have something to prove 
 
Bilateral cooperation agreements are often depicted as ‘stepping-stones’ towards more advanced 
cooperation, or ‘interim solutions’ until a more broad international consensus arises.45 The European 
Parliament in its resolution on EU cooperation agreements on competition policy enforcement 
explicitly stated that the Council and the Commission should promote bilateral second generation 
agreements “while multilateral cooperation is not fully operational.”46 Such an ‘interim’ approach can be 
placed in the context of the ‘building block theory’, which is a manifestation of political consensus-
building in public choice theory. This theory puts forward that limited areas of consensus will merge 
into a larger agreement via negotiations and trade-offs.47 While this is indeed the case in some 
instances, it seems to be less so in the field of competition law. Bilateral competition agreements are 
generally only concluded with partners that have very similar competition law systems. The 
consensus that is formed in such a way is therefore not easily transposed to a multilateral level. It is 
unlikely that a broader international consensus will emerge in the near future. Discussions on 
international competition law have been taking place as early as 1927.48 Negotiations under the WTO 
took place for close to ten years, without result.49 Indeed, competition law remains a national 
phenomenon to a large extent. KARAMANIAN stated in 2002 that “[e]fficiency and harmonization are 
almost as elusive today as they were in the early 1970s.”50 Although this is a controversial statement, it is true 
that competition law is characterised by strong historical, economic, political, and social roots, 
making it “a market nation’s ultimate form of public law,”51 and thus a difficult subject of compromise. It is 
therefore relevant to study the so-called ‘interim’ solution and how it can be optimized, as it might be 
a more permanent solution than originally envisaged. TERHECHTE asked the question whether a 
‘unified law’ in the sense of a coherent multilateral treaty would be imaginable or whether the future 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
unilateral conduct cases. It is added that “the number of opportunities for cooperation has probably increased much more than the actual 
incidence of cooperation.” (OECD, Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition Law Enforcement, 2014, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/challenges-international-coop-competition-2014.htm, accessed March 
2015, 15.) The OECD further specified that ‘in recent years’ 90% of fines against cartels by the US authorities have been 
international, while the number of cartel cases involving an EU and a non-EU party had increased by more than 450% 
since 1990. Mergers and acquisitions with a cross-border dimension have increased about 250-350% in the same period. 
(OECD, Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition Law Enforcement, 2014, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/challenges-international-coop-competition-2014.htm, accessed March 2015, 5.)   
45 See for instance C. Wallace, “‘Extraterritorial’ Discovery: Ongoing Challenges for Antitrust Litigation in an 
Environment of Global Investment”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2002, 392.  
46 European Parliament Resolution on EU cooperation agreements on competition policy enforcement – the way 
forward, 2013/2921(RSP), 5 February 2014, paragraph 10.  
47 M. Taylor, International Competition Law: a New Dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
128.  
48 In the context of the World Economic Conference. The first national competition laws date back to 1889 (Canada) 
and 1923 (in Europe - Germany). 
49 Starting with the 1995 Report of the Group of Experts and the First Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Singapore 
in 1996, and ending with the exclusion of competition issues from the Doha-agenda in 2004. See below, Part I, 3.3.3.   
50 S. Karamanian, “Book Review: An International Antitrust Primer: a Guide to the Operation of the United States, 
European Union, and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global Economy”, The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 96, 2002, 1012.   
51 S. Waller, “The Internalization of Antitrust Enforcement", Boston University Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 2, 1997, 395, as 
cited in M. Blauberger, “The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions. How International Cooperation Enhances the 
Autonomy of Competition Authorities”, Transtate Working Papers, No. 102, Bremen, 2009, 11. 
11 
 
will rather depend on the observance of different regimes in this field and their interaction.52 This 
study believes that the second option is the correct answer to that question, and looks into how this 
interaction can successfully take place.  
 
Change of EU focus 
 
One reason why bilateral agreements on competition matters are often called an ‘interim solution’ is 
that the EU has consistently promoted a binding multilateral approach towards competition 
cooperation. Moreover, the EU wanted to include competition in a trade context. Indeed, 
throughout the nineties and until the collapse of the WTO talks in 2003, the EU formally supported 
the adoption of a binding WTO multilateral agreement including competition provisions (see below, 
Part I, 3.3.3.1).53 In other words, the initial ambitions of the EU were entirely the opposite of 
bilateral dedicated competition agreements. It is only after the collapse of the WTO negotiations that 
the EU reluctantly diverged from this path. PAPADOPOULOS concluded that the EU’s approach 
towards bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements has been neutral at best, and that depending 
on the type of agreement, the role of the EU in the formation and application of such agreements 
varied.54 The question could be asked, however, whether the EU’s track record in this regard truly 
reflects neutrality, or rather points to an inherent limitation of this type of agreement. Another open 
question is that in case it is a neutral stance, whether there is reason to believe that the EU will 
continue on this path in the future. Is the EU now fully dedicated to the bilateral option, or is it still 
considered a gap-filler until the binding multilateral option is again on the table?  
 
Little data available 
 
Information on (the implementation of) bilateral cooperation agreements in the field of competition 
law is scarce. This becomes even more apparent when compared to the follow-up that multilateral 
initiatives receive, where frequent reports narrate the accomplishments of diverse initiatives. While 
the effects of bilateral agreements might be less tangible than the recommended practices or 
guidelines issued by multilateral bodies, it is nevertheless possible to provide more detail on what has 
been accomplished under the agreements and in which cases meaningful cooperation took place. 
Concrete numbers on international competition cooperation could originally be found in the 
Commission’s Annual Reports to the Council and the European Parliament on Bilateral Cooperation 
in Competition Policy and in the Annual Reports on Competition Policy. However, from 2006 
onwards, these reports no longer mention such data, and according to BLAUBERGER the 
Commission could not provide the data upon request.55 Why this information is no longer available, 
be it low priority or redundancy due to the proclaimed commonality of cooperation, is unclear.   
 
Other documents only provide general information on the frequency and quality of international 
cooperation in competition matters. Examples include the work of the OECD’s Competition 
Committee. Many countries do not seem to consider the collection of data as a priority. For instance, 
                                                          
52 J. Terhechte, International Competition Enforcement Law Between Cooperation and Convergence, Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag, 
2011, 70. 
53 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 62. 
54 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 62, 265. 
55 M. Blauberger, “The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions. How International Cooperation Enhances the 
Autonomy of Competition Authorities”, Transtate Working Papers, No. 102, Bremen, 2009, 8, footnote 11.  
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in its contribution to the Global Forum on Competition ‘improving international co-operation in 
cartel investigations’, the US often neglected to answer (fully or exactly) the questions that were 
asked, which is regrettable as it presented an opportunity to provide transparency about the 
cooperation habits of one of the most important competition authorities in the world. Also in the 
reports of Working Party Three of the OECD terms such as ‘routinely’ or ‘increasingly’ are used, 
which ultimately provide the reader with little concrete information.56 While OECD and ICN surveys 
generally enjoy a relatively large response rate, the information they disseminate remains quite vague 
and generalist. The report following the OECD/ICN Joint Survey confirmed that information on 
international cooperation is not systematically gathered by respondents (especially in the case of 
informal cooperation).57   
 
Several reasons may explain why relatively little information is available about the implementation of 
bilateral cooperation agreements in competition matters. A first explanation is that while bilateral 
competition cooperation agreements have been lauded as contributing to the efficiency of 
competition enforcement and reducing conflicts and disputes,58 it is acknowledged at the same time 
that the real impact of such agreements is difficult to assess because of the confidentiality of 
intergovernmental/interagency discussions and the mediatisation of failure rather than success.59 
JENNY correctly admitted that it is very difficult to find reliable data on whether case-specific 
cooperation has indeed progressed between parties to bilateral or regional agreements, and whether 
these instruments have been useful tools of cooperation. Indeed, “the reality and measurable importance of 
international cooperation agreements in competition law enforcement remain to a large extent unknown.”60 JENNY 
continued that based on the information that is available, in the assumption that this information is 
correct, the importance of cooperation on competition enforcement may be overestimated, at least 
with regard to case-specific cooperation. He pointed to the plausible scenario that competition 
officials have pictured their cooperation efforts rosier than is the case.61 Indeed, speeches and 
publications on the subject of international competition law enforcement generally tend to be rather 
general in nature and paint an overly positive picture.62 Statements such as the following, by former 
FTC chairman PITOFSKY, are alarming: “In my view, it is hard to imagine how day-to-day cooperation and 
coordination between enforcement officials in Europe and the United States could be much improved. Within the 
bounds of confidentiality rules, we share on a regular and continuing basis, views and information about particular 
transactions, coordinate the timing of our review process to the extent feasible and almost always achieve consistent 
remedies.”63 Not only are statements like this testimony of a weakened ambition towards continuous 
improvement, this type of optimism about the current state of international competition cooperation 
might be aimed at discouraging attempts to create a more formal cooperation mechanism that would 
                                                          
56 For instance “Indeed, parties to merger investigations routinely waive statutory confidentiality protections to facilitate inter-agency 
cooperation, and increasingly are doing so in unilateral conduct investigations.” (OECD, Discussion on International Co-operation, 
Contribution of the United States, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)24, 12 June 2012, 4. 
57 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 47, 74.  
58 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_theme_22.html (accessed May 2015). 
59 E. Swaine, “Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy: United States” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and 
Competition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 16. 
60 F. Jenny, “International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and Perspective”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 48, 
Winter 2003, 988.  
61 Ibid., 988, 1001.  
62 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 6.  
63 R. Pitofsky, “EU and US Approaches to International Mergers – Views from the US Federal Trade Commission”, 
Remarks before the EC Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference, Brussels, 14 September 2000.  
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decrease the discretionary power of the antitrust agencies, and might also serve to protect antitrust 
agencies from criticism by the business community or other governmental bodies.64 Others have 
claimed that US optimism regarding cooperation is merely a strategy to steer away from 
harmonisation efforts.65 An additional cause for the scarceness of information is that despite the fact 
that at present over a hundred countries, meaning more than half of the world, have adopted 
competition laws, most of these countries have only done so in the last twenty years.66 The fact that 
these competition systems are very young also affects how much information is available. 
 
More data are needed, however, because the usefulness of bilateral cooperation agreements is often 
questioned by the statement that they basically formalise what can be done, and what is done, 
informally.67 The agreements are also criticised for their lack of binding power, more precisely the 
fact that they do not provide a mechanism for resolving conflicts (for instance by means of a choice 
of law provision or via a dispute settlement body), and consequently allegedly cannot overcome the 
test of hegemony and ethnocentrism.68 A deeper analysis of these agreements might help alleviate 
such criticisms, or on the contrary provide evidence for them. It would be an added value to inform 
the general public, and the business world in particular, of how, and how intensely, international 
competition cooperation takes place.  
 
Contribution to existing literature 
 
While official data on international competition cooperation are scarce, legal scholars have been 
discussing the topic as soon as it emerged. This study aims to further refine existing research on 
international cooperation in competition cases. It thereby attempts to complete some of the main 
analyses in this field. This study can be seen as a partial follow-up and reassessment ten years down 
the road of ZANETTIN’s key work ‘Cooperation between antitrust agencies at the international level’, 
in which he examined the existing bilateral competition cooperation agreements, with a focus on the 
1991 EU-US Agreement.69 This study, starting ten years after the conclusion of ZANETTIN’s analysis, 
focuses more closely on one of the ‘hard cooperation’ paths identified by ZANETTIN, namely the 
exchange of confidential information, and identifies the evolution that has taken place in the past ten 
years and that is still desirable in the years to come. 
 
PAPADOPOULOS in 2010, employing a more broad perspective than ZANETTIN, studied international 
agreements which are devoted to or include competition provisions, in his book ‘The international 
dimension of EU competition law and policy’.70 He thereby focused on bilateral enforcement 
cooperation agreements, bilateral trade agreements including competition provisions, plurilateral 
regional agreements including competition provisions, and multilateral negotiations on competition. 
                                                          
64 F. Jenny, “International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and Perspective”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 48, 
Winter 2003, 1001.  
65 M. Chowdhury, “From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling the Obstacles to Transatlantic 
Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement”, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 11-09, 28 November 2011, 22.  
66 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 258. 
67 E. Swaine, “Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy: United States” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and 
Competition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 17. 
68 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 82. 
69 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 279.  
70 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 331p.  
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While his work is extremely valuable as a comprehensive work on the prevalent situation of 
international cooperation at the time, it lacks a more practical perspective. Indeed, it does not include 
an analysis of the functioning of the agreements analysed – the book merely wished to identify the 
international dimension of EU competition law and policy. PAPADOPOULOS offered a very broad, 
albeit somewhat superficial, analysis of the existing instruments of international cooperation in the 
field of competition law. This study will engage in a more thorough analysis of a smaller research 
topic. In particular, it will focus on two research subjects of PAPADOPOULOS’ book, namely bilateral 
enforcement cooperation agreements and to a lesser extent trade agreements including competition 
provisions. PAPADOPOULOS identified as main weaknesses of the cooperation agreements the fact 
that they do not facilitate the exchange of confidential information and the fact that they are soft law 
instruments that do not truly commit the parties. He welcomed the arrival of second generation 
agreements, but expressed his doubts on whether the EU would conclude more bilateral cooperation 
agreements in the future. The two main arguments of the book were that the intensity of EU 
influence depends on the particular type of agreement, and that because of the relatively young age 
of competition law, a consensus on the optimum operation of competition law and policy is not yet 
in sight, much less an agreement on a binding multilateral agreement on competition.71 Therefore, as 
mentioned before, the central focus of this study will be on enforcement cooperation rather than 
substantive convergence.  
 
The 2011 book edited by GUZMAN, ‘Cooperation, comity, and competition policy’, is a very solution-
oriented book dealing with the difficulties of international cooperation in competition matters.72 The 
book starts with a series of country reports, providing an overview of the national laws and their 
extraterritorial reach. While ZANETTIN identified both comity and the exchange of confidential 
information as forms of hard law, GUZMAN’S book focuses on the former. The book also offers very 
insightful policy proposals by several experts on the matter, tackling some of the issues international 
competition cooperation is currently dealing with. The exchange of confidential information, 
however, is not dealt with as such in the book, but will occupy a particular place in this study. In 
general, literature on international competition cooperation has mainly focused on the possibilities of 
a multilateral agreement and its institutional form, the emergence of regional agreements, and the 
‘network’-idea.73 This study, however, as mentioned, wishes to revive the debate on the different 
facets of bilateral cooperation.  
 
The future: management plans DG COMP indicate a major rise in FTA’s including 
competition provisions  
 
From the beginning of this study in 2012, until its conclusion in 2017, there has been a status quo in 
first generation agreements, an increase from zero to (almost) two second generation agreements, a 
moderate increase in MoUs on competition law, and a significant increase in FTAs containing 
competition and/or state aid clauses, according to the mid-term prospectuses for bilateral 
competition cooperation in DG COMP’s management plans.74 The large increase in FTAs with 
                                                          
71 Ibid., 90, 260-267.  
72 A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 374p.  
73 Also see D. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 394p. 
and C. Noonan, The Emerging Principles of International Competition Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, 639p.  
74 DG Competition Management Plan 2012, available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/comp_mp.pdf 
(accessed August 2014), 37; DG Competition Management Plan 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_management_plan/amp_2013_en.pdf (accessed June 2017), 38; 
DG Competition management plan 2014, available at 
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competition provisions indicates that the most important goal for the EU in this context, apart from 
the specific situation of agreements with future member states, the ENP, or the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership, seems to be the support of trade liberalisation, following the internal philosophy of the 
EU according to which EU competition policy supports the liberalisation within the Single Market. 
This raises the question whether this indicates the end of dedicated agreements and what the 
consequences would be of embedding competition provisions into bilateral FTAs. This study 
therefore, in its final part, analyses the potential of trade agreements as instruments for international 
competition cooperation.   
 
The Vitamins Cartel as an example 
 
In his discourse on the Vitamins cartel,75 FIRST stated that the sentencing recommendation 
accompanying a case pertaining to this cartel described the cartel as an extremely well organized 
operation. The recommendation clarified that the co-conspirators held meetings at least on a 
quarterly basis, during which they exchanged information about pricing, sales volumes, and market 
share on a country, regional, and worldwide basis. High-level corporate officials also met with each 
other on a yearly basis to set a ‘budget’, and to make projections of global sales volumes and pricing 
for the coming year. The co-conspirators agreed on dates for announcing price increases and the 
firms to announce them.76 International competition cooperation should mirror itself to this image. 
Frequent meetings should be held between both case-handlers as well as higher-level policy makers, 
deadlines should be coordinated and enforcement actions should be well organised. This study aims 
to find out how first and second generation agreements (can) contribute to this objective.  
 
Renewed momentum 
 
Finally, this study comes at a time where both the OECD and the ICN have dedicated renewed 
attention to international cooperation in the field of competition law.77 In the OECD/ICN Joint 
Survey sent out in 2012, international cooperation was identified as a policy priority by 46 agencies, 
representing 84% of respondents. Increased and enhanced (or widened and deepened) enforcement 
cooperation is seen as a necessity.78 This priority was confirmed by the high number of country 
submissions for the OECD Policy Roundtable on International Co-operation in Cartel 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_management_plan/amp_2014_en.pdf (accessed June 2017), 45-
46; DG Competition management plan 2015, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/comp_mp_2015_en.pdf (accessed June 2017), 55; DG Competition 
management plan 2016, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/comp_mp_2016_en.pdf (accessed June 
2017), 39. In 2017 no differentiation was made anymore among different types of cooperation agreements and FTAs in 
the prospectus. DG Competition management plan 2017, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/management-plan-comp-2017_en_0.pdf (accessed June 2017), 
41.    
75 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359 (2004). For a quick overview of the European 
decision, see European Commission, Press Release, “Commission Imposes Fines on Vitamin Cartels”, IP/01/1625, 
Brussels, 21 November 2001.   
76 H. First, “The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law”, Antitrust Law 
Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2001, 715.  
77 See, for instance OECD, The Competition Committee’s two strategic themes for 2012-2014: international co-
operation and evaluation of competition interventions – Workplans, DAF/COMP(2012)1, 15 February 2012.  
78 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 6, 25.  
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Investigations.79 Many agencies indicated that they expected an increase in cooperation, the main 
reason being the rise in multijurisdictional cases.80 While increased cooperation can lead to better 
cooperation instruments, and requires better cooperation instruments, the opposite can be true as 
well, and good instruments may lead to increased cooperation. This study looks at how this incentive 
could be created.  
 
Overview  
 
The main research question is approached in three stages. Part one discusses the background, 
evolution, and context of international competition cooperation. It is important to understand the 
history of international competition cooperation to be able to assess and further develop it. More 
concretely, the first chapter examines the need for international competition cooperation. 
International cooperation is no longer a ‘luxury’ but has become pivotal for the sake of domestic 
enforcement as well, due to mainly two factors: globalisation combined with an exponential increase 
in competition laws and competition agencies. Next, chapter two elaborates on the different shapes 
cooperation can take. As mentioned, international competition cooperation can take many forms. It 
can be multilateral or bilateral, formal or informal, and established and maintained via hard or soft 
legislation. A more fundamental question that can moreover be asked is whether enforcement 
cooperation should be the end-goal, or rather lead to convergence and harmonisation. Benefits and 
drawbacks of each option are explored. The origins of international cooperation are analysed in 
chapter three. The early history of international cooperation is analysed, and certain tendencies or 
recurrent issues are identified. Specific attention is devoted to the way international cooperation has 
evolved, in particular whether it advanced with revolutionary leaps, or only gradually, and whether it 
was able to adapt to a changing reality or rather limped behind. This chapter proceeds 
chronologically, starting with failed multilateral efforts, over extraterritorial enforcement, to the first 
landmark OECD documents and the incorporation of the principles put forward in these documents 
in bilateral agreements.  
 
Part two starts with the development of benchmarks against which the EU’s bilateral competition 
cooperation agreements can be assessed. Both first and second generation agreements are analysed 
on four levels: the context of conclusion of the agreements, their content and scope, their legal value, 
and their use. Particular attention is devoted to the challenges surrounding the exchange of 
confidential information. Some alternative and complementary cooperation mechanisms from within 
the competition policy field as well as other policy fields are explored, in order to present a 
comprehensive picture and to gather inspiration for further improvements in the cooperative 
process.  
  
Although the focus of this dissertation is on bilateral competition law enforcement agreements, it is 
important to study the reality in which they appear as well. In part three such agreements are 
therefore framed among other attempts to address international competition law enforcement issues, 
in order to determine their relative added value amongst the aforementioned ‘dense web’ of 
cooperation initiatives, in particular because such other initiatives receive significant attention from 
                                                          
79 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 309.  
80 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 57.  
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the European Commission.81 The study of the ‘dedicated’ approach of bilateral cooperation 
agreements focussing only on competition law will therefore be complemented by an analysis of an 
‘integrated’ approach, both on a substantial level, by scrutinising the integration of competition 
chapters in FTAs, and on a geographical level, by assessing the role of several multilateral initiatives. 
The emergence of competition chapters in EU FTAs will first be analysed. The evolution and 
content of such chapters, the rationale behind them, and the role they (can) play is assessed, as well 
as the potential drawbacks of such an inclusion. In the section on multilateralism, focus will be on 
the OECD, the WTO, UCNTAD, the ICN, and by exception one regional platform, the ECN. It is 
analysed what role they fulfil, what challenges they face, and issues of network governance will be 
discussed. Finally, the main results of this study are assembled in a concluding chapter.  
  
                                                          
81 U. Aydin, “Promoting Competition: European Union and the Global Competition Order”, paper prepared for 
presentation at the European Union Studies Association 11th Biennial International Conference, Los Angeles California, 
23-25 April 2009, 2. 
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PART I: Trial and error in the development of international competition law enforcement 
cooperation  
 
“No matter how firmly someone may believe that the antitrust or competition law of a particular place has achieved 
final wisdom, history offers a strong message that some modesty is called for here.”82 
 
In order to appreciate the significance of dedicated agreements in the context of international 
competition law enforcement, it is important to understand how such cooperation has originally 
evolved, and what necessity it was born from.83 Before analysing the EU’s first and second 
generation dedicated cooperation agreements, it is therefore necessary to understand the history and 
development of international cooperation between competition agencies.   
 
1. Need for international competition cooperation 
 
International action in the field of competition law was necessitated by two factors: globalisation, and 
the exponential increase in the number of jurisdictions that have adopted antitrust laws and have 
established antitrust agencies. This affected the need for lawmakers and enforcers to consider 
conduct outside of the nation’s territory. As jurisdiction is limited, cooperation is necessary. State 
sovereignty has since long been at the centre of the international political order. The concept 
originated with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, where the hierarchical organization of international 
society was replaced with the idea of co-existence between states that are sovereign in their own 
territory. Sovereign states became the primary subjects of international law as they came to be the 
sole responsible for the regulation of any matter that arose within their territory.84 This sovereignty 
entails three kinds of jurisdiction. Prescriptive jurisdiction85 refers to the power of a state to develop 
the norm that is applicable to certain conduct. It relates to a state’s right to prescribe norms of 
conduct, while enforcement jurisdiction deals with the possibility of a state to enforce this law, and 
thus ensure compliance with it via fines or other punishments.86 Judicial jurisdiction, finally, describes 
the authority of a state’s court or similar institute over people or corporations. Depending on what 
type of jurisdiction is involved, it can generally be based, according to public international law, on 
either territory or nationality.87   
 
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ, the predecessor of the International Court of 
Justice) established the ‘objective territoriality principle’ in its 1927 Lotus judgment, confirming that a 
state may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct that took place outside of its territory on the 
ground that it caused harm within that territory.88 The Court stated that “far from laying a general 
prohibition to the effect that states may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to 
persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only 
                                                          
82 D. Wood, “Is cooperation possible?”, Luncheon Speech, New England Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 111.  
83 J. Wayland, “International cooperation at the antitrust division”, remarks as prepared for the International Bar 
Association’s 16th Annual Competition Conference, Florence, 14 September 2012, 2. 
84 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 47-48.  
85 Also known as legislative or subject-matter jurisdiction, A. Jones & B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials, 3rd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, 1357.  
86 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 7, footnote 1. 
Also see A. Jones & B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 
2008, 1357. 
87 D. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 59.  
88 S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey), 7 September 1927, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, footnote 8.  
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limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.”89 Such limits have been developed over time in case-law in 
several jurisdictions. However, relating to enforcement jurisdiction, the PCIJ made it clear that “the 
first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a state is that, failing the existence of permissive rule to 
the contrary, it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state.”90 Contrary to prescriptive 
jurisdiction, enforcement jurisdiction is thus purely territorial.91 This was also recognised by 
Advocate General MAYRAS in the Dyestuffs case (see below, Part I, 3.2.1).92  
 
1.1. Globalisation 
 
1.1.1 What is globalisation? 
 
International competition law enforcement is necessitated first of all by globalisation.93 While the 
term ‘globalisation’ is commonly used, its allocated meaning may differ. STEGER identified four 
characteristics at the core of the phenomenon, leading him to the following definition: “Globalization 
refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social 
interdependencies and exchanges while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections 
between the local and the distant.”94 Globalisation is thereby identified as a concept encompassing several 
dimensions, formed by an economic, political, cultural and ideological component. In the context of 
this study, focus is put on the economic interdependence of countries.95 PAPADOPOULOS defines 
‘economic globalisation’ as “improvements in technology and communications, liberalisation of international trade, 
and the subsequent increase of economic flows through the operation of multilateral firms, that has appeared at least in 
the last decades, and that has weakened the distinction between the domestic and the international in several fields of 
economic activity.”96 The core characteristic of economic globalisation is therefore the existence of 
transnational and multinational economic transactions and other economic activities.  
 
The origins of contemporary economic globalisation are traced back to the Bretton Woods 
Conference of 1944, where the gradual emergence of a new international economic order was 
assembled. Apart from the creation of a more stable monetary exchange system, the conference 
resulted in a commitment of the major economic powers to abandon protectionism and expand 
international trade, as well as to establish binding rules on international economic activities. 
                                                          
89 Ibid., paragraph 46.   
90 Ibid., paragraph 45.  
91 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 41. 
92 Joined opinion of Advocate General Mayras in Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission of the European Communities, 
Badische Anilin- & Soda-Fabrik AG v Commission of the European Communities, Farbenfabriken Bayer AG v Commission of the 
European Communities, J. R. Geigy AG v Commission of the European Communities, Sandoz AG v Commission of the European 
Communities, SA française des matières colorantes (Francolor) v Commission of the European Communities, Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur 
AG v Commission of the European Communities, Farbwerke Hoechst AG v Commission of the European Communities, Azienda Colori 
Nazionali - ACNA S.p.A. v Commission of the European Communities, 57-69, EU:C:1972:32, 695.  
93 J. Steenbergen, “Competition and Trade Policy and the Challenge of Globalization” in I. Govaere, R. Quick & M. 
Bronckers (eds), Trade and Competition Law in the EU and Beyond, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, 3. For a 
thorough analysis and more broad understanding of the concept of globalisation and its origins, see J. Scholte, 
Globalization: a critical introduction, 2nd ed., New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, 492 p.  
94 M. Steger, Globalization, a very short introduction, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, 9-12. For a limited overview 
of other definitions of globalisation, see M. Steger, Globalization, a very short introduction, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2003, 10. 
95 A. Klevorick & A. Sykes, “United States Courts and the Optimal Deterrence of International Cartels: a Welfarist 
Perspective on Empagran”, in E. Fox & D. Crane (eds.), Antitrust stories, New York, Foundation Press, 2007, 361.  
96 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 36-37. 
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Additionally, the institutional foundations for the establishment of the International Monetary Fund, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the World Bank) and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later the World Trade Organisation) were set. The system collapsed 
in the early 1970s, as President NIXON abandoned the gold-based fixed rate system. Global 
economic instability followed whereby controlled capitalism (or Keynesianism) was abandoned in 
favour of a neoliberal approach to economic and social policy in the 1990s, consciously linking the 
notion of globalisation to the ‘liberation’ of economies globally. This movement was further 
strengthened by the collapse of the Soviet Union.97  
 
In the nineties the international environment for competition policy therefore radically changed due 
to large-scale liberalisation. The iron curtain disappeared, causing Eastern European states to 
embrace the free market model. International trade was boosted as well due to the successful 
conclusion of the Marrakesh agreement.98 Developing countries were urged by donors or 
international institutions to adopt market friendly policies and a better investment climate.99 On top 
of this, the exponential progress in technology, communications, and transport hastened the 
interdependence of business and commerce. In the last 100 years the world has known five or more 
big merger waves. In the 1990s in particular the corporate structure of entire industries underwent 
major change through the wave of megamergers in that period. In 2000 the number of mergers and 
acquisitions worldwide was already three times higher than in the 1990s while the transaction volume 
had increased twelvefold.100  
 
Economic globalisation has been strengthened by three main evolutions. First, trade liberalisation 
has been accompanied by the liberalisation of financial transactions, resulting in increased mobility 
within the financial industry and greater investment opportunities, further accelerated via 
technological advancement. A second evolution is the increasing strength of transnational 
corporations, resulting in certain power differentials. Finally, international economic institutions like 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO played an increasingly important role.101  
 
Economic globalisation is most noticeable via foreign direct investment (FDI) movements. Data 
collected in 2008 by UNCTAD showed that FDI had multiplied by factor seventy during the last 
thirty-five years, reaching US$ 1,979 million in 2007, before decreasing again due to the recent 
financial crisis.102 Global production and trade have increased roughly threefold since the early 1980s. 
This demonstrates that FDI is more dynamic than world output and world trade. It can be 
considered one of the main drivers of globalisation.103 However, the recent crisis has reinforced the 
tendency to rely on protectionism. The DHL Global connectedness index - that represents the 
extent to which countries are connected via trade, migration, investments and communication - 
demonstrated that since 2007 the crisis had strongly affected these relations, that are slowly 
recovering from 2009 onwards.104 
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1.1.2 How did globalisation affect competition (law)? 
 
This interconnectedness of the global economy has obvious effects for competition and competition 
law, to such an extent that it is said that “international competition policy is without doubt one of the most 
crucial issues of a global political order.”105 The Microsoft decisions or the Vitamins cartel are only some 
examples of the problems that can be caused by the externalities of one jurisdiction’s regulatory acts 
on those of another, and of the effect that behaviour occurring in one jurisdiction can have 
elsewhere.106 Predicting the size and scope of such effects is, however, a complex issue.  
 
International competition law, or at least international cooperation between competition authorities, 
is necessitated by what GERBER calls ‘the scissors paradox’, namely the fact that “[p]aradoxically, some 
of the same forces that increase the need for competition law also constrain its development and undermine its 
effectiveness.” Facilitated transportation, increased mobility of assets, and faster communication make 
markets more global, but also facilitate anticompetitive behaviour. This paradox is linked to another 
contradiction mentioned earlier, namely that between the sovereignty-based legal system, on the one 
hand, and the political and economic intertwining known as globalisation, on the other. More 
globalisation, while offering significant (economic) benefits, also increases the losses that can result 
from anti-competitive conduct.107 The growing interdependence of the global economy has made the 
economy blossom, but at the same time it has caused many cartels and anticompetitive mergers to 
become international in scope as well. Globalisation does not only result in a growth of companies, 
but also in a growth of markets. When national borders are easily crossed, companies are susceptible 
to competition from their peers in other jurisdictions. Globalisation, indeed, has a double effect on 
competition. On the one hand, it intensifies competition as markets that were once protected are 
now accessible, but on the other hand it jeopardises competition as it fosters anticompetitive 
behaviour on a much larger scale.108 Given the rising number of multinational firms, anticompetitive 
agreements made by these firms have a larger impact as well.109 Moreover, such firms are often less 
sensitive to changes in the national regulatory framework. Indeed, VON BISMARCK already cautioned 
that transnational traffic of goods and capital undermine domestic regulations. Later, ‘anti-
globalisation’ protestors objected against ‘plutocracy’ and the political power of larger 
corporations.110 International corporations can significantly influence processes of regulatory 
competition among states.111  
 
As rising economic liberalisation led to the removal of trade barriers, it created fresh incentives for 
anti-competitive behaviour by firms becoming more vulnerable to foreign competition. Competition 
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laws therefore needed to supplement this liberalisation in order to protect its effects.112 Whereas in 
1999 it was still said that international cooperation was only relevant in less than a third or even a 
quarter of the cases handled by a national competition authority,113 this has changed immensely 
today, even if globalisation is not a new phenomenon.114 From 1991 until 2011, the number of cross-
border merger filings (involving companies inside and outside the EU) has increased five-fold. 
Already in 1999, cross-border mergers amounted to 80% of all FDI-flows.115 Mergers involving at 
least one company based outside the EU, with effects in the EU, now overtake the number of 
mergers that are intra-EU. While concrete percentages vary, all law firms responding to the survey 
sent in the framework of this study indicated that international merger cases constituted at least 40% 
of the cases dealt with by the firm. The percentage thereof that dealt with third countries, varied 
from 20 to 100%.116 With regard to cartels, data show that between 2011 and 2013, 70% of cartel 
cases decided by DG COMP (Directorate-General for Competition) involved a non-EU company. 
In absolute numbers, the amount of ‘international’ cartel cases between 1990 and 1995 amounted to 
less than fifteen cases, while this number rose to ninety-two between 2008 and 2012.117 With regard 
to international cartel cases the numbers varied. Some firms indicated that 20 to 40% of their cartel 
cases were international, of which 80 to 100% involved third countries, while at the other extreme 
some firms indicated that 80 to 100% of cases were international, of which 60-80% was including 
third countries. It was moreover said that “all cartel cases at EU level usually have an impact on non-EU 
countries since mother companies of subsidiaries involved in the infringement are often located in the US, Asia, Russia 
or BRICS countries.”118 The average number of jurisdictions involved reported by respondents ranged 
from four to seven.119 Former competition Commissioner ALMUNIA stated in a speech in 2011 that 
his services were investigating over twenty-five cartel cases, only about half of which were limited to 
Europe.120  
 
Along with this increase in international cases, DG Competition witnessed a significant increase in 
international cooperation in competition law investigations, both in the number of multijurisdictional 
cases as well as in the number of jurisdictions involved in each case.121 It is estimated that between 30 
and 50% of DG Comp’s major cases of recent years involved international cooperation, more 
specifically 40% in cartel decisions, 50% in antitrust decisions, 30% in mergers phase II, and 33% in 
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mergers phase I – commitments.122 Globally, the ICN-OECD Joint Survey on international 
enforcement cooperation identified a clear trend of increased international cooperation in the period 
2007-2011, with an estimated increase of 15% in cartel cases, 35% in merger review cases and 30% in 
unilateral conduct cases. When comparing the number of cross-border cartel investigations in the 
periods 1990-1994 and 2007-2011, data suggest an increase of 527%.123 
 
The importance the Commission places on fighting international cartels is clear from many of its 
formal and informal communications. The section ‘International’ of the website of DG COMP 
opens with the heading ‘Facing the challenges of globalisation’. The Commission therefore explains 
its international engagements through the need for effective enforcement in a globalised economy, 
where a majority of companies operates across borders, affecting several distinct national markets.124 
The need for a global reach of competition law enforcement was not only put forward by 
competition authorities, it is also supported by legal doctrine, confirming that assistance between 
states, for instance during investigations, proceedings or enforcement action, is essential for the 
effective enforcement of national competition laws.125 It is recognised that companies and business 
transactions alike have taken on global dimensions that call for transnational cooperation, and that 
the effects of such global transactions cannot be confined to one jurisdiction or be isolated.126 One 
can therefore conclude that “[i]nternational problems need international solutions.”127 If anticompetitive 
behaviour operates across borders, competition law enforcement should also have an international 
reach.128 
 
1.2 Proliferation of competition laws and increase in enforcement activity 
 
Another factor explaining the need for (increased) international cooperation on competition matters 
is the proliferation of competition laws. The 2012 OECD Policy Roundtable on Improving 
International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations recognized from the outset that the central 
problems facing international competition law enforcement stem from the diversity in legal systems 
underpinning enforcement and the sheer number of competition agencies seeking to work 
together.129 The 2014 OECD document on Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition 
Law Enforcement even identified the immense global proliferation of both competition laws and 
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enforcers as “the single most important development in the competition area over the last 20 years.”130 Even 
though competition law is a relatively young branch of law,131 the first laws enacted in 1889 in 
Canada (the US Sherman Act following swiftly in 1890)132 and in 1923 in Europe (Germany), today 
nearly 130 countries have enacted competition laws and 120 have established the agencies to enforce 
them.133 It is interesting to note that such early competition laws were mostly inspired by trade 
policy.134 Younger competition agencies are also becoming more active.135 These phenomena increase 
the occurrence of several authorities simultaneously investigating the same case, applying different 
national substantive and procedural laws, based on diverse legal and economic standards, and with 
different interests in mind.136 This causes difficulties at several stages, be it the substantive, remedial 
or procedural level.  
 
The existence of substantive conflicts is mainly caused by different traditions of competition policy 
and divergent industrial (or other) policy goals.137 The simultaneous investigation of a case by several 
competition authorities without cooperation implies a duplication of efforts and expenses for both 
the agencies and companies involved. International mergers can be subjected to reviews by five, ten, 
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or twenty other agencies around the world.138 Different deadlines and requirements may have to be 
fulfilled, burdening the undertakings involved with additional costs and legal unpredictability.139 
Remedial problems are best illustrated by the infamous GE/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonnell 
cases, which are discussed below (see below, Part I, 2.2.5).  
 
The abovementioned problems can be described as consequences of ‘over-regulation’, in the sense 
that they are caused by the applicability of more than one set of national competition rules. System 
friction between different antitrust regimes, or the fact that one country's competition laws may 
facilitate conduct that another country's laws prohibit, is not mitigated in the field of antitrust by 
supranational choice of law rules.140 If certain anticompetitive behaviour is governed by multiple 
competition laws, the company will end up complying with the most restrictive rule. While this does 
not always result in truly conflicting obligations for the firm, it is a disincentive for innovation and 
pro-competitive behaviour.141 It results in a veto power in the hands of the most restrictive 
jurisdiction.142 Moreover, if any given competition authority has a 5% probability of a false positive 
for instance, conduct scrutinized by 20 enforcers is faced with a 64% chance of  at least one enforcer 
erroneously prohibiting the conduct.143 However, ‘under-regulation’ can occur as well in the form of 
laws that are too lenient or exemptions and exclusions from the application of competition rules, 
restrictions in the scope of application, procedural or enforcement difficulties, lack of enforcement 
or strategic law enforcement. The behaviour of competition agencies hoping to free ride on the 
enforcement actions of others may result in collective action problems and gaps in the protection of 
competition.144 Companies can benefit from these gaps to engage in anti-competitive behaviour. This 
can be linked to the so-called ‘regulatory competition’ among states. It was already mentioned that it 
becomes increasingly difficult for a single state to govern the behaviour of large corporations. Open 
economies provide opportunities “for firms to seek the most favourable regulatory climate, either by relocating 
production elsewhere or by voicing their interests to regulators.”145 Powerful firms may exert influence on 
lawmakers and this may result in their preferences shaping state regulations.146 This can take the form 
of either explicit statutory exceptions or weak enforcement, allowing states to compete with each 
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other to provide competitive advantages to local firms.147 As a consequence of globalisation, the 
range and domain of cases on which governments act, sometimes to influence the activities of firms 
in other jurisdictions, has continuously expanded.148 Regulatory competition can then result in sub-
optimal protection of competition on the market with the rules being dictated by firm-interests 
rather than the public interest.149  
 
In sum, the de facto regime consisting of an overlap of an increasing number of domestic regulatory 
environments causes legal uncertainty for firms engaging in international business as well as 
problems of both over- and under regulation.150 STEPHAN compared the superimposing of differing 
laws of multiple jurisdictions on a single firm to a perverse and harmful tax on firms that operate 
internationally.151 These issues cannot be tackled by individual states alone, and require international 
cooperation.   
 
2. Four axes of international competition cooperation 
 
There is general agreement about the a need for international action in the field of competition law. 
The debate concerning the best way forward, however, is not any less diverse today than it was in the 
past. Indeed, international cooperation is possible in more than one way. The main variables can be 
placed along four axes, identified in this section.  
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2.1 Multilateralism v bilateralism 
 
A first choice that should be made is deciding on how many partners to engage with. The discussion 
on multilateral versus bilateral cooperation, however, concerns more than the number of parties 
involved.  
 
2.1.1 Level of trust and intensity of cooperation  
 
The fact that multilateral cooperation involves more, and often more diverse, partners has several 
implications. In a multilateral framework, developed and less developed countries, both in general 
and with regard to their experience with competition law, need to agree on a common approach. It is 
logical to assume that cooperation and interaction will generally be more superficial in multilateral 
frameworks than in a bilateral setting, as the latter creates a more favourable environment to generate 
trust between the parties and to promote an intense level of continuous cooperation and 
interaction.152  
 
Considering the sensitive nature of competition policy to nation-states – being closely linked to other 
policy areas such as industrial policy and trade – and the different experiences states have with it, it is 
foreseeable that reaching an agreement will be very challenging in a diverse multilateral context. 
Agreement is often lacking even on the basic goal(s) of competition law and its substantial functions, 
which is the common basis needed to work out more detailed issues.153 The existence of such 
fundamental differences can be illustrated by the Japanese competition system. The regulatory 
culture in Japan is centred towards economic welfare, rather than consumer welfare, and operated 
through guidance whereby decisions do not always require a justification. Opposition from other 
economic ministries to strict enforcement is moreover more common and more fierce than 
elsewhere.154 This is in stark contrast with the ideologies underpinning competition law in the EU 
and the US.  
 
It is often feared that the result of hard multilateral negotiations would reflect only a lowest common 
denominator and could therefore have a perverse effect on the development of a sound competition 
policy. The relatively recent emergence of competition laws on a global scale, the great diversity 
among the existing regimes, and the national sensitivities linked to competition policy, render this 
fear not entirely ungrounded. Bilateral cooperation agreements appear to be a preferable way to 
move forward at the moment, complemented by networks such as the ICN (see below, Part III, 
2.1.4).  
 
2.1.2 Power dynamics 
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TIMBERG rightly underlined the essentially political nature of drafting a multilateral legal convention, 
in particular when it involves vital national interests or controversial economic policies.155 Apart from 
the differing experiences of countries with competition law and their different cultural, political, and 
economical background, international power dynamics may make the negotiation of a multilateral 
agreement more difficult than bilateral negotiations.156 GERBER pointed to significant disparities 
between the capacities of states to influence conduct on global markets, due to different levels of 
political and economic influence, and therefore also differing influence of a state’s conduct norms on 
global competition.157 This influence is also reflected in the negotiation of international 
arrangements. MURPHY underlined the impact of market size as an aspect of national power on the 
determination of the set of regulations that are adopted internationally and pointed to the 
domination of the US, the EU and Japan on the international economic system, its institutions, and 
global trading rules.158 Changing power dynamics might, however, promote the search for multilateral 
solutions. For instance, the growing importance of the Chinese and Indian competition systems 
influences the dynamics between the EU and the US, traditionally the two most dominant antitrust 
players. It becomes increasingly difficult to resolve issues transatlantically without taking the 
competition authorities of these rising economies into account.159 Globalisation and the ensuing rise 
in the number of competition laws and authorities, have indeed created a multi-polar world in which 
a transatlantic agreement no longer solves all problems. Power dynamics are not absent in bilateral 
negotiations, however. According to PAPADOPOULOS bilateral competition cooperation agreements 
facilitate the economically and politically stronger party in steering the agreement towards its own 
preferences, thereby increasing its national power, which may explain the rather intense pursuit by 
the US and EU of such agreements.160   
 
2.1.3 Inclusiveness 
 
As mentioned before, more diverse partners will be involved in multilateral discussions. While this 
renders negotiations more complex, it also enriches them. Not only does it allow the parties to draw 
from a broader range of experiences, it also offers less developed countries a chance to be involved, 
coordinate their actions, and have the opportunity to benefit from the experience and expertise of 
others. Developing countries are often not be selected as a partner for bilateral cooperation, or do 
not have sufficient negotiation powers or the human capital to engage in the negotiation of this type 
of agreements.161 Some cooperation instruments are not readily available to every agency.162  
 
2.1.4 Reach/Impact 
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A truly global competition culture can only be attained when many countries are involved. As market 
sizes increase, bilateral agreements encounter their limitations. A proliferation of bilateral agreements 
in the long term might prove to be counter-effective and confusing, although such effects may be 
somewhat mitigated by engaging such authorities in networks (see below, Part III, 2.3).163 Bilateral 
agreements therefore contribute to a paradox: while they are the easiest form of cooperation because 
trust is more easily created and monitoring is relatively straightforward, in the end they contribute to 
an overall more complex environment as the proliferation of bilateral cooperation agreements would 
result in a different kind of patchwork of rules and norms, entailing transaction costs each time an 
agreement is negotiated.164 TAYLOR pointed to the potential transaction costs that would be involved 
in negotiating bilateral agreements between each nation, and the scope for widely different results in 
each case. He calculated that if 120 of the world’s nations possessed competition laws, a network of 
over 7000 bilateral agreements would be required.165 Dealing with conduct that extends beyond a 
certain bilateral relationship remains cumbersome. Indeed, the rules may still differ significantly from 
one bilateral regime to another.166  
 
Nevertheless, multilateral forums often have a restricted reach as well. Some groupings have limited 
membership, while others have a small geographical scope. Others have a substantive limitation. 
Discussions within the ICN for instance are strictly limited to competition law and policy, whereas 
debate in the WTO will involve competition issues with a trade-dimension. For instance, problems 
relating to competition agency-effectiveness are an appropriate topic for an ICN meeting, but not for 
the WTO, whereas UNCTAD would be the suitable forum to discuss the training of younger 
agencies, as this can be seen as a competition issue with a development-aspect.  
 
2.2 Enforcement cooperation v convergence/harmonisation 
 
The second axe of discussion revolves around whether the goal should be to reach similar or 
uniform competition laws via convergence or harmonisation, or rather to focus on enforcement 
cooperation. Evidently both options are not mutually exclusive. According to TERHECHTE, 
international competition enforcement law does not revolve around the postulate of unity, but rather 
focuses on minimising or overcoming the disadvantages of its fragmentary character, mainly via 
processes of ‘cooperation’ and ‘convergence’.167 This is in line with the findings of THOMPSON, who 
stated that international law enforcement contains three options that are not necessarily strictly 
separated: conflict, cooperation, and convergence.168 In this section an extra distinction will be made 
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between convergence and harmonisation. Unification, in the sense of one global, uniform set of 
competition rules, is left out of this analysis due to its entirely hypothetical nature.  
 
2.2.1 Definitions 
 
Convergence in the context of this study indicates “the tendency [of competition law systems] to grow 
more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances.”169 Put differently, convergence 
“expects national competition law systems to align with each other in ways that improve it.”170 The last part of this 
definition is debateable, as convergence towards an inferior standard is possible as well. The point of 
departure is that competition laws across the globe have not been modelled after a single standard. 
Varying (economic) concerns, idiosyncratic use of language and other factors have created unique 
pieces of legislation. Sharing experiences and developing best practices may, however, lead to the 
appearance of certain commonly held principles.171 It is a rather passive process, in contrast with 
harmonisation, which can be described as active convergence. It is conscious, intentional and works 
towards a predefined standard.172 
 
The term cooperation refers to “consensual joint efforts to accomplish a single job.”173 In this study, ‘the job’ 
is understood as international antitrust enforcement. More concretely, enforcement cooperation can 
include notification, joint discussions on a particular case (e.g. market definition or case theories) or 
on more general policy issues, discussing and aligning remedies, coordinating investigations (e.g. 
timing), and the exchange of non-confidential and confidential information.174  
 
2.2.2 Benefits of convergence/harmonisation: simplification and legal certainty  
 
Having to operate in a fragmented global legal environment with a great diversity of national 
(competition) laws, entails some risks, costs, and inconveniencies for companies as well as 
competition agencies. Resources are not optimally spent, and innovation can be stifled. Convergence 
or harmonisation would certainly simplify the international business environment and make it more 
transparent and predictable.175 Convergence or harmonisation can take place on both a procedural 
and substantive level. Procedural convergence or harmonisation can remove unnecessary costs 
caused by multiple procedures with differing deadlines or information requests, for instance in the 
field of merger notifications or leniency applications. Substantive convergence or harmonisation 
could tackle differences in the legal and economic analysis of alleged anticompetitive conduct, 
thereby reducing the risk of reaching inconsistent or conflicting remedies.176  
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In general, the benefits of harmonised international antitrust rules, according to its proponents, are 
that inconsistent decisions and judgments, biased enforcement, and under-enforcement would be 
avoided, and that transaction costs would decrease.177 The main argument put forward in this context 
revolves around the concept of consistency, that is believed to be crucial to gain investor- and 
company trust in the market.178 It is believed that global welfare is not maximized by the coexistence 
of competition laws of individual states that are engaged in significant international trade.179 
However, as demonstrated below, such benefits are not as straightforward as they seem. It is also 
said that the harmonisation of rules is a necessity in light of fast technological innovation and the 
resulting opportunities for abuse.180 Paradoxically, harmonisation might be least suited in an 
environment of fast-paced innovation and evolution, as it is characterized by often stringent 
procedures for review causing rigidity.  
 
Some practitioners mention “a responsibility to harmonize differences as much as possible.”181 The 
European section of the business community within the International Chamber of Commerce even 
claimed that procedural and substantive convergence or harmonisation is a ‘preliminary requirement’ 
for further cooperation, for example in the field of information exchange, to limit the risk of misuse 
or information.182 PAPADOPOULOS put forward that international harmonisation can be regarded as 
an instrument to provide context to cooperation.183  
 
2.2.3 Drawbacks of convergence/harmonisation: achievable nor desirable   
 
Among those opposing convergence or harmonisation in the form of an international antitrust law, 
arguments vary from it not being achievable, to it not being desirable.  
 
2.2.3.1 Not achievable  
 
A) Insufficient agreement 
 
One of the main arguments against some form of international competition law is that at present, as 
well as in the foreseeable future, it is simply not possible. Currently, insufficient agreement exists 
globally on what competition law should try to accomplish (its goal(s)) and how it should do so. 
While BASEDOW stated in 2004 that a minimum harmonisation was the only realistic option at that 
time,184 more than ten years later the international climate is still not ready to pursue this. Even 
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though it is evolving rapidly, competition law is a young branch of law, and there is too much 
disagreement in the international community on its meaning and function, while national sensitivities 
continue to play a big role.  
 
While convergence is occurring to a certain extent, a significant divide will most likely always be 
there. Competition systems can be divided in roughly three categories: the US model relying on 
criminal and civil courts for competition law enforcement, the EU model based on an administrative 
system and the Asian model that depends more heavily on warnings and in which the enforcement 
agency is usually part of the executive.185 Disagreement is omnipresent even within these larger 
systems. Many terms in the competition law glossary are not self-defining. For instance, nations do 
not agree on the meaning of what is ‘anticompetitive’ and the value and meaning of ‘efficiency’.186 
Such disagreement might imply that any global agreement will inevitably be incomplete, restricted to 
those few areas where clarity and consensus exist, and will therefore offer only limited added value.187 
 
Moreover, among the proponents of convergence of competition laws, many imply convergence 
towards one’s own system.188 The traditional way of reaching consensus on an international level, via 
treaty negotiations, has failed in the field of competition law (see below, Part I, 3). What seems to be 
happening is that the dominant parties in the field of competition law try to promote their own 
competition law systems, thereby trying to create leeway to transform that system into the global 
standard. According to NIHOUL and LÜBBIG, however, the discussion of legal similarities and 
differences may cause officials to realise that significant benefits can be created through only minor 
policy shifts.189 While this may work for some rather superficial issues, it is likely not effective with 
regard to the fundamentals of competition law, such as its goals or the value of economic analysis.  
 
B) Hostage to larger issues of domestic policy  
 
Law, including competition law, is a social construct. It stems from the domestic foundations and 
values of countries and adapts to social reality and experience, varying over time. Its application is 
based on a range of evolving economic approaches and ideologies. It is a political creation, 
susceptive to a wide range of domestic societal variants, and may be applied and developed in the 
light of other policy concerns such as social protection, consumer protection, environmental 
concerns, investment, or even regional development.190 The link between competition and trade and 
industrial policy for instance, makes this topic very susceptible to lobbying and to broader concerns 
of domestic policy, and therefore extremely hard to harmonise. The nature and scope of the 
consequences of changes in competition policy onto other policies are not always predictable. 
Because competition policy is closely linked to and intertwined with other policy areas, 
harmonisation or convergence of competition policy may cause what BLAUBERGER calls sectorial or 
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‘diagonal’ conflicts.191 Competition policy does not take place in a vacuum and requires coordination 
with other economic policies in order to be effective, therefore the effect of changes is sometimes 
difficult to assess.192 
 
Some scholars claim that implicit consensus has already led to a system of international competition 
law.193 While indeed some convergence has taken place, this has remained limited. Because of the 
sensitive nature of this branch of law, the “international community moves only inches along toward an 
acceptable long-term solution, letting the proverbial ostrich approach win out.”194 As mentioned, part of the 
European business community wishes to see substantive and procedural convergence of antitrust law 
before entering into forms of cooperation such as the exchange of information. This approach is 
sometimes criticised as representing a mere indefinite delaying technique by the business community 
to hold on to its control over information exchange in international antitrust cases. Only when it 
furthers their interests, such as in a merger case, can they decide to waive their confidentiality rights, 
if not, they can block or hinder the investigation by not providing their consent. Advanced agency 
cooperation would deprive them of this control.195  
 
If harmonization is limited to mere guiding principles, the risk exists of such rules being applied 
‘selectively’ or being misinterpreted or functionally interpreted because there is no true desire to 
harmonise to any standard other than the domestic preference. Even if principles converge, rules can 
still diverge.196 Key competition law principles are largely similar across the world, but they only make 
up a skeleton.197 Even if consensus existed on the objective of competition policy, for instance 
efficiency optimization of the sum of consumer and producer welfare, this would not necessarily lead 
to agreement on whether a particular regime contributes or detracts from that.198 
 
FOX believes that multilateral consensus on competition policy is possible because of a ‘spirit of 
cosmopolitanism’. This theory, drawing from Rawlsian arguments, puts forward that states will 
adhere to strong redistributive programs, embracing significant transnational wealth transfers. It is 
based on the premise that varying national competition policies reflect differences in local welfare 
and that therefore any convergence toward a global standard would entail distributional effects.199 
Such voluntary adherence to significant wealth distribution, however, seems very unlikely.  
 
C) Monitoring and enforcement 
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More practical problems arise as well. Monitoring and enforcement, for instance, aimed at 
guaranteeing uniform application, will be very difficult to organise. Harmonisation will likely require 
a supranational enforcement authority with dispute settlement powers. The cost of creating a joint 
authority is twofold. Direct costs involve funding the establishment of a new institution or the 
reorientation of an existing one, and allocating trained staff. The division of such costs, for instance 
among developed and less developed countries, already promises to be a challenging endeavour. 
Translation costs as well should be taken into account, which might be substantial when lacking a 
common vocabulary. The significant loss of sovereignty constitutes an indirect cost. Additional 
issues in this context relate to principal-agent problems and finding a way to ensure the neutrality 
and independence of the institution. DREXL, GRIMES, JONES, PERITZ and SWAINE mention the 
example of a merger that is consumer friendly in one member state, but harms consumers in 
another. In this scenario it will be very difficult to set a joint standard for review that ensures an 
overall balance of social welfare, perhaps by including transfer payments.200 A universal competition 
regime that increases global welfare will disadvantage some countries to the benefit of others. 
STEPHAN holds the rather negative view that effective monitoring of this redistribution would only 
clarify the magnitude of the loss particular states would experience. Oversight and dispute settlement 
will moreover be difficult due to the opaque and diverse interests at stake in competition policy. The 
diversity of objectives and the uncertainty with regard to the ‘optimal’ level of competition will 
furthermore necessitate elastic or broad standards rather than precise rules, which will necessarily 
imply high levels of discretion.201   
 
Apart from problems of administration and application, problems of adaptation will also emerge. 
Indeed, the creation but also the reform of law-based international institutions is difficult and 
burdensome. This inferior adaptive capability explains why “international regimes tend to administer broad 
standards and norms rather than precise rules, and they tend to collapse or become irrelevant rather than reform 
themselves.”202 Often unanimous consent is required. An institution enforcing competition law, aiming 
to regulate global, fast-changing and evolving markets, will likely benefit from a flexible mandate and 
tools in order to adapt to changing circumstances.  
 
2.2.3.2 Not desirable 
 
A) Different needs and objectives result in sub-optimal rules 
 
As mentioned, those promoting harmonisation usually have approximation towards the domestic 
model in mind, convinced that the latter is the most optimal form. As said by ARAUJO, “in the debate 
concerning the desirability of establishing international competition rules, the focus is as much on its potential adverse 
impact on the policy space of national governments as it is on what conception of competition law should be favoured.”203 
In 2011, former competition commissioner ALMUNIA stated that “engaging our world partners in dialogue 
and towards a growing convergence of our competition policies and enforcement is the way forward. […] The EU 
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competition system is one of the best, if not the best in the world.”204 That same year ALMUNIA also said that the 
dissemination of the EU’s open model and principles should be the goal.205 The EU competition law 
system might be the appropriate model for the EU at a certain point in time, but it is not necessarily 
the case for other countries, with different economies, levels of development, industries, etcetera.   
 
Indeed, there is no objectively ‘superior’ competition law. While many competition regimes share the 
same basic properties, the range of values, interests, and enforcement philosophies that play a role 
illustrate the inherently ‘porous’ nature of the law.206 Nations develop (economically) at different 
paces and have diverse backgrounds, capabilities, perceptions, and priorities, resulting in different 
needs in terms of which competition policy is suitable.207 They may also pursue different 
objectives.208 Many argue therefore that a uniform competition system should not be the goal, and 
that diversity is necessary and should be respected.209 Other authors claim that business cultures all 
over the world are not that different, and that commerce seeks to address similar economic issues 
and wants to achieve comparable objectives.210 Even if the goals are alike, however, the means to 
reach them probably are not. Furthermore, business cultures are embedded in a broader system, and 
do not function on a stand-alone basis. A nation’s history and its economic and cultural values and 
preferences may justify divergence both in needs and pursued objectives.211 Administrative, 
procedural and substantive differences are likely to arise because states have different policy needs 
and goals depending on their economic structure and level of development. Also differing political 
economy decisions and institutional choices cause differences.212  
 
The above does not necessarily imply that a certain degree convergence should not be pursued, but 
generally a one-size-fits-all solution should not be the end goal.213 Domestic realities should not be 
overridden by a drive towards homogeneity.214 Any international code would to a certain extent 
diverge from the (perceived) optimal policy for a given country.215 As rightly put forward by 
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KINTNER, a global antitrust standard does not have any survival chance unless it is the result of a 
logical culmination of economic, political, and social developments and it did not simply arise 
through legislative acts.216 ‘Forcing’ competition systems upon certain countries via international 
regulation would do exactly this.  
 
B) Need for experimentation 
 
TRITTEL considered harmonisation via a supranational mechanism to be neither realistic nor 
beneficial to the dynamic evolution of competition law. Instead, he believed in the value of soft 
convergence, whereby superior practices are identified via experimentation and other countries are 
offered the possibility to opt in. Despite the existence of a shared belief in the goals of adequate 
transparency and procedural fairness, he nevertheless believed that such goals would likely not be 
achieved to everyone’s satisfaction, as a result of differences in legal systems and traditions.217 
Experimentation does not imply that the goals of competition law should change every time the 
administration of a country has a shift in preferences, it can, however, entail that courts’ 
understanding of competition law evolves and adapts to the growing field of knowledge and a 
changing reality. Experimentation will therefore require some form of flexibility. An international 
code, with a supranational institution often cannot offer this kind of suppleness and openness to 
reform. 218 An undesirable effect of competing rules being eliminated and replaced by one set of 
harmonised rules is that innovation and change may be stultified to a certain extent. This concern 
should not be overestimated, however, as there could still be active efforts to change the one 
standard that prevails, as happened in the US for instance with regard to its set of securities 
regulation rules. Those were actively changed over time due to industry pressure or changes in 
regulatory philosophy.219 Nevertheless, competition law should not become a closed system and 
should retain a certain amount of dynamism to address market and social realities, while retaining its 
conceptual core. Analytical elasticity moreover allows enforcers to experiment with ranging levels of 
intervention, remedies, and enforcement tools.220   
 
C) Cost-benefit imbalance 
 
The benefits offered by an international competition law simply do not outweigh the costs according 
to some.221 First, convergence or harmonisation cannot solve all international antitrust problems that 
arise. Different factual situations in distinct national markets, for instance in the field of intellectual 
property rights, can result in divergent outcomes, even if the rules applied and analysis followed are 
similar.222 Even if the letter of the text converges, the actual meaning of the text might still differ due 
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to divergent interpretation and application to actual cases.223 Moreover, harmonisation should take 
place intensively and must reach deep to achieve the benefits attributed to it. Evolutions such as the 
increasing penalization of competition law, the introduction of leniency programs by more and more 
states, or strengthened private enforcement224 are valuable forms of convergence, but they are 
resource intensive and can create further difficulties instead of diminishing them if the 
approximation is not sufficiently substantial.225 
 
Second, there is no certainty about how effective an imposed rule would be in containing 
international spillovers or about the dynamic implications it would entail.226 Harmonisation can be 
risky, if the method followed and the rules chosen turn out to have significant hidden drawbacks. 
KLODT therefore argues that “[t]he discussion so far yields that the primary goal of international policy 
coordination must be to curb international spillovers without impeding systems competition any more than necessary.”227 
This position is understandable. When certainty on the ‘optimal approach’ and most effective rules is 
lacking and the full impact of legislation cannot be predicted, the danger exists that unforeseen 
spillovers and welfare losses occur. A safer option is then to limit oneself to minimum standards 
only, so no alternative remedies are excluded and evolutionary development of rules through 
international systems competition is not obstructed. This would prevent a supranational authority 
from deciding in favour of suboptimal standards thereby impeding long-term progress and 
innovation.228 
 
An additional cost of establishing a uniform competition code would be that proper enforcement 
would require the establishment of some kind of supranational authority. It was already established 
that this is a cost on its own, but an additional factor is that this sort of ‘use of force’, cannot exclude 
the risk of abuse. This ‘commitment to international coercion’, therefore requires critical 
examination.229 
 
D) Agency problems 
 
As mentioned, it is not unthinkable that a supranational authority, or international antitrust agency or 
tribunal necessary to ensure the proper enforcement of the harmonised rules, is not entirely neutral 
itself, and this bias would be much harder to correct than in a decentralized regime. The risk exists 
that the agency or tribunal adopts “interpretations or enforcement policies that deviate from the views of most or 
all nations.”230 Moreover, ensuring complete independence from political influence will be difficult. 
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STEPHAN is well-known for his critical attitude towards an international competition law. He 
objected to what he calls ‘the concept of international cosmopolitanism’,231 and pointed to the 
dangers of the international administration of non-transparent regulatory programs and the dispute 
resolution derived from such programs.232  
 
2.2.4 Benefits of enforcement cooperation: feasibility and positive competitive regulation 
 
Enforcement cooperation offers two main benefits compared to harmonisation efforts or 
convergence. The first one relates to feasibility, and the second one draws from the positive effects 
of competitive regulation. 
 
TERHECHTE rightly claims that case-cooperation should be prioritised over the creation of a 
common global foundation.233 This statement raises some fundamental objections. Most importantly, 
enforcement cooperation is a more realistic objective than harmonisation or convergence in the 
short-to-medium term as state sovereignty is less affected, while still being able to mediate many of 
the problems international competition law enforcement is currently facing. WOOD is correct when 
saying that international enforcement cooperation permits countries the necessary freedom to tailor 
the law to their own needs, while at the same time allowing international cartels to be effectively 
combatted without contentious jurisdictional disputes.234 Therefore, while enforcement cooperation 
can be considered as a possible stepping-stone towards convergence, it is a worthwhile objective in 
itself.235 Moreover, convergence or harmonisation are only of limited use, if for instance the evidence 
needed to prove a case is located in another jurisdiction and inaccessible for the competition 
authority handling the case. 
 
Another important benefit is that enforcement cooperation between competition authorities may 
draw advantages out of the existing diversity in national competition laws. Through cooperation 
different competition laws worldwide continue to coexist while knowledge about them is increased. 
This provides impetus to continuously create and review best practices, resulting in dynamic 
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rewards.236 At the same time a nation’s domestic preferences can continue to play a role. It can be 
considered a positive form of so-called competitive regulation, where confrontations can act as an 
incentive to improve. VAN GESTEL, MICKLITZ and MADURO see two ways of dealing with 
fragmentation, hybridity and polycontextuality, one focusing on unification, with central monitoring 
and control, and the second one focusing on the acceptance of diversity, relying on policy learning 
through variation and selection, also referred to as ‘jurisdictional competition’. The main benefit of 
the latter approach is that more preferences would be satisfied if different legal regimes would 
compete with each other. This doctrine reminds of the ‘states as laboratories’ metaphor of justice 
BRANDEIS, putting forward the potential benefits of experimentation with different legal regimes 
within a federal state, such as the facilitation of innovation and the transplantation of successful parts 
of legal regimes to other jurisdictions. Monitoring the way in which different states deal with 
problems can lead to intellectual input for law reform. In this process, however, the importance of 
context may not be forgotten. Moreover, an important nuance is that in the absence of a truly global 
and transparent market for legal products, such ‘legal competition’ will not automatically lead to ‘the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number’.237 
 
2.2.5 Drawbacks of enforcement cooperation: unable to solve fundamental problems 
 
Cooperation cannot solve all problems. One example of the limits of cooperation is the well-known 
GE/Honeywell case. This case concerned the aircraft engine maker GE that wanted to merge with 
avionics and non-avionics manufacturer Honeywell, causing concerns of dominance in the respective 
relevant markets. One of the main issues was whether GE was a dominant firm in the jet engine 
market, and whether a certain engine should be included in this market.238 US and EU authorities 
cooperated closely. JAMES, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division DoJ at the time testified 
that ‘a tremendous amount’ of cooperation took place during the course of the investigation. The 
parties even waived their confidentiality rights to allow for more intense cooperation. Frequent 
contact was held over the phone and during several extensive meetings between case-handlers and at 
the highest policy levels, among other issues about the evidence and the theories pursued.239 Both 
authorities could not, however, reach agreement on the appropriate outcome of the case. The US 
reached an agreement with both parties, but the EU blocked the merger.240 This was not caused by 
insufficient or ineffective cooperation, but “flowed from an apparent substantive difference, perhaps a 
fundamental one, between the two agencies on the proper scope of antitrust law enforcement.”241 The US focused on 
the improvements for consumers that would emerge from the mergers, such as better products and 
more attractive prices. The EU (then EC), however, was worried about the anticompetitive effects 
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the merger could have for competitors, as the efficiencies and lower prices might ultimately drive 
some of the competitors from the market or reduce their market shares to a point where they could 
no longer compete effectively.242 The US as well as GE argued that a particular engine should be 
excluded from the market-definition, which implied that GE would no longer be a dominant firm in 
that market. This reasoning was rejected by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
which stated that “[t]he fact… that the United States Department of Justice apparently took [this] view… is 
irrelevant for the purposes of these proceedings. That the competent authorities of one or more non-member States 
determine an issue in a particular way for the purposes of their own proceedings does not suffice per se to undermine a 
different determination by the competent Community authorities. The matters and arguments advanced in the 
administrative procedure at Community level – and the applicable legal rules – are not necessarily the same as those 
taken into account by the authorities of the non-member States in question and the determinations made on either side 
may be different as a result. If one party considers the reasoning underpinning the conclusion of the authorities of a non-
member State to be particularly relevant and equally applicable to a Community procedure, it can always raise it as a 
substantive argument, as the applicant has done in this instance; but such reasoning cannot be conclusive.”243 Another 
famous example is the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case. Here again, while the US authorities approved 
the merger unconditionally, the European Commission could not accept it. Finally, after threats of a 
commercial war by the US, the Commission cleared the merger following commitments made by one 
of the parties.244 
 
Other famous examples are the transatlantic Microsoft investigations. The 1993 Microsoft case was the 
first application of the EU-US Agreement.245 Transatlantic collaboration during the first Microsoft case 
is traditionally considered to be an ideal example of bilateral cooperation, in particular because this 
joint investigation took place at a time when the validity of the EU-US Agreement was being 
challenged before the CJEU (see below, Part II, 2.3.1). The charges were the result of close 
coordination between the Antitrust Division and the European Commission. The investigation was 
described as the first coordinated effort of the two agencies in initiating and resolving an antitrust 
enforcement action. Investigations happened in parallel and were practically identical. Microsoft 
moreover cooperated intensely with both authorities and provided a waiver of confidentiality rights 
so that both authorities could discuss all aspects of the investigation. It even demanded that the 
European Commission would participate in the DoJ’s negotiations over the consent decree in order 
for the two investigations to be concluded concurrently.246 KEEGAN referred to these investigations 
as ‘testing ground’ for the EU-US Agreement, delivering positive effects for both the jurisdictions 
involved as well as Microsoft in the form of efficiency gains in information-gathering and 
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prosecution and a coordinated effort resulting in a joint settlement. In this manner Microsoft did not 
risk the agreement reached with the US being used against it as leverage to negotiate stiffer terms in 
the EU.247 The coordinated approach, joint negotiations, and trilateral talks were not reiterated, 
however,  in the second Microsoft case, where, despite extensive discussions, the EU and US did not 
act in unison, even if the Commission and the DoJ kept each other regularly informed on the state of 
play of their respective cases, and held meetings at regular intervals, allegedly ‘in a cooperative and 
friendly atmosphere’, where experiences were shared.248 In the second case the substantive focus of 
the EU and the US diverged to a rather large extent.249 While the European Commission and the DoJ 
were in contact throughout the investigation, ZANETTIN mentions “a perceived reticence on the part of the 
DoJ to discuss substantive issues raised by these cases with the Commission.”250 In the EU the case related to 
Microsoft’s refusal to provide competitors with information relating to its operating system source 
code that would allow full interoperability between Windows servers and non-Microsoft servers, as 
well as between Windows clients and non-Microsoft servers, and the bundling of Windows Media 
Player with Windows. The EU fined Microsoft and required that it would sell two versions of its 
Windows operating system, one with Windows Media Player and one without it, and that it publishes 
and licenses interoperability information.251 In reaction, the US DoJ Antitrust Division stated that the 
EU’s remedy could hinder successful competitors and impose burdens on third parties, and may risk 
chilling innovation and competition. It blamed the EU for protecting competitors rather than 
competition, and referred to the rejection by a US district court of remedies similar to those imposed 
by the EU in US litigation.252 In the US the case revolved around the fact that Microsoft had 
unlawfully maintained its monopoly in the market of computer-based operating systems by excluding 
competing middleware, mostly web browsing software, posing a threat to the Windows operating 
systems. The DoJ and Microsoft negotiated a settlement obliging Microsoft to provide software 
developers with the necessary interfaces to interoperate with is operating system, allowing for the 
creation of competing middleware. Manufacturers and consumers were also free to substitute 
competing middleware on Microsoft’s’ operating system.253 Even if the facts of the case were 
somewhat different in the EU and the US and therefore justify a different outcome in both 
jurisdictions, the fact that the timing of both investigations was not aligned added to the cost, delay 
and uncertainty of the final outcome.254 Exemplary of the disrupted communication is that the 
European Commission was only informed of the settlement between the DoJ and Microsoft by 
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means of the press.255 This demonstrates that successful cooperation does not depend on the 
existence of an agreement, but rather the specificities of the case, such as the scope of the 
investigation, the effect on other policies, the interests at stake, as well as the cooperation of the 
companies involved. If fundamental differences in analysis exist, enforcement cooperation cannot 
overcome this.  
 
These cases also demonstrate that even though the competition laws of the EU and the US are 
similar, they can pursue different policy goals. While convergence among US and EU doctrines has 
certainly taken place over time, important differences remain. Some controversial areas include 
excessive unilateral pricing, above-cost predatory pricing, unilateral duties to deal, loyalty and 
volume-based discounts, vertical territorial restraints, and vertical and conglomerate mergers. Apart 
from deep-rooted substantial differences, another issue is that even if the rules are similar, the 
assessment of the facts, or the how the law applies to such facts, may differ.256 Moreover, while it is 
possible that established and deep cooperation between certain countries can overcome political 
considerations, such as the creation or protection of national champions, this will be the exception 
rather than the norm.257  
 
GAL opposed enforcement cooperation via bilateral agreements on the ground that this model 
continued to rely on unilateral enforcement of national laws on the national territory. The final 
assessment of a situation remains at the national level by national agencies based on national 
legislation and considerations. A risk of inconsistent outcomes therefore remains very present.258 
According to GAL such agreements are a “poor solution to the issues of under-deterrence that result from limited 
resources or a limited ability to create a credible threat of enforcement.”259 She even claimed that problems of 
clashing remedies or duplication of resources might be aggravated as more jurisdictions would be 
required to apply their laws.260 Enforcement cooperation indeed in principle does not change the 
substance of foreign laws, but it may, however, influence enforcement priorities, and may even act as 
a catalyst for other jurisdictions to adapt their competition laws and agencies. 
 
WOOD made the remark that cooperation implies the idea of a ‘common end or effect’ agreed 
among the parties.261 She asked the question, however, how broad or deep these common ends need 
to be. An obstacle faced by advanced enforcement cooperation is that it sometimes entails doing 
something for the benefit of another, without immediate return-benefit. However, the fact that 
assistance will not necessarily be balanced in its number of requests and number of responsive acts, 
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does not mean that cooperation is doomed from the start.262 A change in mentality from a short-
term to a long-term perspective is necessary. As the interconnectedness of the global economy will 
probably only increase, there is a growing likeliness of repeat-interactions between several 
competition authorities. Achieving a fair balance with regard to the assistance provided and received, 
should therefore become easier as well.  
 
2.3 Formal v informal cooperation  
 
2.3.1 Definition 
 
International cooperation can take place formally and/or informally. The exact meaning of those 
terms is, however, not entirely clear. According to the 2012 OECD stocktaking exercise on the work 
of the Competition Committee, formal cooperation implies that “the competition agency of one country 
makes a formal request of another, usually in writing, for information that the requested country has about a particular 
case or for assistance in gathering evidence that may exist in the requested country.”263 Informal cooperation on 
the other hand consists of “informal communications between competition agencies that are case-specific but do not 
involve the specific exchange of evidence that has been generated by an investigation. The agencies may discuss such 
matters as investigative strategies, market information and witness evaluations.”264 The definitions offered are 
somewhat lost in a circular reasoning. The difference seems to lie in the nature of the information 
exchanged, namely whether it contains evidence or not. In the same year, the OECD Policy 
Roundtable report on improving international cooperation in cartel cases defined informal 
cooperation, as “all co-operation among competition authorities that does not include sharing confidential 
information or obtaining evidence on behalf of another authority.”265 The ECN is described as an ‘informal 
network’ because it does not take formal decisions and cannot require its members to act in a certain 
way.266  
 
In the context of this study, however, the distinction between formal and informal cooperation lies 
in the fact whether or not communication takes place within the framework of a specific cooperation 
instrument. Indeed, cooperation can be based either on a legal provision, an international agreement 
or a waiver from one of the parties under investigation, or it can take place outside any such 
framework.267 Informal competition cooperation can in other words be described as the free and 
voluntary exchange of information and ideas between competition officials within legal boundaries, 
while formal cooperation implies that the timing, scope, manner and/or content of the cooperation 
is determined in an agreement or other legal instrument. Of course informal cooperation may lead to 
or may pave the way for formal cooperation, and formal cooperation may be complemented or even 
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enabled by informal contacts.268 In reality cooperation will often involve a mix of formal and 
informal contacts. 
 
2.3.2 Informal cooperation has benefits, but formal cooperation remains necessary 
 
The background note of the OECD Global forum on Competition is somewhat vague on the 
benefits of formal international cooperation agreements. It claims that the existence of such 
agreements is not a guarantee for cooperation, while its absence does not necessarily preclude it. It 
states that it offers a formal framework for cooperation, ‘despite the legal limits’, and that it is an 
indication of the willingness and ability of a state or authority to hold ‘a constructive dialogue’ with 
foreign peers. Achieving the right balance between what can be accomplished via informal 
cooperation and what requires more formal mechanisms is identified as a challenge for developing 
countries, although this remains a challenge for more developed authorities as well.269  
 
According to the 2012 OECD Roundtable Report on Improving International Co-operation in 
Cartel Investigations, factors contributing to the choice of a cooperation-method include “the 
availability of formal instruments, contacts with and knowledge of the other authorities involved and the specific 
circumstances in a given case.”270 The report mentions for instance that while criminal jurisdictions can 
make use of mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and other formal forms of cooperation in 
criminal matters, such forms are less available to authorities in administrative jurisdictions, which 
make more extensive use of informal cooperation methods.271 This is true to the extent that the 
procedural requirements for certain information to be admitted to trial are lower, but as soon as 
confidential information is at stake this is no longer an option.  
 
A 2001 ICN survey indicated that while the US and the European Commission had made several 
formal requests from 1999 to 2001, such instances remained relatively infrequent.272 Paradoxically, 
while most competition agencies did not provide any concrete examples of having used informal 
cooperation in cartel cases in the 2007 ICN Report on Cooperation between Competition Agencies 
in Cartel Investigations,273 the more recent OECD/ICN Joint Survey on international enforcement 
cooperation specified that informal (case) cooperation is particularly highly valued, and may suffice 
in many cases. Informally contacting another agency is fast and easy.274 The Joint Survey 
demonstrated that due to the increased occurrence of multijurisdictional antitrust cases, agencies 
have developed reciprocal relationships that allow them to informally notify each other. KLAWITER 
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and LACIAK confirm that cooperation among competition authorities has evolved into an informal 
network of daily contacts and discussions outside of a formal framework.275 
 
More formalized cooperation, in the form of bilateral cooperation agreements for instance, will 
however remain necessary for mainly four reasons. First, procedural or organisational requirements 
may prevent informal cooperation. For instance, information exchanged under a formal request for 
assistance will often fulfil the requirements of relevant rules of civil or criminal procedure and 
evidence and can thus be used in trial. Information exchanged informally, while still useful for the 
investigation, will often not satisfy such requirements.276 While many competition authorities indeed 
emphasise the importance of informal cooperation,277 the US authorities, for instance, indicate that at 
least at the investigative stage cooperation with the DOJ mainly occurs through formal requests for 
assistance pursuant to MLATs or letters rogatory to seek corporate documents or to conduct witness 
interviews.278 A second example is assistance in the form of capacity building. With regard to 
developing countries, capacity building assistance can both provide technical expertise and foster 
mutual understanding, paving the way for future cooperation, but this type of cooperation can only 
take place in a formalized manner.279  
 
A second factor is that formal cooperation (ideally) is more transparent than informal cooperation. 
Informal cooperation can take place in very opaque ways, for instance via personal phone calls. This 
lack of transparency contributes to the fact that it is so difficult to assess the effectiveness and 
usefulness of this type of cooperation. While a certain degree of confidentiality may be valuable to 
the investigation, the general lack of transparency in cooperation is not instructive for other 
competition agencies, nor does it create a platform for public support.280 Soft law cooperation 
agreements are often criticised as being redundant, as the cooperation mechanisms developed in 
such agreements can also take place informally. A benefit of using a soft law instrument that 
formalizes cooperation to a certain extent, however, is the transparency it creates.281 A downside of 
this transparent and formalized cooperation is, however, that it will more often occur at a slower 
pace.282 
 
Additionally, formalized arrangements may ensure some form of consistency in the cooperation 
process when there is high employee turnover resulting in weak institutional memory of the 
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agency.283 While personal relationships and habits can be useful, they are more difficult to pass on. 
Embedding informal cooperation processes in a formal agreement, can help transfer such habits to 
future generations of officials and may also facilitate cooperation with newer agencies.  
 
Finally, a formal cooperation agreement may also serve to signal a state’s commitment more credibly 
or be part of a country’s culture.284 DG Competition has, for instance, experienced a certain 
reluctance on the part of its third country peers to cooperate without an explicit provision in a 
bilateral agreement expressly permitting it.285 A formal commitment can therefore constitute a 
requirement for some competition authorities to engage in cooperation. In the experience of the EU 
formal arrangements prove particularly useful when dealing with Asian cultures. NAMBU, Deputy 
Secretary General for International Affairs of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission stressed that in 
his view formal cooperation agreements are preferable, as they establish firm lines of communication 
and promote further cooperation.286 Another example is the cooperation agreement with South-
Korea, that barely differed from the existing Memorandum. The value of the cooperation agreement 
lay in the fact that to the Korean competition agency a formal agreement with the EU signified a 
confirmation of its value.287  
 
2.4 Hard v soft law 
 
Once the choice has been made to cooperate within a formal framework, this framework may be set 
up by hard or soft law.288  
 
2.4.1 Generic definition 
 
Soft law appears to be a contradictio in terminis, inciting many to attempt to define the concept. GATTO 
claimed that the expression ‘soft law’ originally referred to “declarations, resolutions, guidelines, principles 
and other high levels statements [sic] by groups of States such as the United Nations, the International Labour 
Organization and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development”289, emphasizing the 
international origins of the concept. KLABBERS considered soft law to be a type of default-category, 
applying in case a rule cannot be qualified as hard law, but is not ‘irrelevant’ either. He interpreted 
soft law very broadly, including guidelines, codes of conduct, resolutions, recommendations and 
action programmes, indeterminate provisions of treaties, unratified conventions, possibly even 
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opinions of Advocates-General or dissenting opinions of individual judges.290 Similarly, HOLMES et al. 
defined soft law as “creating obligations that are usually imprecise and remain voluntary and are somewhat more 
[than] a political promise but a lot less than a binding commitment.”291 The most commonly encountered 
definition of soft law describes the concept as “instruments that are not legally binding but can produce 
practical and legal effects”.292 The difference between hard and soft obligations is then that the former 
are legally binding and the latter are not.293 The term ‘legally binding’, is often left unspecified, but 
relates to third party opposability and seems to imply the existence of an enforcement mechanism or 
compulsory process.294 TAYLOR stated that hard laws can be enforced with the potential application 
of a range of legally mandated sanctions, while the breach of ‘morals’ as he calls it may only result in 
social censure and potential adverse political repercussions.295   
 
2.4.2 Soft law in an international context 
 
Apart from the generic definitions discussed above, it is relevant to discuss the concept of soft law 
specifically in an international context.296 ‘Law’ in an international context has different connotations 
than law in a domestic context, as a formal enforcement mechanism is often absent regarding most 
international legal obligations.297 
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The sources of international law are listed in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice.298 Whether instruments of soft law (in particular international agreements that do not 
constitute full-fledged treaties) are caught by the definitions listed in this article is subject to debate.299 
In international law a distinction is made between treaties and ‘non-treaty agreements’.300 As 
confirmed by the Court of Justice,301 if the parties to an agreement decide to conclude a formal 
treaty, this entails certain consequences. Such ‘consequences’ are described in Article 2(1)(a) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.302 Concluding a non-treaty agreement excludes 
the application of international treaty law, including the legal consequences resulting from the non-
fulfilment of such a commitment (compensation, dispute settlement procedures, reprisals, etcetera).303 
A non-treaty agreement is described as “a self-contained regime whose characteristics depend on the parties’ 
intentions in the specific case.”304 AUST stated that soft law in an international context generally refers to 
international instruments that are not regarded as treaties by the parties negotiating it, despite the use 
of mandatory language, promulgating non-legally binding principles or rules with the hope that such 
will become of general application. Another possibility is that the concept refers to treaty-provisions 
that have such a general nature that they cannot form the basis of legal rights and obligations, 
sometimes because the subject matter is not fully developed, or because there is no consensus on the 
content of the principles.305 This coincides somewhat with what TAYLOR called ‘unintentional soft 
law’: provisions in binding treaties that are so vague and/or imprecise that they cannot be enforced 
in practice. WEIL went even further by stating that only the latter form of soft law deserves to be 
labelled as such, as according to him, sub-legal obligations simply do not constitute ‘law’ at all.306 
 
An example of a non-treaty agreement is an MoU (see below, Part II, 4.1.4). The effects of non-
compliance with the agreement will take place in the realm of politics. The other party does not have 
the possibility to bring the case before an international court or tribunal, or to impose 
countermeasures that it might be entitled to take in the case of breach of a treaty. However, the other 
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party can resort to its general right of retorsion (retaliation by a state by means that are not illegal, 
such as breaking off diplomatic relations).307 The exact effects of soft law instruments are difficult to 
determine in advance.308 An example of the potential unexpected influence of soft law is that it could 
be used in court to give substantive content to vague normative standards such as ‘due diligence’.309 
Nevertheless, while its effects are difficult to determine in advance, it is generally supported that soft 
law is able to affect the behaviour of nations to a considerable extent.310 
 
According to GUZMAN the uncertain place of soft law in the realm of international law can be 
attributed to negative presumptions regarding state compliance to soft law.311 The scope of this study 
does not allow to elaborate on the many theories on state compliance.312 One theory worth 
mentioning in this context, however, is the theory put forward by GUZMAN, originating from the 
frustration that “[l]egal scholarship lack[ed] a satisfactory theory of why and when states comply with international 
law.”313 His reputational theory departs from a model of rational, self-interested states, encompassing 
a broader view of international law, which includes soft law, and “any promise that materially alters state 
incentives”, as such promises will also have a reputational impact on a state if they are breached. 
According to GUZMAN compliance does not so much depend on international law considerations, 
but rather on a cost-benefit analysis relating to both the reputational impact of a violation of an 
agreement, as well as the cost of compliance. When issues of profound national importance are at 
stake, compliance costs will likely not outweigh the reputational cost of a violation.314  
 
Whether or not an agreement is legally binding is approached subjectively by some scholars as 
depending on the intention of the parties to be bound by their commitments, claiming that 
international law does not contain an assumption that agreements are of a treaty nature. Another 
approach holds an objective view of soft law, based on the content of the rule (in this vein, see the 
concept of legalization below).315 AUST identified some criteria along which to distinguish between a 
treaty and an MoU, but the criteria can be generalised to all types of non-treaty agreements. They 
include evidence of an intention to conclude (or not conclude) a treaty, terminology and form, 
content, express provisions as to the non-legally binding status of the document, the circumstances 
in which the instrument was concluded, and registration or non-registration. He adds that the will of 
the parties may be expressed by using carefully chosen terminology to indicate that the parties do not 
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intend to create international legal rights and obligations, but rather wish to write down their 
understandings of expected future conduct.316  
 
The CJEU elaborated on this matter in the case C-233/02, French Republic v Commission of the European 
Communities.317 This case concerned the competence of the Commission to enter into an international 
agreement with the US, namely the Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency. The 
case reflected the increasing intolerance of Paris regarding the perceived ‘soft institutionalisation’ that 
was engaged in by EU and US officials to govern their transatlantic relationships. The Guidelines 
were developed within the framework of the Action Plan created for the Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership, which contained in the section on technical barriers to trade a paragraph on regulatory 
cooperation. The interest on the part of the US to develop guidelines on regulatory cooperation with 
the EU was not surprising as the EU market would soon grow with ten new member states, that 
would adhere to the rules decided on in Brussels.318 Because the Commission only lacks the 
competence to conclude legally binding international agreements, the central issue in this case was 
whether the agreement was binding in nature.319 The French government relied on the content of the 
agreement to classify it as a legally binding international agreement. According to the French 
government, although the language of the guidelines was carefully selected, the provisions were 
complete and operational in nature, setting out precise objectives, the field of application and the 
measures to be taken and therefore constituted “a legal instrument which is sufficiently detailed to reflect a 
commitment entered into by bodies subject to international law and which has binding force for the latter.”320 The 
Commission, however, maintained that the Guidelines were not legally binding. It was convinced 
that the intention of parties to enter into binding commitments could be “the only decisive criterion in 
international law for the purpose of establishing the existence of binding effect.”321 This intention allegedly 
emerged from the text, structure, and context of the Guidelines. 
 
The Court, rather unconvincingly, took the same stance as the Commission, clarifying that “the 
intention of the parties must in principle be the decisive criterion for the purpose of determining whether or not the 
Guidelines are binding.”322 The use of the words ‘in principle’ suggests that exceptions are possible, but 
the Court did not elaborate on what possible deviations from this principle could be. This intention 
was found both the text of the Guidelines and the history of the negotiations, where the 
Commission repeatedly emphasized the voluntary, non-binding nature of the obligations. The Court 
recalled that both the Transatlantic Economic Partnership and the Action Plan were approved by the 
Council, and that the committee set up pursuant to Article 133(3) EC was regularly informed of the 
progress of the negotiations.323 By reiterating the steps that led to the development of the Guidelines, 
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the Court demonstrated that the Commission had respected the division of competences and the 
institutional balance foreseen in the Treaty with regard to the Common Commercial Policy.324  
 
Surprisingly, the Court avoided to rule on the admissibility of the claim. The Commission had put 
forward that the Guidelines constituted an administrative arrangement, which therefore could not be 
the subject-matter of an action for annulment, and even if the Guidelines were considered binding, 
they did not lay down or produce legal effects and therefore could not be challenged. Contrary to 
established case-law, where the decision on admissibility precedes the judgment on the substance, the 
Court merely stated that “the Court takes the view that given the circumstances in the present case, it is not 
necessary to rule on the objections as to admissibility raised by the Commission, since the form of order sought by the 
French Republic must in any event be dismissed on the substance.”325 This is not merely ‘annoying’ or illogical. 
By deciding on the substance of the matter and declaring that the Guidelines do not have binding 
force, the Court has, for the first time, extended its legality control to acts without legal effect. 
Generally, if an analysis of the admissibility indicated that the act under scrutiny did not hold legal 
effects, the action for annulment was void. Some clarity on what exactly constitute ‘legal effects’ 
would have been very welcome.326 
 
The Court did not only proceed to assess the legality of an act lacking legal effect rather than 
declaring the call for annulment inadmissible, it moreover specified that an act such as the Guidelines 
can only be concluded by the Commission after a process of consultation involving the Council and 
other competent committees. France’s action, while not succeeding in getting the Guidelines to be 
declared void, can nevertheless be considered a victory for the applicant in that the judgment 
established first, the competence of the Court to rule on substance regarding an act such as the 
Guidelines, and the need for prior political consensus for a non-binding act to be legally adopted.327 
BARONCINI opined that the judgment was ambiguous and not entirely convincing. She rightly 
suggested that because it was clear that the Guidelines are normative in nature, rather than labelling 
them as non-binding, it would have been preferable to state that the parties meant to establish best 
efforts obligations rather than obligations to achieve a result, and meant to interfere minimally with 
the discretionary powers of the agencies involved (in this context, see the concept of legalization 
below).328  
 
This judgment came ten years after France had similarly requested that the agreement between the 
Commission and the government of the United States regarding the application of their competition 
laws be declared void, based on the Commission’s alleged lack of competence to conclude the 
agreement. This judgment is elaborately discussed in Part II (see below, Part II, 2.3.1). In this 
context, however, it can already be stated that in this case as well, the Court had to decide on the 
legally binding nature of the agreement, and did so in a dubious way. The Court first stated very 
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briefly that “as is apparent from its actual wording, the Agreement is intended to produce legal effects.”329 Then it 
reiterated that the Community alone has the capacity to bind itself internationally, continuing that 
“[t]here is no doubt, therefore, that the Agreement is binding on the European Communities.”330 The causality in 
the line of thought of the Court is far from clear. The Court is of the opinion that the Agreement fits 
the definition of an international agreement within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a)(i) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations of 21 March 1986. Non-performance of the Agreement could then 
result into international liability for the Community. Appreciation of the intention of the parties to 
the agreement was much less present, if not totally absent, in the 1994 judgment of the Court. It is 
equally surprising that in the 2004 judgment, the Court did not refer to its Opinion 1/75,331 nor to 
the Vienna Convention.332 Most recently, with regard to the definition of an agreement according to 
international law, the Court in its Opinion 1/13 confirmed that it interprets the concept of 
‘agreement’, both under the law of treaties and for the purposes of EU law, in a broad way. It states 
that, in the context of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, “the act 
of accession and the declaration of acceptance of such an accession, although each is effected by means of a separate 
instrument, give expression, overall, to the ‘convergence of intent’ of the States concerned and thus amount to an 
international agreement.”333 Two unilateral statements can therefore nevertheless be considered to form 
an international agreement.334      
 
Around the same time that the Court of Justice ruled on the issue of the legally binding nature of the 
EU-US Agreement, so did the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its 1994 case ‘Concerning 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Quatar and Bahrain (Jurisdiction and Admissibility)’. In 
this case one of the central questions was whether the Minutes that were signed by the parties, 
referring to the consultation between the two foreign ministers of Bahrain and Qatar and that noted 
what had been ‘agreed’ between the parties, constituted a binding treaty under international law. The 
ICJ first assessed the ‘nature’ of the text, and only then the ‘content’. It reiterated that international 
agreements can have different forms and have a diversity of names, referring to the definition of 
treaty in the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties of 1969. The ICJ is of the opinion that the 
‘actual terms’ of an agreement and the circumstances in which it was drawn up should be the main 
factors to ascertain whether a treaty has been concluded.335 The Court continued that the Minutes 
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were not a simple record of a meeting, and took an entirely different stance than the CJEU when it 
did not find it necessary to consider the likely intentions of the Foreign Minister of Bahrain or Qatar. 
The ICJ finally concluded that het Minutes constituted an international agreement that created rights 
and obligations for the Parties.336 
 
2.4.3 The concept of legalization 
 
The definitions of soft law covered so far consider the legally binding nature of the rule to be the 
main factor in categorising a rule as either hard or soft law, the dividing line being constituted by the 
intention of the parties according to the Court. This distinction, however, is rather artificial. Some 
scholars, therefore, put forward that the reality consists of a whole spectrum, or continuum, of 
‘softer’ and ‘harder’ law, an approach that is supported by this study. The European Parliament as 
well recognised that in the first place “[…] the notion of soft law, based on common practice, is ambiguous and 
pernicious” and that “[…] the distinction between dura lex/mollis lex, being conceptually aberrant, should not be 
accepted or recognised.”337 The distinction between hard and soft law for the purpose of this study is not 
considered to be a binary one. Rather, international agreements are seen to cover a whole spectrum 
of commitment.338 Since competition law is a fairly technical topic on which there exists some form 
of consensus on the practices that should be condemned, but much less agreement on the specific 
approach that should be followed, DAVIDOW and CHILES remarked that instruments dealing with 
restrictive business practices will fall somewhere between both extremes.339  
 
GUZMAN identified at least two dimensions along which the level of commitment of the parties can 
be adjusted, namely the formality and the clarity of an agreement.340 In line with the ‘continuum 
approach’, ABBOTT, KEOHANE, MORAVCSIK, SLAUGHTER and SNIDAL have further developed and 
refined this approach via what they call ‘the concept of legalization’. According to this concept, the 
place of a rule along the continuum between hard and soft law is determined according to three 
characteristics: obligation, precision, and delegation. As a legal rule is weakened along one or more of 
those three dimensions, the realm of soft law begins. The variety that is possible along the three 
aforementioned dimensions results in a great diversity of ‘harder’ and ‘softer’ law.341 A clear 
distinction must be made, however, between the nature of an agreement and its content or 
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stringency. A formal treaty could contain the same obligations as, for instance, a conference 
declaration,342 and non-treaty agreements can be as complete as a proper international treaty.343  
 
The concept of legalization is empiricist in origin and was tailored to the reality of international 
relations. Obligation measures the degree in which the subjects of a rule are bound by it and the 
extent to which their behaviour is scrutinized under international and domestic law.344 ABBOTT et al. 
point out that legal obligations differ from obligations resulting from coercion or morality alone, as 
the former “bring into play the established norms, procedures, and forms of discourse of the international legal 
system.”345 An agreement can be binding in many ways, but it is either binding under international law 
or not.346 As mentioned, this distinction is classically used to determine the difference between hard 
and soft law. ‘Obligation’ relates to the fundamental international legal principle of pacta sunt 
servanda.347 If the legal commitments are broken, accepted procedures and remedies are foreseen by 
the international legal system to ensure reparation. Entering into a formal treaty therefore expresses 
the intent of the parties to create legally binding obligations that are governed by international law. 
Under legally binding agreements states can assert legal claims, engage in legal discourse, invoke legal 
procedures, and resort to legal remedies. This is not possible under non-legally binding instruments, 
where states can make normative claims, engage in normative discourse, and resort to political 
remedies.348 Breach of a non-treaty agreement can be seen as ‘an unfriendly act’ and can be 
responded to with countermeasures and retaliation inherent in the system.349 The distinction may not 
always be very clear. Many techniques can be used to create variety in the level of obligation. This 
sometimes results in surprising and confusing contrasts between form and substance. These 
techniques include contingent or hortatory obligations, escape clauses, or simply allowing withdrawal 
of the agreement after a specified notice period. Alternatively, seemingly unconditional obligations 
can be created by institutions without direct law-creating authority. The legal implications can 
therefore be quite contested.350  
 
This first factor therefore aligns with the classical binary approach. The concept of legalization goes 
beyond this by adding the factor of precision. HILLGENBERG believes that the level of precision of 
an agreement is not an appropriate criterion for determining the binding or non-binding nature of an 
agreement.351 The concept of legalization takes this criterion into account, but it is not the only 
relevant factor. Precision refers to the extent to which a rule unambiguously defines the required or 
forbidden behaviour in a precise and elaborate way, or rather sticks to vague principles.352 A formal, 
legally binding treaty may contain obligations that are so vague that they cannot be properly enforced 
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or that make it nearly impossible to assess compliance.353 The more precise a rule is formulated, the 
narrower the scope for reasonable interpretation becomes. In case of a precise rule, non-acceptable 
behaviour is largely defined ex ante by the legislator, whereas when the rule is rather imprecise, this 
determination is made ex post.354 TAYLOR claimed that a distinctive feature of international soft law is 
that it “has avoided the need to express matters in black and white terms and has therefore remained consistent with 
the approach of international diplomacy and its myriad nuances and shades of grey.”355 He explained that this is 
achieved via so-called ‘studied ambiguity’, namely “the use of deliberate ambiguity to gloss over differences 
between nations when expressing international agreement.”356 A benefit of this technique is that it can create 
an atmosphere of agreement, promoting cooperation, but a drawback is that it may not result in 
actual effects.357  
 
Delegation is the third factor contributing to the concept of legalization. It refers to the extent to 
which designated third parties are authorised to implement, interpret and apply the rules, be it a 
court, arbitrator or administrative organ.358 Such a delegation of authority to interpret certain rules, 
often to an international body or the judiciary, can limit the discretion that accompanies imprecise 
rules. 
 
While variation along each factor is possible, there is a certain degree of interdependency. For 
instance, high delegation will very often be accompanied by a high level of legal obligation. 
Nevertheless, the authors of ‘The concept of legalization’ indicate that not all factors are weighed 
equally. The dimension of obligation should be weighed most heavily, and the precision-dimension 
carries the least weight. Reasons for this imbalance, however, are not provided. Many of the factors 
used to distinguish between hard and soft law seem to indicate the extent to which compliance can 
be assessed and the law is enforceable. Rather than looking for signs indicating the intentions of the 
parties to determine the legally binding nature of an agreement, indications of enforceability such as 
obligation, precision, and delegation might give a clearer image of the level of commitment the 
parties were willing to accept.  
 
2.4.4 Benefits of soft law 
 
In this section the benefits and drawbacks of soft law are analysed. How and to what extent these 
benefits apply in the context of international competition cooperation in particular will become 
apparent in Part II of this study. Before identifying the main benefits and drawbacks of ‘soft law’ in 
its various forms, it is important to note that one particular form of legalization is not inherently 
superior to another.359 Many authors believe in the distinct benefits of soft law as a full-blown 
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alternative for hard law in certain situations.360 MARSDEN, for example, a strong promotor of soft law 
and informal cooperation, stated that in the context of international competition law cooperation 
binding rule-making has simply ruled itself out by not happening.361 ABBOTT and SNIDAL claimed 
that soft law offers some of the same benefits as hard law, while also overcoming some of its costs, 
and adding some independent advantages of its own.362 Soft law undeniably has distinct own 
benefits, and while it can lead to harder forms of law, this is not its only merit, and this is also not a 
guarantee. Indeed, “[h]ard law is probably more likely to evolve from soft law than from (utopian) plans to create 
hard law full-blown. But this does not imply that all soft legalization is a way station to hard(er) legalization, or that 
hard legalization is the optimal form.”363 Soft law can be useful in particular contexts, but not in all.364 As 
ABBOTT and SNIDAL put it, “international legalization is a diverse phenomenon because it helps a diverse universe 
of states and other actors resolve diverse problems.”365 Different levels of soft law can be more effective and 
efficient in different circumstances.366  
 
2.4.4.1 Flexibility in procedure and effects 
 
One argument opposing hard law is that once negotiated rules are formalised, they are difficult to 
change and adapt to societal and other evolutions, thus risking obsolescence.367 Indeed, soft rules can 
generally be produced and changed via less stringent procedures and therefore seem more 
appropriate in a rapidly changing environment, as the formality of a rule and its ‘hard’ of ‘soft’ nature 
will often be closely interlinked. The emergence of the use of soft law was indeed explained by 
HEATHER and LOBRANO by the fact that the rapid expansion of competition laws combined with 
stronger antitrust agencies did not allow antitrust to proceed through legislative changes and formal 
treaties.368  
 
Moreover, soft rules offer flexibility by allowing states to adjust their commitments to their particular 
domestic political and economic conditions, “rather than trying to accommodate divergent national 
circumstances within a single text.”369 Not all parties are equally ready for legalization due to differences in 
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the domestic situation. Some countries’ institutions, laws, or personnel restraints do not allow the 
implementation of hard commitments.  
 
2.4.4.2 Less contracting costs and less implementation costs 
 
A consequence of this flexibility is that soft law generally entails less contracting and implementation 
costs than hard law. The negotiation of soft law will become more attractive to states as the 
contracting costs of hard law increase. These contracting or negotiation costs include relatively 
mechanical costs such as the number of actors involved in the negotiation process and the 
procedures to be followed. Approval and ratification by the legislator is a time- and resource-
consuming complex process, that can sometimes be avoided if the negotiated rules are not legally 
binding. Softer forms of law allow states to test the consequences of their agreement. This type of 
learning process will often lower the perceived costs of subsequent moves to harder legalization. 
Depending on the formality of the agreement and precision of the obligations, soft law moreover 
entails less costs when renegotiation is needed in light of new information.370 Not all possible 
contingencies can be foreseen by an international agreement, no matter how complex it is or how 
many reservations, exceptions, or escape clauses it contains. 
 
Implementation costs mainly concern the gravity of the distributional effects of the agreement and 
therefore to a large extent align with ‘sovereignty costs’, meaning the limitations imposed on the 
sovereign will of the state following the agreement. Sovereignty costs vary, and can range from minor 
differences in the outcome of particular issues, to loss of authority over decision making in certain 
field. The highest sovereignty costs are encountered in the case the traditional hallmarks of 
sovereignty are touched upon, such as the relation between a state and its citizens or territory.371 
Some sovereignty costs can be unanticipated. Potential legislative reforms are costly, and the impact 
of a reform on other enforcement policies can be difficult to predict.372 Delegation entails this risk to 
a large extent.373  
 
Soft law often allows a certain degree of case-by-case cooperation, or cherry-picking, permitting 
states to capture the benefits of cooperation only where the perceived benefits outweigh the 
perceived costs.374 This way, states may more easily choose for so-called ‘efficient breach of contract’. 
Soft law offers parties the opportunity to signal their willingness to engage, while limiting the 
consequences in case a party at some point violates part of the agreement.375 Parties to a non-binding 
agreement avoid the risk of breaching international law when they ignore their obligations under the 
agreement.376 They avoid this risk if they are ultimately unable or unwilling to comply with their 
obligations and can to a large extent hold on to the control they have over their domestic laws, but 
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still capture some of the gains of international cooperation.377 While states often retain the possibility 
to withdraw from a legally binding agreement, “processes of enmeshment may make it increasingly costly for 
them to do so.”378 Softer legalization implies that via the inclusion of escape clauses, imprecise 
commitments or particular forms of delegation states can maintain future control in the occurrence 
of adverse circumstances and thereby dampen security and distributional concerns.379  
 
While soft law reduces negotiation and implementation costs, it does come at a charge of its own. 
Hard law can offer stable commitment via several international and domestic institutions and 
procedures, giving the committed actors both normative and reputational arguments to maintain 
their policy, while softer law may necessitate frequent renegotiations and persuasion, being costly 
activities.380 BRADFORD argued that the multitude of soft bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral 
governance instruments, taken together, are more costly than the negotiation of a more 
‘comprehensive’ single binding international antitrust agreement. She did add, however, that this is 
only so “provided that such an agreement was feasible to reach.”381  
 
2.4.4.3 Generally equally effective as hard law on the international scene  
 
Whenever there is no simultaneous execution of obligations, it is crucial to have credible 
commitments and assurances. Generally, appropriate enforcement mechanisms can offer this 
credibility. However, in international law, even ‘hard’ international law encounters difficulties with 
enforcement, and cannot be compared to domestic enforcement via the power of the state. Even 
where enforcement mechanisms are in place, the wish not to disturb diplomatic relations may 
prevent them from ever being used.   
 
An often-heard argument is that in fact, hard and soft international law have the same effect. 
SLAUGHTER believes that soft law, via international guidance through principles, guidelines, codes, 
standards, best practices or other non-legal instruments is actually as powerful as hard law.382 
HILLGENBERG confirmed that the level of compliance for non-treaty agreements and treaties is 
largely the same.383 The remark must be made that soft law is not equally effective as hard law for all 
issues. In the field of competition law, while soft law is appropriate for matters such as coordination 
or procedural harmonization, it has less success with subjects where substantive disagreement exists 
and where national legislation needs to be amended, as is the case with for instance the exchange of 
confidential information. It is commonplace to state, among public international law scholars, that 
state behaviour can only be changed by binding international rules and the underlying belief of pacta 
sunt servanda. However, international relations scholarship has expressed scepticism with regard to the 
impact of binding treaties. It is believed that “[i]f states want out of a commitment, they will build in an 
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exception, or they will breach and fight it out in dispute settlement proceedings.”384 HILLGENBERG confirmed that 
the danger of elusive results is equally strong in case of treaties and non-treaty agreements.385 
According to MARSDEN, formal treaty-making rarely overcomes the dominance of national 
interests.386 Rules do not just operate though material incentives, but also via the modification of 
understandings, behavioural standards and identities. Compliance may be motivated by many 
reasons, regardless of the legal status of the rules (e.g. reciprocity, reputation, damage to valuable 
state institutions, or normative and material considerations). The fear for reputational damage after 
non-compliance may have an equally large effect as the threat of international law enforcement 
mechanisms.387  
 
2.4.4.4 Avoiding or breaking through deadlock 
 
KLABBERS considered that soft law undermines the raison d’etre (in his point of view) of law, namely 
simplifying the complexities of reality in order to organize life in a way man can handle. He stated 
that by introducing soft law, everyday complexity has been substituted by legal complexity.388 While it 
is certainly true that soft law adds to the complexity of the legal system, it also offers a solution for 
the cases in which hard law cannot form the answer. Indeed, soft law is often employed when a hard 
law agreement is not feasible. Agreements that would not be possible under a binding regime, are 
sometimes accepted under a soft law system.389 In negotiations for a legally binding agreement, the 
result is sometimes that after a process of so-called ‘issue subtraction’, only the non-controversial, 
but often empty topics remain included in the agreement, severely limiting the latter’s relevance and 
impact. Scaling down the impact of the provisions, instead of leaving them out of the negotiations, 
can then be a useful alternative.390 Soft law “allows states to capture the ‘easy’ gains they can recognize with 
incomplete knowledge, without allowing differences or uncertainties about the situation to impede completion of the 
bargain.”391 Soft law agreements can therefore have a strong symbolic value, signalling the willingness 
of the parties to make efforts in a certain field, without having to fully commit from the start. On the 
other hand, soft obligations may easily be discarded if changes in the political climate or 
administration of a jurisdiction occur. Continuity is not ensured. This is an important drawback to 
take into account. 
 
In the field of competition law for instance, while states all recognize the need for enhanced 
international antitrust cooperation, they do not agree on the precise content of such cooperation. 
And while states also see the benefits of competitive markets and antitrust laws, they have differing 
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views on the goals and priorities of such laws. The necessity to coordinate antitrust enforcement 
across jurisdictions is recognised, but the specifics remain an issue of debate (see above, Part I, 2).392 
A ‘soft’ agreement can therefore be seen as an intermediate step between ‘no agreement’ and 
‘binding agreement’. In this way, “in the face of protracted international negotiations over difficult and complex 
issues”, rapid consensus building is promoted, and political momentum may be sustained.393 Soft law 
can be of help in those situations where “some agreement […] is better than no agreement at all […] And on 
this line of thought, […] any form of cooperation is better than no form of cooperation at all[…].”394 Sometimes the 
quality of the cooperation can even be higher than if hard law would be involved. MARSDEN for 
instance claimed that the ICN aims to develop best practices and tries to find a ‘highest common 
denominator’ instead of the lowest, as the aim is not agreement at all cost.395  
 
2.4.5 Drawbacks of soft law  
 
2.4.5.1 May disrupt institutional balance in the EU 
 
The European Parliament issued a Resolution in 2007 on the institutional and legal implications of 
the use of soft law instruments in the EU legal order.396 While the resolution targeted the use of soft 
law in an ‘intra-EU’ context, some of its claims are valid in an international context as well. Because 
soft law instruments are often concluded in an informal manner, avoiding complex legislative 
procedures, the European Parliament warned that “[…] it is only by means of the adoption of legislation 
through the institutional procedures laid down in the Treaty that legal certainty, the rule of law, justiciability and 
enforceability may be secured […].”397 It continued that soft law instruments disrespect the institutional 
balance enshrined in the Treaty that allows for openness of decision-making. The European 
Parliament recalled that soft law was historically used to alleviate a lack of formal law-making 
capacity and/or means of enforcement, and went even further to state that in general, where the EU 
has competence to legislate, this precludes the use of ‘soft law’.398 The Parliament expressed its 
concern that soft law instruments should not be used “as a surrogate for legislation where the Community 
has legislative power and where […] this would also constitute a breach of the principle of conferred specific powers 
[…]”399Another consequence is that sometimes the legal basis upon which the act is based is unclear 
or questionable.400 Case C-660/13 Council of the European Union v European Commission 
demonstrated that this fear for institutional imbalance is still very much alive (see below, Part II, 
4.1.4).   
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2.4.5.2 Democratic deficit and limited transparency   
 
Linked to the previous point, soft law mechanisms are often criticised because they can be used to 
bypass the democratic process, by avoiding the procedures that are involved when passing hard 
legislation.401 The procedural flexibility allowed when adopting more informal soft law instruments 
can significantly decrease the number of institutional players involved in decision-making, while at 
the same time offering less opportunities for other interested parties to express their opinion. The 
rise of soft law is also a trend in domestic competition law.402 In the aforementioned European 
Parliament Resolution, it is stated that the use of soft law may disrupt the division of competences in 
the EU and flout the principles of democracy, rule of law, subsidiarity and proportionality.403 The 
Parliament went quite far by accusing soft law of creating “a public perception of a ‘superbureaucracy’ 
without democratic legitimacy, not just remote from citizens but actually hostile to them, and willing to reach 
accommodations with powerful lobbies in which the negotiations are neither transparent nor comprehensible to citizens, 
[…] this may raise legitimate expectations on the part of third parties affected (e.g. consumers) who then have no way 
of defending them at law in the face of acts having adverse legal effects for them.”404 Soft law is indeed accused of 
being instrumental to the privatisation or setting aside of legally binding standards,405 and therefore is 
regarded with a certain suspicion. Others have an even more extreme opinion, stating that ‘informal 
law’ can be regarded “as a ploy by the powers that be to strengthen their own position, to the detriment of others” 
and is but a ‘vehicle for administrative power’.406 It is said that it lays power in the hands of unelected 
technocrats rather than elected officials.407 
 
Others, however, claim that having experienced experts such as competition officials ‘talk among 
themselves’ is better, because it creates credibility, expertise and objectivity, and is likely to be more 
effective.408 This is linked to the larger debate on democracy versus technocracy. Because the official 
procedures for the adoption of formal hard law do not need to be followed, transparency on how a 
soft law instrument came into existence can be lacking. Informal soft law instruments are moreover 
not subjected to the publication-obligation in Article 297 TFEU, again reducing transparency.409 
 
2.4.5.3 Pick and choose leading to uncertainty  
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It often appears from ICN surveys that a very large number of respondents uses or intends to use 
the ICN’s Merger Practices and that ICN output has contributed to change in their merger review 
regimes.410 This information does not indicate, however, whether this implies a full implementation 
of the practices or rather a ‘pick and choose’ of the most beneficial elements.411 While the latter is 
beneficial for the states involved, it is far less so for the business community, whose situation is not 
necessarily clarified or made more certain. Because states are not legally bound by their commitments 
and have great discretion in the implementation, soft law may sometimes create legal uncertainty for 
companies and may fail to sufficiently smoothen the legal landscape.412 Finally, without enforcement, 
unclear concepts in a soft law act remain unchallenged and thus opaque. This is “aggravated by a 
lingering notion that non-binding instruments may at times be drafted in a less elaborate manner than hard law.”413 
This again contributes to an environment of uncertainty.  
 
2.4.5.4 Smokescreen  
 
Realists dismiss and criticize soft law in international affairs as being mere ‘window dressing’. Others 
reject soft law as a ‘destabilizing factor’414 or regard soft law as a ‘second-best’ solution or ‘interim’ 
solution, when reaching a binding agreement is not (yet) possible, and claim the value of soft law 
only lies in that function.415  
 
In 1998, KLABBERS, holding an extremely negative view towards soft law, called soft law a redundant 
and detrimental concept.416 He believed that in practice, soft law “collapses into either hard law, or no law 
at all.”417 He stated that “If we anticipate that parliament may not be persuaded, then we simply devise a solution 
that need not be presented to parliament. If we think voters need to be comforted that some international solution does 
not hurt them, we tell them that as a matter of hard law, our chosen option is of limited relevance only: they need not 
worry, as our solution is only soft law. And if we sense that substantive agreement is still out of reach, we settle for the 
next best thing: the semblance of agreement. All this is perhaps most visible in international law.”418 While this 
statement also criticises the democratic deficit, his main problem with soft law is that it does not 
contribute to a real solution to pressing issues, and merely functions as a ‘smokescreen’. He adds that 
a degree of formalism in law is necessary to avoid arbitrary power.419 DAVIDOW and CHILES seem to 
adhere to this point of view by claiming that agreeing to soft mechanisms such as consultation 
procedures is in fact “a cosmetic formula for indicating goodwill and diplomatic accessibility and disguising 
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unwillingness to surrender national discretion or to create powerful international institutions.”420 TAYLOR equally 
claimed that soft law enables governments to be perceived as achieving progress.421 
 
This criticism is not entirely justified. While soft law is not legally binding, other incentives to comply 
(such as reputational damage) do exist. Nevertheless, the monitoring of compliance with soft law is 
often difficult and therefore creates opportunities to shirk, while the lack of firm international 
commitments can make it easier for domestic forces (private or government groups) to undo the 
agreement and change government policy.422  
 
2.4.5.5 Domestic legal protectionism  
 
The preference of the US for soft cooperation agreements rather than a binding multilateral 
agreement on competition cooperation (see below, Part I, 3), may be explained by the fact that 
“[c]ountries with greater power will want the international standard to move closer to their domestic laws, in order to 
reduce the transition costs to the new system.”423 The choice for soft law may thus be related to the relative 
economic and political power of a state. Powerful states would only accept hard law if it incorporated 
the domestic preference. Generally, weaker states benefit from harder obligations, as more powerful 
states can then credibly constrain themselves from opportunistic behaviour and in this way induce 
cooperation.424 A downside of hard law for weaker states is that they might not want to be perceived 
domestically as ‘following the dictates of a powerful state.’425 
 
3. Origins of international competition cooperation  
 
As demonstrated above, globalisation and the accompanying increase in cross-border anticompetitive 
behaviour shook the pillars of Westphalian sovereignty, and combined with an increase in national 
competition legislation, called for international cooperation. It had become increasingly difficult for 
states to independently tackle the anticompetitive behaviour affecting their territory, and large 
corporations were able to decide on the laws they were governed by. Although competition law is a 
young branch of law, international cooperation proved itself necessary from the very beginning. 
 
This section analyses the factors that necessitate a continuous reconsideration of competition law at 
the global level, such as deficiencies in jurisdictional regimes, evolving relations between states, and 
changes in the structure of competition law itself.426 Analysis of these developments helps to better 
understand the current situation, and allows the identification of areas of improvement. It helps to 
explain where certain provisions originate, and what the rationale behind them was. As this study 
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aims to answer the question whether there is a future for bilateral competition cooperation, analysis of 
cooperation efforts in the past is crucial.  
 
3.1 External events overthrew early multilateral initiatives  
 
3.1.1 The 1927 World Economic Conference  
 
The history of international cooperation on competition law issues started already in 1926 in the 
Preparatory Committee of the World Economic Conference (WEC), established under the auspices 
of the League of Nations, only a few years after the appearance of the first competition laws in 
Europe.427 This occasion is generally considered the earliest recorded proposal for regulating 
international anti-competitive conduct and the first occasion during which global antitrust was 
discussed.428 Europe in the 1920s was characterized by US ascendancy amidst a lack of economic 
development and disturbed political relations following WWI. Combined with rapid re-
industrialization after the war, a fertile climate was created for international cartels to thrive. It is in 
this unstable context that the League of Nations initiated a global conference aimed at the 
development of appropriate responses to the economic problems of the world, placing the 
protection of competition at the forefront of economic policy concern. The initiators of the 
conference intended to “convince governments that cooperative arrangements were necessary to avoid economic 
disaster and its political repercussions.”429 This made the use of law to protect global competition 
materialize as a prominent international issue.  
 
The aim of the conference was not to reach a binding agreement. Participants to the conference were 
seen as ‘super experts’ in their field carrying great moral authority, but they did not represent their 
governments in official capacities. A similar rationale can now be found in the ICN, where experts 
(academic experts, as well as competition agency officials, not governmental agents) gather to create 
non-binding best practices relating to competition. A big difference, however, is that while the ICN 
focuses strictly on competition issues (see below, Part III, 2.1.4), the WEC focused on the reduction 
of (mainly governmental) barriers to international trade, such as tariffs. However, as many attributed 
equal importance to private barriers, for instance international cartels, the conference followed a 
rather integrated approach.430 Delegates at the conference represented (although not officially) fifty 
nations, and embodied many interest-groups such as industrialists, the business community, 
agriculturalists, financiers, government officials, economists and labour leaders. The mainly non-
political nature of the WEC (in the sense that professional politicians were not negotiating the 
agreement) is applauded by some commentators as one of the main reasons of its ‘success’.431 
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One notable participant to this conference was the US, who only held observer status as it was not a 
member of the League of Nations. This limited participation not only diminished the political weight 
of the conference, but was also the reason why the conference generated little awareness across the 
ocean. The US was perceived by the Europeans as a threat rather than a partner, among other 
reasons due to the distinctive characteristics of the US’ antitrust system that was attributed little 
relevance for the European situation.432 Characteristic of the international environment at the time as 
well is that some commentators emphasised the ‘weakness’ of the Soviet representatives, which were 
not member of the League either, while viewing the US input as “an outside view of what are primarily 
European problems.”433 In retrospect this ‘exclusion’ might have played a role in the aggressive 
extraterritorial behaviour of the US (see below,  Part I, 3.2). 
 
The WEC took place from May 4th to 23rd 1927 in Geneva. The plenary sessions were mainly 
intended to create a certain atmosphere among the participants. After these preliminaries, the 
negotiations took place in three main committees: commerce, agriculture, and industry. It is in the 
latter that the discussions on international competition policy took place. The committee was 
criticized as being disappointing and covering too wide a range of subjects, ranging from social 
justice to the future economic organisation of the League.434 
 
On initiative of France, the conference was encouraged to promote cartels, which were seen as a 
means to rationalize economic development and industry, reduce overproduction, increase job 
stability, and stabilize economic relations.435 Indeed, originally cartels were perceived as respected 
economic institutions in Europe as they drove economic growth by being an engine of industrial 
development. It is said that “economy by cartel was the rule in Europe prior to 1945.”436 The conference 
took place in a context where there was little experience with competition law and all its complexities 
were not apparent yet.437 Concerns about cartels were nevertheless expressed and it was advocated 
that an international organisation under the League should keep the cartels in order.438 The 
conference therefore, while mostly wanting to gain support for cartels, wished to warn for abuse as 
well. The difficult and contentious discussions on cartels resulted in a final recommendation to 
“collect information concerning international cartels, monitor their conduct, investigate the effects they produced, and 
publish information about harmful conduct”,439 as it was decided that the attitudes on the issue of 
international regulatory coordination to address the adverse effects of international cartels “were too 
diverse to support any international regulatory regime […]”,440 a comment that will reappear repeatedly in the 
future. While indeed international rules concerning cartels were considered impracticable given 
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differences in national cartel policies, the Committee nevertheless encouraged cooperative 
supervision.441  
 
The Report finally produced by the WEC was labelled “among the most important and remarkable 
documents which has yet appeared under the auspices of the League.”442 The Conference was lauded for having 
been able to produce unanimous and categorical recommendations on controversial issues, despite 
being such a large and diverse body.443 Even with the support from numerous governments, 
however, the Great Depression and later World War II and the Cold War made it basically 
impossible for states to adhere to the recommendations and the climate of mistrust that was 
generated by these events obstructed the pursuit of international agreement and coordination for 
decades to follow.444  
 
3.1.2 The 1948 Havana Charter  
 
A paradigm shift occurred during World War II and the extreme changes in the international 
environment, in which the idea of an ‘international community’ was abandoned. At the same time, 
the adverse political consequences of industrial cartelisation and the negative welfare effects of 
excessive concentration of economic power were recognised.445   
 
The global competition law idea resurfaced after World War II, where a shattered Europe allowed 
the US to take the lead. The period of post-war economic reconstruction was seen by the US as an 
opportunity to advocate their plans of “institutionalising international economic relations, liberalising world 
trade, and establishing an open and stable international economic system.”446 The global competition law project 
was contained in the Bretton Woods program, and more specifically in the plans for an International 
Trade Organization (ITO), which later fell victim to the troubled relationship between the US and 
the former Soviet Union.447 The ITO was created by the so-called Havana Charter initiated by the US 
in 1945. The context in which the Havana Charter was created differed from the context of the 
Geneva conference in two ways: states had more experience with competition laws, and recent 
events had emphasised the global nature of economic issues. 
 
The proposal for the Havana Charter, dealing with public as well as private restraints to trade, was 
comprised of a set of multilateral substantive principles that should serve as a code of conduct for 
states, and suggested the establishment of an international organisation mandated to enforce these 
principles. A Europe desperately craving economic recovery generally supported US proposals, 
regardless of whether there was true agreement on the underlying principles.448  
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The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations appointed a preparatory committee to 
discuss and develop the proposal. The very ambitious draft charter for the ITO proposed by the US 
was based on the premise that anti-competitive behaviour should be considered a barrier to world 
trade and should be subject to strict international regulation. The draft even contained a rebuttable 
presumption that certain conduct was anti-competitive. The draft allowed ratifying nations as well as 
private parties to petition the ITO to undertake investigatory action. If the ITO identified a breach 
of the Charter, it would be able to direct ratifying nations to take action in order to rectify any 
harmful business practices.449 
 
Many states regarded the draft as being too radical. The Charter was substantially softened and 
intense negotiations led to a revised charter for the ITO in 1948, which eventually became known as 
the ‘Havana Charter’. The basic rationale of the Havana Charter remained the same in that it aimed 
to establish uniform minimum rules, as well as a supranational enforcement body, but this time with 
mere recommendatory powers. While less ambitious than the previous draft, it retained some radical 
elements.450   
 
Competition law in the Havana Charter was embedded in the Restrictive Business Practices Code. As 
mentioned, the ultimate goal of the Charter was to revive global trade and stabilize global economic 
relations in the post-war era by addressing public as well as private restraints. Therefore, as was the 
case during the Geneva WEC, competition was embedded in a wider trade context. While the 
inclusion of a competition chapter received wide support, on a substantial level the final charter was 
indeed much less stringent than originally envisaged. There was a presumption that states should take 
action against certain anti-competitive actions, but there was no explicit prohibition on anti-
competitive conduct.451 An exhaustive list of such anti-competitive practices was included in 
paragraph 3 of article 46.452 Article 50 (1) of the Charter required each member to “take all possible 
measures by legislation or otherwise, in accordance with its constitution or system of law and economic organization, to 
ensure, within its jurisdiction, that private and public commercial enterprises do not engage in [prohibited] practices 
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[...] and it shall assist the Organization in preventing these practices.” This is considered as the earliest 
multilateral call for competition law enforcement.453  
 
The enforcement possibilities as well had been weakened.454 The Charter foresaw a consultation and 
investigation procedure described in respectively Articles 47 and 48. The investigation procedure 
started with a complaint that any affected Member may file to the ITO. The organization assessed 
whether the complaint was justified, providing reasonable opportunity to be heard to all relevant 
parties. If it decided that the complaint was grounded, the members concerned would be requested 
to take every possible remedial action, or they will be recommended to carry out remedial measures 
in accordance with their respective laws and procedures.455 The ITO therefore had the authority to 
pressure states to take action and served to some extent as an international dispute settlement body, 
but it no longer had binding force.456   
 
Fifty three of the fifty seven nations meeting in Havana ratified the Charter. Ironically, it was 
abandoned by the international community in 1950 primarily due to the behaviour of its main 
advocate. The weakened version of the Charter was perceived by the US State Department as a 
threat to the more stringent US competition laws, and the US Congress considered it a hazard to US 
economic hegemony and domestic political sovereignty, particularly in the context of its struggles 
with the Soviet Union, which had already rejected the Charter.457 This slow withdrawal and increasing 
disinterest of the US was strengthened by evolutions such as MAO TSE TUNG’S victory in China and 
the start of the Korean war, creating an atmosphere of disillusionment within US congress regarding 
international commitments.458 Moreover, the parallel negotiation by a smaller number of states of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), focussing on a narrower set of related objectives, 
provided an easy ‘excuse’ for those opposing the ITO. They claimed that the GATT agreement 
would be adequate to deal with the most urgent trade issues and no new international organization 
was necessary, even if eventually no competition-related rules were included in the original GATT.459 
In the end, then US President TRUMAN, realizing that Congress would not approve the Charter due 
to the internal and external political developments, withdrew the agreement from consideration in 
December 1950.460 As with the Geneva conference, the Havana Charter ultimately did not reach its 
goal mostly due to non-competition law related events. 
 
3.1.3 The 1951 ECOSOC initiative 
 
Another ambitious scheme putting forward a supranational system of control was developed under 
the Council of Europe. A European convention on the control of cartels was drafted in 1951, one 
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year after the demise of the Havana Charter. Multijurisdictional restrictive agreements were to be 
registered, a commission would receive complaints from individuals or from governments, conduct 
hearings, negotiate settlements, and refer cases to a European-level court that could award 
compensation, impose fines, or delegate such tasks to Member States. Again, this original draft was 
considered too far-reaching and was watered-down.461 The proposal was eventually overtaken by the 
UN. The US suggested that an intergovernmental committee be established “to make recommendations 
to the Council solely for the prevention and control of restrictive business practices in international trade.”462 The UN 
therefore decided to embark on a more modest mission, by trying to formulate an international 
agreement on restrictive business practices, within the realm of the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC).463  
 
A draft convention was developed by an intergovernmental committee of ten countries, and was 
originally intended to go beyond what was developed in the framework of the Havana Charter, by 
adding a series of procedural and organizational articles.464 After the failure of the Havana Charter 
and the change of the international attitude on the matter, the draft was considered to represent 
minimum standards to which a large number of nations could agree. The Parliamentary Assembly 
furthermore underlined the benefits of a global approach.465 The Draft established an international 
agency that lacked any right of interference in the legislative practice of other nations, but 
nevertheless could engage in investigations, studies, consultations, and could issue 
recommendations.466 It did not hold any judicial, legislative, or other sovereign powers, the only 
‘sanction’ that followed one of its reports was the one of publicity,467 and even this moderately weak 
sanction was already heavily objected by business circles.468 TIMBERG stated that as the draft 
agreement could not be formulated ‘with the precision of conveyance or contract of sale’, it should 
be seen as embodying general principles of action, not particularistic prescriptions, and cannot be 
seen as anything more than that.469   
 
Despite being the initiator of the proposal, the US again was the one who rejected the ultimate 
proposal. TIMBERG, Secretary of the relevant UN Committee at the time, stated that the sole reason 
for the rejection was that allegedly there was a basic lack of agreement on the fundamentals, more 
precisely that “this Draft Agreement would not be practicable or effective in accomplishing the elimination of 
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restrictive business practises in international trade because the various national policies, legislation, and enforcement 
procedures in this fields were not sufficiently comparable.”470 While this may be so, it remains confusing why 
the initiative was proposed in the first place, shortly after the demise of the Havana Charter even, as 
surely such agreement did not exist at that time either. It seems that the political nature of antitrust 
rose to the surface during this process. The lack of trust in further efforts toward international 
cooperation by the US may find its origins here, as the US has lost some of its credibility after 
abandoning its own initiatives multiple times. According to TIMBERG, the value of the draft is to be 
found in providing the international community with general clues as to the basis for effective 
United Nations action in the economic area.471 
 
3.2 Extraterritoriality emerged as default solution 
 
These consecutive disappointments to develop a multinational legal framework led to an overall 
abandonment of the project for decades. Moreover, in Europe, competition law was no longer at the 
forefront of social and economic organization. During the war the state had gained near total control 
in the economy and its intervention was still needed for recovery.472 National laws therefore 
remained the only option to combat international anticompetitive behaviour and an alternative 
solution emerged in the form of extraterritorial application of national competition laws.473  
 
3.2.1 Theories of extraterritoriality 
 
At EU-level, the extraterritorial application of competition laws is not regulated (formally or 
informally) in the treaties. The main articles concerning competition law in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Articles 101 and 102 TFEU474 do not mention whether 
they apply extraterritorially. Therefore, the Court of Justice of the EU (the Court), often confirming 
Commission practice, has developed their application in its case-law.475 Several systems of 
extraterritoriality exist.476 Three well-known legal doctrines have been put forward, two of which 
were explicitly confirmed by the Court.  
 
The first doctrine, based on the nationality principle, was only confirmed by the Court in 1972 in the 
Dyestuffs case. The ‘economic entity doctrine’ implies that the activities of undertakings that have their 
seat in the EU fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Court held parent companies from 
third countries liable for the anti-competitive behaviour of their EU subsidiaries over which they had 
control and therefore formed a ‘single economic entity’. Pivotal in this doctrine is that the 
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subsidiaries in practice do not make their business decisions independently, but under the decisive 
influence of the parent company.477  
 
Evidently this theory has its limits, as it cannot be used to assume jurisdiction over purely non-
European players distorting the Single Market. An alternative doctrine was therefore developed. The 
‘implementation doctrine’ found its origins in the territoriality principle, and inferred jurisdiction to 
the EU over conduct having a sufficiently close link to its territory. The core of the doctrine is that in 
case anticompetitive agreements or practices are implemented within the EU and trade between 
member states is affected, they fall under the scope of articles 101 and 102 TFEU, irrespective of 
their geographic origins, or whether or not EU subsidiaries, (sub-) agents or branches were used.478 
This was clarified by the Court in the Wood Pulp case, where it distinguished between two elements of 
an infringement of former Article 85 (current article 101 TFEU), namely the formation of the 
anticompetitive agreement, decision or concerted practice, and its implementation. The Court then 
pointed to the ease with which the competition provisions of the EU could be evaded if their 
applicability depended on the place of formation of the anticompetitive agreement, decision or 
concerted practice. It concluded that the place of implementation of the anticompetitive conduct 
should therefore be the decisive factor, regardless of where and by whom it was conceived.479 What 
actions constitute an ‘implementation’ was further clarified in the Gencor case, stating that the mere 
sale in the EU is an implementation act, irrespective of where the sources of supply or the 
production plants are located.480 ELHAUGE and GERADIN read in this doctrine that it required that 
affirmative steps were taken by the companies in question to market products within the EU.481 
Their opinion is supported by former Advocate General VAN GERVEN, who concluded that this 
requirement was what distinguished the implementation doctrine from the US effects doctrine.482 
The vision that a refusal to sell, creating a competitive restriction within the EU’s territory, can be 
considered as being implemented in the EU exists as well. 483  
 
The final doctrine is acknowledged by the Commission and various Advocate Generals, but 
disagreement exists on whether it is generally confirmed by the Court, which prefers to rely on the 
two other doctrines, as they are less politically sensitive.484 This doctrine is the effects doctrine, which 
is also based on the territoriality principle and extends jurisdiction to situations where the effects in 
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the EU of foreign anticompetitive actions are immediate, reasonably foreseeable, and substantial.485 
The doctrine has been endorsed by the Court of First Instance (now General Court) in the 
aforementioned 1999 Gencor case, where it stated that the Commission could apply the Merger 
Regulation to the merger of South African Gencor Ltd. and British Lonrho Plc. as it would have had 
an ‘immediate and substantial effect in the Community.’486  
 
The EU was not at the forefront of the extraterritorial application of competition laws. While in the 
US extraterritoriality was still rejected in 1909,487 already in 1911-1913, decisions can be found that 
enlarged the reach of the US jurisdiction, further expanded by decisions in 1917 and 1927 stating that 
“trivial or incidental U.S. acts by the defendant or its agents were sufficient in cases where there were substantial effects 
in the United States.”488 This was later converted into a general effects test. The US has for long 
aggressively pursued extraterritorial application of its laws and was the first to be confronted with the 
limits of this strategy. US antitrust laws have broad extraterritorial reach. The Sherman Act provides 
that “[e[very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal”, while the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act (FTAIA), covers any conduct that has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect on US commerce and that gives rise to a claim under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.489 
 
While the effects doctrine is now used all over the world,490 it was originally developed by a US Court 
of Appeal in the well-known Alcoa judgment of 1945, the same year the US initiated the Havana 
Charter. In this case, the US’ jurisdiction was confirmed, provided that the anticompetitive conduct 
had an intended effect on the US market.491 The exact meaning of these concepts and thus the scope 
of the extraterritorial jurisdiction were later interpreted by many other courts and were subject to 
vast debate.492 The Timberlane judgment refined and softened the doctrine (that until then did not 
whatsoever take into account foreign nations’ interests) and integrated some form of self-restriction 
by demanding first, that there is some (actual or intended) effect on US foreign commerce, second, 
that such effect is sufficiently large to form a cognizable injury to the plaintiff, and third, that the 
interests of the US and the links to it in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction are ‘sufficiently strong’ 
compared to those of other states (a comity requirement, see below, Part II, 2.2.4).493 This multi-
factor balancing test is known as the ‘jurisdictional rule of reason test’. This reasoning, however, was 
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criticised by other Courts494 and rejected entirely by the US Supreme Court in the infamous Hartford 
Fire case.495 In this case the Supreme Court limited the use of comity, in other words the balancing of 
the US’s interests with those of other states, to cases of ‘true conflict’, i.e. cases in which an actor 
falling under the rules applicable in multiple jurisdictions cannot comply with one jurisdiction’s rules 
without violating the other’s. The Supreme Court, by narrow majority, thereby endorsed the effects 
test but rejected the rule-of-reason limitation.496 This approach obviously resulted in a very aggressive 
US pursuit of extraterritorial jurisdiction.497  
 
Some moderation was offered by the Empagran case, in which the US Supreme Court restricted the 
reach of US extraterritoriality to a certain extent.498 This moderation was in no small part the 
consequence of the intervention of numerous foreign governments including the United Kingdom, 
Republic of Ireland, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Canada, Japan and the Netherlands, all 
making the point to greater or lesser extent that considerations of comity should lead the US to defer 
to foreign remedies.499 The Supreme Court in this case gave considerable weight to issues of 
international comity and enforcement cooperation.500 In the judgment, based on the US FTAIA, “the 
Court unanimously held that where anticompetitive behavior, such as a price-fixing agreement, ‘significantly and 
adversely affects both customers outside the United States and customers within the United States, but the adverse 
foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic effect,’ plaintiffs who allege that they have been injured by the 
“foreign effect” cannot invoke the jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust laws or courts.”501 In other words, injuries that are 
independent of any adverse domestic effect cannot give rise to a damages claim under the Sherman 
Act for foreign purchasers. This interpretation of comity by the US Supreme Court can be 
contrasted to a certain extent to its subsequent ruling in Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices, which will be 
discussed in Part II (see below, Part II, 2.2.4.3).502   
 
3.2.2 Limits of extraterritoriality  
 
Extraterritorial enforcement only benefits those jurisdictions that have the economic or political 
leverage to do so.503 Small or developing jurisdictions often lack the credibility and resources to apply 
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their laws against large international firms.504 Apart from the fact that this way of ‘regulating’ 
international competition is a developed country luxury due to the fact that it requires the 
mobilization of substantial resources, other objections exist as well.505  
 
3.2.2.1 Uncertainty  
 
Central in the extraterritorial application of national competition laws is that it is a unilateral process, 
in which decisions are based primarily on the state’s own interest. To what extent, if at all, foreign 
interests are considered, is at the discretion of the state. The exact scope of a jurisdiction’s 
extraterritorial reach, or rather the relevant weight attributed to international comity considerations 
and the circumstances in which they apply, are hard to determine and cause much legal uncertainty. 
This is illustrated by the conflicts on this matter between policy-makers and some of the US 
judiciary, among the US’ circuits, and even inside the Supreme Court itself (see below, Part II, 
2.2.4).506  
 
As demonstrated by DLOUHY, there are countless qualifications of the scope of the effects doctrine, 
such as whether anticompetitive behaviour should or should not be intended, and whether it should 
have “‘some effect’, ‘any effect’, an ‘appreciable effect’, a ‘substantial effect’, a ‘direct and substantial effect’ or a ‘direct 
and influencing effect’.”507 Right after the introduction of the effects doctrine in the Alcoa case, some 
courts concluded that anticompetitive behaviour fell under US jurisdiction as soon as there was any 
kind of effect in the US, however, most courts as well as the Second Restatement of Foreign 
Relations required a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect. This was later codified in the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982.508 An example of the opacity surrounding the effects 
doctrine can be found in the Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics et al. and Hsiung and AU Optronics 
Corp. America Inc. v. United States cases, wherein the Supreme Court refused to resolve a circuit split on 
the applicability of the FTAIA, more precisely regarding the scope of the FTAIA’s requirement that 
anticompetitive conduct must have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on US 
commerce to fall within the reach of the Sherman Act. Both cases dealt with protracted criminal and 
civil litigation relating to an alleged worldwide scheme to fix prices in liquid crystal display panels. 
They concerned the same products, the same conspiracy, and the same FTAIA provisions (in 
particular 15 USC § 6a, limiting the extraterritorial application of US antitrust law), but the circuit 
courts nevertheless arrived at opposite conclusions.509 In the Motorola Mobility case,510 Judge Posner 
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from the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the FTAIA bars suits alleging the 
price fixing of component parts (LCD displays) sold and integrated abroad into final products 
(mobile phones) eventually imported to and sold within the US because such price fixing failed the 
FTAIA’s direct effects test as well as the requirement that the effect of the defendant’s practice must 
give rise to an antitrust claim in the US.511 In other words, it was established that “the extraterritorial 
reach of U.S. antitrust law does not extend to claims based on the anticompetitive conduct of foreign actors in non-U.S. 
sales of component parts, even if the defendant(s) know those components will be integrated into products eventually sold 
in the United States, and even if a U.S. entity determined the components’ purchase price on behalf of its foreign 
subsidiary.”512 In the AU Optronics case,513 the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that if the government 
proceeds under the FTAIA using a ‘domestic effects’ theory, it must prove that the defendants’ 
conduct had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on US commerce, but declined to 
assess whether the government satisfied this standard (which according to many was the most 
significant issue) because it found that substantial evidence supported a conviction under the ‘import 
trade/commerce’ theory.514 Earlier, in a different context the Seventh and Ninth Circuits had already 
clashed when employing different standards to determine whether an effect of foreign 
anticompetitive conduct was ‘direct’ under the FTAIA. In LSL Biotechnologies,515 the Ninth Circuit 
rather strictly stated that an effect is ‘direct’ if it follows as an immediate consequence of the 
defendant’s activity, without deviation or interruption. The Seventh Circuit’s Minn-Chem opinion, 
however, considered that an effect is direct if it bore a ‘reasonably proximate causal nexus’ with the 
foreign anticompetitive conduct.516  
 
3.2.2.2 Inadequacy  
 
Sticking to a strict territorial approach clearly does not suffice to protect a state’s market from global 
anticompetitive behaviour.517 While noticeably widening the scope of jurisdiction, unilateral 
extraterritorial application of the law comes with significant drawbacks as well. It subjects 
international cartels or other anticompetitive behaviour to different national laws, which may result 
in irreconcilable outcomes or burdensome procedures. Indeed, regulations vary across jurisdictions, 
and firms engaging in multinational business are confronted with several sets of legal rules that must 
be followed, resulting in a de facto regime that is likely more restrictive than any individual state 
would choose for itself. As mentioned (see above, Part I, 1.2), under-regulation may occur as well 
when countries simultaneously and selectively do not apply their laws outside their borders, for 
instance with regard to export cartels.518  
 
3.2.2.3 Resistance 
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Diplomatic problems can arise, as states will often find themselves harmed in their sovereignty by the 
extraterritorial application of foreign laws.519 States feared in particular the wide discovery powers 
available for private parties and courts in the US and the possibility of treble-damages being imposed 
on non-US defendants.520 Moreover, in order for extraterritorial enforcement to be effective, very 
often the assistance of other states will still be needed, for instance during the proceedings, in 
gathering evidence or during the enforcement.521 STEPHAN elaborated on the fact that actually there 
is “no categorical reason to believe that the benefits from desirable competition rules permitted by the effects test 
necessarily will be greater than the costs generated by inefficient regulation.”522 Indeed, the rule of reason test in 
the effects doctrine entails a high degree of instability and unpredictability, while it does not eliminate 
the costs of under- or overregulation.523 
 
Nevertheless, the Zeitgeist was right for the US to apply its laws extraterritorially: many European 
states were still preoccupied with their economic and political reconstruction, and most states did not 
have sufficiently advanced competition laws to (threaten to) reciprocate. While generally the rejection 
of a newly asserted principle by a large number of states results in its preclusion from being 
considered a valid legal principle under international law, a perhaps deceptive, but significant delay in 
responses caused by the particular post-war circumstances prevented this.524 According to WAGNER-
VONN PAPP the sheer number of jurisdictions adhering to the effects doctrine “makes it a fruitless 
endeavor to argue that it is incompatible with public international law.”525   
 
Some resistance emerged nonetheless, most noticeably in the form of blocking- and claw-back 
statutes. Blocking statutes are intended to restrain extraterritorial claims by making discovery more 
difficult.526 Indeed, unilateral extraterritorial enforcement of domestic laws is not only limited by 
public international law (via the ban on intervention as well as the ban on abuse of law and the 
related principle of comity) but also by national laws.527 Through this type of statutes, states hoped 
that by forbidding their national firms to provide documents to foreign competition authorities or 
courts (by prohibiting to comply with court orders, or investigative requests)528, those courts would 
                                                          
519 A. Jones & B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, 
1357.  
520 H. First, “The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law”, Antitrust Law 
Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2001, 723-724.  
521 J. Basedow, “Competition Policy in a Globalized Economy: from Extraterritorial Application to Harmonization” in 
M. Neumann & J. Weigand (eds), The International Handbook of Competition, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004, 
324-325. 
522 P. Stephan, “Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of Cooperation”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 38, 
2005, 208.  
523 Ibid., 209.  
524 D. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 67. The same 
spirit caused the initial enthusiasm for US proposals for the Havana Charter.  
525 F. Wagner-von Papp, “Should Google’s Secret Sauce be Organic?”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, 2015, 
616-617.  
526 E. Swaine, “Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy: United States” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and 
Competition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 10. For more information on blocking statutes, see B. Zanettin, 
Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 49-52. 
527 J. Terhechte, International Competition Enforcement Law Between Cooperation and Convergence, Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag, 
2011, 43. 
528 W. Connolly, “Lessons to be Learned: the Conflict in International Antitrust Law Contrasted with Progress in 
International Financial Law”, Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000, 214-215. 
78 
 
renounce to enforce their order.529 Blocking statutes therefore refer to laws that prohibit cooperation 
with foreign authorities (for instance by supplying evidence) or laws that prohibit local firms from 
complying with certain foreign awards.530 Similarly, when the US enacted its International Antitrust 
Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA) (see below, Part II, 3.2.1.3), allowing the exchange of 
confidential information between competition authorities, opposition rose in the form of blocking 
statutes compelling domestic parties to resist “both discovery production orders issued by U.S. authorities 
(discovery blocking statutes) and U.S. court judgments rendered in antitrust cases against a foreign party (judgment 
blocking statutes).531 Foreign defendants in antitrust cases can moreover introduce special international 
defences, such as ‘foreign sovereign compulsion’, as the Chinese defendants in the Vitamins cartel 
case attempted to do in the US courts.532 Use of this defence obstructs liability in front of a foreign 
court.533 The doctrine is based on the reasoning that “if a foreign defendant has no choice but to comply with a 
foreign sovereign's directive, and if this choice results in a violation of U.S. laws, fairness considerations for the 
defendant and recognition of the foreign government's interests may outweigh the interests served by holding the foreign 
defendant liable in a U.S. court.”534 A final type of defensive measure are claw-back statutes, that enable 
firms to ‘claw-back’ the damages they had to pay pursuant to foreign decisions.535 It was a reaction to 
the possibility of the imposition of treble damages under US antitrust laws, and allows the reduction 
of such damages.536 Such laws were very common by the end of the 1980s, varying in severity and 
scope.537  
 
3.3 Multilateral efforts continue to fail 
 
The context for international cooperation drastically changed during the 1990s, putting pressure on 
the then existing system. New economic and political relations as well as technological progress 
recreated global markets and changed the size, importance, and interdependence of markets. The 
collapse and market turn of the Soviet Union in 1991 put global competition on the agenda again, as 
the shortcomings of extraterritorial enforcement became more and more apparent.538   
 
3.3.1 Munich Group Draft International Antitrust Code 
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In the early nineties a private initiative, led by Professor Wolfgang FIKENTSCHER refocused attention 
to the value of an international antitrust law. Meeting in Munich, an International Antitrust Code 
Working Group of (mainly European - German, but also some US and Japanese) competition law 
scholars developed the Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC) or ‘Munich code’.539 The authors 
found inspiration in the examples of the Paris Convention of 1883, the Berne Convention of 1886, 
and other intellectual property (IP) protection treaties, as these international instruments used 
national laws for international purposes and because IP law was considered comparable to the field 
of competition law. The sanction mechanism of the GATT also served as an inspiration.540 The code 
was meant to establish a basis for international debate and perhaps an international agreement.541 
However, the goal was not just to elaborate some vague principles, and political constraints or 
feasibility arguments were not taken into account. What further distinguished the DIAC from earlier 
multilateral initiatives was that it did not intend to create a uniform global competition law, but 
reserved a prominent place for national antitrust laws.542  
 
The DIAC was intended to be incorporated into the GATT as a plurilateral trade agreement. It was 
intended to provide practical rules for international trade and commerce, rather than a theoretical 
model of competition.543 It was meant to be enforced via national institutions in domestic 
jurisdictions. Nations adhering to the code were required to incorporate certain minimum standards 
described in the code into their domestic law. The scope of the code was similar to the scope of the 
Havana charter, covering horizontal restraints, vertical restraints, mergers and concentrations and 
abuses of dominant position.544 It consisted of a substantive as well as procedural hatch. The DIAC 
intended to provide certain substantive minimum standards to be incorporated in national law, as 
well as to allow for international procedural initiatives, for both an international body and the parties 
to the agreement, which were limited to cross-border situations to ensure the effectiveness of 
international antitrust law.545 According to GERBER, the most prominent substantive provision in the 
code was a prohibition of so-called ‘consensus wrongs’. These were certain ‘hard-core’ anti-
competitive practices that should be condemned by all states adhering to the code, in particular a 
general ban on cartels as well as abuse of market power. Also pre-merger notification rules were 
foreseen.546 Article 17 of the DIAC obliged all member states to establish independent competition 
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authorities with sufficient financial means. Moreover, their investigative powers were described in 
detail (Article 18 f.).547 
 
Procedurally, the main feature of the DIAC was the establishment of two international organizations. 
On the one hand the International Antitrust Authority, supported by an International Antitrust 
Council, would monitor and ensure compliance, more precisely that the national laws of the parties 
were based on the minimum standards of the Code and that they were enforced. This authority 
would serve as international executive body and would be entrusted with significant competences: if 
national authorities refused to take action, it would be able to bring actions against those authorities 
in that nation’s courts; it would be able to sue private firms or sue a party to the agreement before 
the International Antitrust Panel (see below); it would be allowed to hold a right to appeal; and 
finally it would assist parties with the enactment and enforcement of competition law (Article 19 sec. 
2 lit. b).548 On the other hand, an International Antitrust Panel would settle disputes via legally 
binding decisions. The International Antitrust Panel would serve as ‘judicial’ tribunal for signatory 
countries,549 and would be responsible for disputes between signatory states with regard to the 
code.550 The latter were allowed to bring actions against each other before the Panel if consultations 
between the parties and the International Antitrust Authority failed. The Panel’s decisions would 
have the same authority as decisions of a WTO dispute resolution panel,551 and would therefore be 
legally binding. Moreover, if a national court’s decision was inconsistent with the obligations of the 
agreement, then that court had to reconsider its decision according to the findings of the 
International Antitrust Panel.552 The DIAC also established a right for private parties to recover 
damages.553 
  
Reactions to the DIAC were diverse. Some described it as ‘indicative of what the WTO competition 
agreement should not be’554 and ‘hopelessly flawed.’555 The Code did meet with some response in 
Europe.556 While the EU supported a multilateral agreement with minimum standards and actively 
advocated the inclusion of competition law in the WTO-agenda, the US on the other side was very 
critical towards the Code. US criticism was foreseeable as the Code was heavily influenced by 
European approaches, identifying prohibited behaviour via conceptual rather than economic 
approaches. More precisely, criticism targeted the definition of prohibited conduct, unaccountability 
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of very powerful administrators, and unnecessary bureaucratic elements. That it was not necessarily 
the content of the Code that caused commotion, but rather the very concept of it, was reflected in 
the fact that the Code was simultaneously criticised both for its broad and often ambiguous 
wording,557 as well as its overly detailed nature.558 The US, consistent with its criticism on previous 
multilateral initiatives, pointed out the diverse goals that are pursued through competition law in 
several jurisdictions, and the inability of the code to appreciate and further all these goals.559 US 
officials therefore reiterated their preference for increased cooperation rather than a substantial 
code.560  
 
3.3.2 The UNCTAD Code on Restrictive Business Practices - ‘the Set’ 
 
Twenty years after the ECOSOC-initiative, under the impetus of developing nations in an attempt to 
gain more control over corporate behaviour in international commerce, the UN undertook another 
endeavour to engage in international antitrust development.561 It was perceived that multinational 
corporations were taking advantage of developing countries and slowing down their economic 
progress. Demands were crystallized in the form of comprehensive proposals to adjust global 
economic relationships. This was known during the seventies as the strive towards a ‘new 
international economic order’. Competition law was perceived as a mechanism for redistributing 
international welfare, redressing the imbalance in bargaining power, and dealing with the paradox of 
wanting local control over economic development, but simultaneously needing foreign investment to 
foster such development. Developed nations agreed to negotiate such issues of good corporate 
behaviour, in return for non-discrimination, promoted investment, and the provision by developing 
nations of broad latitude for freedom of contract and the operation of market forces.562 
Consequently, the development of a code on restrictive business practices was placed on the agenda 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),563 established in 1964, 
“to deal primarily with the economic problems of the developing countries in their relations with the more developed 
parts of the world.”564 Preparations for the Code started in the early 1970s, soon after the OECD had 
issued its first recommendations, which mainly focused on the needs of developed nations (see 
below, Part I, 3.4). In 1976 a committee of experts received a mandate from the fourth UN 
Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi to resolve certain preliminary technical issues. 
The Code was completed in 1980, where the remaining issues were tackled in two sessions under the 
auspices of the UN Conference on Restrictive Business Practices. It was unanimously adopted by the 
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UN General Assembly in Resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980, in the form of a recommendation 
addressing both states and enterprises, named ‘Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and 
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices’, also known as ‘the Set’.565 
 
As mentioned, what is particular about this Set is that it has a particular focus on furthering the 
competition systems of developing countries. However, the final Set was very different from the one 
originally envisaged by the developing countries, who desired a detailed binding instrument. 
Developed countries wanted the Set to be no more than ‘an instrument of moral persuasion’ and 
insisted that therefore it should remain a voluntary instrument, reiterating again, and perhaps more 
validly this time due to the parties involved, the disparities in development and approaches to 
competition law among the members of the UN.566 Pressure of developed countries therefore 
resulted in a set of non-binding recommendations and voluntary guidelines.567 This legally non-
binding nature is reflected in the form as well as the substance of the Set (in particular provisions for 
implementation and enforcement).568 Developing countries suggested that the Secretary-General of 
the UN be vested with a power to convene consultations, instead a non-binding consultative 
mechanism was established.569 The Set was furthermore limited to the antitrust principles that were 
already reflected in the national laws of developed countries and the aforementioned OECD 
Guidelines. The novelty of the Set as envisaged by developing countries, namely that it would include 
preferential treatment of companies in developing countries was opposed by developed nations, who 
wanted the Set to be universally applicable and providing for fair and non-discriminatory treatment 
of enterprises by states.570   
 
In the Set, states rather than an international body remain the central actors in the prevention and 
control of anticompetitive behaviour in international trade. Issues that arise under the Set are dealt 
with by an Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, which monitors 
the application and implementation of the Set, provides a forum for discussion and undertakes 
studies related to the Set.571   
 
Even though the Set would not be legally binding, reaching consensus proved to be difficult,572 
mainly because the provisions should “serve as general principles for the developed countries and yet also be 
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sufficiently specific to meet the interests of the developing countries.”573 According to GILL the title ‘multilaterally 
agreed’ is misleading as wide areas of disagreement consisted.574 One essential area of disagreement 
was on the role that should be played by competition law. Another area of disagreement included the 
prohibition of export cartels.575 GILL states that general principles such as those imbedded in the Set, 
are often “no more than polite statements of disagreement” and represent just another step in the “continuing 
process of international education in and acceptance of competition as a rule for business conduct.”576 DAVIDOW as 
well observed that for most Western European countries involved in the negotiations the process 
was the actual product.577 
 
Some claim that due to its voluntary nature the impact of the Set is limited and its existence is not 
widely known.578 Indeed, the Set was not revolutionary (as it was originally intended to be), but it did 
focus attention on young and developing competition systems. BENSON rightly observed that 
because of the non-legally binding nature of the Set, its success will depend on its continued 
acceptance by the members as being a fair and balanced document. Considering the large variety of 
parties involved, this was, and will continue to be, a very difficult exercise. The success of the Set has 
been attributed by some to its narrow and technical focus. The Set enjoys substantial moral authority, 
considering its universal acceptance as a UN recommendation.579 Its influence as a UN soft law 
instrument cannot be overlooked, and since its adoption its legitimacy has been reaffirmed by several 
United Nations Conferences to Review All Aspects of the Set under the auspices of UNCTAD, 
every five years since 1985.580 
 
3.3.3 WTO from Singapore to Cancun  
 
3.3.3.1 The build-up 
 
The nineties saw the birth of an even more ambitious endeavour towards an international 
competition law. While the GATT originally did not contain any specific competition provisions, and 
when the issue revived in the late 1950s it was considered that it would be impractical,581 the EU 
nevertheless was the main proponent of a global competition policy initiative within the framework 
of the WTO.582 The EU’s preference for binding mechanisms likely derives from its unique domestic 
experience with regional integration, where (partial) harmonisation of competition laws takes place 
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while binding dispute resolution occurs through the General Court and Court of Justice of the EU.583 
Moreover, EU officials believe less strongly than Americans do in the possibility of a smooth 
convergence of competition systems via informal and bilateral cooperation, possibly influenced by 
the relatively slow and incomplete convergence of Member States’ competition laws, even under the 
obligations imposed by the Treaties.584 These experiences may lead to a natural tendency to support a 
binding multilateral approach via an international organization such as the WTO.585 It should be 
noted, however, that SIR LEON BRITTAN and DG Trade were the primary advocates of this position. 
DG COMP was not in favour of promoting competition measures in the WTO.586 
 
Competition policy was considered as a possible topic for future WTO work at the 1994 Ministerial 
Conference at Marrakesh, but the 1995 report ‘Competition policy in the New Trade Order: 
strengthening international cooperation and rules’, drafted by experts from both the Commission 
and external bodies, provided the impetus for the start of true reflection on the matter.587 The 
Report, labelled ‘the van Miert Report’, was initialled by the European Competition Commissioner at 
that time, KAREL VAN MIERT, who instructed a group of ‘Wise Men’ to progressively reflect on the 
ways to organise antitrust in the global era. In this report the idea of an international agreement on 
competition within the WTO was proposed. Starting with provisions on cooperation and aid to new 
antitrust regimes, it was suggested that the agreement could later on evolve to incorporate more far-
reaching commitments, and finally result in a comprehensive substantive agreement.588 In the end the 
agreement should commit WTO Members to gradually introduce competition laws and strong 
enforcement procedures. Members should adhere to core principles of competition law, including 
non-discrimination, transparency, and the prohibition of hard core cartels. Cooperation mechanisms 
between national competition authorities should be established and the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism should apply.589  
 
When the Commission issued a communication to the Council explaining its views on an 
international framework for competition rules,590 the report already received substantial criticism 
from the American corner, which lead to the watering down of its content. According to this new 
version of the proposal, substantively only cartels should be included in the negotiations of an 
international antitrust agreement, and dispute resolution was scaled down.591 The original plans of the 
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EU for the inclusion of competition law in a WTO-context indeed included relatively advanced 
cooperation provisions as could be found in bilateral cooperation agreements, some minimum 
substantive principles for cross-border cases, with priority given to business practices which have a 
foreclosure effect. This was subsequently restricted to hard-core cartels only. Developing countries 
were to receive particular support for the progressive reinforcement of their competition laws and 
institutions. Furthermore, focus lay on the core principles of non-discrimination, transparency and 
procedural fairness. The EU originally intended the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to review 
four distinct types of possible disputes in competition cases: international procedural obligations, 
per-se prohibitions, rule-of-reason violations, and impediments to market access. This was later on 
adapted to exclude individual cases.592  
 
The Commission’s proposal was picked up by the WTO during its 1996 Ministerial Meeting in 
Singapore and, driven by a wish for greater policy-coherence, a working group was created to study 
the interaction between trade and competition policy.593 The Working Group on the Interaction 
between Trade and Competition held its first meeting in July 1997.594 The group was to focus on the 
clarification of core principles such as transparency, non-discrimination, procedural fairness, 
provisions on hard-core cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive 
reinforcement of competition institutions ins developing countries through capacity building.595 
During the 2001 Doha Round it was agreed that negotiations would take place after the Fifth Session 
of the Ministerial Conference, provided there was consensus on the modalities of such 
negotiations.596 Intense preparatory work took place since 1997 on the so-called ‘Singapore issues’, 
leading up to the 2003 Conference.597  
 
3.3.3.2 The demise 
 
The preparations did not result in a balanced package and an agreed work programme that would 
bring together the mandated negotiations (agriculture, services) and the ‘new’ Singapore-issues.598 
The EU’s advocating efforts failed with the collapse in 2003 of negotiations at the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference.599 During these negotiations, which took place from 10 to 14 September 
2003, it was decided that competition policy would henceforth be excluded from the Doha 
negotiations, due to lack of consensus on modalities for negotiations in this area. This decision was 
made official on 1 August 2004 via the General Council’s Decision on the post-Cancun Work 
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Programme, the so-called ‘July package.’600 The concrete provocation of the failure of the 
negotiations was that near the end of the Cancun conference the African Union expressed that it was 
determined not to agree on any deal regarding the Singapore issues. South Korea retaliated by 
claiming that it would not agree to any deal without an agreement on all four of the Singapore issues. 
This stalemate can be considered the main reason behind the failure of the talks.601 
 
Unsurprisingly, opposition was voiced most strongly by the US, and perhaps more astonishingly by 
developing countries. The US reiterated its belief that sufficient consensus was lacking, and more 
specifically due to insufficient experience on the part of developing countries. Opposition by the US 
arose as well due to the aforementioned confidence in convergence (toward the US standard) via 
cooperation agreements. PAPADOPOULOS referred to this attitude as ‘the hegemonic stance’, 
denoting a consistent belief in the superiority of US antitrust law and the fact that “until other countries 
reach the US level of competition enforcement, national US competition law should be applied to resolve situations 
where US firms are harmed due to inefficient enforcement of national competition laws by other countries.”602 The US 
feared that a WTO agreement on competition policy would lead to the harmonisation of competition 
rules based on the EU model.603 Timing was therefore a crucial factor. Stronger players in the 
competition field were likely convinced that if they waited with the conclusion of an international 
agreement on competition law, this would be more favourable to them as convergence towards the 
national system would take place over time.604 The US also believed that competition standards could 
be distorted due to the quid pro quo nature of WTO negotiations, and the fact that any result would be 
the lowest common denominator, resulting in a race to the bottom. In the minds of both politicians 
and academics the concern existed that WTO-compromises would risk resulting in ‘populist antitrust 
divorced from economic underpinnings’ because in the course of negotiations certain principles 
would be accepted that would not directly relate to the ‘proper function’ of competition law, 
according to US standards.605 Another concern was that the use of dispute settlement and the 
adversarial nature of the WTO panels would undermine mutual trust and lead to politicisation of the 
application of competition rules, although this argument is not fully valid considering that many 
disputes are resolved informally.606 Finally, the US tackled the timing of the endeavour. KLEIN, head 
of the DoJ Antitrust Division at the time, found it too early to include competition law in the WTO, 
in particular considering the lack of experience of the institution in this regard. Such ‘prematurity’, 
according to him, could actually injure sound competition law enforcement rather than promote it.607 
Considering all these objections, it is somewhat puzzling why the US accepted to include 
competition policy as an agenda-item for Doha in the first place. One aspect that has likely played a 
                                                          
600 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/history_e.htm#doha (accessed December 2013).   
601 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 234.  
602 Ibid., 225-227.  
603 B.A. Melo Araujo, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, 184. 
604 E. Elhauge & D. Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2nd ed., Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 
2011, 1246. 
605 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 229, 263.  
606 I. Maher, “Competition Law in the International Domain: Networks as a New Form of Governance”, Journal of Law 
and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2002, 129 and A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 226.  
607 J. Tavares de Araujo, Jr., “Competition policy and the EU-Mercosur trade negotiations”, paper prepared for the 
Working Group on EU-Mercosur Trade Negotiations, Paris, 12-13 May 2000, 2. 
87 
 
role in this decision is a divide between the US trade and antitrust administration, the former being 
more open to the idea of adopting WTO-competition rules than the latter.608  
 
The proposed sanctioning of unfulfilled domestic enforcement obligations scared developing 
countries. They feared to be most subject to these sanctions due to their limited resources and 
general concerns regarding their ability to implement the proposed reforms and the consequences 
this may have with regard to the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.609 The regulatory and 
political cost of an effective competition system would be high.610 Indeed, effective antitrust 
enforcement is costly and requires a high degree of expertise in the form of institutional capacity and 
political and ideological backing, which developing countries not necessarily possess.611 While this 
could be resolved through technical assistance and flexibility in the form of funding or transfer 
payments, as acknowledged by the initial Doha declaration, developing countries did not consider the 
safeguards for such assistance sufficient, and feared that the dependency that would be created in 
this way would deprive them of equal influence on policy decisions.612 Their fear was not entirely 
ungrounded, as previously negotiated provisions on technical assistance had not been implemented 
without problems (or sometimes at all). Accepting further commitments on competition 
enforcement, which furthermore is not a priority for a number of developing countries, would 
therefore create an even greater financial burden for developing countries.613  
 
Developing countries also saw the Singapore issues as a distraction from discussions on agricultural 
subsidies or standards and technical barriers. Moreover, some of the proposed reforms were 
perceived to be destructive for the competitive advantages of developing countries over developed 
countries.614 Developing nations indeed have different needs and expect different things from a 
competition policy than developed countries, for instance due to larger production-inefficiency. 
Political economies vary, and a multilateral WTO-agreement might be more adapted to the needs of 
developed nations. While some exceptions on strict enforcement might be conceivable in the 
beginning, it was reasonable of developing nations to fear “that once any international antitrust authority 
was created, it would be hard to stop its expansion to cover the full range of competition law issues.”615 A striking 
example of the dominance of developed countries in the shaping of a competition policy within the 
WTO was the planned exemption of export cartels, mainly supported by the US.616  
 
The reason why some considered the opposition of developing countries as rather surprising, apart 
from the circumstance that it were in fact the developing countries that originally suggested 
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multilateral negotiations on competition,617 is related to the fact that rationally, developing countries 
have every reason to support a strict international agreement. Developing countries worried about 
overly intrusive antitrust enforcement even though they are among those suffering the most of the 
under-enforcement of large international cartels. According to ELHAUGE and GERADIN “[u]nless the 
developed nations are unable to effectively enforce their antitrust laws against export cartels in small or developing 
nations because of problems in procuring evidence or penalizing assets in the latter nations, small or developing nations 
would seem to lack any strategic reason to oppose international antitrust enforcement.”618 That developing nations 
did in fact oppose the agreement therefore demonstrates that external factors, not related to mere 
rational competition-law related arguments, are at play. Competition policy is indeed closely related 
to and intertwined with trade policy and industrial policy, which makes it a very sensitive topic in 
international negotiations. Developing countries place a lot of emphasis on industrial policy, which 
allows them to strengthen their firms and their competitiveness on the international market. This 
influences their stance towards competition policy. They wished to see broad industrial policy 
exceptions included in a WTO competition law. It is true that many industrialised countries pursued 
social and political objectives via extensive exemptions from the application of competition rules, 
while more efficiency-related objectives were only prioritised at a later time. This demand would 
likely not have become an insurmountable obstacle to the negotiations, as the Doha Declaration 
already took these arguments into account by introducing the notion of flexibility, and clear-cut 
exemptions would have been accepted by the EU.619  
 
Another cause of opposition of developing countries was their dissatisfaction with the process of 
negotiations on agriculture.620 In general, it was insufficiently clear to developing countries what the 
alleged trade-related benefits would be of the addition of competition policy to the negotiating 
agenda. Due in part to an information asymmetry, developing counties viewed competition policy as 
a threat to their interests.621 This demonstrates the risk attached to issue-linkages: it may cause 
negotiations on a certain topic to fail due to negotiations on substantively entirely unrelated points. 
DAMRO defined the concept of issue-linkage as a negotiating tactic causing the likelihood of failure 
to increase or decrease, thereby referring to the definition by SEBENIUS, who described issue-linkage 
“as a situation in which issues are ‘simultaneously discussed for joint settlement.”622 Issue-linkage may decrease 
chances of failure by employing trade-offs, log-rolling or side-payments, or it may do the opposite by 
expanding the range for disagreement.623 The WTO in particular is a forum in which member states 
pursue a wide range of possibly conflicting aims. PAPADOPOULOS claimed, based on interviews with 
EU Commission officials, that the EU proposal for a competition agreement at the WTO was the 
initiative of DG Trade. DG COMP was hesitant about the WTO as the forum of choice for the 
development of competition rules, exactly because it preferred avoiding linking issues such as trade 
and non-trade goals. It also wished to avoid an increased likelihood of political intervention in the 
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performance of its mandate.624 GALLAGHER moreover claimed that “it was the single undertaking that 
forced retrenchment: when everything on the table forms part of the final ‘package’ of agreements, the stakes placed on 
the table at the start of negotiations are as crucial as the deals done at the end.”625 In a ‘take it or leave it’ 
scenario, the slightest dissatisfaction may indeed cause the whole package to fail.  
 
The demands of globalisation have pressed certain members in taking on a hectic pace for the 
negotiations and including additional domains of economic regulation such as competition policy. 
This ‘pressure’ was not felt by all members, and some did not feel ready to take on multilateral 
obligations in this field. The abundance of other international and non-binding forums such as the 
OECD or UNCTAD that offered the possibility to negotiate the trade-competition linkage, took 
away the sense of urgency to deal with this matter in the WTO.626 The EU realised that by insisting 
on the inclusion of competition in the WTO it would eventually see significant efforts go to waste 
and therefore broadened its horizon and decided to pursue competition law and policy in every 
possible international forum.627 A number of countries requested clarification on existing issues, prior 
to launching new negotiations.628 This was supported later on by more members, in particular Least-
Developed, African, Asian and Latin American countries. The priority attached to the new Singapore 
issues caused friction among members, some urging to first implement the agreements already 
concluded under the Uruguay Round. The attempt to decide on issues that did not yet reach 
consensus and the suggestion of starting to develop modalities for negotiations on investment and 
competition policy and to start negotiations on government procurement and trade facilitation 
created the perception among many developing country ministers that this was an attempt to hastily 
force such issues into the single undertaking, dismissing their objections. Apart from the 
untimeliness, another criticism was that some of the annexes containing options to begin 
negotiations were not sufficiently distributed by the proponents and discussed among members. 
Some annexes were only discussed in small group meetings, thereby excluding some members of 
discussing the modalities proposed. 629  
 
Criticism did not only come from within, but from outsiders and the general public as well. The 
increasing price of WTO-accession, its lack of openness and accountability as well as its heavy 
bureaucratic nature allegedly made the venue less attractive for a multilateral agreement including 
competition issues.630  
 
3.3.4 Other initiatives 
 
                                                          
624 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 242-243.  
625 P. Gallagher, The First Ten Years of the WTO 1995-2005, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 33. 
626 C. Damro, “Destructive Issue linkages: the International Politics of EU Failure”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 57, No. 3, 
2012, 583.  
627 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 244.  
628 WTO, General Council – Proposals for Inclusion in the Draft Text for Cancun, Communication from Benin, 
Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
WT/GC/W/510, 14 August 2003. 
629 P. Gallagher, The First Ten Years of the WTO 1995-2005, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 118-119, 126-
127, 134-135. Also see WTO, Ministerial Conference - Fifth Session - Cancun, 10 - 14 September 2003 - ACP 
Declaration on the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO, Communication from Botswana, WT/MIN(03)/W/4, 1 
August 2003.  
630 P. Gallagher, The First Ten Years of the WTO 1995-2005, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 126-127. 
90 
 
The overview of multilateral initiatives provided in this Part I is not exhaustive. Many other 
initiatives, most of them rather short-lived, can be mentioned. As an example, the 1951 draft 
convention of the Council of Europe can be mentioned, which shared many characteristics with 
earlier initiatives like the Havana Charter or the ECOSOC project. The 1951 draft convention 
foresaw a compulsory public registration of international restrictive business agreements, and private 
persons injured by such practices would be able to bring their complaint before a special 
commission. If this commission did not succeed in settling the case, it would be referred to a 
European court, which could then award damages or impose fines, or render declaratory judgments 
which would allow national authorities to intervene. This system was inspired by the enforcement 
mechanism of the European Convention on Human Rights, but in 1958 the project was deferred 
without further action. Agreement was lacking on “a common substantive standard for judgment of the legality 
of international restraints of trade.”631 Again, the ambition of the project did not align with reality.  
 
The same fate awaited another, more original project within the Council of Europe, initiated in 1965. 
This time the aim was not to establish a set of uniform substantive principles, but rather to develop 
for the first time a system to avoid jurisdictional conflicts emerging from the extraterritorial 
application and enforcement of national competition laws. A preliminary study was conducted to 
establish a uniform rule of jurisdiction that would be recognized in all contracting countries. It soon 
became apparent, however, that the preliminary study suffered from a great deal of legal and political 
problems. Once again, it proved too ambitious to expect parties to adhere to a formal and binding 
obligation to recognise foreign extra-territorial antitrust action and to give legal assistance to foreign 
courts and authorities in the presence of significantly differing antitrust laws.632 
 
3.4 The OECD Recommendations and the switch to the bilateral level  
 
The issuing of recommendations concerning cooperation between member countries on 
anticompetitive practices affecting international trade by the OECD in 1967 marks one of the first 
occasions where a multilateral soft law instrument was truly successful in the field of international 
competition law cooperation.633 The OECD recommendations did not focus on the development of 
substantive principles, as did previous multilateral initiatives, but rather focused on the promotion of 
voluntary cooperation. A Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practises was established, 
which originally mainly focused on comparative competition law developments, but later broadened 
its view to include restraints of trade in international commerce. This resulted in the creation of two 
working parties, working respectively on the factual side of the problem in order to obtain a better 
factual basis for discussion, and the procedural aspects, including the various ways and means of 
cooperation within OECD.634  
 
The first recommendation on international competition law enforcement cooperation issued by the 
OECD was the 1967 Council Recommendation Concerning Co-operation between Member 
Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade. It encouraged the 
notification of investigations involving other members’ important interests and suggested that other 
authorities take this into account and consult with each other, promoted coordination of actions 
when several jurisdictions are dealing with the same case, and stimulated the supply of information 
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on anti-competitive practices within the limits of national laws, not affecting national sovereignty or 
extra-territorial application of competition laws.635 As ZANETTIN put it, the Recommendations “were 
exploring virgin fields”, which may explain their rather superficial character.636 They were revised on 
several occasions. As their main content has largely been taken over and developed in bilateral 
cooperation agreements, a more detailed analysis of the cooperation mechanisms will take place in 
Part II.  
 
The first revision took place in 1973 and resulted in the Recommendation Concerning a 
Consultation and Conciliation Procedure on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International 
Trade. It is recognized therein that closer cooperation is needed. The principle of positive comity 
was introduced (see below, Part II, 2.2.4) as well as an arbitration/consultation procedure that should 
be followed when the interests of a member are affected by anti-competitive business behaviour in 
foreign jurisdictions, whereby a committee of experts would attempt to reach conciliation. In 1979 
both previous recommendations were repealed and substituted by one version. This version was 
further refined in 1986, which added an interpretative appendix holding a set of ‘Guiding Principles’, 
clarifying the existing procedures. Further enhancement took place in 1995, in the Recommendation 
Concerning Co-operation between Member Countries on Anti-Competitive Practices Affecting 
International Trade, which was revised again in 2014.637 In the 1995 version, more emphasis was put 
on efficient cooperation and coordination of investigations and assistance. This is both due to the 
merger wave in the nineties and the inspiration coming from successful EU/US cooperation.  
 
The newest Recommendations, adopted on 16 September 2014 changed focus to a certain extent, 
following an elaborate OECD study on the challenges of international cooperation in competition 
law enforcement in the same year.638 While the classical topics of notification, consultation, 
coordination and comity are present, the field of cooperation is broadened, and the focus is more on 
information sharing. The new Recommendations wished to offer enforcers innovative solutions to 
problems of international cooperation, such as the introduction of national ‘information gateways’, 
allowing confidential information exchange without prior source consent, or enhanced cooperation 
in the form of investigative assistance. The Recommendations also commend explicitly a certain 
commitment from members to effective international cooperation.  
 
The success of the Recommendations lies in the fact that many (bilateral) cooperation agreements 
almost literally incorporated the principles developed in the recommendations.639 In theory the 
OECD Recommendations could serve as a sufficient legal basis for states to cooperate 
internationally within their national legal limits. In practice, however, the majority of OECD member 
states (endorsing the principles of the recommendations) that engage in international cooperation 
prefer to conclude bilateral agreements on the application of their respective competition laws.  
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4. Intermediate conclusion Part I 
 
Discussions on international competition law have occurred since the appearance of competition 
laws in Europe. The need for such discussions has only augmented, considering the increasingly 
international nature of economic relations, and the growing number of national laws and authorities 
attempting to regulate such relations. That the global economy requires some kind of international 
approach regarding competition law enforcement is beyond doubt. What form this international 
response should take, however, is subject to much debate. The legal nature of such an arrangement, 
the number of parties involved, the areas of focus, or the level of formality are all aspects that may 
vary, each with particular benefits and drawbacks.  
 
When deciding whether to cooperate multilaterally or bilaterally, account must be made of the level 
of trust between the parties and the desired intensity of cooperation, certain power dynamics, issues 
of inclusiveness, and the reach and impact of the cooperation mechanism. A choice must also be 
made (even though both are not mutually exclusive) between a focus on enforcement cooperation or 
on convergence or harmonisation efforts. Convergence and harmonisation efforts have the benefit 
of simplifying the legal environment and thereby reducing transaction costs and increasing legal 
certainty, but it was demonstrated above that uniform rules are not achievable and not desirable. 
Enforcement cooperation is a more realistic option that can render law enforcement more effective 
and efficient and attenuate conflict, but has the disadvantage that it is often unable to solve 
fundamental disagreements between nations. Of particular importance when analysing bilateral 
cooperation agreements is whether a formal agreement is needed or whether informal cooperation is 
preferable. While informal cooperation certainly has its benefits, the main drawback is that it offers 
little transparency. As cooperation between enforcers cannot guarantee a successful outcome, it is 
crucial that it at least can ensure that there can be trust in the process. Transparent, formal, 
agreements can help achieve that transparency and create that trust. A final distinction is the one 
between hard and soft law. This study acknowledges that the distinction is not binary, but a 
continuum exists along factors such as obligation, delegation, and precision. Both options have 
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand soft law can offer flexibility in procedure and 
effects, often entails less contracting costs and implementation costs, can be as effective as hard law, 
and can break through or avoid a deadlock. However, soft forms of law can disrupt the institutional 
balance in the EU, can suffer from democratic deficit and limited transparency, and the pick and 
choose that may be paired with the flexibility offered by such legislation may lead to uncertainty. Soft 
law may also just be a smokescreen to mask lack of true agreement and commitment, and may be a 
vehicle of protectionism. On the other hand, hard law is less flexible and generally costlier to achieve, 
but offers more certainty and a stronger commitment, and is created according to democratically 
approved procedures. 
 
Difficult choices must therefore be made, and preferences have varied over time. Early efforts to 
deal with the extraterritorial effects of anticompetitive behaviour were characterised by their 
(over)ambitious goals. The initial reaction of states to the effects of global competition was to try to 
actively create a set of uniform hard substantive principles that would be supported by a large 
number of members. Such principles were strongly embedded in a trade context, in an attempt to 
address both public and private restraints to international trade. A supranational enforcer would 
ensure adherence to the agreed text. Examples are the 1927 World Economic Conference, the 
Havana Charter, and the ECOSOC initiative. Remarkable is the role played by the US during this 
period. While the US several times was the initiator of multilateral projects, it was also the first to 
abandon the projects when they steered away from the US-preferred standard. The failure of these 
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multilateral efforts can be explained by the fact that the ambition shared by these projects did not 
seem to arise out of a true desire to reach an international common standpoint. It was rather an 
attempt by dominant jurisdictions to reach harmonisation towards their national standard. This is 
testimony of a ‘competition between interests’. This theory seeking to explain innovations in 
governance suggests that institutions are shaped by the consciously enacted strategies of self-
interested actors, rather than the logic of evolution, and that institutional innovation is a product of 
competition over transnational policy.640 More specifically, (neo)Marxist theories view global 
governance as ‘the executive committee of the global bourgeoisie’, reflecting the economic interests 
in powerful states. Focus is thereby on the role played by multinational corporations and the interests 
of capital(ist actors).641 In the history of international competition law, this dynamic is indeed 
apparent from the US’ repeated position that there was insufficient agreement on the basics of 
competition law, on its goals and underlying theories, to move forward, despite being the initiator of 
many of the projects. PAPADOPOULOS, when analysing the failure of the WTO negotiations on 
competition law, used the fact that neither the US nor the EU, jurisdictions with mature competition 
systems, enthusiasm for competition law and expressed antipathy towards cartels, were willing to 
accept a commitment on the prohibition of export cartels to demonstrate that “what is of utmost 
importance in the context of the negotiations of competition at the international level is the reassurance that national 
interests are satisfied before any sort of mutual commitments may be made.”642 This finding is valid for all 
attempts at a global code discussed in this study. While external events and issues not directly related 
to competition law did play a role in the demise of some of the past attempts at harmonisation, 
growing experience of states with competition law exposed underlying complexities and sensitivities. 
A significant lack of agreement on the essence of competition law became apparent and prevented 
any form of harmonisation. Again referring to the example of the WTO negotiations, it is telling that 
even the watered down proposal of the EU containing basic principles such as non-discrimination, 
transparency, due process, a provision on hard-core cartels, and modalities for cooperation and 
technical assistance, was unable to evoke consensus.643 The time was not ripe for a formal 
international agreement on the matter.  
 
It should be noted that even if the external factors that stood in the way of a global antitrust regime 
in the past are no longer present today,644 an attempt to create global rules remains complex at 
present as well. A lot more countries have experience with competition law, and are more willing to 
push through their preferences. This poses entirely different obstacles to a global agreement. 
EICHENGREEN and UZAN in their analysis of the 1933 World Economic Conference in the context 
of the economic crisis, rightly remarked that a cooperative response could never be devised, when 
there was not even a shared diagnosis of the problem or a common conceptual framework. They 
correctly underlined the importance of recognising the existence of competing conceptual 
frameworks and domestic political constraints.645 The same applies to global competition law. A few 
decades later, in 1968, MARKERT similarly concluded that earlier attempts to establish an 
                                                          
640 T. Hale & D. Held, “Editors’ introduction: mapping changes in transnational governance” in T. Hale & D. Held (eds), 
Handbook of transnational governance – institutions and innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, 20. 
641 Ibid., 21. 
642 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 240-41. 
643 Ibid., 242.  
644 M. Gal, “Review Essay: New Perspectives on International Antitrust”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
106, 2012, 404.  
645 B. Eichengreen & M. Uzan, “The 1933 World Economic Conference as an Instance of Failed International 
Cooperation”, Working Paper No. 90-149, October 1990, University of California at Berkeley, Department of 
Economics, 2, 36.  
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international antitrust system, for instance under the auspices of the United Nations or by the 
Council of Europe failed due to the contrast between the ambitious programs and the lack of 
agreement among the participating countries with regard to their attitudes concerning restraints of 
trade.646 Today the same conclusion could be reached, as there have not been any evolutions 
indicating that a multilateral consensus would be possible in the short to medium term. The question 
moreover is not limited to the feasibility of a global competition law, but to the desirability of it as 
well. The opening quote of this Part I by WOOD647 implies that competition law is indeed very closely 
intertwined with the environment it is developed in, and developed for, and that this environment is 
continually evolving, at different paces, in different places. A global set of rules is not able to address 
those different needs and concerns.    
 
The default solution to the lack of global regulation of competition was the extraterritorial 
application of national laws, first according to the economic entity doctrine, and later following the 
implementation doctrine and the effects doctrine. Indeed, extraterritorial enforcement of national 
competition laws was not the first response to international restrictive business practices, and it is 
not ‘the natural and necessary’ way to deal with them.648 Despite many evolutions in the economic, 
political and legal field, the complexity of the international business environment today combined 
with the exponential increase in, and variation among competition laws, makes it difficult to let go of 
the current sovereignty-based system, which remains the basic mechanism for dealing with 
international competition.649 States are aware, however, that the unilateral application of their 
national laws is not only difficult and will often still require the help of the jurisdiction where the 
harmful activity takes place or the evidence is located, it also creates diplomatic problems as well as 
legal uncertainty, not to mention the fact that it may confront firms with conflicting remedies. 
Competition authorities, legislators, and subjects of the law therefore all suffer from this sub-optimal 
solution.  
 
The disappointments in trying to create a multilateral agreement and the realisation that 
extraterritorial application of national rules leads to suboptimal outcomes resulted in a shift in 
preferences from binding multilateral harmonisation with supranational enforcement to soft 
multilateral convergence and bilateral enforcement cooperation. The irreconcilable interests of 
developed countries favouring non-legally binding codes including general equitable principles on the 
one hand, and developing countries preferring legally binding codes of conduct containing specific 
rules on the other hand, led to a prevalence of the former’s interests and a move towards the use of 
bilateral diplomatic approaches, rather than formalized international consultation and conciliation 
procedures.650 History therefore demonstrated how cooperation efforts can move along the four axes 
of cooperation mentioned earlier in this Part. This evolution did not proceed smoothly or efficiently, 
and did not occur in revolutionary leaps. Only gradually were countries able to adapt to a changing 
reality. Many different actors attempted to do the same thing (to develop a multilateral set of 
competition standards), revolving around the same principles and including much of the same ideas. 
                                                          
646 K. Markert, “Recent Developments in International Antitrust Cooperation”, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 13, 1968, 355.   
647 “No matter how firmly someone may believe that the antitrust or competition law of a particular place has achieved final wisdom, history 
offers a strong message that some modesty is called for here.” D. Wood, “Is cooperation possible?”, Luncheon Speech, New England 
Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 111. 
648 D. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 19. 
649 Ibid., 55.  
650 J. Davidow & L. Chiles, “The United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary Nature of International Codes 
of Conduct regarding Restrictive Business Practices”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 72, No. 2, 1978, 249, 
268.  
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Only as experiences with competition law grew, did the complexities become more apparent. 
Alternative solutions were sought for and found in soft convergence and bilateral cooperation. The 
OECD was one of the first actors to issue non-binding guidelines. Those guidelines formed the basis 
for the early bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements.  
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PART II: an assessment of the EU’s dedicated competition cooperation agreements 
 
“The basic prerequisite for any international cooperation in competition cases is the exchange of information and 
evidence between the national competition authorities. This lies at the centre of any efficient cooperation, and the level of 
its implementation may impede or enhance the activities of such authorities.”651  
 
1. Benchmarks  
 
This Part will analyse how and to what extent the EU’s bilateral competition cooperation agreements 
tackle some of the problems revolving around effective international competition law enforcement, 
namely widely diverging substantive laws and underlying theories, jurisdictional disputes, availability 
of investigative tools, and more practical issues such as language barriers and timetables.652 It will 
become clear whether these instruments, that are often considered an ‘interim-solution’ until the 
possibility of a global substantive agreement re-emerges, are more than that, or at least have the 
potential to be.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned, dedicated competition cooperation agreements are agreements that exclusively focus 
on the modalities of enforcement cooperation between competition agencies. This study, which 
focuses on the EU, adheres to the typology employed by DG COMP, distinguishing between two 
generations of agreements.653 First generation agreements are centred around the comity principle. 
They provide for cooperation mechanisms such as notification, coordination, consultation, and 
exchange of information. Second generation agreements go beyond what is possible in first 
generation agreements, allowing the exchange of confidential information between the competition 
agencies of the contracting parties.654 The main limitation of first generation agreements is indeed 
that the exchange of information protected by confidentiality legislation is excluded,655 as first 
generation agreements generally foresee that no changes to existing laws should be made following 
                                                          
651 M. Błachucki & S. Jóźwiak, “Exchange of information and evidence between competition authorities and 
entrepreneurs’ rights”, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2012, 139.  
652 D. Wood, “Is cooperation possible?”, Luncheon Speech, New England Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 107-108. 
653 Others distinguish between three or even four generations of agreements. See for instance M. Taylor, International 
Competition Law: a New Dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 108: “[…] bilateral 
competition agreements have undergone four distinct evolutionary phases over the past thirty years with each successive evolutionary phase 
involving a more sophisticated and ambitious form of bilateral co-operation:  
(a) ‘passive co-operation’ agreements, from 1976 (‘First Generation Agreements’); 
(b) ‘negative comity’ agreements, from 1988 (‘Second Generation Agreements’); 
(c) ‘positive comity’ agreements, including international antitrust enforcement assistance agreements , from 1995 (‘Third Generation 
Agreements’); 
(d) ‘extension of jurisdiction’ agreements, which remain rare (‘Fourth Generation Agreements’).”  
The typology of DG COMP is selected because this study is written from an EU-law perspective, and the EU did not 
really participate in the ‘passive cooperation’ and ‘negative comity’ agreements mentioned above.  
654 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 18.  
655 Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, COM/2012/0244 final - 2012/0126 
(NLE), Explanatory Memorandum, June 2012, paragraph 1.  
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the agreement.656 In the US such agreements are sometimes described as antitrust-specific MLATs 
(see below, Part II, 2.4.2.3).657  
 
The fact that the recent management plans of DG COMP (see above, introduction) indicated that 
the EU is no longer planning to invest in first generation agreements, might suggest that an 
assessment of such agreements is no longer useful. It is nevertheless interesting to find out, and 
therefore also the purpose of this assessment, why these agreements are being phased-out, and 
whether this decision is justified. Moreover, it is likely that the content of the provisions will survive 
in other types of agreements, such as MoUs, second generation agreements, or recommendations, 
justifying continued study. The assessment adheres to a functionalist approach towards international 
competition cooperation. Central in this approach is an evolutionary logic, whereby “[i]nstitutions that 
are well adapted to their socio-economic setting will survive and replicate, while institutions that do not match their 
settings must adapt or perish.”658 Changes in the nature of political or economic problems will then 
dictate the shape of institutional arrangements.659 Scrutiny of second generation agreements is 
relevant because of the rarity and novelty of the agreements. As the EU is planning to conclude 
more second generation agreements, it is important to analyse from the start whether these 
agreements fulfil their potential and whether and where there is room for improvement.   
 
1.2 Methodology for the determination of the benchmarks 
 
Generally, indicators to assess the impact or success of an international agreement would include 
legislative changes, the development of political agendas, public discourse, or actor strategies, but this 
is difficult to measure when it comes to enforcement cooperation agreements. First, available data 
are limited (see above, introduction) and even where data are available, the number of cooperation 
instances reveals little about the quality of cooperation. It is moreover impossible to develop 
counterfactuals, in other words, there are no data on the road not taken. It is extremely difficult to 
determine what would have happened if certain authorities would or would not have cooperated at a 
certain stage in the investigation. Second, public discourse does not necessarily reflect true success, 
and finally, and most importantly, causality is difficult to determine, as a host of competing factors 
and explanations for progress or lack thereof would have to be disentangled.660 However, while the 
evaluation or assessment of an international agreement is certainly difficult, the task of seeking to 
measure whether competition cooperation agreements are furthering their goals is a valuable one and 
one worth pursuing. This study will therefore focus on the content of the provisions in the 
agreement, where possible illustrated with practical examples of their application, rather than 
exclusively focussing on the implementation of the agreements. The quality and nature of the tools 
offered to the agencies will be assessed.  
 
                                                          
656 For a detailed overview of the provisions of first generation agreements, see V. Demedts, “International Competition 
law enforcement: different means, one goal?”, Competition Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2012, 223-253.   
657 M. Chowdhury, “From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling the Obstacles to Transatlantic 
Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement”, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 11-09, 28 November 2011, 9. 
658 T. Hale & D. Held, “Editors’ introduction: mapping changes in transnational governance” in T. Hale & D. Held (eds), 
Handbook of transnational governance – institutions and innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, 19. 
659 Ibid., 18.  
660 S. Weber Waller, “The next generation of global competition law” in N. Charbit, E. Ramundo, A. Chehtova, & A. 
Slater (eds), William E. Kovacic An Antitrust Tribute, Liber Amicorum – Volume I, New York, Institute of Competition Law, 
2012, 99.  
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An analysis of the added value of dedicated competition agreements necessarily depends on the 
standards they are measured against. The conclusion of competition cooperation agreements can be 
motivated by a diversity of factors, which means that diverse criteria can be used to assess the 
effectiveness of the cooperation. The agreements themselves have remained quite vague with regard 
to their pursuits (see below, Part I, 1.3), and the ones concluding the agreements have not been very 
explicit about their reasons to choose such a legal instrument. In what follows, measurable 
benchmarks modelled on the potential benefits of agreements are listed and categorised. These 
benchmarks will be used further in this study for the assessment of the content of the first and 
second generation agreements concluded by the EU with third countries. It will be systematically 
analysed whether and to what extent the EU’s cooperation agreements have contributed to the 
attainment of such benefits.  
 
The categories listed below were developed in the framework of this study to represent a more far-
going breakdown of the distinct benefits of (case-specific) cooperation. This breakdown is necessary 
to arrive at more measurable and testable benchmarks that go beyond vague generalities. The 
categories are the result of an accumulation of different sources. The first main source from which 
the information in the following section is drawn is the stocktaking exercise under the auspices of the 
ICN. This exercise was finalised in 2007 and dealt with cooperation between competition agencies in 
cartel investigations (although many of the results are valid for merger cooperation and cooperation 
on unilateral conduct as well), a project on which DG COMP volunteered to take the lead.661 Second, 
the stocktaking exercise of the OECD Competition Committee’s work, issued in 2012 and stretching 
over 20 years,662 as well as other OECD documents such as the work carried out in the framework of 
the Global Forum on Competition in 2012 concerned with improving international cooperation in 
cartel investigations.663 Also the paper of TEMPLE LANG regarding enhanced enforcement 
cooperation was used as inspiration.664 Finally, an important source of information are the results of 
the OECD/ICN Joint Survey on international enforcement cooperation.665 To assess the legal 
instrument as such, apart from its content, use will be made of the benefits of ‘soft law’, mentioned 
above (see above, Part I, 2.4.4) to determine whether the level of legalization of the agreements is 
appropriate.   
 
1.3 Measurable benchmarks  
 
A state will mainly conclude a competition cooperation agreement to be able to better address the 
international anticompetitive behaviour affecting its territory by improving enforcement. The main 
beneficiaries of early first generation agreements, however, were those subject to scrutiny, in other 
words those involved in antitrust proceedings, as the main goal was to diminish the risk of 
conflicting outcomes. Other obvious beneficiaries are the competition agencies concluding the 
agreement, which will (or should) benefit from more streamlined procedures. Lastly, it are the 
                                                          
661 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 5.  
662 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012.  
663 Again, the results can generally be transposed to merger investigations and unilateral conduct cases. OECD, Global 
Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background Note, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012.  
664 OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by John Temple Lang, “Aims of enhanced 
international cooperation in competition cases”, DAF/COMP/WP3(2014)7, 28 May 2014, 2-3. 
665 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013.  
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consumers and other market players affected by anticompetitive conduct that will profit from better 
enforcement. 
 
When assessing the worth of the EU’s first generation competition agreements, it is important to 
first determine what can be achieved by such agreements and what is out of reach. In other words: 
what are the goals of the agreement and what are not. The first generation agreements under scrutiny 
in this study remain quite vague in determining their objectives. In the 1991 EU-US Agreement for 
example, the preamble acknowledges that cooperation would enhance the sound and effective 
enforcement of the parties' competition laws. Article I.1 adds that “[t]he purpose of the agreement is to 
promote cooperation and coordination and lessen the possibility or impact of differences between the Parties in the 
application of their competition laws.” The goal of the agreement is mainly described negatively as conflict-
avoidance. If this is compared to more recent first generation agreements such as the 2003 EU-Japan 
or the 2009 EU-Korea agreements, there is a slight change of tone. Both agreements state in their 
articles I.1 that “[t]he purpose of this Agreement is to contribute to the effective enforcement of the competition laws of 
each Party through promoting cooperation and coordination between the competition authorities of the Parties and to 
avoid or lessen the possibility of conflicts between the Parties in all matters pertaining to the application of the 
competition laws of each Party.” The purpose is therefore somewhat broadened, focussing not only on 
conflict avoidance but also more generally on contributing to effective enforcement. Even though 
the content has remained more or less the same, the way in which the Agreement is applied has 
somewhat changed.  
 
WAYLAND categorised the principal purposes of international cooperation into three groups: a larger 
understanding of the competitive process, greater effectiveness of competition enforcement 
activities, and an increased efficiency of the overall global enforcement effort with the aim of 
facilitating and promoting economic activity to the advantage of consumers.666 GERBER equally 
deconstructed the scissors paradox mentioned above (see above, Part I, 1.1.2) into three 
components. These components can be seen to represent three important obstacles to effective 
international competition law enforcement. For the purpose of this study they can be translated into 
categories of benefits that international cooperation in general (not restricted to case-cooperation) 
can bring to remedy these obstructions. A first component of the scissors paradox is that deterrence 
is undermined. This can be mitigated by strengthening enforcement, via increased 
awareness/detection of infringements or better access to evidence. A second aspect is the increased 
potential for jurisdictional conflicts, both in likelihood and scope. While a choice-of-law rule is too 
far-going for most jurisdictions because it is too intrusive, there are other solutions to mitigate the 
consequences of such conflicts. Coordination of remedies will be of great importance for the 
competitive process. Greater understanding of the processes (be it the language and/or content of 
the procedural and substantive rules) leading to foreign decisions might moreover lead to greater 
acceptance of divergent outcomes. In other instances the use of comity might lead one jurisdiction to 
defer to another. Finally, GERBER identifies risk, uncertainty, inconsistency and compliance costs as 
the final component of the scissors paradox. The answer here is to create a more predictable and 
consistent legal environment. While this will not be possible on all fronts, some minimum 
harmonization of procedural rules could significantly improve the situation.667 While highly relevant, 
these are not exactly measurable benefits of the cooperation that the agreements aim to promote. 
                                                          
666 J. Wayland, “International cooperation at the antitrust division”, remarks as prepared for the International Bar 
Association’s 16th Annual Competition Conference, Florence, 14 September 2012, 2. 
667 D. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 92, 94.  
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The abovementioned objectives should therefore, as mentioned, be further broken down in smaller, 
measurable units.  
 
Bilateral dedicated competition agreements are obviously characterised by some inherent limitations. 
First, the existence of substantive conflicts in multijurisdictional competition cases is primarily 
caused by different traditions of competition policy and divergent competition, industrial, or other 
policy goals.668 Enforcement cooperation via first generation bilateral agreements cannot overcome 
such problems and does not aim to do so. It can, however, foster greater understanding of different 
competition systems and can encourage competition authorities to take into account considerations 
of other competition authorities. While cooperation agreements do not address substantial 
divergence of analysis, they do allow for the coordination of responses to anticompetitive 
behaviour.669 Second, bilateral agreements are not adequate in themselves for cases in which more 
than two jurisdictions are involved, for instance multijurisdictional merger cases that require multiple 
notifications.670 Even though it could be claimed that several bilateral arrangements would result in 
an entanglement of differing coordination requirements, coordination among some countries of 
information requirements or timelines would already be a significant improvement for the companies 
involved.  
 
1.2.1 Limitation of negative externalities: conflict avoidance 
 
As mentioned, the main goal of early cooperation agreements was to reduce the risk negative 
externalities such as divergent or conflicting decisions and remedies. International cooperation can 
serve as an interface between competition agencies and different legal systems. Certain behaviour 
may enhance global welfare, but severely affect the national welfare of a particular country, causing 
the country to nonetheless prohibit the actions. Legislative and enforcement choices are thus 
determined by whose welfare should be promoted. This, in part, explains the continuing 
disagreement on what constitutes an ‘optimal’ antitrust policy.671 A typical example of the nationally-
oriented mind-set of the competition authorities the lax regulation and enforcement of export 
cartels, especially compared to domestic cartels.672 Even if a nation’s competition laws are formulated 
in a neutral way, its policy choices or enforcement practice may be biased and rather ‘inward-
focused’. This explains why even similar substantive laws may result in conflicting outcomes when 
multiple authorities are investigating the same case. According to the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission (AMC) (see below, Part II, 2.5.2.2) there is a large cost connected to inconsistent 
                                                          
668 M. Blauberger, “The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions. How International Cooperation Enhances the 
Autonomy of Competition Authorities”, Transtate Working Papers, No. 102, Bremen, 2009, 1. 
669 Also see A. Schaub, “International Co-operation in Antitrust matters: making the point in the wake of the 
Boeing/MDD proceedings”, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1, 1998, 2-6.  
670 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 91.  
671 A. Klevorick & A. Sykes, “United States Courts and the Optimal Deterrence of International Cartels: a Welfarist 
Perspective on Empagran” in E. Fox & D. Crane (eds), Antitrust stories, New York, Foundation Press, 2007, 377-378. 
672 H. Klodt, Towards a Global Competition Order, Berlin, Liberal Verlag GmbH, 2005, 71-72. Export cartels created by or 
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Fox & D. Crane (eds), Antitrust stories, New York, Foundation Press, 2007, 379.) Export cartels may create artificial 
product scarcity on domestic markets or may directly or incidentally limit imports within the domestic territory. (E. 
Elhauge & D. Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2nd ed., Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2011, 
1193).  
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remedies, significantly obstructing innovation as well as global trade and investment, creating an 
atmosphere of uncertainty and political tension.673  
 
Some scholars claim that actual damage suffered by companies due to conflicting antitrust decisions 
is very rare.674 Explicit conflict, however, is only a small part of the negative effects that the 
applicability of multiple national laws on one case may have. The above type of conflicts may also 
create political tension and lead to conflict between authorities or states. While the impact of 
cooperation agreements here is difficult to measure, the past has already proven that first generation 
agreements are unable to entirely stop political conflicts from emerging. Proof hereof are the 
infamous GE/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas cases (see above, Part I, 2.2.5). In the OECD 
Report on Positive Comity it was illustrated that resentment over jurisdictional disputes can be an 
obstacle to cooperation. It was observed by one enforcement official that, despite the exceptionality 
of actual jurisdictional conflicts, “jurisdictional differences between the United Kingdom and the United States 
have significantly limited the co-operation between their competition authorities.”675 The potential hindrance to 
international enforcement cooperation may therefore be larger than appears at first. 
 
The main way in which conflict avoidance can be achieved is by ensuring that authorities investigating 
the same case remain in close dialogue from the early start of the investigation process, taking into 
account externalities of their actions, and by aligning the timing of the procedures to the biggest 
extent possible within the respective legal frameworks, in particular deadlines and decision-making 
moments. Differing substantive laws entail that conflicting remedies can never be entirely eliminated, 
but close cooperation can limit the damage.  
 
Not all negative externalities can and should be avoided. Some differences between the competition 
systems of jurisdictions are related to capacities of antitrust authorities, stages of economic 
development, different impacts of the same transaction or conduct in different markets or different 
facts. Cooperation agreements cannot and should not attempt to remedy this type of divergences. 
When different outcomes are related however to for instance a lack of knowledge or perspective of 
less-experienced agencies, or would stem from divergences such as the earliest allowable date of 
premerger notification, this can and should be addressed.676 
 
1.2.2 Rationalisation of resources 
 
Globalisation resulted in an increased workload for agencies that have not necessarily gotten the 
equivalent budget-increases over the past years. Studies indicated that international cartels may 
escape prosecution due to resource constraints of enforcement agencies.677 Rationalisation of 
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resources is therefore a necessity. A major benefit of successful international cooperation is that it 
can result in a more efficient use of agency resources and in general reduce the cost of enforcement. 
If competition agencies cooperate, there will be less duplicative efforts and less misallocation of 
resources.678 Resources can be rationalised via deference, or other forms of cooperation such as 
exchange of information which would for instance make evidence-gathering easier. If agencies can 
cooperate beyond their jurisdiction, evidence can be transmitted, instead of having to resort to 
expensive discovery techniques.    
 
Of course cooperation itself comes at a cost as well. Cooperation will require human resources, and 
will at times imply an increased administrative burden (communicating and coordinating, translation 
costs,…).679 Many competition authorities claim that there are insufficient resources available to 
address requests for assistance.680 This problem is acute for both younger, less experienced 
competition authorities as more established ones. The former need time to gain credibility as an 
enforcer and need to develop the necessary tools and policies to achieve that aim. It is difficult then 
to direct the little resources they have towards foreign assistance.681 The latter may be flooded with 
requests from smaller jurisdictions and face difficulties as well. In the 1998 OECD Cartel 
Recommendation it is explicitly foreseen that resource constraints form a legitimate reason to deny a 
request for assistance.682 Authorities and governments should however pay attention that the costs 
involved in cooperating do not outweigh the costs of non-cooperation.  
 
1.2.3 An increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of the investigation  
 
Another potential benefit of case-cooperation is that enforcement can take place more effectively 
and more efficiently. These gains can take place on two levels: prior to the investigation, and during 
the investigation. It starts with raising awareness prior to any case. One reason for under-enforcement 
is the fact that a competition agency may simply not be aware of an infringement. If competition 
agencies cooperate and notify each other about possible infringements, or (im)pending cases they are 
dealing with that could potentially harm the other party’s important interests, information will more 
easily and more timely find its way to the relevant authorities. Even though it is easier for agencies to 
hear about potentially anticompetitive behaviour in this internet- and media-age than before, it is 
possible that agencies are not aware of parallel investigations taking place in other jurisdictions. The 
level of enforcement may in this manner be increased via cooperation.  
 
Cooperation can also increase the effectiveness and efficiency of competition investigations once 
they have started. The main obstacle for more advanced international enforcement is the limited legal 
ability of competition authorities to exchange information, and in particular confidential 
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information.683 Already in 1999, in the Draft Plans for a Report to the Council Concerning Hard 
Core Cartels, the OECD Competition Committee identified legal restrictions on international 
information exchange among competition authorities as major obstacles to effective cooperation. 
This concerned both confidential as well as non-confidential information, even in the presence of 
proper safeguards and when the exchange would benefit both parties.684 If the legal framework is 
considered weak, the relevant procedures are not sufficiently transparent, or if the safeguards for due 
process are considered insufficient, countries will rightly be reluctant to cooperate.685 Information 
and evidence are crucial throughout competition cases. Coordination and information exchange can 
increase the speed of an investigation, and can provide greater access to evidence. This could be 
done by coordinating dawn raids or other investigatory measures, thereby maximising the element of 
surprise and avoiding the destruction of evidence. Evidence may also be unavailable because it is 
situated in another jurisdiction, this situation could be addressed via exchange of information.686  
 
Another benefit of international cooperation related to more effective enforcement is that via 
cooperation the risk of forum hopping or forum shopping is diminished. Divergent approaches, 
where one jurisdiction does not take into account another jurisdiction’s interests, would encourage 
forum shopping in the form of firms lodging complaints there where they can best expose their 
competitors, or strategic leniency applications, for example. This represents a standard prisoner’s 
dilemma involving two prisoners, in separate rooms, unable to communicate with each other. If both 
prisoners do not say anything, the sheriff can only give them a fine. If one prisoner confesses, he is 
granted leniency, but the other one will be incarcerated for ten years. If both confess, each prisoner 
will be incarcerated for five years. In the context of international competition law, this translates into 
the fact that each firm wishes strict (antitrust)control for other firms, yet no, or more lax restrictions 
for itself.687 Cooperation among competition agencies will allow those agencies to control this 
process to a certain extent, resulting in more thorough and effective enforcement.688 Increased 
contact between enforcement officials may also lead to increased levels of expertise, thereby 
improving the overall quality of enforcement. 
 
1.2.4 An increase in transparency and legal certainty  
 
Concluding a cooperation agreement can also increase transparency and linked to this, legal certainty 
for both other agencies as well as those subject to a competition investigation. This can be done by 
stating clear goals, and describing clear procedures that safeguard the procedural rights of the parties. 
This implies a certain level of precision. Vague generalities offer no added value to what would 
otherwise be mere practice. When cooperation agreements are explicit and precise, other agencies 
                                                          
683 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 100, 112. Also see OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel 
investigations, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 309. 
684 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 28.  
685 OECD, Issues paper by the secretariat, Limitations and constraints to international co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)8, 23 October 2012, 14.  
686 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 7.  
687 X., Contribution of James R. Atwood in Summary of Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing - International 
Antitrust Issues, 15 February 2006, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/antitrust/at-links/pdf/at-
mod/02_15_06.authcheckdam.pdf (accessed September 2015), 1.  
688 M. Blauberger, “The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions. How International Cooperation Enhances the 
Autonomy of Competition Authorities”, Transtate Working Papers, No. 102, Bremen, 2009, 18.  
105 
 
can observe the agreements concluded and take away their own lessons from it, while those involved 
in a merger for instance can anticipate on the process and aid it even further. International 
cooperation between competition agencies increases the predictability of the legal environment in 
which companies act. This can happen via coordination of procedures or consultations regarding 
remedies to avoid incompatibility.689 Divergence in antitrust laws creates uncertainty about the legal 
consequences of certain cross-border transactions. More legal certainty, in particular with regard to 
procedure, will be an incentive for companies to innovate and engage in pro-competitive activities.690  
 
1.2.5 Overcoming practical issues  
 
An agreement focusing on case-cooperation offers the opportunity to overcome practical issues that 
may hinder the international enforcement process. A common hurdle in coordinating investigations 
is the language barrier.691 It is thereby not only the language itself that can be problematic, but the 
terminology or jargon as well. Competition law is a technical and fast-evolving branch of law, and the 
terminology follows suit. Not every competition authority may be familiar with new or developing 
terms.692 GERBER called competition law an ‘unusual’ form of law as it aims to protect the integrity 
of a process (the competitive process), and employs an often unfamiliar and imprecise terminology. 
He warned for the hazards of cross-border communication, and mentioned as an added difficulty the 
complexity of the concepts themselves, inter alia because they involve an intertwining of economic, 
legal and procedural components. This makes it challenging for those inside the system to 
communicate effectively and efficiently, and opaque for outside observers.693 Cooperation can help 
overcome some of these problems as authorities learn from each other or agree on a shared 
terminology. Clear definitions are of utmost importance.  
 
What will likely remain a difficult issue is cooperation between authorities from different time 
zones.694 While working in different time zones cannot entirely be overcome via an agreement, as 
mentioned, decision making moments can be aligned within the room offered by the parties’ 
procedures. Finally, the question who should pay for certain acts of cooperation can be regulated as 
well.  
  
1.2.6 Decreased burden for companies  
 
Competition agencies are not the only ones benefitting from international cooperation between 
competition agencies. Cooperation could help companies save both time and expenses by 
significantly reducing the (procedural) burden and costs for the companies involved, be it to a lesser 
extent than a multilateral agreement would. For instance, if a merger has to be notified to a handful 
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or more competition authorities, this involves high transaction costs in the form of having to comply 
with different procedures, information requirements and deadlines, resulting in high fees of lawyers, 
economists, accountants or others.695 To successfully engage in a multijurisdictional merger, parties 
indeed require the assistance of international law firms to analyse the merger, prepare the necessary 
notifications, and they often need to cooperate with local counsel in each separate jurisdiction.696 
Cooperation could alleviate this burden by aligning deadlines and other requirements.  
 
1.2.7 Discipline 
 
Finally, a cooperation agreement can install a certain discipline in the cooperation process. A clear 
structure to cooperate, with clear boundaries and safeguards, as well as a clear commitment to a close 
working relationship, can provide strong incentives for parties to systematically consider and execute 
acts of cooperation. Not only the legal form of the agreement will play a role here, but also the type 
of obligations within it.  
 
1.4 Benefits not measured in the framework of the study 
 
The abovementioned benchmarks are based on benefits of agreements revolving around case-
cooperation that can measured within the framework of this study. There are broader benefits as 
well, but these require more intense empirical research, which falls outside the scope of this study. 
These benefits are mentioned below for the purpose of comprehensiveness.   
 
1.4.1 Enhanced autonomy and authority   
 
An independent competition authority is central in a solid competition law system. An effect of 
international cooperation that is particularly beneficial for younger or less established competition 
agencies is that it can – at first sight perhaps paradoxically – enhance their autonomy vis-à-vis politics, 
the judiciary, and the business world. When different national competition authorities come to 
conflicting outcomes in a certain case, they become susceptible to external influences. Indeed, it 
creates an opportunity for governments to intervene, for firms to engage in forum-shopping, and for 
judges to decide in cases of conflict.697 If agencies cooperate however, and their decisions are 
consistent with those of other authorities, this confers greater authority to the decisions and will 
make the competition authorities less institutionally dependent.  
 
Independence from politics can be interpreted in many ways. First, a competition policy or 
procedure that is supported internationally, has a stronger case against interference by other policies, 
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or politicization by the government. International support makes competition authorities 
institutionally more independent, allowing them to protect competition policy from being overly 
influenced by other policy goals.698 International cooperation can thus be seen as a type of defence 
mechanism from ‘attacks’ at national level. Secondly, also interest groups might have less power in an 
international setting than in a national setting.699 It has been demonstrated by empirical research that 
industrial policy objectives negatively affecting macroeconomic growth pursued by national 
governments are often included under pressure of private stakeholders, especially under the weight 
of elections. Firms publicly pressuring competition authorities will have less power when the 
authority has the support of its international colleagues.700 Governments may also find it easier to 
resist to such pressure if they can refer to ‘pressure from above’ or ‘international obligations’.701 
Autonomy from the judiciary results from the fact that cooperation renders questions of 
jurisdictional overlap and the limits of extraterritoriality less frequent and less salient.702  
 
MATEUS claimed that the reputation of a competition authority has a strong influence on 
enforcement and deterrence, and it plays a role on several distinct moments in the enforcement 
process.703 Of course the narrative is circular: if an agency has a good reputation, it will likely be more 
involved in cooperation processes, which in turn will again strengthen its standing. The reputational 
effect alone may then lead to increased deterrence and compliance. International cooperation can 
increase the legitimacy and authority of competition law enforcement. If different agencies 
investigating the same case work together and reach the same conclusion while imposing non-
conflicting remedies, parties and the public will be less tempted to question the soundness of the 
national competition policy.704 Cooperation may be a way to grant more visibility to the usefulness of 
the work of competition agencies, and a way to potentially obtain larger budget allocations.   
 
1.4.2 Stimulate a learning effect and generate trust 
 
Another significant benefit of international cooperation between competition agencies is the learning 
effect it can create. This learning effect is threefold. First, analysis of individual cases might be 
facilitated via discussions among competition authorities on the methods used in a particular case.705 
This may relate to theoretical analysis, or particular enforcement actions.706 Second, frequently 
interacting with other competition authorities fosters a greater understanding of not only the 
different laws that apply, but also of the functioning of the foreign agency. Cooperation can 
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therefore lead to a broader learning effect beyond a certain case, and can therefore also be relevant to 
cases that do not have a transnational character. Even if agencies are not working on the same case, 
they can still benefit from each other’s experience. An agency can share relevant experience with a 
certain market or a certain type of behaviour with another agency faced with the matter that has less 
knowledge about it.707 In today’s world, rapid technological and institutional changes often create 
new challenges for competition authorities, such as unstable market definitions. This benefits the 
companies operating in these markets as well, as competition authorities will be able to make better 
informed decisions. Regular interaction may over time lead to convergence in the economic and legal 
analysis of competition cases due to a greater understanding of different competition systems. By 
stimulating consistent contact between different competition authorities, a close working relationship 
and mutual confidence in each other’s capabilities is encouraged.708 This can play an important role in 
generating deeper cooperation in the future.709 Finally, the learning process relates to the cooperation 
itself as well. Via repeat interaction, competition authorities will learn to handle difficulties in the 
coordination of investigations, in dealing with different legal systems, different time-schedules, 
different priorities, different languages, and shortcomings in the internal organisation of competition 
authorities.710 They will understand each other better, and be able to fine-tune the cooperation 
process.  
 
1.4.3 Catalyst for further cooperation and convergence 
 
Bilateral cooperation agreements may function as a catalyst for cooperation and convergence. While 
they might not create cooperation where there was none previously, as partner signatories are 
carefully selected before entering into an agreement, once the agreement is in place, cooperation does 
seem to become a more structural part of the daily enforcement culture. Parties that have concluded 
a formal cooperation agreement will often engage in informal cooperation as well.711 It is therefore 
not true that first generation agreements merely amount to a public statement expressing the 
willingness of the signatories to enforce competition laws.712  
 
The role as catalyst for cooperation contributes to the stepping stone-theory in a certain way. 
Bilateral competition cooperation agreements can pave the way for more advanced cooperation 
techniques. MELAMED, former US Assistant Attorney General of the DoJ Antitrust Division, 
confirmed that bilateral cooperation enables antitrust agencies to learn and therefore allows them to 
tackle specific enforcement problems more effectively and efficiently, but moreover improves the 
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bilateral relationship itself. As parties become more comfortable with each other and gain a better 
understanding of the issues and interests involved, agreements containing simpler obligations evolve 
into more complex arrangements. In this manner the US’ 1984 cooperation agreement with Canada 
led the way to their 1995 agreement, the US’ 1982 agreement with Australia helped to build the 
confidence necessary for the mutual assistance agreement between the two parties, and the 1991 EU-
US Agreement spawned the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement. Bilateral agreements, while lacking 
strong legal effect, have strengthened trust between parties and thereby laid a foundation for sound, 
day-to-day enforcement relationships.713 Generally, personal relations play an important role in 
fostering the necessary trust to engage in cooperation.714 When this type of relationships is not 
available, however, formal agreements can play a facilitating role by demonstrating the willingness of 
both parties to engage themselves, and by laying down clear rules. 
 
2. First generation agreements: a costly way to create and maintain momentum 
 
Cooperation between competition authorities is quite a young phenomenon. KLAWITER and LACIAK 
mention the following anecdote in 2003: “At a recent conference, an official was asked how today’s ECUS 
cooperation differs from the level of cooperation five years ago. After beginning to answer, the official abruptly paused 
and responded: ‘Five years ago we weren’t even speaking to each other!’”715 This demonstrates both the fast pace 
in which international cooperation on competition matters has evolved, as well as the fact that during 
the late nineties, indeed, after the entry into force of the EU-US first generation competition 
cooperation agreement, cooperation was not going as smoothly as hoped.  
 
Following the benchmarks identified above, this part will assess the performance of the first and 
second generation agreements concluded by the EU with third countries. Based on this assessment, 
suggestions for improvement will be offered, drawing from experience in both competition policy 
and other policy fields. For both first and second generation agreements, the context in which they 
were concluded, their content, meaning the cooperation mechanisms offered, the legal nature of the 
agreements, and their use will be discussed.   
 
2.1 Context of conclusion of the EU-US Agreement 
 
The EU has concluded four bilateral first generation competition cooperation agreements, more 
precisely with the US in 1991 (complemented by a specific agreement on positive comity in 1998, an 
administrative arrangement on attendance in 1999, as well as Guidelines on Cooperation in Merger 
Investigations in 2002, renewed in 2011), with Canada in 1999, with Japan in 2003, and with the 
Republic of Korea in 2009.716 This study will be based on the EU-US cooperation Agreement, as 
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comparative analysis of the abovementioned agreements indicate that the EU-US Agreement can be 
considered a model for later EU first generation agreements. Moreover, the EU-US Agreement 
relates to two very experienced competition law enforcers and trade actors, and has been in force for 
over 25 years.717 
 
The earliest formal competition cooperation agreements date back to the seventies and eighties, 
more precisely the 1976 US - Germany agreement, the 1982 US-Australia and US - Canada 
agreements, and the 1987 agreement between France and Germany.718 The US has been at the 
forefront of formalised bilateral cooperation agreements, while the EU has invested more in 
multilateral cooperation.719 As mentioned before, for the US the conclusion of cooperation 
agreements was a form of ‘self-restraint’ when it came to its aggressive extraterritorial antitrust 
enforcement. However, according to a Commission official the EU-US Agreement was not a 
‘defensive’ agreement, like the ones previously concluded by the US with Australia, Canada, or 
Germany, but was more positive in approach with an emphasis on cooperation.720 Another major 
catalyst for the emergence of bilateral cooperation agreements was the work done by the OECD in 
the form of formal policy recommendations.721 It nevertheless took some time before the ideas 
offered in these recommendations were included in bilateral cooperation agreements. The first 
OECD recommendation indeed dates back to 1967, almost ten years prior to the first bilateral 
cooperation agreement.  
 
The first transatlantic bilateral cooperation agreement on competition law followed fifteen years after 
the 1976 agreement, on the initiative of the Competition Commissioner at the time, SIR LEON 
BRITTAN.722 Factors that play a role when deciding whether or not to cooperate include the perceived 
usefulness of cooperation, the relationship between the relevant agencies and the knowledge of each 
other’s procedures. One can assume that these factors play to an even larger extent when deciding 
whether or not to conclude a cooperation agreement with another jurisdiction, where cooperation 
will likely occur more regularly.723  
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The EU-US Agreement was inspired by the 1986 OECD Recommendation Concerning Restrictive 
business practices Affecting International Trade, to which the EU and the US both adhered. The 
Commission wanted to draw up a legally binding document.724 The negotiations proceeded 
expeditiously. In less than a year they were finished, motivated in particular by the entry into force of 
Regulation 4064/89 (the merger regulation), which would have a considerable impact on the 
potential instances of conflict between both legal systems as the array of potential mergers falling 
under both jurisdictions would increase significantly. After approval by the college of 
Commissioners, SIR LEON BRITTAN signed and concluded the agreement on behalf of the 
Commission, while the Attorney General and President of the Federal Trade Commission, 
representing the US government, did the same for the US. Member states never expressed 
discomfort with the content of the Agreement during these negotiations, but some questioned 
whether it should have been the Commission alone to conclude the Agreement.725 The competence 
of the Commission to conclude the agreement was successfully challenged by France (see below, 
Part II, 2.3.1), causing the agreement to be concluded under different terms in 1995, nevertheless 
maintaining its content. 
 
Apart from the 1991 EU-US Agreement and the 1998 EU-US Positive Comity Agreement, 
transatlantic cooperation consists of a set of Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, 
issued by the US-EU Merger Working Group in 2002, and revised in 2011.726 This ‘addition’ was 
intended to serve as an advisory framework offering best practices for interagency cooperation, more 
precisely when US and EU antitrust agencies review the same merger. As it represents a mere 
advisory framework, the agencies involved retain full discretion regarding the implementation and it 
is explicitly stated that nothing in the document is intended to modify or create any enforceable 
rights.727 The Best Practices confirmed and built upon existing practice, and therefore formalised 
what was already taking place informally between EU and US competition agencies. It should be 
mentioned, however, that this ‘extension’ of the original bilateral dedicated agreement via best 
practices rather than an amendment to the agreement is unique to EU-US relations and does not 
appear in the context of any of the EU’s other bilateral competition agreements.  
 
According to KOVACIC the advances in EU-US cooperation in key respects resembled the core 
elements of the New Transatlantic Agenda established in 1995, aimed, inter alia, at improving the 
quality and reducing the cost of regulating transatlantic commerce. The New Transatlantic Agenda 
sought to strengthen regulatory coordination between the two jurisdictions by enhancing interaction 
at several levels in a process-oriented approach. First, by encouraging intergovernmental contacts 
among the chiefs of government and other high level public officials; second, by stimulating trans-
governmental contacts on a day-to-day basis among lower level officials; and finally, by motivating 
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transnational contacts among non-government institutions and individuals such as academics or the 
business community.728 
 
2.2 Cooperation mechanisms in the EU-US Agreement 
 
The main purpose of first generation competition cooperation agreements, apart from generally 
promoting cooperation and coordination, is to reduce or avoid conflict generated by the 
simultaneous application of the competition laws of different jurisdictions to the same case and to 
enhance the effective enforcement of the parties’ competition laws.729 As already mentioned, the 
cooperation mechanisms that are included in first generation agreements to pursue these goals 
mainly relate to case-specific cooperation, but they may also contribute to a more general policy 
dialogue.730 
 
The competition laws that fall under the Agreement are referred to specifically, with the addition of 
such other laws or regulations as the Parties agree in writing to be a competition law for purposes of 
the agreement. The requirement of written consent serves to ensure that the definition of what is a 
competition law is not extended beyond its intended scope, while nevertheless taking into account 
the possibility that further laws or implementing regulations may be adopted in the future.731 
 
2.2.1 Notification 
 
While it is said that the entire cooperation process starts with notification,732 this was perhaps more 
the case at the time of conclusion of first generation agreements than it is today, when cooperation 
can take place even before a formal notification is issued, as competition authorities are generally 
more aware of possible infringements, for instance via the media.733 A notification requirement 
nevertheless remains useful in the fight against selective enforcement with protectionist intent. 734 
 
The 1991 EU-US Agreement requires parties to notify each other whenever their competition 
authorities become aware that their enforcement activities may affect important interests of the other 
                                                          
728 W. Kovacic, “Nine next steps for transatlantic antitrust policy cooperation”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 1, October 
2011, 3.  
729 Article I 1991 EU-US Agreement. Similarly: Article I EU-Canada Agreement, Article 1 EU-Japan Agreement, and 
Article 1 EU- Korea Agreement. 
730 H. Dieckmann, “The Benefits of Cooperation between Competition Authorities”, Inaugural Symposium of the 
Competition Policy Research Center, Tokyo, 2003, available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/DP/CPDP-9-E.pdf 
(accessed December 2011), 5. 
731 Communication from the Commission to the Council concerning the Agreement between the European 
Communities and the Government of the United States on the application of positive comity principles in the 
enforcement of their competition laws, COM(97) 233 final, 97/0178(CNS), 18 June 1997, 6.  
732 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 
43. 
733 See C. Damro, “Comparing International EU Competition Cases: What Can Business and Politics Learn?”, paper 
prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies Association 11th Biennial International Conference, Los 
Angeles California, 23-25 April 2009, 8.  
734 A. Bradford & T. Büthe, “Competition policy and free trade – Antitrust provisions in PTAs” in A. Dür, M. Elsig 
(eds), Trade cooperation – the purpose, design and effects of preferential trade agreements, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2015, 267.  
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Party.735 This is quite vague in itself, so guidance is provided with regard to the type of enforcement 
activities that would ordinarily require notification. The Agreement provides the parties with a non-
exhaustive list of such situations, as well as an indication of the appropriate timing of notification, 
where a distinction is made between merger proceedings and other matters.736 The provision is quite 
specific with regard to the timing of notifications in merger cases,737 but remains rather cryptic and 
unartful in other cases, stating that “notification shall ordinarily be provided at the stage in an investigation when 
it becomes evident that notifiable circumstances are present, and in any event far enough in advance of: (a) the issuance 
of a statement of objections in the case of the Commission of the European Communities, or a complaint or indictment 
in the case of the Government of the United States of America; and (b) the adoption of a decision or settlement in the 
case of the Commission of the European Communities, or the entry of a consent decree in the case of the Government of 
the United States of America; to enable the other Party's views to be taken into account.”738 Such ‘instructions’ do 
not provide much clarity to those in charge of implementing the agreement, or others wishing to 
learn from the Agreement. Parties should also notify each other in case their competition authorities 
participate in any way in regulatory or judicial proceedings that do not arise from their own 
enforcement activities, and if this participation may affect the other Party's important interests. This 
applies to public regulatory or judicial proceedings, public intervention or participation pursuant to 
formal procedures; and in the case of regulatory proceedings in the United States, only proceedings 
before federal agencies. Contrary to the level of detail with regard to timing, the Agreement is silent 
about the content of notifications under the Agreement, apart from the fact that they should contain 
enough information to allow the recipient party to make an initial assessment of any effects on its 
interests.739 Again, not much grip is given to those burdened with the implementation of the 
Agreement or those wishing to learn from it.  
 
As is valid for most provisions in this Agreement, notification can happen outside of the framework 
of a formal cooperation agreement as well. The OECD Recommendations issued on the matter are 
generally considered a sufficient basis. Nevertheless, analysis of the number of notifications between 
1991 and 2000 reveals a much higher notification-rate from the EU to the US than to other OECD 
partners. ZANETTIN derives from this that a bilateral agreement provides stronger incentives to 
                                                          
735 Article II 1991 EU-US Agreement.   
736 It already deserves to be mentioned here that this approach is abandoned in the EU’s second generation Agreement 
with Switzerland, see below, Part II, 3.2.3. 
737 Article II.3 1991 EU-US Agreement: “With respect to mergers or acquisitions required by law to be reported to the competition 
authorities, notification under this Article shall be made:  
a) In the case of the Government of the United States of America, 
(i) not later than the time its competition authorities request, pursuant to 15 USC §18a(e), additional information or documentary material 
concerning the proposed transaction, 
(ii) when its competition authorities decide to file a complaint challenging the transaction, and  
(iii) where this is possible, far enough in advance of the entry of a consent decree to enable the other Party’s views to be taken into account; and  
b) In the case of the Commission of the European Communities, 
(i) when notice of the transaction is published in the Official Journal, pursuant to Article 4(3) of Council Regulation no. 4064/89, or when 
notice of the transaction is received under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty and a prior authorization from the Commission is required under 
that provision, 
(ii) when its competition authorities decide to initiate proceedings with respect to the proposed transaction, pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of Council 
Regulation no. 4064/89, and 
(iii) far enough in advance of the adoption of a decision in the case to enable the other Party’s views to be taken into account.”  
738 Article II 1991 EU-US Agreement. Similarly: Article II EU-Canada Agreement, Article 2 EU-Japan Agreement, and 
Article 2 EU-Korea Agreement. 
739 Article II 1991 EU-US Agreement, Article II EU-Canada Agreement, Article 2 EU-Japan Agreement, and Article 2 
EU-Korea Agreement. This feature is subject to change in the EU’s second generation Agreement with Switzerland, see 
below, Part II, 3.2.3. 
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notify than the OECD recommendations and that seemingly parties to a bilateral agreement pay 
more attention to each other’s interests.740 One must not deduct from this statement, however, that it 
is the existence of a formalized agreement itself that is responsible for this stronger engagement. It is 
very plausible that it is due to the extensive history of dialogue between officials or simply that the 
EU and US have the two biggest markets involved, and therefore instances of affected interests are 
more frequent, that the number of notifications is higher. These are reasons to enter into a 
cooperation agreement in the first place. The causal relationship is therefore uncertain.  
 
Communications under the 1991 Agreement, including notifications under Articles II (notification) 
and V (positive comity), may be carried out by direct oral, telephonic, written or facsimile 
communication from one Party's competition authority to the other Party's authority. Notifications 
under Articles II, V and XI (entry into force, termination and review), and requests under Article VII 
(consultation), shall be confirmed promptly in writing through diplomatic channels.741 
 
The original Reports from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
application of the Agreement provided an overview of all notifications under the Agreement for a 
certain timeframe. This practice stopped when these Reports were absorbed by the more general 
Annual Reports on Competition Policy and the accompanying Staff Working Documents (see above, 
introduction, and see below, Part II, 2.4).  
 
2.2.2 Exchange of information 
 
The exchange of information is central in enforcement cooperation between competition agencies. 
The parties to the 1991 Agreement recognised the importance of sharing information that would 
facilitate the effective application of their respective competition laws or that will help them better 
understand economic conditions and theories relevant to their enforcement activities. Exchanging 
information may happen on request, and biannual meetings (at minimum) between officials from the 
competition authorities are foreseen. Flexibility is offered with regard to the format of such meetings 
or the bureaucratic level at which the meetings should take place (‘appropriate officials’).742 These 
meetings could for instance occur in the margin of multilateral meetings such as the ICN annual 
meeting.  
 
Topics to be discussed include enforcement activities and priorities, economic sectors of common 
interest, policy changes under consideration, and other matters of mutual interest relating to the 
application of competition laws. The Agreement furthermore provides that parties should provide 
each other “with any significant information that comes to the attention of its competition authorities about 
anticompetitive activities that its competition authorities believe is relevant to, or may warrant, enforcement activity by 
the other Party’s competition authorities.”743 A requested party should provide the information if it is in its 
possession and in so far it is relevant to an enforcement activity being considered or conducted by 
the requesting Party’s competition authorities. What can be exchanged is information that is in the 
public domain, and even though it is not specified in the agreement, it is common practice to 
                                                          
740 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 79.  
741 Article X 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
742 Article III 1991 EU-US Agreement, Article VIII EU-Canada Agreement, Article 8 EU-Japan Agreement, and Article 
8 EU-Korea Agreement.  
743 Article III EU-US agreement. Also see Article VII EU-Canada Agreement, Article 3 EU-Japan Agreement, and 
Article 3 EU-Korea Agreement.  
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exchange so-called ‘confidential agency information’ as well (see below, Part II, 3.4.4). It must be 
pointed out that the agreement does not oblige a party to share information in any way. 
 
The exchange of information is limited in one important way: the exchange of confidential 
information is excluded. This should be distinguished from confidential agency information, and 
includes inter alia premerger notifications, the responses to investigational inquiries, or identities of 
complainants or witnesses.744 The Exchange of Interpretative Letters annexed to the Agreement 
provides further clarity on what is considered to be confidential information: “the information covered by 
the provisions of Article 20 of Council Regulation 17/62745 or by equivalent provisions in other regulations in the field 
of competition may not under any circumstances be communicated by the Commission to the US antitrust authorities, 
save with the express agreement of the source concerned.” Information that was transmitted will be protected 
from disclosure, unless the disclosure was authorized by the Party supplying the information, or 
required under the law of the receiving Party.746 The guiding principle remains that the agencies 
attempt to maintain to the fullest extent possible the confidentiality of any information provided to it 
in confidence, and to oppose to the fullest extent possible any application for disclosure of such 
information by a third party.747 The exchange of letters confirms that information that is provided in 
confidence by one party merits the protection provided by the other party’s applicable rules, 
including domestic confidentiality rules and that both parties will use all the available legal means to 
oppose the disclosure of this information. The relationship between the Commission and the 
Member States is clarified. If the Commission notifies the US antitrust authorities, it will inform the 
Member States whose interests are affected. It will also, after consultation with the US authorities, 
inform them of any cooperation and coordination of enforcement activities. It is added that both 
parties will respect requests not to disclose the information that was provided, when necessary to 
ensure confidentiality, subject to any contrary requirement of the applicable law.  
 
Parties are not required to exchange information the disclosure of which is prohibited by the law of 
the Party possessing the information or if the exchange would be incompatible with important 
interests of the Party possessing the information. Each Party furthermore commits to maintaining to 
the fullest extent possible the confidentiality of any information provided to it in confidence by the 
other Party under the Agreement, including the opposition to any application for disclosure of such 
information by a third party that is not authorized by the Party that supplied the information.748 
Indeed, while the communications between competition authorities may not necessarily contain 
confidential information sensu stricto, they may nevertheless include sensitive information which 
should not be disclosed to a third party.749 The 2012 OECD/ICN Joint Survey confirmed that more 
                                                          
744 F. Jenny, “International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and Perspective”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 48, 
Winter 2003, 995-996.  
745 “1. Information acquired as a result of the application of Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 shall be used only for the purpose of the relevant 
request or investigation. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 19 and 21, the Commission and the competent authorities of the Member States, their 
officials and other servants shall not disclose information acquired by them as a result of the application of this Regulation and of the kind 
covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. 
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not prevent publication of general information or surveys which do not contain information of 
undertakings.” 
746 For instance in court proceedings.  
747 Article VIII(2) 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
748 Article VIII 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
749 OECD, Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 20 
November 2015, 28.  
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than a decade after the entry into force of the EU-US Agreement, non-confidential information is 
frequently exchanged and that such exchanges often take place informally.750  
 
2.2.3 Cooperation and coordination in enforcement 
 
The competition authorities of both Parties are obliged to render assistance to each other, but only 
to the extent that it is compatible with their own jurisdictions’ laws and important interests, and 
within its reasonably available resources.751 This gives the competition authorities broad discretion in 
deciding whether or not to cooperate, in particular considering that once cooperation is started, each 
competition authority can limit or terminate its participation in a coordination arrangement and 
pursue its enforcement activities independently, as long as ‘appropriate’ notice is given. Indeed, first 
generation agreements allow cooperation rather than require it. It can be assumed that ‘appropriate’ in 
this context does not solely refer to the timing of the notification, but also requires sufficient 
motivation. An explicit commitment to motivate would however have been desirable.  
 
The Parties are given the opportunity to coordinate their enforcement activities in the event of 
mutual interest in pursuing related enforcement activities. The Agreement specifies the factors that 
should be taken into account when deciding whether or not to coordinate, relating to resource 
efficiency, gathering of information, achievement of objectives, and cost-reduction for those subject 
to the enforcement activities. These factors reflect the general attitude of the EU that the extent of 
the cooperation between the EU and third countries on competition cases depends on the specific 
circumstances of the case. Elements of interest could indeed be whether it involves an international 
or a world-wide cartel or whether novel issues are at stake where it would be necessary to exchange 
views. The decision to cooperate is taken on a case-by-case basis, with particular attention for the 
centre of gravity of the behaviour.752 The fact that an agreement is concluded with a particular 
country, does not seem to add to the decision to cooperate or not.   
 
In furtherance of their engagement to coordinate enforcement activities, the EU and the US in 1999 
concluded a so-called Administrative Arrangement on Attendance. This bilateral and reciprocal 
Arrangement allows the US competition authorities to attend oral hearings in competition 
proceedings before the European Commission as observers, in appropriate cases of mutual concern, 
and permits the Commission to attend at high level meetings (so-called ‘pitch meetings’) between the 
US competition authorities and the parties in US antitrust cases. Attendance is allowed ‘in 
appropriate cases’, when satisfactory assurances or arrangements regarding confidentiality and the 
use of information are in place. Express consent of the persons concerned by the enforcement 
proceedings in either jurisdiction is required, however, and their rights are not in any way limited by 
the arrangements.753 The text of the Arrangement is available via document request, but little 
                                                          
750 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 13.  
751 Article IV 1991 EU-US Agreement, Article IV EU-Canada Agreement, Article 4 EU-Japan Agreement, and Article 4 
EU-Korea Agreement. 
752 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution 
from the European Union, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)53, 9 February 2012, 4-5.  
753 Commission Report to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement between the 
European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their 
competition laws, 1 January 1999 to 31 December 1999, COM(2000) 618 final, 4 October 2000, 5-6.  
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information is available on its practical application.754 The Arrangement has been invoked several 
times by the US antitrust agencies to attend oral hearings at the Commission, for instance in the 
BOC/Air Liquide, Time Warner/EMI, AOL/Time Warner, WorldCom MCI/Sprint, GE/Honeywell, and 
Alcoa/Reynolds merger cases. There is less mention of Commission officials attending pitch meeting 
at the DoJ. This happened for the first time in 2000 in connection with the MCI WorldCom/Sprint 
case.755 
 
2.2.4 Comity 
 
2.2.4.1 Negative comity or avoidance of conflicts  
 
One of the central objectives of the EU’s bilateral competition cooperation agreements is the 
avoidance of conflicts over enforcement activities. The main mechanism to achieve this is ‘negative 
comity’, ‘traditional comity’, ‘the non-interference principle’, or ‘the principle of voluntary 
abstention’, although it will become clear that the last two denominations do not really cover the 
load.756  
 
Comity arose as a means for mitigating the negative effects of the unilateral assertion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, in particular by the US, and to achieve a balance between the different 
policy- and enforcement concerns of the states involved. It has been recognized for over a hundred 
years by public international law, and knows a wide application beyond international competition 
matters, for instance in tax, insolvency, anti-bribery, and environmental cases.757 Some claim that the 
preconditions for cooperation under a comity-arrangement are relatively low, and that therefore first 
generation agreements containing this mechanism constitute an appropriate instrument for 
cooperation among competition authorities that have not yet engaged in earlier cooperation.758 One 
might, however, strongly disagree, as will become clear below.  
 
The OECD defines comity as the legal principle that countries should mutually take each other’s 
important interests into account while conducting their law enforcement activities. Comity therefore 
does not imply an abdication of jurisdiction (hence the inappropriateness of the terms ‘voluntary 
abstention’ and ‘non-interference principle’), but it is rather the exercise of jurisdiction with regard 
for the impact that this may have on the law enforcement activities of other countries. Basically 
international comity refers to judicial respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations. ZAMBRANO 
                                                          
754 The text of the Arrangement is not public, but some information is provided in EU Bulletin 3-1999, Competition 
(18/43).  
755 I. Van Bael, Due Process in Competition Proceedings, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2011, 63; M. Dabbah, “Future 
directions in bilateral cooperation: A policy perspective” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 291; Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with 
the common market and the EEA Agreement, Case No COMP/M.1630 - Air Liquide / BOC, 18 January 2000; 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration incompatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement, Case 
No COMP/M.1741 - MCI WorldCom / Sprint, 28 June 2000. 
756 E. Elhauge & D. Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2nd ed., Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 
2011, 1176; OECD, Report of the Committee on Competition Law and Policy – Making International Markets More 
Efficient through ‘Positive Comity’ in Competition Law Enforcement, DAFFE/CLP(99)19, 14 June 1999, 5.  
757 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 4.  
758 M. Taylor, International Competition Law: a New Dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
113.  
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referred to it as ‘the judicial way of conducting diplomacy.’759 The WTO defines comity in the 
context of international cooperation in competition law matters as the whole of factors and issues 
taken into account by a competition authority when deciding to pursue international enforcement 
action.760 The United States Supreme Court first defined the legal notion of comity in Hilton v Guyot 
in 1895, a case not related to competition law. The US Supreme Court considered comity to be a 
horizontal, sovereign state-to sovereign state concept, which finds itself in between the extremes of 
absolute obligation and mere courtesy and good will. It added that “it is the recognition which one nation 
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection 
of its laws.”761 This definition emphasises the balancing act that should take place.  
 
The 1991 EU-US Agreement marked the first time that the concept has been codified in a binding 
international agreement on competition law, which is somewhat of a contradiction in itself.762 In the 
Agreement, parties are obliged, albeit within the framework of their own laws and to the extent 
compatible with their important interests, to take into account each other’s important interests, at all 
stages of enforcement activity, in particular when deciding on the initiation and scope of an 
investigation or proceeding, and with regard to the nature of the remedies or penalties sought.763  
 
The agreement provides some guiding principles with regard to the application of the comity 
principle. First, while it is accepted that a party may have an important interest with regard to a 
particular case even in the absence of official involvement, a presumption exists that important 
interests will generally be reflected in antecedent laws, decisions or statements of policy by the other 
party’s competent authorities.764 Furthermore, even if such important interests can be affected at any 
stage of enforcement activity, the risk is higher in the remedial stage of the enforcement process than 
in the investigative stage. Finally, a non-exhaustive list is provided of factors to be taken into account 
by the parties when seeking an appropriate accommodation of the competing interests, where it 
                                                          
759 D. Zambrano, “A Comity of Errors: The Rise, Fall, and Return of International Comity in Transnational Discovery”, 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 2006, 162. 
760 WTO, World Trade Report 2004: Exploring the Linkages Between the Domestic Policy Environment and 
International Trade, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report04_e.pdf (accessed 
October 2015), 159.  
761 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 4, footnote 2. The reason why different definitions of comity are 
mentioned at this point is because the concept of comity is sometimes surrounded by a haze of confusion. The US’ 
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law (Third) mentions that comity, as opposed to the independent principle of 
reasonableness (“Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under s 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law 
with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.” Restatement 
of the Law (Third), comment (a) of Section 403 ‘Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe’, available at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/conflicts/rest403.html, (accessed June 2015)) is not a rule of international law, but that 
it is rather a factor for determining reasonableness, and when there are conflicting reasonable exercises of jurisdiction. (B. 
Peck, “Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws and the U.S.-EU Dispute over the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas 
Merger: From Comity to Conflict? An Argument for a Binding International Agreement on Antitrust Enforcement and 
Dispute Resolution”, San Diego Law Review, Vol. 35, 1998, 1177) Some US courts have, however, reversed the logic, and 
have applied the principle of reasonableness as a requirement of comity. (Restatement of the Law (Third), comment (a) 
of Section 403 ‘Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe’, available at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/conflicts/rest403.html, (accessed June 2015)). 
762 E. Baroncini, “La Cour de justice et le treaty making power de la Commission européenne depuis l’Accord de 
coopération dans l’application des régimes antitrust jusqu’à l’Accord sur les orientations en matière de coopération 
normative et de transparence”, Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne, No. 2, 2006, 378. 
763 Article VI 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
764 This presumption disappears in the EU’s second generation Agreement with Switzerland, see below, Part II, 3.2.3. 
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appears that one party’s enforcement activities may adversely affect important interests of the other 
party. Such factors include the relative significance of anticompetitive conduct occurring in either 
party’s territory, the absence or presence of anticompetitive purpose, the relative significance of the 
effects of the anticompetitive activities on either party’s interests, the existence or absence of 
reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by the enforcement activities, the degree 
of conflict or consistency with the other party’s laws or articulated economic policies, and finally the 
extent to which related enforcement activities of the other party may be affected.765  
 
The US, in its 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, offered slightly 
more detailed information on the factors its antitrust agencies and courts may take into account 
when performing a comity analysis. The non-exhaustive list, with factors to be weighed on a case-to-
case basis, includes:  
 
- the relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct within the United States, as compared to conduct 
abroad;  
- the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;  
- the presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consumers, markets, or exporters;  
- the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the United States as compared to the 
effects abroad;  
- the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by the action;  
- the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic policies;  
- the extent to which the enforcement activities of another country with respect to the same persons, including 
remedies resulting from those activities, may be affected; and  
- the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. enforcement action.766 
 
The factors overlap to a certain extent but are not identical. In 2017 the Enforcement Guidelines 
were revised.767 They reiterate that the relative weight given to each factor taken into account in a 
comity analysis depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Among the factors weighed, 
the existence of a purpose to affect or an actual effect on US commerce, the significance and 
foreseeability of the effects of the anticompetitive conduct on the United States, the degree of 
conflict with a foreign jurisdiction’s law or articulated policy, the extent to which the enforcement 
activities of another jurisdiction, including remedies resulting from those enforcement activities, may 
be affected, and the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to US enforcement are 
                                                          
765 Article IV 1991 EU-US Agreement, Article VI EU-Canada Agreement, Article 6 EU-Japan Agreement, and Article 5 
EU-Korea Agreement. 
766 The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for 
International Operations”, April 1995, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm.     
767 More generally the revision restructures the guidelines to make them more useful and more accessible. It does so by 
focusing on the most significant questions from the point of view of the users. The revision describes current practices 
and methods of analysis used in cases with an international dimension. In particular, the revision adds a chapter on 
international cooperation, which addresses the US agencies’ investigative tools, confidentiality safeguards, the legal basis 
for cooperation, types of information exchanged and waivers of confidentiality, remedies and special considerations in 
criminal investigations, it updates the discussion of the application of US antitrust law to conduct involving foreign 
commerce, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, foreign sovereign immunity, foreign sovereign compulsion, 
the act of state doctrine and petitioning of sovereigns, in light of developments in law and practice, and it provides 
revised illustrative examples. (https://www.justice.gov/atr/guidelines-and-policy-statements-0/antitrust-guidelines-
international-enforcement-and-cooperation-2017, accessed August 2017). 
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mentioned.768 In the US there is no single, unified set of factors that courts use when assessing 
comity. Different courts apply different factors. The US Supreme Court for instance followed the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law,769 while the prominent Second Circuit court applied 
four principal factors derived from the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law.770  
 
The Supreme Court in Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale outlined a five-part test that is applicable 
where the protection of the EU’s leniency programme is balanced against US discovery requests. The 
five factors taken into account were how important the requested information was to the US 
litigation, how specific the request was, whether the information originated in the US, whether there 
were alternative means of securing the information, and to what extent the refusal of the request 
would have undermined important US interests, or complying with the request would have 
undermined important interests of the state where the information is located. The last factor is 
considered to carry the most weight.771 In Rubber Chemicals, the District Court had to rule on a 
discovery request for certain communications between an EU leniency applicant and the 
Commission in a competition case. The District Judge found that “the conspiracy sought to restrain trade in 
Europe (factor 1), that the document requests were fairly specific (factor 2), and that the documents were created, 
transmitted, and used only in Europe in relation to European proceedings (factor 3). Furthermore, the relevant 
information contained in the requested documents could be obtained from the public versions of the Commission’s 
findings (factor 4). Finally, the court accepted that the disclosure of the documents would undermine the Commission’s 
ability to carry out investigations by giving companies a disincentive to cooperate with the Commission (factor 5).”772 
The Court therefore decided not to disclose the documents.773 The Aerospatiale test was criticized, 
however, for allowing the overvaluation of US interests and only pretending to offer a balancing 
test.774  
 
The comity provision in the 1991 EU-US Agreement was drafted cautiously. Parties should only 
‘seek’ to take into account each other’s important interests, ‘as appropriate’, and ‘within the 
framework of their own laws and to the extent compatible with their important interests’. There are 
very few documented examples of the use of traditional comity. One noted instance was the 
Oracle/People Soft merger, wherein the European Commission decided to delay its investigation until 
the US proceedings had been completed.775 In this case the DoJ Antitrust Division objected to the 
                                                          
768 US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and 
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121 
 
merger because it was likely to give rise to competition problems in the relevant market for software 
applications for automated financial management system and human resources processes. This was 
in line with the view of the European Commission. The US District Court however rejected this 
decision due to gaps in the definition of the relevant market. The European Commission then 
decided to clear the merger, taking into account evidence gathered as part of the proceedings before 
the District Court. This would not have been possible without the existence of the bilateral 
cooperation agreement between the US and the EU.776 It is advisable that when it has played during a 
certain case, it is included in the press release. This would offer guidance to other agencies, and 
would in general lead to increased transparency. 
 
This limited documented use also demonstrates that comity might indeed not be the ‘low-threshold’ 
cooperation mechanism it is sometimes held to be. The development of the concept of comity in 
case-law further demonstrates this point. The concept was first raised before the European courts by 
IBM in 1981, long before the conclusion of the EU-US Agreement, claiming that the Commission 
violated the international principles of comity between nations and non-interference in internal 
affairs, because it did not take into account that IBM’s anticompetitive conduct mainly occurred in 
the US, where it was also the subject of legal proceedings.777 The Court, however, did not pronounce 
itself on this issue as IBM’s claim was declared inadmissible.  
 
The second time the issue arose before an EU Court was in the Wood Pulp case, where certain 
Canadian applicants held that the Commission had infringed Canada’s sovereignty and the principle 
of international comity. It was also maintained that the application of the EU competition rules in 
this case harmed US interests in promoting exports by US companies that were exempted from the 
US’ antitrust laws (by the Web Pomerene Act of 1918). In response to this claim, the Court first 
defined the principle of comity very narrowly as only playing when a person is subject to two 
contradictory, legitimate, orders. It is therefore not enough that rules differ, one rule must actively 
proscribe the behaviour prohibited by another. In such a situation ‘each State is obliged to exercise 
his jurisdiction with moderation.’ Secondly, the Court rather counter-intuitively ruled that it was not 
necessary to investigate whether the rule of comity existed in international law, because the 
conditions for its application were in any event not satisfied. It appears strange to test prima facie the 
fulfilment of the conditions of a rule of which the existence is not confirmed. In this case, the 
conduct required by the United States was not contradictory to the EU’s prohibition of export 
cartels, as the US’ Webb Pomerene Act exempts the conclusion of export cartels from the 
application of US antitrust laws, but does not require the conclusion of such cartels.778 In other 
words, the Court ruled that there should be mention of true compulsion rather than mere permission for 
the comity principle to apply.779 The Court reinforced its statement by underlining that the US 
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international law. Suffice it to note that there was no conflict between the course of action required by the South African Government and that 
required by the Community given that, in their letter of 22 August 1995, the South African competition authorities simply concluded that the 
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authorities were consulted by the Commission in accordance with the 1979 OECD 
Recommendations780 and failed to raise any objections relating to any jurisdictional conflict.781  
 
In Compagnie maritime belge, the Court referred to the principle of international comity to claim that 
“courts in one State should refrain from judging acts of another State carried out in its own territory.”782 In another 
case on liner conferences, namely Atlantic Container Line, applicants claimed that the Commission had 
breached the principle of comity – thereby expressly referring to the cooperation agreements in place 
between the EU and the US – because it had not explained why its assessment of the practices and 
issues raised in this case was different from that of the United States. The parties also claimed to be 
under conflicting obligations. Their argumentation was rightly rejected by the Court as the obligation 
on the Commission to state reasons under former Article 190 of the EC Treaty cannot be 
interpreted in such an extensive manner.783 The principle of comity should have been taken into 
account before the Commission took its decision, it does not interfere with the obligation to state 
the reasons on which a decision is based.    
 
In the Showa Denko and SGL Carbon cases, two of the appeal cases following the graphite electrodes 
cartel,784 the parties claimed (expressly and implicitly) that the European Commission failed to obey 
the comity principle because it had not taken into consideration the fines already imposed on the 
appellant by the US, Canada and Japan.785 The Court opined that the cooperation agreements 
concluded between the EU and the US are of mere procedural nature, and do not oblige a party to 
the agreement in any way to counterweigh or take into account penalties imposed by the other 
party.786  
 
As demonstrated, the Court’s relationship with comity has generally been rather uneasy. It has not 
been very receptive towards comity considerations in the rare cases where the concept appeared in its 
case-law, also because the concept has often been misused or misinterpreted by the parties relying on 
it. A final illustrative example is the case Industries chimiques du fluor (ICF) v European Commission, a 
competition case, wherein the Court rejected the argument of the party that international comity had 
not been respected on the grounds that first, the party failed to clarify the principle invoked or explain 
how it would apply to the case, and second, because the party used the argument of breach of comity 
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in the wrong way. The party questioned the competence of the EU to apply its competition rules to 
the conduct in question, but comity is not an instrument to determine jurisdiction or competence, it is 
a principle that comes into play once jurisdiction is determined.787  
 
There is indeed some confusion on whether comity should come into place as a tool to solve 
jurisdictional conflicts once parallel jurisdiction has been established, or whether the concept serves to 
determine jurisdiction in the first place. In the US Timberlane case (see above, Part I, 3.2.1), as well as the 
US Third Restatement of the Laws, comity was used as a factor to decide on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of US antitrust laws. This balancing approach was nevertheless rejected by some other 
circuit courts. For instance, the 7th Circuit in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation clarified that comity 
should only play when deciding whether existing jurisdiction should be asserted.788 The EU Courts 
have not felt the need to provide clarity about this concept which, as demonstrated, was 
misinterpreted or misused by the parties invoking it more than once.   
 
An explanation for this rather uneasy relationship may be found in what the US Antitrust 
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations state with regard to the appearance of the 
concept in US case-law. The Guidelines claim that it is not for the US courts to call into question the 
judgment of the executive branch as to the proper role of comity concerns.789 Also in the Laker 
Airways case, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the US judiciary should 
enforce US laws and is not suited to weigh the national interests of various nations.790 This attitude 
might cause the judiciary to be overly careful in judging on comity issues, refusing to even clarify the 
concept. While interference by the judiciary would be complex to execute, would require the courts 
to possess detailed information on each case, and might result in difficult outcomes and delays, 
judiciary overview of the concept, in particular where it is included in first generation agreements, 
might promote more diligent use of it. 
  
Both the 1995 and 2017 US Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines stated with regard to traditional 
comity that “the Agencies will assess the articulated interests and policies of a foreign sovereign beyond whether there 
is a conflict with foreign law.”791 This might indicate a more comprehensive understanding of traditional 
comity, as opposed to the very restrictive view of the judiciary that requires true conflict. The comity 
analysis takes into account to what extent certain conduct is encouraged or discouraged by a certain 
country, or whether the parties are left free to choose among different courses of conduct.792  
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ZAMBRANO argued that three recent US civil cases indicate a revival of the comity concept, in 
particular in the context of discovery.793 He believed that these cases are an indication that US courts 
“are following the executive’s lead in refurbishing their international comity bona fides when faced with overbroad 
discovery requests”, compared to a history of ruling almost unanimously in favour of US interests and 
rendering comity to a frivolous argument raised by foreign litigants as a last resort.794 This ‘pro-forum 
bias’ reached such heights that courts had developed whole categories of US interests that 
automatically overcame concerns for foreign laws, including patent law, antitrust law, criminal law, 
and anti-terrorism laws. It concerns the Daimler case, decided upon by the US Supreme Court, the 
Second Circuit Gucci case, and the Motorola case before the New York Court of Appeals. In all three 
cases attempts by plaintiffs to subject foreign entities to US jurisdiction or otherwise impose on them 
overbroad duties, including those in conflict with foreign laws, were rejected. According to 
ZAMBRANO, these cases are particularly noteworthy because of the courts that issued them, as well as 
the fact that they espouse a consistent rejection of Aérospatiale-era jurisprudence. These cases 
allegedly extend the trend of cabining the extraterritorial application of US law into the realm of 
discovery. In Daimler, the Court urged future courts to consider international comity as a crucial 
concern, rather than as a formality to be fulfilled via a contrived balancing test. The other cases as 
well made international comity a prominent reason for refusing to hear cases implicating foreign 
interests.795  
 
2.2.4.2 Positive comity 
 
Whereas negative comity implies restraint in the assertion of jurisdiction in the interest of another 
jurisdiction, positive comity requires the assertion of it, on request of another jurisdiction.796 
 
Positive comity, according to the OECD, implies that “a country should give full and sympathetic 
consideration to another country’s request that it open or expand a law enforcement proceeding in competition cases in 
order to remedy conduct in its territory that is substantially and adversely affecting another country’s interests. In 
addition, the requested country is urged to take whatever remedial action it deems appropriate on a voluntary basis and 
in consideration of its own legitimate interests.”797 This allows a particular problem to be dealt with by the 
authority best placed to do so.798 In other words, positive comity is an active courtesy process, in 
which the parties may request the application of the other party’s competition rules, following anti-
competitive behaviour on that party’s territory, because it affects the important interests of the 
requesting party.799 Potential benefits include improved effectiveness and efficiency of proceedings, 
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and a reduced need to share confidential information.800 According to the Commission, positive 
comity allows it to retain control of foreign enforcement procedures addressing anticompetitive 
behaviour that takes place within the EU and limits parallel investigations.801 
 
Positive comity should be distinguished from other forms of cooperation such as the taking of 
evidence in support of foreign proceedings, as provided for under the Hague Evidence 
Convention.802 When a requested country engages in positive comity, the proceedings (investigating 
and possibly remedying anti-competitive conduct) are conducted by the requested country according 
to its own procedures. Investigatory assistance, however, involves support to the requesting country’s 
enforcement action, according to the latter’s procedures and rules.803 The main difference is therefore 
that in a case involving positive comity, the proceedings will take place according to the rules and 
instructions of the requested state, without interference by the requesting state. The responsibility for 
enforcement is transferred entirely to a foreign jurisdiction, although not in a definite or irreversible 
way.804  
 
The term positive comity was first coined during the negotiations of the 1991 EU-US Agreement, 
but as with traditional comity, the underlying concept had existed for decades already.805 Worth 
mentioning in particular is the history of the concept in the context of the OECD Competition 
Committee. The original draft of the 1967 Recommendations did not call for positive comity, but did 
include a consultation requirement and a call for legislation authorising information sharing. Both 
requirements were left out of the second draft, however, and replaced by a type of positive comity 
provision, only to have it deleted again in the final version and substituted by a new provision, 
nodding towards positive comity, stating that “early notification would permit the requesting country to ‘take 
account of … such remedial action as the other Member may find it feasible to take under its own laws to deal with the 
restrictive practice’.”806 The concept of positive comity was formally included in OECD 
recommendations in 1973 under the umbrella of ‘Consultation and Co-ordination’,807 and therefore 
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reflects a policy well-known to all OECD members since the early seventies.808 In the OECD 
Recommendations parties were to give ‘full and sympathetic consideration’ to positive comity 
requests, meaning that considerations that would always exist, such as the domestic nature of the 
target firms, are not valid causes for refusal. Resources do make up a relevant factor in deciding 
whether or not to accommodate a request. It was clarified, however that the cost for the requested 
country should be weighed against future savings and other benefits resulting from the reciprocal 
nature of positive comity, as well as the general benefits of more effective enforcement. Despite the 
voluntary nature of a positive comity request, already there were fears that the pressure to respond 
would take away resources from case investigations and upset domestic enforcement agendas.809  
 
The reason why the concept attracted renewed attention in the 1991 EU-US Agreement is because it 
was the first time a positive comity provision was embedded in a modern bilateral agreement 
exclusively dedicated to competition law. The concept was moreover given a name, and the timing 
was right as well, as the relationship between competition law and market access was heavily 
discussed at the time.810 MARSDEN believed that the concept of positive comity mainly arose to 
relieve the trade friction that resulted from allegations of market access barriers created by business 
practices. He explained that the late eighties and nineties were characterised by accusations that 
governments were not sufficiently committing to the enforcement of their competition laws, 
resulting in serious trade tensions.811 The OECD confirmed that positive comity is likely to be most 
successful in export restraint or market access cases.812 The strong link with trade is demonstrated 
again by the fact that in the ICPAC (International Competition Policy Advisory Committee) Report 
(see below, Part III, 2.1.4.1) positive comity is discussed in the chapter ‘Where trade and competition 
intersect’.813 The concept gained renewed attention because it respected states’ sovereignty, while at 
the same time promoting an atypical form of cooperation.814 It was believed to minimise 
inefficiencies from duplicative enforcement and maximise predictability and consistency.815 Positive 
comity would be a preferable alternative for governments to the extraterritorial exercise of their 
jurisdiction.816   
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In order to address the practical problems resulting from extraterritorial jurisdiction as well as to 
eliminate the jurisdictional ‘imbalance’ resulting from the rather aggressive extraterritorial antitrust 
enforcement by the US, it was decided to further develop the positive comity provision in a 
supplement to the 1991 EU-US Agreement.817 Apart from adding more flesh to the bones of the 
positive comity provision in the 1991 Agreement, it was believed that the importance of this 
additional agreement went beyond its specific terms by underscoring a strong commitment to 
cooperation.818 In its preamble, the 1998 Agreement between the European Communities and the 
Government of the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the 
Enforcement of their Competition Laws clarifies that it further elaborates the principles of positive 
comity and its implementation to enhance the effectiveness of the 1991 Agreement. According to 
ZANETTIN the 1998 Agreement was intended to boost an instrument that was considered to be 
underused.819 Another factor in the creation of the 1998 Agreement is the rather negative experience 
with the first formal referral under the 1991 Agreement. The 1998 Agreement seems to address 
some of the concerns raised during this occasion, such as timing and communication concerns (see 
below).820 
 
The effect of the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement, like the 1991 EU-US Agreement, is constrained 
by the fact that nothing in the Agreement or its implementation “shall be construed as prejudicing either 
Party's position on issues of competition law jurisdiction in the international context”821 and that nothing in the 
Agreement “shall be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the existing laws, or as requiring any change in the 
laws, of the European Communities or the United States of America or of their respective Member States or states.”822 
None of the parties therefore gain competences that they did not already have. Either party can 
moreover terminate the agreement with a 60 day notice.823   
 
Mergers or concentrations are excluded entirely from the scope of the 1998 Agreement.824 This 
exclusion cannot be found in the 1991 Agreement, so the basic positive comity provision in that 
agreement seems to nevertheless allow the application of the principle on merger cases.825 The cause 
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of the exclusion of merger proceedings in the 1998 Agreement can be found in the introduction in 
the latter agreement of a presumption of deferral or suspension (see below). If an authority were to 
defer in a merger case following a positive comity request, and discover only when the relevant 
deadline to act has passed that the requested party did not or could not remedy the anticompetitive 
effects of the merger within their jurisdiction, the consequences for that jurisdiction would be grave 
as it would have lost the opportunity to act entirely.826  
 
Two conditions surround the application of the positive comity principle in the 1991 EU-US 
Agreement. The requesting party should convince the other party that its important interests are 
adversely affected by anticompetitive activities taking place for at least a substantial part in the 
territory of the latter, that are moreover impermissible under that party’s competition laws. Only 
then does the 1998 Agreement apply.827 In such circumstances, a request containing specific 
information about the anticompetitive behaviour call for the initiation of enforcement activities, 
upon which the requested party may decide whether or not to accommodate, while keeping the 
requesting party informed. It is emphasised that both parties maintain full discretion with regard to 
whether or not to undertake enforcement activities with respect to the notified anticompetitive 
activities.828 Export cartels are often exempted from the competition rules of a nation, and will for 
this reason, regrettably, fall out of the reach of positive comity requests under the 1998 Agreement, 
an area where positive comity would have had a significant effect. The International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) rightly warned that such limitations may prevent the agreement from being 
effective in providing an alternative for the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by competition 
authorities.829 It is clarified here, in contrast to the 1991 Agreement, that a party’s interests are 
adversely affected when anticompetitive activities cause harm to either the ability of domestic firms 
to invest in, export to, or otherwise compete in the territory of the other Party or to competition in a 
Party's domestic or import markets.830  
 
Article III contains the basic principle of positive comity under the 1998 Agreement. A request for 
enforcement action in accordance with the Requested Party's competition laws may be issued 
regardless of whether the activities are illegal according to the Requesting Party's competition laws, 
and regardless of whether the competition authorities of the Requesting Party have started or 
planned taking enforcement activities under their own competition laws. Article IV contains the core 
and major novelty of the 1998 Agreement, namely a presumption of deferral or suspension of 
enforcement activities of the Requesting Party in favour of enforcement activities by the competition 
authorities of the Requested Party. This deferral or suspension is subject to several conditions, 
relating to the impact of the anti-competitive activities at issue, the ability to fully and adequately 
address the adverse effects on the interests of the Requesting Party, and the engagement of the 
competition authorities of the Requested Party.831 Most importantly, it is required that “[t]he 
                                                          
826 Communication from the Commission to the Council concerning the Agreement between the European 
Communities and the Government of the United States on the application of positive comity principles in the 
enforcement of their competition laws, COM(97) 233 final, 97/0178(CNS), 18 June 1997, 4.  
827 Article I(1) 1998 EU-US Positive Comity Agreement.  
828 Article V 1991 EU-US Agreement, Article V EU-Canada Agreement, Article 5 EU-Japan Agreement, and Article 6 
EU-Korea Agreement. 
829 International Chamber of Commerce Policy Statement: ICC Comments on EU-US Positive Comity Agreement, Law 
and Practices Relating to Competition, 12 March 1997. 
830 Article II(1) 1998 EU-US Positive Comity Agreement.  
831 Article IV(2) 1998 EU-US Positive Comity Agreement: “(a) the anti-competitive activities at issue: 
(i) do not have a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in the Requesting Party's territory; or 
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anticompetitive activities at issue: do not have a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in 
the Requesting Party's territory, or where the anticompetitive activities do have such an impact on the Requesting 
Party's consumers, they occur principally in and are directed principally towards the other Party's territory.”832 These 
are similar requirements to those that play for the Sherman Act to be applicable (see above, Part I, 
3.2.1). The Commission explained that such requirements, in particular those relating to the 
engagement of the competition authority in the requested party are necessary to create the required 
trust from the Requesting Party to defer or suspend action.833 When such conditions are satisfied, the 
Requesting Party can nevertheless choose not to defer or suspend its enforcement activities, but it is 
required to inform the competition authorities of the Requested Party of its reasons. It can, on the 
contrary, also decide to defer or suspend when not all conditions are fulfilled.834 Even when a 
requesting party has decided to defer or suspend, it can still initiate enforcement activities at a later 
stage, provided that, again, it notifies the competition authorities of the Requested Party of their 
intentions and reasons. If this should lead to parallel investigations, the competition authorities 
should, where appropriate, coordinate their investigations according to Article IV of the 1995 
Agreement.835 This provision is particularly weak. The conditions do not really seem to matter, as the 
requesting authority may choose not to defer or suspend its enforcement activities even if the 
conditions are satisfied and may initiate or reinstitute independent enforcement proceedings later at 
any time, imposing its own penalties instead. There is no pressure at all to use the positive comity 
procedure instead of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Meaningful implementation is made 
very difficult.836 Moreover, nothing is mentioned in the Agreement on notification to the companies 
being investigated.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(ii) where the anti-competitive activities do have such an impact on the Requesting Party's consumers, they occur principally in and are directed 
principally towards the other Party's territory; 
(b) the adverse effects on the interests of the Requesting Party can be and are likely to be fully and adequately investigated and, as appropriate, 
eliminated or adequately remedied pursuant to the laws, procedures, and available remedies of the Requested Party. The Parties recognise that it 
may be appropriate to pursue separate enforcement activities where anti-competitive activities affecting both territories justify the imposition of 
penalties within both jurisdictions; and 
(c) the competition authorities of the Requested Party agree that in conducting their own enforcement activities, they will: 
(i) devote adequate resources to investigate the anti-competitive activities and, where appropriate, promptly pursue adequate enforcement 
activities; 
(ii) use their best efforts to pursue all reasonably available sources of information, including such sources of information as may be suggested by 
the competition authorities of the Requesting Party; 
(iii) inform the competition authorities of the Requesting Party, on request or at reasonable intervals, of the status of their enforcement activities 
and intentions, and where appropriate provide to the competition authorities of the Requesting Party relevant confidential information if consent 
has been obtained from the source concerned. The use and disclosure of such information shall be governed by Article V; 
(iv) promptly notify the competition authorities of the Requesting Party of any change in their intentions with respect to investigation or 
enforcement; 
(v) use their best efforts to complete their investigation and to obtain a remedy or initiate proceedings within six months, or such other time as 
agreed to by the competition authorities of the Parties, of the deferral or suspension of enforcement activities by the competition authorities of the 
Requesting Party; 
(vi) fully inform the competition authorities of the Requesting Party of the results of their investigation, and take into account the views of the 
competition authorities of the Requesting Party, prior to any settlement, initiation of proceedings, adoption of remedies, or termination of the 
investigation; and 
(vii) comply with any reasonable request that may be made by the competition authorities of the Requesting Party.”  
832 Article IV(2)(a) 1998 EU-US Positive Comity Agreement. 
833 Communication from the Commission to the Council concerning the Agreement between the European 
Communities and the Government of the United States on the application of positive comity principles in the 
enforcement of their competition laws, COM(97) 233 final, 97/0178(CNS), 18 June 1997, 7.  
834 Article IV(3) 1998 EU-US Positive Comity Agreement.  
835 Article IV(4) 1998 EU-US Positive Comity Agreement.  
836 International Chamber of Commerce Policy Statement: ICC Comments on EU-US Positive Comity Agreement, Law 
and Practices Relating to Competition, 12 March 1997. 
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Only few documented examples exist of the use of the positive comity principle. In the 2012 
OECD/ICN Joint Survey, just three agencies reported having made requests for assistance on the 
basis of the principle of positive comity.837 One publicly known example of informal use of positive 
comity between the European Commission and the US antitrust authorities is the IRI/A.C. Nielsen 
case in 1996, before the entry into force of the Positive Comity Agreement, revolving around abuse 
of dominance in the international market for retail tracking services.838 While both the European 
Commission and the DoJ initiated investigations into A.C. Nielsen’s alleged anticompetitive 
behaviour following a complaint by IRI, the US, convinced that the EU had a firm intention to act, 
agreed to let the European Commission take the lead, as most of the alleged anticompetitive conduct 
occurred in Europe and affected European customers more, even if it also had an adverse effect on 
US exports and the main firms involved were American. Following negotiations, A.C. Nielsen finally 
undertook to change its practices, satisfying both the European Commission and the US DoJ.839 
During the entire process, the Commission informed the DoJ and gave it the opportunity to 
comment. No formal request to act was issued in this case as the Commission had already started an 
investigation, but the US nevertheless waited for the results of the Commission’s investigation and 
therefore the case is often mentioned as an informal example of the use of positive comity.840 It 
should be added that cooperation was made substantially easier by the waivers of confidentiality 
issued by the parties (see below, Part II, 4.1.1).841  
 
The only documented occasion of a formal positive comity request between the EU and the US to 
date is the Sabre/Amadeus case initiated in 1997, before the entry into force of the positive comity 
Agreement.842 Central in this case was the alleged discrimination of US airlines by certain 
computerised reservation systems (Amadeus), set up by Lufthansa, Iberia, and Air France. The 
alleged anticompetitive behaviour mainly took place on European territory, while US firms were 
among the main victims. The US antitrust authorities requested the EU to take enforcement 
action.843 The EU finally opened a procedure against Air France for abuse of dominant position, 
resulting in a private settlement agreement between Sabre and Air France.844 The investigation of this 
                                                          
837 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 42-43. 
838 For the facts of the case, see International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Antitrust Division, ICPAC Final 
Report, 2000, available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ICPAC/finalreport.htm (accessed September 2015), Chapter 
5.   
839 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 76; B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 189-
190.  
840 EC submission to the WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/129, 12 July 1999, as mentioned in P. Marsden, “The curious incident of positive comity - the dog that 
didn’t bark (and the trade dogs that just might bite)” in A.T. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 303-304, footnote 5. 
841 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 189-190.  
842 Also see E. Swaine, “Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy: United States” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, 
Comity, and Competition Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 17. For a detailed account of the facts of this 
case, see B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 188-189 
and International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Antitrust Division, ICPAC Final Report, 2000, available at 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ICPAC/finalreport.htm (accessed September 2015), Chapter 5.  
843 M. Blauberger, “The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions. How International Cooperation Enhances the 
Autonomy of Competition Authorities”, Transtate Working Papers, No. 102, Bremen, 2009, 16-17.  
844 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 77. 
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case by the European authorities took quite some time, almost three years start to end, while Article 
IV of the 1998 Agreement recommends a six month timeframe.845 This caused the US authorities to 
doubt the commitment of the EU to the investigation. KLEIN, Assistant Attorney General at the 
Antitrust Division of the DoJ at the time, in a speech in 1999 when the case was still pending, 
already stated that based on the Division’s experience, this time frame would be unrealistic in most 
cases.846 The Judiciary Committee of the US Senate held several hearings evaluating the usefulness of 
positive comity. The matter got rather controversial when one member of Congress claimed that the 
EU investigation was started reluctantly, staffed inadequately, and dragged out interminably, even if 
the US antitrust authorities were not involved in this controversy, and condemned politically 
pressuring a foreign partner in a positive comity case.847 This case demonstrates that a great level of 
trust is needed between parties engaging in positive comity, even if they have developed rather 
similar competition systems.  
 
The limited (documentation of) use stands in contrast with the excitement that revolved around the 
concept of positive comity when it re-emerged in the nineties. Several explanations were sought for 
this apparent paradox. Until 1995 it was thought that parties refrained from formally invoking the 
1991 Agreement out of caution, considering the legal challenge to the Agreement (see below, Part II, 
2.3.1).848 Others claim that there was simply no need for positive comity provisions. In the early days 
of the 1991 Agreement, the Commission explained the limited use by stating that in several cases 
under active investigation by the Commission, a formal request under Article V was unnecessary 
because the case was dealt with through cooperation.849 VAN BAEL equally labelled formal provisions 
on positive comity as ‘an out-of-date concept’ because many issues have been identified as raising 
comity questions, without the comity agreements having been invoked. A formal request under the 
comity provision is therefore unnecessary according to him if a case can be dealt with through 
cooperation. Moreover, (multinational) companies can now go directly to the jurisdiction in which 
they face an issue.850 It is certainly overly optimistic to claim that the inspiration coming from the 
positive comity provision in the 1991 Agreement has led to cooperation being so good that it made 
the activation of formal (positive or negative) comity procedures obsolete.851 Moreover, if informal 
requests and other types of cooperation suffice, it certainly does not explain why the need was felt to 
conclude an agreement dedicated entirely to formal positive comity in 1998. It may, however, be so 
that the initiation of the Working Group on Trade and Competition within the WTO relieved some 
of the tension that was present at the time positive comity was re-introduced, as this gave trade and 
competition officials the opportunity to engage with each other more intensely and more frequently. 
                                                          
845 Article IV(c)(5) 1998 EU-US Positive Comity Agreement.  
846 J. Klein, Statement before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition Committee on the 
Judiciary United States Senate concerning International Antitrust Enforcement, Washington D.C., 4 May 1999, 13.   
847 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 195.  
848 “The legal certainty regarding the status of the Agreement enjoyed since its approval on 10 April 1995 has allowed the European 
Commission to pursue its efforts to cooperate with its US counterparts.” Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of 
the United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws, 10 April 1995 to 30 June 1996, 
COM(96) 479 final, 8 October 1996, 2. Also see OECD, Report of the Committee on Competition Law and Policy – 
Making International Markets More Efficient through ‘Positive Comity’ in Competition Law Enforcement, 
DAFFE/CLP(99)19, 14 June 1999, 11.  
849 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement 
between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of 
their competition laws, 10 April 1995 to 30 June 1996, COM(96) 479 final, 8 October 1996, 11. 
850 I. Van Bael, Due Process in competition proceedings, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2011, 61-62.  
851 OECD, Report of the Committee on Competition Law and Policy – Making International Markets More Efficient 
through ‘Positive Comity’ in Competition Law Enforcement, DAFFE/CLP(99)19, 14 June 1999, 11. 
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At the same time the overall development of competition laws and authorities globally may have 
increased company trust causing companies to address their complaints directly to the foreign 
agency.852  
 
A more ‘negative’ factor could be that the most well-known examples of positive comity ‘were not 
exactly paragons of action’853 and the few cases in which it was employed were not ‘shining examples 
of its efficiency.’ Positive comity may therefore, relatively quickly, have been perceived to have 
limited value. The OECD described the experience with positive comity in bilateral agreements as 
‘somewhat of a damp squib.’854  
 
2.2.4.3 Limitations 
 
Indeed, the main reasons for the limited use of both negative and positive comity principles seem to 
be their inherent limitations. Those include the voluntary nature of the principles, the need for 
advanced trust between the parties, the absence of a mechanism to ward off politicisation, and the 
legal conditioning. These arguments will now be further developed.   
 
Characteristic of the comity principle is its inherently voluntary nature, even when embedded in a 
formal cooperation agreement. As rightly pointed out by GERADIN, REYSEN, and HENRY, the 
importance of a comity principle in a formal agreement is undermined by its lack of binding effect.855 
While the incorporation of comity provisions in a binding agreement may more clearly offer the 
parties the possibility to employ the principle, the absence of even an obligation to motivate refusals 
does not even commit the parties to consider requests.856  
 
The voluntary nature of the principle renders comity completely useless in situations where both 
parties believe that they have a predominant interest in a matter.857 This was clearly demonstrated by 
the infamous Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell merger cases (see above, Part I, 2.2.5). 
Some, for instance, claim that comity did not play a role in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger.858 
                                                          
852 P. Marsden, “The curious incident of positive comity - the dog that didn’t bark (and the trade dogs that just might 
bite)” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 305, 307, 
309. The infamous Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger clash only happened after the conclusion of the cooperation 
agreement. 
853 P. Marsden, “The curious incident of positive comity - the dog that didn’t bark (and the trade dogs that just might 
bite)” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 307. 
854 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 23.  
855 D. Geradin, M. Reysen, & D. Henry, “Extraterritoriality, Comity, and Cooperation in EU Competition Law” in A. 
Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 32. 
856 Also see OECD, Report of the Committee on Competition Law and Policy – Making International Markets More 
Efficient through ‘Positive Comity’ in Competition Law Enforcement, DAFFE/CLP(99)19, 14 June 1999, 7. 
857 P. Marsden, “The curious incident of positive comity - the dog that didn’t bark (and the trade dogs that just might 
bite)” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 309.  
858 B. Peck, “Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws and the U.S.-EU Dispute over the Boeing and McDonnell 
Douglas Merger: From Comity to Conflict? An Argument for a Binding International Agreement on Antitrust 
Enforcement and Dispute Resolution”, San Diego Law Review, Vol. 35, 1998, 1169, 1193. Commission Decisions declaring 
a concentration compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case No IV/M.877 - 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, 30 July 1997; Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger, 
Roscoe B. Starek III and Christine A. Varney in the Matter of The Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 
9710051, 1 July 1997, expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the interference of the European 
Commission in the merger of the Boeing Company and McDonnell Douglas; Mitchell, Alison, “Clinton Warns 
Europeans of Trade Complaint on Boeing Deal” , The New York Times, 18 July 1997. 
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However, it is not true that both parties did not take each other’s interest into account, it is rather 
that both parties believed that their interests were of greater importance, and that they were most 
severely affected by the merger in question. In the context of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, 
then Director-General SCHAUB acknowledged that “procedures of notification and consultation and the 
principles of traditional and positive comity allow us to bring out respective approaches closer in cases of common interest 
but there exists no mechanism for resolving conflicts in cases of substantial divergence of analysis.”859 More recent 
examples include the Oracle/Sun Microsystems case, and the Microsoft case (see above, Part I, 2.2.5).860 
Another example in the merger sphere is the Sandoz/Ciba-Geigy case. Both pharmaceutical giants 
wanted to merge and form a new company, Novartis. The merger was cleared by the EU, subject to 
certain conditions relating to licensing practices. The US, also investigating the case, was much more 
strict in its review. The FTC approved the merger, but subject to much heavier conditions. The FTC 
decision came only after the EU issued its decision, and it was criticised for not giving much 
consideration to the Commission’s analysis and evaluation.861 FOX in 2011 has pointed out that in 
cases involving significant US antirust interests, there is not a single US court that has ever judged 
that the interests of another nation outweighed the US interests.862 She therefore claimed that 
‘comity’ was somewhat of a ‘throw away’ word.863 GERADIN, REYSEN and HENRY similarly asked 
“whether comity has ever stopped EU or U.S. authorities, for example, from meddling in a transaction or taking issue 
with a certain line of conduct because the other party is better placed to deal with it.”864 They concluded that 
comity is of little use in the event of a real conflict, because the authorities involved will very likely 
find an overriding interest in enforcement and disregard comity.865 The interests involved in such 
cases are balanced by actors that are not objective and lack clear criteria, namely the involved states 
                                                          
859 Schaub, Alexander, “International Co-operation in Antitrust matters: making the point in the wake of the 
Boeing/MDD proceedings”, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1, February 1998.  
860 Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the 
EEA Agreement, Case No COMP/M.5529 - Oracle/ Sun Microsystems, C(2010) 142 final, 21 January 2010; DoJ Press 
Release, “Antitrust Division Issues Statement on the European Commission’s Decision Regarding the Proposed 
Transaction Between Oracle and Sun”, 09-1210, 9 November 2009; Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, C(2004)900 final, 24 March 2004; DoJ Press Release, 
“Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, R Hewitt Pate, issues Statement on the EC’s Decision in Its Microsoft 
Investigation”, 04-184, 24 March 2004; Murad, Ahmed, “Obama attacks Europe over technology protectionism”, 
Financial Times, 16 February 2015; Kanter, James & Scott, Mark, “Europe Challenges Google, Seeing Violations of Its 
Antitrust Law”, The New York Times, 15 April 2015; Robinson, Duncan, & Spiegel, Peter, “Concerns grow over EU rules 
targeting American Companies”, Financial Times, 26 July 2015; A. Ezrachi, “Sponge”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 
5, No. 1, 2017, 72. 
861 B. Peck, “Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws and the U.S.-EU Dispute over the Boeing and McDonnell 
Douglas Merger: From Comity to Conflict? An Argument for a Binding International Agreement on Antitrust 
Enforcement and Dispute Resolution”, San Diego Law Review, Vol. 35, 1998, 1189-1192.  
862 X., Contribution of Prof. Eleanor M. Fox in Summary of Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing - 
International Antitrust Issues, 15 February 2006, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/antitrust/at-
links/pdf/at-mod/02_15_06.authcheckdam.pdf (accessed September 2015), 2. She repeated this statement later on: 
“[t]hrough all the years from the famous Timberlane case to the present, not one U.S. court has ever found that the interest of another nation 
outweighed the interest of the United States in cases in which the United States had an antitrust interest at stake.” E. Fox, “Antitrust 
Without Borders – From Roots to Codes to Networks” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 269. 
863 X., Contribution of Prof. Eleanor M. Fox in Summary of Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing - 
International Antitrust Issues, 15 February 2006, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/antitrust/at-
links/pdf/at-mod/02_15_06.authcheckdam.pdf (accessed September 2015), 2.  
864 D. Geradin, M. Reysen, & D. Henry, “Extraterritoriality, Comity, and Cooperation in EU Competition Law” in A. 
Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 33.  
865 Ibid., 33-34, & footnote 60. 
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themselves.866 Moreover, as demonstrated by the developments in the case-law, comity has been 
further watered down to a principle that is only relevant when the conduct in question is compelled 
in the relevant third country.867  
 
The Intel case serves as another example of the uncertainty that is inherent to the comity principle.868 
Computer technology company AMD attempted to gain access to documents in private US antitrust 
proceedings via US courts in support of a complaint submitted to DG COMP. AMD had 
complained to the European Commission that Intel was abusing its dominant position in the micro-
processing industry in the European market. To support its claim, it suggested that DG COMP 
should obtain the documents Intel had produced in a private antitrust suit in a US Federal Court 
(more precisely the documents produced to Intergraph Corporation in an action in the northern 
District of Alabama). DG COMP refused to do so, upon which AMD sought after the documents 
itself, relying on 28 USC §1782(a), a provision allowing, but not obliging, US federal district courts to 
provide assistance in obtaining evidence for use in proceedings before foreign and international 
tribunals.869 In this case such assistance would consist of ordering a resident company to produce a 
document under US discovery rules. The European Commission was free not to take the discovered 
documents in to account, but nevertheless filed amicus curiae briefs to the effect of a dismissal of 
AMD’s request.870 Lower courts in the US had been strongly divided on whether 28 USC §1782(a) 
included a ‘foreign discoverability requirement’.871 It was finally clarified by the US Supreme Court 
that §1782(a) does not require that the documents in question be subject to discovery in the foreign 
jurisdiction. It is therefore allowed, under certain conditions, to obtain discovery using US civil 
procedure in support of a complaint before the European Commission. The Court rejected a general 
foreign discoverability requirement, but listed four comity-based factors that the District Courts can 
use in assessing discovery requests under §1782. The Supreme Court first underlined the difference 
between evidence sought from a participant in a foreign proceeding and evidence sought from a 
non-participant. In the former case a foreign tribunal has jurisdiction and may order the production 
of evidence from those appearing before it. Secondly, the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character 
of the foreign proceedings, and the receptivity of the foreign government, court, or agency abroad to 
                                                          
866 B. Sweeney, "International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress", Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 10, 2009, 67.  
867 D. Geradin, M. Reysen, & D. Henry, “Extraterritoriality, Comity, and Cooperation in EU Competition Law” in A. 
Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 22. 
868 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).  
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“Assessing internatonal discovery after Intel v AMD (US Supreme Court, 2004): expanded US discovery opportunities 
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(C.S. Goldman, C. Hersh, C. L. Witterick, “International antitrust: developments after Empagran and Intel – comity 
considerations”, American Bar Association Spring Meeting, 31 March 2005, 3, 11) Other circuit and district courts as well 
were divided on whether a party seeking judicial assistance under §1782(a) must show that the evidence sought is 
discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction or not. For an detailed account of the Intel saga, see M. Zalta, “Recent 
interpretation of 28 USC§ 1782(A) by the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.: the effects on 
federal district courts, domestic litigants, and foreign tribunals and litigants”, Pace International Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, 
September 2005, 413-443. 
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US Federal Court judicial assistance should be taken into account. According to RYNGAERT the 
introduction of this factor indicates the weight that the Supreme Court attaches to international 
comity, as this consideration mitigates the impact of the Court’s prior holding that the competition 
proceedings before the European Commission qualify as proceedings before a foreign tribunal for 
the purpose of §1782. The Court also called for ‘suspicion’ with regard to all §1782 requests aimed at 
circumventing foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country, as not to 
offend other nations. Finally, ‘unduly intrusive or burdensome requests’ ought to be trimmed or 
rejected. This factor may therefore be used to avoid fishing expeditions. In casu, the District Court 
reproached AMD for not having tailored its application to the subject matter of the complaint.872  
 
ELHAUGE and GERADIN were rightly critical toward this judgment. According to them, it is 
unintelligible why litigants are allowed to obtain discovery in the US for use in a foreign proceeding 
when this would not be possible in a similar US litigation and is not permitted under the discovery 
rules of the foreign nation. This undermines the discovery limits imposed by the foreign nation, in 
particular when the foreign tribunal is not receptive to this type of ‘assistance’.873 This case is indeed 
detrimental to the promotion of international cooperation and coordination in antitrust 
enforcement.874 Justice BREYER, an internationalist-minded Supreme Court Justice, forcefully 
dissented and underlined that this opinion ignored the opposition by the Commission to being 
labelled a ‘tribunal’ and therefore undermined comity.875 GOLDMAN, HERSH, and WITTERICK rightly 
claimed that “there is a disconnect between some of the U.S. courts and policy-makers with regard to the types of 
international law and comity issues raised.”876 This case was also decided rather differently than the earlier 
Empagran case, which appeared to restrict the role of US courts in the context of foreign antitrust 
proceedings (see above, Part I, 3.2.1), again resulting in uncertainty with regard to the effect of the 
comity principle.877 Strikingly, the EU-US agreements are the obvious absentee in this type of cases. 
It is remarkable how the agreements are not brought up either in the Commission’s amicus curiae 
briefs nor in the judgments themselves. While admittedly these agreements relate to the working 
relationship between the competition agencies of both jurisdictions, they are nevertheless testimony 
to a certain relationship among the parties, and the intentions of aiming to achieve a mutually 
beneficial relationship. While the judiciary should evidently remain independent it would be 
beneficial to explicitly take the broader working relationship between the competition authorities and 
the agreements concluded in this regard into account.  
 
When it comes to positive comity it is very difficult to assess, without objective criteria at hand, when 
one nation should defer because another nation has a greater interest and therefore a greater claim of 
right.878 The only guidance offered in this regard by the 1998 Agreement is that a nation should 
‘normally’ defer or suspend if the anti-competitive activities at issue “(i) do not have a direct, substantial 
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and reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in the Requesting Party's territory; or (ii) where the anti-competitive 
activities do have such an impact on the Requesting Party's consumers, they occur principally in and are directed 
principally towards the other Party's territory.”879 According to the OECD, the latter requirement is the 
main cause of uncertainty.880 In addition, it is often said that courts lack the expertise to accurately 
take into account foreign interests due to most domestic judges’ lack of experience with foreign laws 
or international law. Lack of guidance in this regard contributed to the fact that courts often found 
US interests that outweighed those of other nations, even if the latter were substantial. ZAMBRANO 
in this context promoted government input via letters and amici, because the latter allegedly are 
better equipped than courts to evaluate the interests of the nation, which was also underlined by 
Justice BLACKMAN in his Aérospatiale dissent. Courts are not designed to exchange, negotiate, and 
reconcile the problems accompanying the realisation of national interests within the sphere of 
international association.881 However, this again opens the gates for politicisation (see below) and 
may endanger the separation of powers.  
 
The reasoning ‘in the books’ underpinning positive comity is that it allows a case to be dealt with by 
the authority best placed to do so. In practice, authorities engage in cooperation because they expect 
to reciprocally benefit from cooperation in another case. This adds to the difficulty of deciding when 
to answer to, or make, a comity request.882 Shortly after the conclusion of the 1991 Agreement, 
ATWOOD already warned that the principle of positive comity could not overcome the proposition 
that laws are written and enforced with the protection of national interests in mind.883 Similarly, 
PECK wondered whether the EU-US Agreement, revolving around the positive comity concept 
could continue to be a viable framework for resolving antitrust jurisdiction disputes, considering that 
nations will protect their own economic interests.884  
 
Positive comity was strongly supported in the early days because it was respectful of participating 
countries’ sovereignty, as the country whose market is most directly affected is given principal 
enforcement responsibility. The OECD underlined in this context that the main issue in this context 
of voluntary cooperation is trust, more so than the text of an agreement.885 One could rightfully 
claim that the level of trust needed to engage in allocative positive comity (i.e. when there is deferral 
by one authority for the benefit of another) is even greater than that required for the exchange of 
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confidential information, the latter being an enormous hurdle for competition cooperation that is 
only now slowly being overcome. In her speech ‘is cooperation possible’ in 1999, WOOD referred to 
positive comity as ‘the milder cousin’ of cooperation.886 But is it truly a milder cousin? Allocative 
positive comity goes beyond toleration, notification, and some forms of cooperation. It requires 
complete trust in the enforcement action of a foreign jurisdiction and in a foreign agency’s legal 
tools, resources, and independence.887 It is paradoxical that as a party to the 1998 Positive Comity 
Agreement, foreseeing a presumption of deferral, LOWE, former Director-General of DG 
Competition, said during the 2008 Annual Fordham Competition Law Conference on International 
Antitrust Law and Policy that although the US and the EU work together, they would not even 
consider deference of one authority to another.888   
 
Politicisation is another risk linked to (positive) comity cases, as demonstrated by the aforementioned 
Sabre/Amadeus and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas cases. Such headline-generating transactions attract 
political scrutiny, as they involve the engagement of time and resources for the benefit of (companies 
in) another jurisdiction, or may concern for instance the enforcement of domestic laws against a 
national champion, which may cause apprehension in the public opinion or with the political 
authorities. In particular media and aviation transactions, and later the high tech industry are among 
the most likely to receive intense scrutiny.889 This might discourage antitrust enforcers to engage in 
comity for fear of attracting too much political attention.890 Politics can also have an influence in 
another manner. The GE/Honeywell transaction for instance was announced just before the 2000 
presidential elections in the US, while the review took place during the transition to a new 
administration. This led to the situation that there was no Assistant Attorney General in charge of 
the Antitrust Division until June 2001, which according to STERN impacted the handling of the 
case.891   
 
Some problems surrounding formal positive comity requests have to do with the legal conditioning of 
the concept. A determinant and logical factor in the application of the principle is the requirement 
that the behaviour at stake should be illegal under the laws of the requested party. Significant 
substantive differences between national competition laws may therefore severely limit the potential 
use of positive comity. The EU and the US remain in disagreement on what constitutes 
anticompetitive behaviour, in particular with regard to dominance or vertical restraints.892 ZANETTIN 
demonstrated via a comparative analysis of EU-US and US-Japan cooperation that similar 
competition policies form a precondition for an effective use of positive comity.893 This is likely the 
case among partners to a cooperation agreement, but experience has shown that even under such 
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conditions the use of the concept is limited. A consequence of the conditions surrounding allocative 
positive comity, is that it will only occur when the requesting jurisdiction faces severe difficulties in 
bringing a claim or successfully investigating a case itself. Whenever the requesting country does have 
the jurisdiction and means to enforce, it will likely want to impose its own fines or other remedies.894 
This was implicitly confirmed in a speech by Assistant Attorney General KLEIN in 1999,895 who also 
acknowledged that positive comity lacked the practicality that would allow it to be used frequently.896  
 
The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, in its report issued two years after the 
entry into force of the 1998 Agreement, suggested that the amelioration of the procedural aspects of 
the process could address some of the challenges faced by the positive comity principle, for instance 
by requiring ‘a realistic assessment’ at the start of an investigation of the resources of the requested 
party or the establishment of a timetable for processing the referral.897 None of these suggestions, 
however, seem to have received any follow-up or would make a big difference for that matter, as 
they would seemingly only complicate the process. The ideas moreover remained general, and were 
not detailed suggestions for improvement. For instance, it is unclear who would assess the resources 
of the requested party. If it is the requested party itself, hidden agenda’s might influence the objective 
nature of the assessment. If it is the requesting party, it remains to be seen whether the agency would 
want to spend time and own resources doing such a thing.   
 
In 2006 the US AMC held a hearing to obtain testimony on international antitrust issues, including on 
ways to foster comity between antitrust agencies.898 The 2007 Report and Recommendations of the 
AMC concluded, despite the limitations identified above and previous attempts at refining the 
concept, that the US should pursue more international agreements incorporating comity principles, 
while at the same time making greater use of the already existing comity provisions.899 These 
objectives seem to clash with past experience and appear detached from reality. The 2014 OECD 
Recommendation concerning International Cooperation on Competition Investigations and 
Proceedings, finally, also continued to mention the negative and positive comity principle, without, 
however, including a presumption of referral.900 This relentless promotion of comity principles makes 
one wonder whether the principle is much more successful than appears from the abovementioned 
available data. If so, agencies are strongly encouraged to share their positive experiences with the 
larger public.  
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Six years after the positive comity agreement with the EU, and despite its limited track record, the 
US entered into a similar agreement with Canada in 2004, to enhance the effectiveness of the 
competition cooperation agreement between the two nations in 1995.901 The Agreement is similarly 
careful not to prejudice either party’s position on issues of competition law jurisdiction in the 
international context.902 While the scope of application of the agreement is limited to activities that 
may be subject to penalties or relief under the competition laws of the requested party, the comity 
provisions themselves are identical.903 This agreement is the only other competition-specific positive 
comity agreement in place, apart from the EU-US Agreement. No similar agreements have been 
concluded by the EU.  
 
One could finally wonder whether, comity being a general concept not confined to competition law, 
its flaws are common too, or whether they are specific to the field of antitrust. There are indications 
that not only in the context of competition law little use is made of positive comity, also Article 
XVIII of the 1954 Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty between Germany and the United 
States reportedly had little practical effect, as well as the comity provision in the Treaty Establishing 
the Benelux Economic Union and similar provisions in bilateral cooperation agreements between the 
US and Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, and Japan.904 
 
2.2.5 Consultation 
 
Finally, the parties to the 1991 EU-US Agreement are required to consult with one another at 
appropriate levels upon motivated request regarding any matter related to the agreement. Such a 
request should indicate applicable time limits or other considerations urging speed. Parties should 
moreover attempt to conclude such consultations quickly, with the intention to reach mutually 
satisfactory conclusions. Such consultations should take place in a demonstrable spirit of 
cooperation.905  
 
It is not entirely clear what the scope is of these meetings. ‘Regarding any matter related to the 
agreement’, is very broad, and seems to imply that it can relate to the implementation of the 
agreement as such, as well as particular cases dealt with under the Agreement. Possibly, non-urgent 
matters will be dealt with during the biannual meeting of officials under Article III(2), where current 
enforcement activities and priorities, economic sectors of common interest, considered policy 
changes and other matters of mutual interest relating to the application of competition laws can be 
discussed. The Commission indicated in the early years of the agreement that many contacts took 
place during which priorities with regard to effective enforcement and cooperation on specific cases 
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were discussed.906 While understandable in terms of the administrative burden this would bring 
along, it is nevertheless regrettable that the level of transparency regarding these meetings is low.  
 
2.2.6 Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations 
 
The difficulties encountered during the GE-Honeywell transaction in 2001 served as a catalyst for 
deepening merger cooperation between the EU and the US, resulting in a set of best practices for 
coordinating merger investigations in 2002. These best practices mainly memorialized practices that 
had been in place, while also making them more transparent.907 The Best Practices of 2002 and the 
review in 2011 consist of the same five sections, relating to the objectives of cooperation, 
communication between reviewing agencies, coordination on timing, the collection and evaluation of 
evidence, and remedies and settlements. There are no radical differences between the 2002 and 2011 
Best Practices. The latter build on the former based on additional experience, but adhere to the same 
principles.  
 
The 2011 Best Practices contain a lot of detail, and mention many practical examples of where 
certain forms of cooperation would be particularly useful. The objectives are clarified in detail and it 
offers hands-on guidance. The Best Practices moreover repeatedly address the role of the merging 
parties themselves in ensuring an effective and efficient investigation and on various occasions make 
explicit the benefits of cooperation for both agencies and parties. Emphasis throughout the 
document is on the exchange of information and coordination of timing to allow for meaningful 
discussion at key stages of the investigation, tailored to the needs of the case.  
 
2.3 Legal nature 
 
2.3.1 Legal basis of first generation agreements and procedure of conclusion 
 
There was some confusion as to the nature of the EU-US Agreement at the time of its conclusion. 
The Agreement was originally concluded in 1991 between the European Commission and the 
government of the United States of America. While there was no Treaty basis for doing so, the 
Commission had a longstanding practice of concluding agreements with third countries, covering a 
variety of policy fields.908 Common characteristics were the creation of limited obligations only 
engaging the Commission, absence of financial commitments that could affect the budget of the 
Community, and a mere theoretical possibility that breach of the agreement would result in 
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international liability of the Community, as breach would result first and foremost in the extinction 
of the agreement. It can be assumed that the Commission expected that the agreement with the US 
would equally fall within this format. To this end, it rejected for instance the inclusion of an 
arbitration provision foreseeing the binding resolution of conflicts between the two parties by an 
independent arbitrator. Such a clause had never been included in an administrative agreement and 
would have constituted a limitation of the discretion of the Commission.909 
 
The conclusion of this type of ‘administrative agreement’ by the Commission was characterised by a 
large degree of institutional uncertainty and the absence of normative involvement. An intervention 
by the Court was therefore of great significance.910 It was France (supported by Spain and the 
Netherlands) that challenged the competence of the Commission to enter into the agreement. The 
main point of discussion was whether the EU-US Agreement should be considered a binding 
international agreement or rather an ‘administrative agreement’ as contended by the Commission. If 
the Agreement were a full-fledged international treaty, this would imply that the Commission did not 
have the authority to conclude the Agreement according to Article 210 and Article 228(1) of the 
EEC Treaty at the time, which reserved the capacity to bind the Community internationally to the 
Community itself, having legal personality.911 The term ‘agreement’ in these provisions represents 
“any undertaking entered into by entities subject to international law which has binding force, whatever its formal 
designation”, as established by the Court in its Opinion 1/75.912  
 
There are some reasons why France decided to challenge this agreement in particular, even though 
the practice of the Commission existed before. One reason related to the content of the EU-US 
Agreement, which, according to BARONCINI, was different from previously concluded administrative 
agreements and represented a genuine foreign policy orientation, and therefore a decision that should 
have been made by the Council even when the execution would be the sole competence of the 
Commission and would not imply any legislative or financial changes for the Community. The 
French government further observed that due to the similarities with traditional mutual legal 
assistance agreements (see below, Part II, 4.2.3) the Agreement could not be considered to be purely 
‘administrative’ and the Commission could not be the one holding the competence to make such 
commitments. There was more generally a climate of fear surrounding the Agreement, relating inter 
alia to the presumption that the Commission would share substantial amounts of information with 
the US authorities without receiving the same advantage in return and without sufficient safeguards 
in place for the protection of confidential information.913 TORREMANS warned that “[o]ne should […] 
not under-estimate the political change and the risk which is involved when the United States authorities become 
effectively one of the players that determine the direction in which European competition policy is being developed and 
how it is being applied. All this would give an external party a much bigger influence in European matters than was 
the case ever before.”914 Moreover, Bloomberg BNA published an article entitled ‘European Lawyers 
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Predict Negative Impact on business Sector From New U.S./EC Accord’, illustrating the 
atmosphere of the time.915 Finally, the political climate offered fertile ground for France’s claim. The 
atmosphere was particularly tense when it came to the Commission’s behaviour on the international 
scene following the uproar regarding the Blair House Agreement in the Uruguay Round.916 This clash 
between member states (France in particular) and the Commission led to a systematic mistrust and 
resulted in less ‘generous’ and less flexible negotiating mandates being issued by the Council and in 
increased scrutiny of the Commission’s negotiations with third countries.917 Some member states 
feared that they would lose further control to the Commission over the development of competition 
rules if this agreement was left unchallenged. Implied was the further worry that the Commission 
could then give up the European Communities’ control over their competition law system to the US, 
by overly relying on US guidance.918 
 
The Commission’s main argument in support of its claim that the Agreement was not a binding 
international agreement but an administrative agreement, was that failure to adhere to the Agreement 
would not result in international liability, but mere termination of the Agreement. It furthermore 
pointed to Article IX, which prevented the Agreement from requiring any changes to national laws 
or inconsistent interpretations with those laws.919 Article 228(1) EEC Treaty proscribed: "Where this 
Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more States or an international 
organization, such agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the powers vested in the 
Commission in this field, such agreements shall be concluded by the Council, after consulting the European 
Parliament where required by this Treaty.”920 France maintained that such ‘powers vested in the 
Commission’ were limited to agreements to be concluded by the Commission for the recognition of 
Community laissez-passer,921 or, indeed, the conclusion of administrative or working agreements.922 
The Commission, however, relying on the French text of the Article, claimed that the exception in 
Article 228 EEC Treaty should not be interpreted in a restrictive manner, and allowed the 
Commission to derive its powers from sources other than the Treaty, such as the practices followed 
by the institutions.923 Indeed, the Commission argued that, with regard to the establishment of its 
competence to conclude international agreements, in addition to the hypotheses set out in the 
sources of primary EU law, the practice of the institutions, coupled with the practice interpreting 
Article 228 EC, gave rise to an application based on which it would be able to conclude agreements 
the execution of which did not require intervention by the Council nor interference by the latter.924  
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Advocate General TESAURO emphasised the origins of the EU-US agreement. He first referred to 
the OECD initiatives in the field of international cooperation and the ensuing call from the 
Commission for more ambitious objectives following changes in the international economy, in 
particular the need for a legally binding document. The Advocate General was of the opinion that 
the agreement did not differ from a normal international agreement, taking into account its 
designation as ‘agreement’ and the parties that have concluded it. He then focused on the identity of 
the addressees, the will of the contracting parties, the content of the agreement and the absence or 
presence of penalties in the event of non-compliance. The Advocate General pointed to the fact that 
while the Commission is expressly referred to as a party, certain provisions of the agreement, for 
example those referring to ‘the party’s territory’, or ‘the party’s States or Member States’, clarify that 
it was in fact the Community that had committed itself internationally. With regard to the will of the 
parties to bind themselves, he recalled that the Commission itself expressed the intent to go beyond 
the OECD recommendations via the conclusion of a legally binding act. Finally, according to the 
Advocate General, the obligations set out in the Agreement could be qualified as instrumental and 
procedural obligations that are binding on the parties, while the provision providing for the 
revocation of the Agreement is also characteristic of a binding international agreement governed by 
international law.925  
 
The Advocate General furthermore pointed out that so-called ‘administrative arrangements’ are in 
fact unknown in international law, where the only distinction involves binding versus non-binding 
agreements, the latter category generally consisting of gentlemen’s agreements or understandings.926 
Arrangements brought into being by specific administrative entities with a view to establishing forms 
of cooperation with the authorities of other States having similar powers are not international 
agreements, as they are concluded by bodies lacking power to bind the State effectively at 
international level. Such arrangements are tolerated, but are not governed by international law, as 
such arrangements amount to mere concerted practices between authorities which act in the exercise 
of their discretion.927  
 
The Court, like the Advocate General, opined that the Agreement was intended to produce legal 
effects and does so in practice. This conclusion was drawn from the wording of the Agreement, as 
well as its context of conclusion.928 The Court examined the Agreement in the light of the definition 
of an international agreement as described by Article 2(1)(a)(i) of the Vienna Convention of 21 
March 1986 on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations, even though the EU in itself is not a party to that Agreement.929 It 
concluded that because the Agreement produced legal effects and matched the definition of the 
Convention, the Community at the time could incur liability at international level in the event of 
non-performance of the Agreement. The Commission therefore overstepped its boundaries, as 
practice cannot override the provisions of the Treaty and even though the Commission has the 
                                                          
925 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-327/91, 
EU:C:1993:941, paragraph 3, 18-21.  
926 Ibid., paragraph 22.  
927 Ibid.  
928 Judgment of 9 August 1994, French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-327/91, EU:C:1994:305, 
paragraph 15, 23; Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-
327/91, EU:C:1993:941, paragraph 7.  
929 A treaty is defined in this provision as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.”  
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power internally to take individual decisions in the field of competition law, this does not alter the 
allocation of powers between the EU institutions with regard to the conclusion of international 
agreements. The Court therefore judged that the Commission did not have the competence to 
conclude the agreement with the US.930 A joint Decision of the Council and the Commission of 10 
April 1995 approving the Agreement and declaring it applicable form the date it was first signed by 
the Commission remedied this situation.931 
 
In conclusion, the EU’s bilateral competition cooperation agreements are full-fledged, binding 
international agreements. They are concluded between the government of the third country and the 
Council. They can therefore be considered as state-to-state agreements (although the EU is not a state), 
as opposed to agency-to-agency agreements.932 While the competition authorities of both parties are 
involved in executing the obligations incorporated in the agreement, it are the governments of the 
parties that conclude it, and it is the EU (before the Lisbon Treaty: the EC) that commits itself 
internationally.933 It is thereby demonstrated again that treaty status is not dependent on the 
substance, ‘hardness’ of obligations or enforcement mechanism in an agreement.934  
 
This qualification has consequences regarding the procedure of conclusion of such agreements. The 
legal basis for the EU’s pre-Lisbon competition cooperation agreements were articles 87 EC Treaty, 
Article 235 EC Treaty,935 and to the extent that the Agreement applied to ECSC products, Articles 65 
and 66 ECSC Treaty. After the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam this became Article 83 
and 308 EC Treaty,936 corresponding with current Articles 103 TFEU and 352 & 353 TFEU.937 
Agreements were concluded under the procedure of the first subparagraph of Article 228 paragraph 
3 EC Treaty, later Article 300 TEC, and currently Article 218 TFEU. As the agreements are entirely 
dedicated to competition law, which is an exclusive competence of the Commission, the member 
                                                          
930 Judgment of 9 August 1994, French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-327/91, EU:C:1994:305, 
paragraph 25, 36, 41, 43.  
931 Decision of the Council and of the Commission of 10 April 1995 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of 
their competition laws, 95/145/EC, ECSC, OJ L 95, 27.4.1995. Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of 
the United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws, 10 April 1995 to 30 June 1996, 
COM(96) 479 final, 8 October 1996, 1. 
932 C. Damro, Cooperating on Competition in Transatlantic Economic Relations: the Politics of Dispute Prevention, New York, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2006, 12. Switzerland, the UK, and the US, for instance, recognize agency-to-agency agreements as 
international agreements. Such executive agreements generally regulate detailed technical cooperation and do not include 
political obligations which would require ratification through parliaments. (A. Ott, E. Vos and F. Coman-Kund, “EU 
agencies and their international mandate: A new category of global actors?”, CLEER Working Papers 2013/7, 11.) 
933 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-327/91, 
EU:C:1993:941, as cited in B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart 
Publishing, 2002, 77. 
934 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd ed., New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 18.  
935 Not for the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement, as cases falling under the Merger Regulation were not within the scope 
of that agreement.  
936 Treaties Office Database, Summary of Treaty, Agreement between the European Community and the Government of 
Japan concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true
&treatyId=360 (accessed December 2011).   
937 Communication from the Commission to the Council concerning the Agreement between the European 
Communities and the Government of the United States on the application of positive comity principles in the 
enforcement of their competition laws, COM(97) 233 final, 97/0178(CNS), 18 June 1997, 4.  
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states are not involved,938 nor are other Directorate-Generals (DG’s). The negotiation of this type of 
agreements is indeed done solely by DG Competition, leaving other important DG’s such as DG 
Trade out of the process. Nevertheless, a Council mandate is needed to open negotiations.939 
Approval of the agreement and authorization to sign the agreement is done by a Council decision, 
after a proposal of the Commission and consultation of the European Parliament.940 The Council 
must finally conclude the agreement with qualified majority.941  
 
In both France v. Commission cases, the Court rather artificially denied the existence of international 
administrative agreements within the EU legal system, thereby also rejecting the Commission’s 
competence to conclude such agreements. Administrative agreements have a long history in the 
international cooperation practice. Even when they lack an explicit legal constitutional foundation, 
technical-administrative agreements outnumber formal constitutional treaties.942 Even the 
Commentaries of the International Law Commission on both Vienna Conventions acknowledge the 
existence of a specific type of (binding) international agreement covering technical, administrative 
and financial issues, that are less formalised than ‘formal treaties’ and are concluded according to 
streamlined procedures.943 This judgment of the Court contributed to the fact that administrative 
agreements are surrounded by ambiguity and neglect.944 With this strict interpretation of the 
institutional balance in EU treaty-making, the Court did not engage in the discussion on 
administrative agreements.  
 
2.3.2 Qualification on the soft law – hard law continuum 
 
The concept of legalization, discussed earlier in Part I (see above, Part I, 2.4.3), revolves around the 
principles of obligation, precision, and delegation. While bilateral competition cooperation 
agreements are legally binding agreements, their content is de facto unenforceable.  
 
As established, the 1991 EU-US Agreement and the 1998 Agreement on Positive Comity are full-
fledged international agreements that are considered legally binding. In a communication from the 
                                                          
938 Art. 3(1)(b) TFEU. 
939 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 62. 
940 Council Decision of 16 February 2009 relating to the conclusion of the Agreement between the European 
Community and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities, 
2009/586/EC, OJ L 202, 4.8.2009; Council Decision of 16 June 2003 concluding the Agreement between the European 
Community and the Government of Japan concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities, 2003/520/EC, OJ L 
183, 22.7.2003; Council and Commission Decision of 29 April 1999 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the European Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the application of their competition laws, 
1999/445/EC, ECSC, OJ L 175, 10.7.1999; Decision of the Council and of the Commission of 29 May 1998 concerning 
the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of 
America on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws, 98/386/EC, 
ECSC, OJ L 173, 18.6.1998; Decision of the Council and of the Commission of 10 April 1995 concerning the conclusion 
of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding 
the application of their competition laws, 95/145/EC, ECSC, OJ L 95, 27.4.1995.   
941 Article 218 TFEU io. Article 103 TFEU.  
942 F. Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as global actors – a legal study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex, and 
Europol, Maastricht, Production print Datawyse/Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2015, 145-147.  
943 UN, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries 1966, Text adopted by the International Law 
Commission at its eighteenth session.   
944 F. Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as global actors – a legal study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex, and 
Europol, Maastricht, Production print Datawyse/Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2015, 147 
146 
 
Commission to the Council with regard to the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement, however, the 
Commission repeatedly referred to the Agreement as ‘a political commitment’.945 In the 
abovementioned case France v Commission (C-327/91) as well, the Commission underlined the 
weakness of the commitments and obligations contained in the Agreement. The Agreement does not 
affect the discretion of the Commission and is to a large extent limited to formalising and 
systemising existing practices. The content and effect of first generation competition cooperation 
agreements are governed by the fact that such agreements do not require any changes to existing 
laws, and should be interpreted in a manner consistent with existing laws.946 Because of the large 
discretion given to the parties in first generation agreements, it is rightly said that the outcome of 
cooperation is determined more by policy than by law.947  
 
According to STEPHAN, the content of bilateral competition cooperation agreements does not even 
create soft law, and merely expresses a desire to consult and cooperate, without limiting the 
discretion of the authorities or truly addressing problems of overlapping regulation. He goes even 
further to say that such agreements in fact illustrate the conflicting interests of jurisdictions and their 
difficulties with surrendering regulatory discretion.948 Within the realm of the OECD the agreements 
are identified as soft law as well, for the same reasons. Indeed, bilateral competition cooperation 
agreements do not amend domestic legislation and allow the parties to take into account own 
national interests when deciding whether or to what extent cooperation will take place.949 The US 
itself as well refers to its competition cooperation agreements with the EU as ‘soft’ antitrust 
cooperation agreements and indicates that this type of agreement serves as a catalyst for cooperation, 
but is not necessary for cooperation to take place.950 
 
Theoretically, according to ABBOTT and SNIDAL, if the level of uncertainty (incomplete information 
making it difficult to anticipate all consequences of a legalized arrangement) and sovereignty costs are 
both low, a state will prefer a hard legal arrangement to manage its interactions, with high levels of 
obligation, precision, and delegation. In case sovereignty costs are high, but uncertainty is low, states 
will refrain from delegating, while allowing precise and/or binding arrangements. In the opposite 
case, low sovereignty costs and high uncertainty, states will opt for imprecise, but binding rules, 
subject to moderate delegation. Finally, if both factors are high, states will favour imprecise, flexible 
and hortatory rules that are not institutionalized.951 This theoretical model explains the choices made 
in first generation competition agreements. States are confronted with high uncertainty, as the 
‘stream of requests’ for assistance and the degree to which cooperation and coordination will be 
necessary is difficult to predict, and they are confronted with high sovereignty costs considering the 
                                                          
945 Communication from the Commission to the Council concerning the Agreement between the European 
Communities and the Government of the United States on the application of positive comity principles in the 
enforcement of their competition laws, COM(97) 233 final, 97/0178(CNS), 18 June 1997, 5. 
946 Article IX 1991 EU-US Agreement, Article XI EU-Canada Agreement, Article 10 EU-Japan Agreement, and Article 
10 EU-Korea Agreement. 
947 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 78. 
948 P. Stephan, “Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of Cooperation”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 38, 
2005, 205.  
949 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 35.  
950 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Contribution 
from the United States (DoJ), DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)46, 31 January 2012, 2.  
951 K. Abbott & D. Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance”, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, 
2000, 444.  
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fact that competition policy is interlinked with for instance trade and industrial policy. The 
developers of the concept of legalization identify the Sherman Antitrust Act and the EU competition 
rules as examples of a reaction to uncertainty by states via the combination of somewhat imprecise 
rules and strong delegation.952 In contexts of disagreement about norms and concerns about 
sovereignty and autonomy, hard law is difficult to accept.953 Moreover, in international competition 
law there are no minimum obligations to live by. This may be an additional factor for states to hold 
on to their sovereignty as they did not have to give it up previously.954  
 
2.3.3 Appearance of first generation agreements in case-law 
 
The Union’s first generation agreements rarely make an appearance in the EU Courts’ case-law.955 
However, they are not entirely absent from it. Two examples demonstrate how the Courts or 
Advocate Generals have referred to the 1991 EU-US Agreement and provide insight in its 
functioning.  
 
One example is the Opinion of Advocate General MENGOZZI in the Archer Daniels appeal case.956 The 
judgment of the former Court of First Instance at the origin of this appeal had confirmed the fines 
imposed by the Commission decision under scrutiny, including the increase of the fine for one of the 
companies, Archer Daniels Midland Co. (ADM), on account of aggravating circumstances, namely 
being the ring-leader of the cartel. ADM was moreover denied the benefits of the leniency 
programme.957 ADM appealed against this judgment to the Court of Justice. One particular plea on 
appeal of ADM is relevant in the context of this study, namely the argument that its procedural 
safeguards were not observed as a result of the use of an FBI Report as evidence of ADM’s 
leadership status within the cartel.958 
 
The Advocate General first recalled that there is no general prohibition on the use by the 
Commission of evidence produced in a proceeding other than that being conducted by the 
Commission itself. He departed from the premise that while in EU law there is freedom as to the 
form of evidence adduced and unfettered evaluation of evidence except in the case of specific 
                                                          
952 K. Abbott, R. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A.-M. Slaughter & D. Snidal, “The Concept of Legalization”, International 
Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2000, 405.  
953 Arrangements such as the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (row V), imposing binding 
treaty obligations, but expressed in general, even hortatory language not connected to an institutional framework are 
often used in such cases. K. Abbott, R. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A.-M. Slaughter & D. Snidal, “The Concept of 
Legalization”, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2000, 407.  
954 D. Sokol, “Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy 
Chapters in Free Trade Agreements”, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2007-13, 131.  
955 Searches on both Curia, the website of the Court of Justice, and Eur-Lex, on the official title of the Agreements with 
Japan, Canada and South-Korea did not deliver any results with regard to appearance in EU case-law.  
956 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of the European Communities, C-
511/06 P, EU:C:2008:604.   
957 Ibid., paragraph 6-7. 
958 More specifically, it was apparent from the appendixes added to Part I Section C of the Statement of Objections, in 
which the Commission set out the facts on which its objections related and the evidence relied upon, that the 
Commission had relied upon a report of the statements made by a former ADM representative before representatives of 
the US DoJ and FBI agents during the antitrust proceedings carried out by the US authorities. This report contained the 
detailed description of the cartel arrangements and of the information on the meetings between the undertakings in 
question, as well as indications of the active leadership role played by ADM. Judgment of 9 July 2009, Archer Daniels 
Midland Co. v Commission of the European Communities, C-511/06 P, EU:C:2009:433, paragraph 17, 21. 
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provisions to the contrary, not all evidence is usable, and should be evaluated on the merits by the 
Commission or the Community (now EU) judicature.959 
 
The central issue at stake was the use of a statement made in a proceeding other than the proceeding 
being conducted by the Commission itself, where the interested party was not given benefit of the 
procedural rights to which it was entitled in that context or those it would have enjoyed under 
Community law at the time if those statements had been taken directly by the Commission.960 The 
Advocate General adhered to a cumulative approach in this case, meaning that the procedural rights 
of the parties in the case should comprise both those of the State where the evidence originated and 
those of the State where the evidence was received. He moreover believed that the Commission 
should have informed the affected party of its intention to use statements originating from a foreign 
proceeding as evidence for the purposes of its final decision, regardless of whether or not there were 
doubts as to the compatibility of such use with the observance of procedural rights.961  
 
Advocate General MENGOZZI questioned whether in casu the use as evidence of an FBI Report was 
compatible with ADM’s procedural rights. He pointed to the responsibility of the Commission to 
take appropriate precautions in deciding how to use the document in the proceedings in a way that 
would not infringe any safeguards granted by US law regarding disclosure of the content of that 
document. One particular issue leading him to this conclusion concerned the protection of the 
confidential nature of the statements made by ADM’s former representative to the US antitrust 
authorities. ADM put forward that the FBI Report was intended to be used only in proceedings in 
the US, indicating that the first page of the report stated that the disclosure of it to third parties was 
prohibited and that the US antitrust authorities had expressly agreed that the information provided 
would not be disclosed except for use in proceedings conducted by the US. The Advocate General 
acknowledged that the Commission may not have known of that commitment and that the Report 
was not forwarded to it by the US authorities but by another undertaking involved in the proceeding. 
He did not, however, believe that the Commission could not have been aware of the potential 
                                                          
959 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of the European Communities, C-
511/06 P, EU:C:2008:604, paragraph 97-109, 114.  
960 Which, according to Advocate General MENGOZZI, may “be considered to include the limits placed by the foreign legal system, in 
the interests of the maker of the statements, on the transmission of the statements to other authorities and on their use by those authorities”. 
(Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of the European Communities, C-511/06 
P, EU:C:2008:604, paragraph 115-116.) In that sense the present case distinguishes itself from the earlier Dalmine v 
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present case, and the Court reasoned that the Commission could use those minutes as evidence as the transfer had 
happened legally considering there was no judgment declaring otherwise. The Dalmine cases moreover concerned 
Member States only, contrary to the ADM case. (Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v 
Commission of the European Communities, C-511/06 P, EU:C:2008:604, paragraph 116, 118, 143.) It should be pointed out 
that the Court of First Instance at the time, as well as Advocate General GEELHOED referred to the legality of the use of 
the information as evidence on the basis of national law, whereas the Court of Justice in Dalmine v Commission only 
referred to the lawfulness of the transmission of the information. Advocate General MENGOZZI claimed in this regard that 
in the judgment the term ‘transmission’ of the document could be interpreted as referring to transmission thereof with a 
view to its use. (Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of the European 
Communities, C-511/06 P, EU:C:2008:604, footnote 85.) 
961 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of the European Communities, C-
511/06 P, EU:C:2008:604, paragraph 119, 124. 
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conflict created by the use of the FBI Report with safeguards under US law regarding the 
confidential treatment of the information supplied by ADM’s former representative, in particular 
because of the ‘state of the relations’ between the EU and US in the sphere of cooperation between 
their respective competition authorities.962  
 
This is where the 1991 EU-US Agreement and the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement come into play. 
The Advocate General underlined that the Agreements do not allow for the exchange of information 
to the extent that it is not already allowed under the laws of the authority possessing the information 
and oblige the parties to respect their confidentiality rules. Exchange of confidential information can 
only take place with the consent of the party providing the information. Confidentiality rules are 
moreover particularly important in the context of participation to a leniency program, as was the case 
for ADM. Absent any coordination of leniency programmes information exchange between 
enforcers would allegedly create a powerful disincentive for undertakings to engage in such 
programmes (see below, Part II, 3.5.2.6). According to the Advocate General the Commission was 
therefore obliged to check the legality of the use of the document with the US antitrust authorities, in 
particular in order to obtain on that matter at least an initial pronouncement.963 Despite the attention 
that Advocate General MENGOZZI devoted to this subject, the Court did not offer a clear answer, 
instead stating that discussion of this matter was no longer necessary in view of the assessment of 
ADM’s first plea concerning its rights of defence in relation to its classification as a leader. In sum, 
ADM’s claim that the Commission gave no warning in the statement of objections of the facts that 
would be taken into account in the decision to find that ADM held a role as leader, and that the mere 
occurrence of the documents from which those facts emanate in an annex was not sufficient to 
guarantee the appellant’s rights of defence, was upheld. As the second to fifth pleas of the appeal 
also concerned the classification of ADM as a leader of the cartel on the basis of evidence taken 
from the FBI Report, their scrutiny was unnecessary according to the Court.964  
 
In Dow Chemical, the Court again offered some clarification regarding the scope of the 1991 EU-US 
Agreement. In this case the applicant claimed that the negative comity provision in the EU-US 
Agreement implied that US law should have been taken into account as the Commission fined a 
company established in the US for the conduct of another company that was also established in the 
US. US law differs from EU law with regard to parental liability of companies, and under US law the 
applicant would not have been held liable for the illegal conduct at stake. The applicant furthermore 
argued that the Commission did not illustrate how the applicant’s conduct would have had an effect 
in the EU, and that the Commission must refrain from applying stricter corporate governance 
standards that are inconsistent with those applied in US corporate law.965  
 
The Court reminded the applicant that there is no principle or public international law convention 
obliging the Commission, when imputing unlawful conduct under EU competition law, to take 
account of assessments made by the competition authorities of a non-member State, and that 
because of the specific nature of the legal interests protected in the EU, the Commission’s 
assessments may diverge considerably from those of the competent authorities of non-member 
                                                          
962 Ibid., paragraph 129, 130, 132-134, 140. 
963 Ibid., paragraph 136, 138, 143. 
964 Judgment of 9 July 2009, Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of the European Communities, C-511/06 P, 
EU:C:2009:433, paragraph 64, 97. 
965 Judgment of 2 February 2012, The Dow Chemical Company v European Commission, T-77/08, EU:T:2012:47, paragraph 68.  
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States.966 It added that the 1991 EU-US Agreement was intended to promote cooperation and 
coordination and to minimise the possibility or impact of differences between the parties in the 
application of their competition laws, but did not aim to govern the imputation of a subsidiary’s 
unlawful conduct to its parent company.967 The Court went even further by explaining that even in 
the situation where such an agreement could be invoked, the negative comity provision clarified that 
the Agreement does not contain an obligation to arrive at a specific result, but is limited to setting 
out the line of conduct that the parties request one another to follow when enforcing their respective 
competition laws, confirming the soft nature of the obligations in the Agreement.968 
 
2.4 Use of the EU-US agreements 
 
While the appearance of the agreements in the EU’s case-law is very limited, there are other ways to 
measure their impact. From 1995 to 2000, the Commission issued fairly detailed reports on the 
transatlantic activity that occurred under the agreements. In the first report, covering the period April 
1995 to June 1996, the Commission elaborated upon the types of cooperation that was possible, and 
what kind of topics could be discussed, ranging from the timing of an investigation, to product 
market discussions, to the discussion of suitable remedies.969 The succeeding reports provided 
concrete data regarding the amount of notifications that took place between both parties, showing an 
overall balance between EU-US and US-EU interactions, wherein merger cases formed a clear 
majority. Examples were provided of cases in which cooperation took place, to the extent that these 
could be publicly discussed.970 After 2000 the reports stopped, likely because cooperation had 
become more common and reporting in detail was no longer a priority or had become too resource-
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regarding the application of their competition laws, 1 January 1999 to 31 December 1999, COM(2000) 618 final, 4 
October 2000.  
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intensive, or because of a lack of similar reports and transparency across the Atlantic. What followed 
were fairly standardized paragraphs on international cooperation with limited examples and without 
concrete numbers, to be found in the Annual Reports on Competition Policy and the accompanying 
Commission Staff Working Documents. Detailed, official EU statistics on international cooperation 
in competition cases do not exist. 
 
The 2007 ICN Report on cooperation between competition agencies in cartel investigations 
confirmed the difficulty of gathering data on cooperation. Competition agencies could not provide 
relevant data because the provisions under which cooperation took place entered into force too 
recently, or because they were not applied independently of other cooperation provisions and data 
were categorised under other laws. The report stated that there was no evaluation of this particular 
cooperation instrument, and that no difficulties with regard to its application were reported.971  
 
Nevertheless, many examples can be provided of cases in which cooperation took place. The general 
tone in the discourse of EU officials is that international cooperation has become part of the daily 
enforcement culture. However, while examples of cases in which international cooperation took 
place are relatively easy to come by, it is more difficult to find detailed information on what exactly 
such cooperation entailed in each of those cases.  
 
In the 2012 OECD/ICN Joint Survey, respondents confirmed that international cooperation is most 
frequent in the area of merger cooperation.972 This is also the environment in which the most 
detailed accounts of cooperation are available. It should be mentioned, however, that no direct causal 
link can be established between the cooperation in the examples mentioned below, and first 
generation agreements. The examples do provide an image of what forms of cooperation are 
possible. A first example is the GE/Alstom case, a recent Phase II case cleared subject to remedies. 
Cooperation took place between the Commission and its peers in Brazil, Canada, China, Israel, 
South Africa, Switzerland and the United States. Different conditions in the respective markets for 
heavy duty gas turbines resulted in different concerns for the DoJ and the Commission. 
Nevertheless, cooperation took place both regarding the investigation and the analysis of remedies. 
As a result, the deal was approved on the same day, with aligned remedies addressing the concerns 
expressed on both sides of the Atlantic.973 
 
Another recent merger case in which cooperation took place was the GlaxoSmithKline/Novartis 
healthcare case, in which the Commission cooperated with the competition agencies of Canada, 
China, Australia, Brazil, Pakistan, and the US. Despite a different substantive analysis, the case was 
resolved with compatible and non-conflicting remedies imposed by the EU and the US, which was 
relied upon by the authorities of Canada, Australia and Pakistan.974 The Google/Doubleclick merger was 
                                                          
971 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 15.  
972 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 
26 February 2013, 58.  
973 X., “Global merger enforcement workshop at the International Competition Network (ICN)”, EU Competition and 
Regulatory Newsletter Slaughter and May, 25 September – 1 October 2015, Issue 38. Also see Commission Decision declaring 
a concentration to be compatible with the internal market and the EEA agreement, Case M.7278 – General 
Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power – Renewable Power & Grid Business, C(2015) 6179 final, 8 September 2015. 
974 X., “Global merger enforcement workshop at the International Competition Network (ICN)”, EU Competition and 
Regulatory Newsletter Slaughter and May, 25 September – 1 October 2015, Issue 38. Also see Commission Decision pursuant 
to Article 6(1)(b) in conjunction with Article 6(2) of Council Regulation No 139/2004, Case No COMP/M.7276 – 
Glaxosmithkline/Novartis Vaccines Business (Excl. Influenza/Novartis Consumer Health Business), 28 January 2015.   
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subject to merger control in both the US and the EU. After a largely similar assessment both 
competition authorities concluded that there were no competition concerns. Differences in 
assessment mainly related to market definition. Both agencies extensively analysed possible non-
horizontal effects of the transaction, albeit with a slightly different focus, reaching the same 
conclusion, in particular regarding the extent to which DoubleClick possessed market power and the 
presence of network externalities.975 Close cooperation between the DoJ and the European 
Commission during the global Google/Motorola Mobility investigation resulted in both the DoJ and the 
European Commission announcing their decisions on the same day, and with the same conclusion to 
clear the transaction, based largely on the same substantive analysis.976 Also the WorldCom/MCI 
merger is a well-known example of cooperation between the US DoJ and the European 
Commission. Confidentiality waivers allowed the coordination of requests for information, joint 
meetings with the parties, and settlements that met the concerns on both sides.977 Such cooperation 
also occurred during the Cisco/Tandberg merger. Waivers and (third) party cooperation facilitated 
close cooperation between the Antitrust Division and the European Commission throughout the 
investigation. Numerous contacts between the investigative staffs were held, documents were 
exchanged, competitive effects analyses were shared, joint meetings and interviews were conducted. 
Senior agency management was also in touch. The Antitrust Division took into account the 
commitments given to the European Commission in determining that the proposed merger was not 
likely to be anticompetitive. The announcements of the DoJ and the European Commission were 
made on the same day.978 Other examples of merger cases in which international cooperation 
involving the EU took place are Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, Dresser/Halliburton, Exxon/Mobil, 
Alcoa/Reynolds,979 Agilent/Varian,980 Procter&Gamble/Gilette, Schering-Plough/Merck, 
Ticketmaster/Livenation,981 BHP Billiton/Rio Tinto,982 Intel/McAfee983 Pfizer/Wyeth, Panasonic/Sanyo,984 
Thomson/Reuters,985 and Novartis/Alcon.986  
                                                          
975 J. Brockhoff, B. Jehanno, V. Pozzato, C.-C. Buhr, P. Eberl, & P. Papandropoulos, “Google/DoubleClick: The first 
test for the Commission’s non-horizontal merger guidelines”, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 2, 2008, 60. 
976 X. “Antitrust Merger Enforcement Update and Outlook”, Gibson Dunn, 21 March 2013, available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2013-Antitrust-Merger-Enforcement-Update-Outlook.aspx (accessed 
November 2015). 
977 E. Fox, “Antitrust without borders: from roots to codes to networks”, E15 Expert Group on Competition Policy and 
the Trade System Think Piece, November 2015, 1.  
978 R. Brandenburger, “International competition policy and practice: new perspectives?”, remarks as prepared for The 
Centre of European Law, King’s College, London, 29 October 2010, 9-10. 
979 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 80.  
980 Contribution by the United States, Roundtable on Modalities and Procedures for International Cooperation in 
Competition Cases Involving more than one Country, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and 
Policy, Geneva, 8-10 July 2013. 
981 S. Scott, “A Canadian Perspective on the Role of Comity in Competition Law Enforcement in a Globalised World”, 
Competition Law International, April 2011, 73.  
982 J. Almunia, “Taking Stock and Looking Forward: a Year at the Helm of EU Competition”, Revue Concurrences 
Conference: New Frontiers of Antitrust 2011, Paris, 11 February 2011.   
983 “[…] it shows our good relations with sister agencies outside the EU. In this case, cooperation with the US Federal Trade Commission 
has been excellent and has led to a swift clearance in both jurisdictions.” J. Almunia, “Taking Stock and Looking Forward: a Year at 
the Helm of EU Competition”, Revue Concurrences Conference: New Frontiers of Antitrust 2011, Paris, 11 February 
2011.   
984 Commission staff working document accompanying the Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2009, 
COM(2010)282 final, SEC/2010/0666 final, 3 June 2010, 122, paragraph 523. 
985 Commission staff working document SEC/2009/1004 final accompanying the Report from the Commission on 
Competition Policy 2008, COM(2009)374 final, 23 July 2009, 99, paragraph 392. 
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The Thermo Fisher Scientific/Life Technologies first phase conditional clearance case can serve as a 
textbook example of international cooperation between competition authorities, both formally and 
informally, and with a significant number of competition authorities worldwide, given that several 
jurisdictions were reviewing the transaction. More specifically, cooperation took place between the 
European Commission, US FTC, CCB, ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission), NZ CC (New Zealand Commerce Commission), JFTC, KFTC (Fair Trade 
Commission Republic of Korea), and Mofcom (Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of 
China).987 Both US companies were active in the life sciences market, namely laboratory instruments 
and consumables. The EC made the acquisition of Life Technologies Corp. by Thermo Fisher 
Scientific Inc. dependent on divestments of business producing and supplying media and sera for cell 
culture, gene silencing products and polymer-based magnetic beads. The EU and US held different 
opinions with regard to the last sector, where the FTC was in a position to dismiss concerns but the 
EC was not. As parties were under time pressure, they decided to avoid going into phase II by 
submitting remedies to the EC regarding this market. Conflicting remedies were averted due to 
several forms of cooperation. The EC was able to take a lead role in the cooperation efforts as it was 
regarded as a neutral authority by other reviewing authorities because the merger would take place 
between two US companies. Exchange of views took place with the FTC and the ACCC. The FTC 
was approached first, and despite procedural differences, dialogue started very early on in the case, 
namely while the case was still in in pre-notification before the EC. This allowed the EC case team to 
become familiar with market characteristics and dynamics from the start. A call from the EC case 
team to the parties to pay particular attention to timing alignment was answered positively. This 
allowed overlap of key decision-making times in the case, cultivating meaningful discussion (at least 
between US FTC, EC and ACCC). This, in turn, resulted in the avoidance of a possible misalignment 
of the remedy discussion and implementation stages of the case, such as conflict of interest issues 
regarding potential trustees or buyer approval. Regular conference calls were held as well as tripartite 
e-mail exchanges among the case teams. Waivers provided by the parties early on in the case proved 
to be particularly useful and allowed the relevant authorities to share key internal documents such as 
the Form CO and draft remedy proposals. The most detailed discussions concerned remedy design 
(such as the scope of the divestment business/assets), implementation issues, and timing issues 
(approval of buyers, appointment of trustee). This resulted in the EC buyer approval decision 
coinciding with the FTC clearance decision and the approval of the same trustee by the EU and US 
authorities. Cooperation with the ACCC as well resulted in workable non-conflicting outcomes. The 
CCB cleared the transaction based on the remedies submitted to the European Commission. This 
cooperation also benefitted the parties, as they were relieved from reporting on monitoring of the 
implementation of remedies in that jurisdiction. Cooperation with the NZ CC, KFTC and JFTC was 
less intense, but the EC case team explained its findings at different stages of the procedure and all 
relevant authorities were we kept informed of the on-going processes. 
 
Another example is the first phase conditional clearance case involving the acquisition by Crane Co. 
(US) of MEI Conlux Holdings (US), Inc. and MEI Conlux Holdings (Japan), Inc. in the unattended 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
986 Annex to the Commission staff working paper accompanying the Commission Report on Competition Policy 2010, 
SEC/2011/0609 final, February 2011, paragraph 420.   
987 Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market according to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, Case No COMP/M.6944 – Thermo Fisher Scientific/ Life Technologies, 26 November 
2013.   
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payment systems sector.988 While the EC clearance was conditional upon the divestment of certain 
banknote and coin handling product lines in Germany (with related sales limited to EEA customers) 
and Canada, working on the basis of (at least) EEA-wide markets,989 the US FTC cleared the case 
unconditionally based on worldwide market definitions. In this particular case outcomes were 
different despite close and open dialogue between the EC and FTC, due to the specificities of each 
respective market. Timing was not aligned. Only by the time the US had already proceeded to the 
stage of issuing a second request, did the EC receive a pre-notification referral request from the 
parties. Nevertheless, the EC decision was adopted two to three weeks before the FTC issued its 
own. Cooperation involved frequent (generally weekly) contacts and the authorities kept each other 
fully informed on the progress of their cases and analysis (in particular regarding product market as 
this industry had not yet been the subject of merger review procedures by the EC) throughout the 
respective review procedures. Again, confidential information, such as the form CO or documents 
identified during document review and collected from the parties, could be exchanged between the 
two authorities due to waivers given by the parties.  
 
Two other examples take place in the aviation equipment market. The first one is the second phase 
conditional clearance of the acquisition of Goodrich Corporation by United Technologies 
Corporation, two US-based companies.990 The EC imposed conditions relating to the divestment of 
Goodrich’s businesses in electrical power generation and in engine controls for small engines, and to 
Rolls Royce being granted an option to acquire Goodrich’s lean burn fuel nozzle R&D project. 
Cooperation took place mainly with the US DoJ and to a lesser extent with the CCB, and resulted in 
the creation of synergies in investigations through joint investigative efforts. For instance, the EC 
and DoJ conducted common interviews of market participants and exchanged the findings of their 
respective investigations, thereby saving time and facilitating inter-agency discussion. Detailed 
discussions were also held on remedy design such as the duration of divestiture periods and 
transitional services. This resulted in non-identical but non-conflicting remedies. Aware of the fact 
that the purchaser criteria were different in the two jurisdictions, the authorities coordinated their 
approaches in relation to implementing steps for remedies, leading to a common monitoring trustee 
being used in both jurisdictions and the approval of the same purchasers for the divestment 
businesses. In the end all three authorities issued their decisions on the same day. The DoJ and the 
Commission accepted remedies that also fully addressed the CCB’s competition concerns in Canada.  
 
The General Electric (US) and Avio S.p.A (Italy) merger took place in the same industry branch as the 
UCT/Goodrich merger case.991 This case was conditionally cleared in the first phase by the EC, with 
commitments related to military aircrafts for export markets outside the EEA, an issue that did not 
occur in the US market. The FTC’s conditions related to a formal remedy for the civil aerospace 
markets, in the form of a consent order repeating the contractual supply obligations entered into by 
                                                          
988 Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market according to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, Case No COMP/M.6857 – Crane Co/ Mei Group, 19 July 2013. 
989 The EC found that the characteristics and competitive dynamics of certain market segments in the EEA could be 
distinguished from those in other regions of the world and customers considered the merging parties as closer 
competitors in the EEA in certain segments. 
990 Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the internal market and the EEA agreement 
according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, Case No COMP/M.6410 - UTC/ Goodrich, 26 July 2012. Also see 
P. Brink, “International Cooperation at the Antitrust Division: A View from the Trenches”, remarks as prepared for the 
Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Chicago Illinois, 19 April 2013, 10-
12, http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518366/download (accessed November 2015).  
991 Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market according to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, Case No COMP/M.6844 - GE /AVIO, 1 July 2013.   
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GE and concerned market participants during the review procedure. Again procedural differences 
did not stand in the way of early cooperation, even during the pre-notification phase before the EC. 
The length of this phase was moreover shortened by virtue of joint investigative calls and inter-
agency interaction that led to a swift understanding of the problems at hand. The case also 
demonstrated that timing can be aligned despite procedural differences if both the parties and the 
relevant authorities cooperate. According to the Commission both authorities maximised the 
available internal flexibility in their procedures to align internal deadlines and therefore decision 
making stages to the best extent possible. Apart from weekly conference calls between the case 
teams, joint calls were held with the parties, surrounded by pre- and post-calls during which the 
authorities could prepare and assess the talks. Joint customer calls (with consent of the customers) 
were also held early on in the case. Third parties could benefit from this in the form of a more 
targeted set of requests for information (RFIs) being sent to market participants by the EC case team 
and less follow up calls with customers. Draft RFIs prepared by the EC were shared and discussed 
with the US FTC. Waivers from the parties were obtained early on in the process allowing the EC 
case team to share the Form CO and replies to the RFIs with the FTC. Again, cooperation resulted 
in the creation of synergies, in particular via close cooperation between the teams of economists 
from the two authorities who drafted joint economic data RFIs and kept in regular contact to discuss 
their respective assessment and ways forward. Such dialogue also allowed for corroboration/double 
checking of information submitted by third parties and parties during the respective procedures. 
Finally, cooperation led to broader processes of learning, for instance regarding interview techniques.  
 
These examples demonstrate that cooperation is varied and adapted to the needs of the case. While 
cooperation is generally most intense during the remedies phase, early cooperation and 
communication throughout the whole procedure are crucial for the efficient investigation of the case. 
Creating awareness of parallel investigations, discussion of the timing of such investigations, 
discussions on the product market and finally coordination of remedies all constitute elements of 
inter-agency cooperation in merger cases.992 Waivers, finally, prove to be essential.  
 
While concrete examples of international cooperation are more difficult to come by in the cartel 
sector, the Commission stated that in cartel investigations as well cooperation takes place regularly 
and from the very early stages of the case. Important aspects are the timing and scope of initial 
investigative actions. Often cooperation serves to prepare or coordinate inquiries or inspections, 
such as simultaneous dawn raids to preserve the element of surprise, but it may also include more 
general discussions on the timing of inspections and discussions on the scope of the actions. 
Cooperation can continue throughout further stages, during which discussions on several aspects of 
the case can take place.993 International cooperation in cartel cases occurs most frequently between 
agencies faced with the same leniency applicant. In its contribution to a roundtable on the modalities 
and procedures for international cooperation in competition cases, organised by the 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy of the UN, the US clarified 
that upon receipt of a leniency application, the applicant is asked whether other jurisdictions have 
been approached and a whether the applicant wishes to grant a confidentiality waiver. If the latter is 
the case, the DoJ is able to discuss with the relevant other jurisdiction(s) issues such as the scope and 
effects of the conduct, available evidence, future plans for investigating the matter, or investigative 
                                                          
992 H. Dieckmann, “The Benefits of Cooperation between Competition Authorities”, Inaugural Symposium of the 
Competition Policy Research Center, Tokyo, 2003, 1, at http://www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/DP/CPDP-9-E.pdf (accessed 
December 2011). 
993 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution 
from the European Union, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)53, 9 February 2012, 4.  
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strategies. Other forms of cooperation are the coordination of searches, service of subpoenas, drop-
in interviews, and the timing of charges, to avoid premature disclosure of an investigation or possible 
destruction of evidence. In the absence of a waiver, general coordination with other jurisdiction may 
still take place, but will be obstructed as the information provided by the leniency applicant or its 
identity may not be disclosed.994  
 
In the cartel sector the Auto Parts investigation, Air Cargo cases, Liquid Crystal Display investigation,995 
Marine Hose cartel,996 Vitamin cartel, Lysine and Citric Acid cartel, Refrigerator Compressor cartel, and the 
Graphite Electrode cartel997 can be mentioned as examples of cases in which international cooperation 
took place. In the Heat Stabilisers, Impact Modifiers and Processing Aids cartel investigations, the 
American, Japanese and Canadian antitrust authorities carried out simultaneous inspections to 
ascertain whether there was evidence of a cartel agreement and related illegal practices concerning 
price fixing and market sharing. The heat stabilisers cartel marked the first occasion that the 
European Commission, the US DoJ, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) and the Canadian 
Competition Bureau (CCB) coordinated surprise inspections into suspected cartels operating 
worldwide.998 The E-books investigation was referred to by the US Acting Assistant Attorney General 
at the time of filing, POZEN, as a shining example of continued cooperation efforts. The 
investigation concerned an alleged conspiracy to increase prices for e-books by Apple and five of the 
largest book publishers in the US.999 No details can be found, however, on what exactly this 
exemplary cooperation consisted of, only that there was close interaction between the DoJ and the 
EC, with frequent contact between investigative staff and senior officials. The Commission in its 
press release merely stated that it worked closely with the US DoJ in order to seek a global solution 
to the identified horizontal concerns.1000 The US government underlined that it was the first case in 
which the DoJ had engaged in such close cooperation with a non-US agency in a conduct 
investigation.1001  
 
                                                          
994 Contribution by the United States, Roundtable on Modalities and Procedures for International Cooperation in 
Competition Cases Involving more than one Country, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and 
Policy, Geneva, 8-10 July 2013. 
995 J. Wayland, “International cooperation at the antitrust division”, remarks as prepared for the International Bar 
Association’s 16th Annual Competition Conference, Florence, 14 September 2012. 
996 Contribution by the United States, Roundtable on Modalities and Procedures for International Cooperation in 
Competition Cases Involving more than one Country, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and 
Policy, Geneva, 8-10 July 2013.  
997 H. First, “The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law”, Antitrust Law 
Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2001. 
998 European Commission, “Statement on inspections at producers of heat stabilisers as well as impact modifiers and 
processing aids - International cooperation on inspections”, MEMO/03/33, Brussels, 13 February 2003.   
999 P. Brink, “International Cooperation at the Antitrust Division: A View from the Trenches”, remarks as prepared for 
the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Chicago Illinois, 19 April 2013. 
1000 European Commission, Press Release, “Commission accepts legally binding commitments from Simon & Schuster, 
Harper Collins, Hachette, Holtzbrinck and Apple for sale of e-books”, IP/12/1367, Brussels, 13 December 2012; also 
see S. Pozen, remarks as prepared for delivery at the E-books Press Conference, 11 April 2012, 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/282147.htm (accessed November 2015): “never before have we seen this kind of 
cooperation in a civil antitrust enforcement matter.”  
1001 OECD, Discussion on International Co-operation, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)24, 12 June 2012, 7. Also see DoJ Press Release, “Justice Department Reaches Settlement 
with Three of the Largest Book Publishers and Continues to Litigate Against Apple Inc. and Two Other Publishers to 
Restore Price Competition and Reduce E-book Prices”, 12-457, 11 April 2012, and E. Kurgonaite, “Apple and four 
publishers in settlement talks with European Commission”, Financial Times, 13 April 2012.  
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Conduct investigations present the least opportunity for cooperation, in part because unilateral 
conduct cases as such occur less frequently and are often domestic in nature. This does not mean 
that cooperation does not occur at all. In 2010 staff of the FTC and DG COMP exchanged views on 
theories of harm and methods of economic analysis during their investigations of charges against 
Intel Corp. regarding the alleged illegal stifling of competition in the market for computer chips.1002 
 
2.5 Assessment 
 
The assessment of the EU’s first generation agreements will take place on two levels, namely the 
instrument itself – a binding international treaty – and the content – the (elaboration of the) 
cooperation mechanisms offered. This will be done by linking back to respectively the benefits 
offered by soft(er) law and the benchmarks developed in the first section of Part II (see above, Part 
I, 2.4.4, and Part II, 1.3 respectively). An explicit distinction is not made, however, as it are the 
agreements as a whole that are assessed. Before embarking on the assessment based on the 
benchmarks developed in this study, some general data are provided regarding the impact of first 
generation agreements.  
 
2.5.1 General impact  
 
2.5.1.1 An instrument that is available and relevant  
 
It is difficult to identify the successes of first generation agreements as empirical information is 
largely missing.1003 Nevertheless, there are some indications of their impact. Competition authorities 
generally possess a variety of legal bases to engage in international competition cooperation, whether 
specifically designed for competition law enforcement or not. The joint survey by the ICN and the 
OECD in 2012 showed that bilateral competition agreements are among the instruments most 
widely available to competition agencies to engage in international cooperation, as illustrated by the 
table below.1004  
 
                                                          
1002 Contribution by the United States, Roundtable on Modalities and Procedures for International Cooperation in 
Competition Cases Involving more than one Country, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and 
Policy, Geneva, 8-10 July 2013. 
1003 As mentioned, Commission reports stopped providing information early on. 
1004 Be aware that ‘bilateral competition agreements’ in these tables include both agreements and MoUs. Not all legal 
bases are explained, however, in the report. It is unclear, for instance, what is meant with ‘multilateral competition 
agreements’, and whether this only refers to non-binding instruments such as OECD or ICN recommendations. Nor is it 
explained what would be the difference between free trade agreements and other ‘bilateral non-competition agreements’. 
OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 
February 2013, 38.  
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Figure 3. OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 38. (numbers = numbers of respondents) 
 
A study by the ICN has pointed out that even where national law provisions directly authorise 
cooperation, an agreement is nevertheless concluded. It is therefore at least perceived to offer added 
utility.1005   
 
                                                          
1005 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 13. 
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Figure 4. OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 39.  
 
The table above shows that instruments such as national law provisions, confidentiality waivers and 
multilateral competition agreements specifically aimed at competition cooperation, are perceived by 
the responding agencies as most relevant for cooperation, as opposed to non-competition-specific 
agreements. While bilateral competition agreements are widely available, and therefore offer parties 
at least the possibility to engage in international cooperation, its relevance is scored somewhat less by 
the respondents, although the overall score is still good, in particular among non-OECD 
members.1006   
 
2.5.1.2 An important factor in deciding whether or not to cooperate 
 
As the tables below indicate, having a legal basis for international cooperation constitutes the main 
factor that competition agencies consider when either requesting or offering cooperation. It is 
unfortunate that the OECD tables do not distinguish between the different legal bases available, as 
this would have provided more meaningful insight into the relative value of each option, for instance 
whether a bilateral agreement plays a bigger role than an OECD recommendation. Indeed, while it is 
clear, and rather straightforward, that the existence of a legal basis for cooperation will play a big role 
in deciding whether or not to cooperate, it is not obvious whether an agreement would provide a 
bigger incentive to do so compared to for instance a multilateral recommendation.   
 
                                                          
1006 The numbers represent a score on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, 1 being ‘not relevant’ and 5 being ‘very relevant’. 
Agencies were asked to assign a score to each instrument. An average score was calculated by dividing the sum of scores 
provided by respondents by the number of respondents who provided a score for each instrument. Respondents did not 
mark a score for categories of legal instruments which they did not indicate as available to them. It might be surprising 
that letters rogatory appear as very highly ranked by non-OECD respondents, but this merely reflects the fact that only 
one non-OECD agency provided a score for ‘relevance’ of letters rogatory, scoring relevance as 5. 
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Figure 5. OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 56. (numbers = numbers of respondents) 
 
 
Figure 6. OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 55. (numbers = numbers of respondents) 
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It is remarkable how low the ‘potential benefit or necessity to the case’ scores as a factor in deciding 
whether to provide cooperation, while agencies score that factor extremely high when making a 
request. This demonstrates that competition agencies remain self-centred when cooperating and do 
not have ‘the greater (enforcement) good’ in mind. Moreover, also ‘potential for future cooperation’ 
seems of only minor importance when deciding to provide cooperation.   
 
2.5.2 Assessment based on benchmarks  
 
2.5.2.1 Limitation of negative externalities: conflict avoidance 
 
International conflict in competition matters can be minimized through mainly three mechanisms. 
Dialogue from the start among authorities investigating the same case, the alignment of the timing of 
procedures, and the taking into consideration of external effects of domestic action.  
 
First generation agreements provide for dialogue and information exchange, but are largely limited to 
generalities. The timing of such actions should be underlined more. Coordination during crucial 
decision making moments, for instance when deciding on remedies or their implementation, should 
be emphasised and encouraged. A particular commitment on the alignment of timing to the extent 
allowed within the domestic framework should be included. A distinction should thereby be made 
between different procedures in order to be as concrete and clear as possible. The information 
exchange provisions should more clearly indicate the types of information agencies can exchange, to 
stimulate mutual learning to the fullest extent without agencies feeling afraid of violating 
confidentiality rules. 
 
Taking into account the effect of (the scope of) a certain investigation, or of the remedies imposed, is 
embedded in the negative comity provision. As mentioned, this provision is drafted with extreme 
caution. As the negative comity concept does not entail an obligation to act in a certain way, but 
merely to take non-domestic considerations into account, this limited obligation can be worded in 
stronger terms.1007 Again, it is important that, either in the text of the agreement itself, or in an 
interpretative addendum, a non-exhaustive yet comprehensive list of examples of situations in which 
action would be appropriate is included. It is also advisable to indicate when negative comity has 
been employed in the press releases accompanying the closure of cases, to send a clear signal to 
companies under scrutiny as well as younger competition authorities that the concept is used, and 
more importantly, how it is used. This would also provide guidance to the judiciary when confronted 
with the argument that comity was not employed or not employed correctly.   
 
2.5.2.2 Rationalisation of resources  
 
The two main ways in which agencies can limit their spending via international cooperation, is via 
deference, by allowing another authority better placed to deal with the case to take on the 
investigation, and via efficiency increases.   
 
A) Deference 
 
                                                          
1007 For instance: “Within the framework of its own laws and to the extent compatible with its important interests, each Party will take into 
account the important interests of the other Party, at all stages in its enforcement activities.” Rather than ‘will seek to take into account’.  
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When talking about deference in the context of first generation agreements, one must make 
reference to the concept of positive comity as conceived in such agreements. The concept of positive 
comity takes up a central place in first generation agreements. As indicated, this principal feature 
does not function properly. According to former competition commissioner VAN MIERT, the 1991 
EU-US Agreement amounted to “a commitment by the EU and the USA to cooperate with respect to antitrust 
enforcement, and not to act unilaterally and extraterritorially unless the avenues provided by comity have been 
exhausted.”1008 This does not seem to correspond with reality, as demonstrated by the limited use of 
the latter concept.  
 
As rightly pointed out by BERTELSMANN, while the concept of comity in principle offers the 
opportunity to make competition law enforcement more efficient and less costly by avoiding 
duplicative enforcement and reducing instances of potentially conflicting decisions, its potential is 
not realised as the concept is only very rarely used.1009 Positive comity involving deferral shall only be 
possible in cartel cases, as the strict timing of a merger case makes deferral or suspension 
undesirable. Trust will moreover be hard to achieve in the absence of fundamental symmetry 
between the parties' antitrust laws and enforcement record. Where positive comity can be applied, it 
is crucial that there is transparency in the process. Delays or other obstacles in the investigation are 
magnified in case of opacity, and stimulate mistrust between parties, as it suggests that the 
investigation is not being conducted adequately or appropriately. Parties should feel assured 
throughout the entire process that their concerns are being addressed in a manner consistent with 
the premise of the bilateral accord.1010 While first generation agreements are careful not to change 
domestic laws or their interpretation and preserve the discretion of the parties involved, (positive) 
comity indeed requires a lot of trust as it implies that one authority fully relies on actions taken by a 
peer to address certain anticompetitive effects and acknowledges that another countries’ interests 
take priority. One commenter to the AMC recognised the contrast between the relative success of 
US bilateral agreements and the comity provisions they contain.1011 This seems somewhat 
contradictory as comity provisions take up a very central place in the agreements.1012 The 
shortcomings in the application of the comity principle can be felt beyond the problems this creates 
in individual cases. It may send a negative signal to competition agencies across the globe when 
jurisdictions such as the US and the EU with very similar and well-developed competition regimes 
fail to visibly apply principles of comity.  
 
Official attempts to modernize some of the cooperation mechanisms in first generation agreements 
have remained scarce and vague. While the EU did not attempt to undertake a general review, the 
AMC was mandated in 2004 to review US antitrust law and examine the need for modernization.1013 
                                                          
1008 A. Jones & B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, 
1390. 
1009 D. Garza, J. Yarowsky, B.Burchfield, W. S. Cannon, D. Carlton, M. Delrahim, J. Jacobson, D. Kempf, Jr., S. Litvack, 
J. Shenefield, D. Valentine, J. Warden, Antitrust Modernization Commission - Report and Recommendations, April 2007, available 
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (accessed May 2015), 221.  
1010 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Antitrust Division, ICPAC Final Report, 2000, available at 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ICPAC/finalreport.htm (accessed September 2015), Chapter 5.  
1011 D. Garza, J. Yarowsky, B.Burchfield, W. S. Cannon, D. Carlton, M. Delrahim, J. Jacobson, D. Kempf, Jr., S. Litvack, 
J. Shenefield, D. Valentine, J. Warden, Antitrust Modernization Commission - Report and Recommendations, April 2007, available 
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (accessed May 2015), 221.  
1012 Although it must be noted that US-style bilateral competition agreements have a slightly broader focus than EU-style 
dedicated agreements, often also containing technical assistance clauses. 
1013 While the EU did issue a Report of the Group of Experts entitled ‘Competition policy in the new trade order: 
strengthening international cooperation and rules’, this report did not provide concrete steps to improve the concept of 
163 
 
It included in its aforementioned Report in 2007 a section on ‘Formal Agreements Incorporating 
Comity Principles’. It was suggested that more informal and efficient uses for comity should be 
developed and that comity principles should be extended to interactions with other nations with 
which no agreements exist.1014 This is not desirable or feasible. First, informal use of comity, while 
not entirely clear what this would entail, would most definitely be paired with a lack of transparency 
as well as visibility. Second, the extension of comity principles to countries with which no agreement 
has been concluded will prove to be extremely difficult. As interests need to be weighed off against 
one another, guidelines are very important. If these are lacking, the risk of each party consistently 
judging its own interests to be dominant will be even higher than when an agreement is in place. The 
concept of positive comity in particular presupposes a certain level of formality.  
 
The AMC further stated that as the US continues to pursue increasing numbers of international 
agreements containing comity provisions, it should attempt to incorporate some core principles 
aiming to assign principal enforcement authority to the country most closely related to the activity at 
issue, while ensuring that other countries with an interest in the conduct are guaranteed that their 
interests are recognized. The first suggested principle is the principle of ‘complete deferral’, meaning 
that in case a cross-border transaction or conduct does not have a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable anticompetitive effect on a particular country, that country should defer to the 
enforcement judgment of the country or countries where such an effect is present. This suggestion 
for modernization seems to be a misrepresentation of the effects doctrine as it exists in the FTAIA 
(see above, Part I, 3.2.1). When there is no direct, substantial and reasonable foreseeable 
anticompetitive effect, there is no jurisdiction in the US, and there can therefore be no question of 
deferral. The Report moreover does not add anything to the existing doctrine by for example 
clarifying when such an effect can be presumed to be present. The second suggestion is the principle 
of ‘presumptive deferral’. In this case, a competition authority in a country with a substantial nexus 
to a transaction or conduct may take enforcement action, while countries with a lesser connection 
should presumptively defer to that action. The former jurisdiction should then consult with the latter 
before taking action that will affect their significant interests. Again, this is not a novelty but a mere 
repetition of the positive comity principle as described in the 1998 EU-US Positive Comity 
Agreement, without any clarifications or improvements. The vagueness of this ‘modernization 
principle’ is underlined by the statement that the presumption may be overturned when there are 
‘other compelling reasons’ for taking action, without a single clarification what such reasons might 
be. The next suggestion concerns harmonisation of remedies. Parties are not obliged to harmonise 
remedies entirely, but should rather seek to avoid imposing inconsistent or conflicting remedies. The 
AMC does not support a principle of deferral in this context, because this would allegedly require 
confidence in the fact that the jurisdiction acting first would be competent as well as free from 
political influence. Here as well additional clarity should have been provided. It is imaginable that 
many competition agencies with which the US authorities concluded a cooperation agreement can 
indeed be presumed to be competent and independent from political influence. This principle should 
be supported, according to the AMC, by a coordination mechanism. This would entail that private 
entities that may be confronted with inconsistent or conflicting rules or remedies regarding the same 
transaction or conduct can request consultation and/or coordination between or among jurisdictions 
to avoid or minimise any inconsistency or conflict. This mechanism is meant to ensure that where 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
comity, but took on a broader approach. European Commission, Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: 
Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules – Report of the Group of Experts, COM(95)359 final, 12 July 1995.  
1014 D. Garza, J. Yarowsky, B.Burchfield, W. S. Cannon, D. Carlton, M. Delrahim, J. Jacobson, D. Kempf, Jr., S. Litvack, 
J. Shenefield, D. Valentine, J. Warden, Antitrust Modernization Commission - Report and Recommendations, April 2007, 221.  
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countries fail to cooperate in the remedies phase, the entities subject to such remedies may 
nevertheless request that cooperation and consultation take place.1015 While the intentions are good, 
one could wonder what such a request would change, if parties failed to reach an agreement in the 
first place. It might also result in unwanted prolongation of the procedure.  
 
B) Efficiency increases 
 
To what extent the efficiency of the investigatory process is increased via first generation agreements 
is discussed below. If higher efficiency is achieved, a logical consequence is that agencies will have to 
spend less resources (in terms of capital, human capital, and time), for instance because evidence 
gathering comes at less cost. 
 
C) Cost of cooperation  
 
What is not addressed in first generation agreements, but is potentially discussed during meetings 
between the agencies, is the issue of priority setting. Cooperation today generally takes place only 
when authorities are dealing with the same or related cases, when a part of the authorities’ resources 
would have gone to such cases either way. It is a reality that case-cooperation will need to be 
prioritised based on the extent to which the benefits outweigh the costs of cooperation.1016 On a 
larger scale, the (increasing) cost of non-cooperation or uncoordinated enforcement is perhaps 
known too little by agencies and more importantly governments creating the legal working 
environment for these agencies. The OECD listed the costs of international cooperation:  
 
 
                                                          
1015 Ibid., 220-225.  
1016 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 32.  
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Figure 7. OECD, “Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation”, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 31. 
 
Resource constraints feature as biggest cost. The time and effort invested in supporting an 
investigation of another jurisdiction is still largely perceived as time and effort that is detracted from 
the domestic investigations, instead of an investment in building stronger enforcement across-
borders.1017 It is suggested in the report on the OECD/ICN Joint Survey that a long-term 
perspective should be employed to assess the effectiveness of cooperation, and that high immediate 
costs should be considered an investment.1018 Overall the potential to reduce enforcement costs 
through international cooperation is high. More detailed information on such costs could provide the 
necessary incentive for the legal and institutional changes needed to address international 
anticompetitive practices more effectively and efficiently.1019  
 
D) Cost of a formal agreement 
 
As demonstrated, there was some confusion about the exact legal nature of bilateral competition 
cooperation agreements (see above, Part II, 2.3). While they are in fact binding international 
agreements, they are often called soft law instruments. The reality is that they constitute 
unenforceable hard law. First generation agreements are a confused hybrid, originating out of the 
1994 France v Commission case, where the negotiators of the EU-US Agreement wanted to regard it as 
agency agreement, but competence rules and limited legal personality obstructed this. This translates 
into the low level of precision of the provisions in the agreements analyzed, combined with high 
formal obligation, diminished again by the wording of certain provisions in hortatory terms. Based 
on the generally weak obligations contained in first generation agreements, one would therefore 
incline to disagree with the choice of a binding treaty-form. 
 
The current content of first generation agreements does not require a treaty form. Softer, informal 
agreements are then as efficient, at less cost. The availability of resources (human and capital) 
therefore may also determine the choice for soft law in the form of a Memorandum. States with little 
resources are likely to prefer soft commitments, as they can implement the agreement according to 
the resources they can commit to it at that moment in time.1020 If the major obstacle when 
concluding an agreement is not how to ensure compliance, but how to reach agreement in the first 
place, a binding agreement does not have much added value. Furthermore, in the case of antitrust, a 
binding formal agreement does not offer significant political economy gains, as national interest 
groups (such as consumers, corporations, or industry organizations) often do not consider an 
international antitrust agreement to be a priority. Relevant interest groups are fragmented and have 
little agenda-setting capacity. Undertakings are selective about when they want antitrust agencies to 
work together. When domestic support is absent, there is little political gain for states when entering 
into a binding competition agreement. This may be one of the reasons why international antitrust 
cooperation is largely an agency-driven process, and strong commitments are unlikely, according to 
                                                          
1017 OECD, Issues paper by the secretariat, Limitations and constraints to international co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)8, 23 October 2012, 13. 
1018 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 8.  
1019 OECD, Issues paper by the secretariat, Limitations and constraints to international co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)8, 23 October 2012, 14. 
1020 K. Abbott & D. Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance”, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, 
2000, 432-433.  
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BRADFORD.1021 As mentioned, however, international agreements do not only require technical 
knowledge, but must also take into account cultural differences. Certain parties adhering to a more 
formalistic culture, in particular in the East, prefer formal treaties over MoUs, because of the 
symbolic value.   
 
2.5.2.3 Increased effectiveness and efficiency of investigations 
 
International cooperation can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of investigations in several 
ways. Prior to any investigation, cooperation in the form of notifications makes it possible to be 
aware (more quickly) of potential anticompetitive practices affecting the domestic jurisdiction but 
taking place abroad. This mechanism was merely formalised in the 1991 EU-US Agreement, but has 
had effect nevertheless. While in the year prior to the agreement the EU received 4 notifications 
from the US while sending out 2, these numbers increased to respectively 60 and 40 in the first two 
years after the agreement.1022  
 
Notification starts the cooperation process, but is relatively futile on its own. The most significant 
effect of international cooperation will take place during the investigation, in the form of 
coordination and information exchange. The 1991 EU-US Agreement leaves the parties the broadest 
discretion. National laws, national interests, or resource concerns may all justify a refusal to render 
assistance. It is clarified which factors should be taken into account when deciding on whether or not 
to coordinate, but it is not clarified what this coordination could entail. The Agreement may 
therefore inadvertently provide more information with regard to refusal to cooperate, rather than 
positive examples of cooperation activities.  
 
A general obligation to cooperate is not feasible nor desirable. Cooperation should be tailored to the 
case, both for the benefit of the case and in order to keep enforcement officials motivated and not 
buried under standardised cooperation applications. Some discipline should nevertheless be present. 
Positive examples of possible actions in support of another authority, be it in the agreement itself or 
in an interpretative annex, might provide extra incentives for agencies to consider cooperation. The 
Best Practices in Merger Cooperation for instance are already far more detailed than the 1991 EU-
US Agreement, and are generally considered successful. Information exchange provisions in first 
generation agreements only increase effectiveness and efficiency to a very limited extent, as this 
exchange is restricted to non-confidential information unless the party providing the information 
consents to the exchange. Here as well, more information should be given on which information 
agencies can exchange without consent, in order to stimulate such behaviour and instruct those who 
are not part of the agreement. The fact that confidential information cannot be exchanged, limits the 
benefits that could be attained by the agreement. Companies will still be able to engage in strategic 
behaviour towards competition agencies, although the extent to which they do so is hardly 
measurable.    
 
2.5.2.4 Increased transparency and legal certainty  
 
                                                          
1021 A. Bradford, “International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for Nonbinding Regimes” in A. Guzman (ed.), 
Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 338-340.  
1022 J. Griffin, “EC/U.S. antitrust cooperation agreement: impact on transnational business”, Law & Policy in International 
Business, Vol. 24, 1992-1993, 1063.  
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DIECKMANN underlined another benefit of bilateral agreements, namely the transparency that is 
created by institutionalising existing practices, thereby allowing other agencies to learn from the 
agreement as well.1023 While informal cooperation can be highly effective, it is often opaque. 
Formalising practice in an agreement opens up the process. First generation agreements contribute 
significantly to the transparency of international cooperation, but there is room for improvement. 
The agreements can be more specific about what they want to achieve, and should provide clear 
procedures rather than vague generalities, in order to significantly improve the predictability of the 
legal environment. Again, an interpretive addendum could provide additional clarity and add 
substance to the agreements.  
 
2.5.2.5 Overcoming practical issues  
 
It is evident that not all practicalities should be regulated in an agreement, but it may benefit parties 
to have more detailed, formal structures in place to work along. Parties could agree on working 
languages, and more importantly on common definitions and terminology. Definitions in the EU’s 
first generation agreements are present, but limited. While the EU’s first generation agreements are 
concluded with parties that have more or less similar competition law systems in place, explicit 
agreement on definitions can take away much confusion in the cooperation process. The Agreement 
specifies in Article X that communications under the Agreement may be carried out by direct oral, 
telephonic, written or facsimile communication, apart from notifications under Articles II, V and XI, 
and requests under Article VII, which should be confirmed in writing through diplomatic channels. 
Nothing is said on who bears the cost for cooperation, for instance translation costs or other 
expenses.  
 
2.5.2.6 Decreased burden for companies  
 
The survey sent out in the framework of this study revealed that the (procedural) burden for 
undertakings involved in antitrust cases is perceived by all firms to have increased over the years, due 
to evolving and more complex standards, differences in pace of evolution of each authority, as well 
as simply the increased number of jurisdictions actively investigating antitrust cases. In international 
cartel cases, law firms almost unanimously mentioned differing requirements to obtain and maintain 
leniency as the main obstacle to effectively and efficiently solving an international case. The biggest 
impediment to effectively and efficiently resolving international merger cases were increasing 
transaction costs due to differing information requirements, jurisdictional rules for making filings, 
different standards of review, timing issues, different degrees of interventionism/protectionism, 
languages, cultural differences, unreasonable information requirements, lack of transparency and lack 
of engagement from case teams.1024 Cooperation agreements have not led to a significant alignment 
of procedures that would tangibly diminish this burden. When companies waive their confidentiality 
rights, they allow competition authorities to communicate extensively, and in this scenario a 
cooperation agreement may be of aid as it provides the structures in which these discussions can take 
place. The extent to which agencies reach compatible remedies in merger cases via international 
cooperation, thereby benefitting the companies involved, is not measurable in the framework of this 
study and therefore not discussed.  
                                                          
1023 H. Dieckmann, “The Benefits of Cooperation between Competition Authorities”, Inaugural Symposium of the 
Competition Policy Research Center, Tokyo, 2003, 1, at http://www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/DP/CPDP-9-E.pdf, (accessed 
December 2011).  
1024 Result of author’s law firm survey (see Annex I). 
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2.5.2.7 Discipline 
 
A dedicated agreement is often perceived to create more of a framework for cooperation than a non-
binding recommendation would.1025 Despite the modest obligations in first generation agreements, 
repeated interaction in this framework may result in workable structures and procedures for 
cooperation.1026 First generation agreements are also seen to install a certain discipline to cooperate 
into the parties. Importantly, responses to the 2001 OECD questionnaire on international 
cooperation indicated that cooperation seems to occur more among jurisdictions that are parties to a 
formal cooperation agreement.1027 If a competition authority dedicates resources to the negotiation of 
a bilateral agreement with a foreign peer, return on investment will be maximised by cooperating as 
frequently as possible and desired. Bilateral agreements seem to have played an important role in 
particular during the early days of international cooperation. First generation agreements helped 
create momentum and solidify an ‘atmosphere of cooperation’ by institutionalizing international 
cooperation to a certain extent and creating a structured framework facilitating policy dialogue and 
case-related cooperation.1028 They created a cooperative dynamic.1029 According to a Commission 
official it is not so much the content of het agreements that matters, but the mere fact that they 
exist.1030 However, it is very likely that this increased cooperation results from the nature of the pre-
existing relationship between the parties rather than the EU-US Agreement itself. Inherently, the 
Agreement does little to install discipline in the cooperation-process. As demonstrated, provisions 
remain vague and general, and rather than providing examples and incentives for positive action, the 
complete discretion of the parties is underlined at several occasions. ZANETTIN claimed that the 
utility of bilateral agreements lay in the fact that they created the incentive and motivation to 
cooperate, even though they are not legally necessary for cooperation to take place.1031 However, 
while being able to rely on a legal basis will indeed be an important factor in deciding to cooperate, 
as demonstrated by the above tables, it will not create the incentive to do so. It are instead the needs 
of the case that create the incentives and motivation to cooperate, not the mere existence of an 
agreement. The Sun/Oracle case for instance demonstrates that if the stakes are too high, cooperation 
will fail (see below, Part II, intermediate conclusion). To exemplify this, one can look at the 
aforementioned Microsoft cases (see above, Part I, 2.2.5). While the first Microsoft case was praised by 
the European Commission and the Assistant Attorney General at the time as respectively “a historic 
and unprecedented piece of co-operation between the EC Commission and the United States” and “a powerful message 
to firms around the world that the antitrust authorities of the US and the European Commission are prepared to move 
decisively and promptly to pool resources to attack conduct by multinational firms that violate the antitrust laws of the 
two jurisdictions”,1032 the second wave of Microsoft cases, beginning in 1998, exactly the year in which the 
                                                          
1025 H. Dieckmann, “The Benefits of Cooperation between Competition Authorities”, Inaugural Symposium of the 
Competition Policy Research Center, Tokyo, 2003, 1, at http://www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/DP/CPDP-9-E.pdf, (accessed 
December 2011), 5.  
1026 D. Klawiter & C. Laciak, “International Competition Cooperation: No Longer Just the Formal Agreements”, The 
Antitrust Review of the Americas, A Global Competition Review Special Report, 2003, 25.  
1027 F. Jenny, “International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and Perspective”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 48, 
Winter 2003, 991.  
1028 OECD, Discussion on Limitations and Constraints to International Co-operation, Contribution of the European 
Union, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)41, 23 October 2012, 3.  
1029 Interview with Commission official. 
1030 Interview with Commission official. 
1031 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 81.  
1032 Ibid., 83.  
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positive comity agreement was concluded between the EU and US, witnessed much less intense 
cooperation between the EC and US authorities.1033  
 
3. Second generation agreements: ignoring crucial issues 
 
In 1999, in a speech concerning international antitrust law and policy, DIANE WOOD stated that in 
her experience, the main reason “why more and better cooperation does not yet occur between national authorities 
can be summed up in a word: confidentiality.”1034 A large majority of jurisdictions indeed has regulations in 
place prohibiting or severely restricting confidential information exchange among competition 
authorities.1035 The EU’s first generation agreements with the US, Canada, Japan and South-Korea 
did not address this issue, as such agreements do not override national confidentiality laws. Legal 
limitations to the exchange of confidential information among competition agencies have since long 
been identified as ‘the primary impediment’ to international cooperation.1036 This call for improved 
information exchange possibilities was answered by some jurisdictions in the form of so-called 
second generation agreements, sometimes referred to as antitrust mutual assistance agreements 
(AMAA).1037 This section assesses the EU-Switzerland Agreement, the first and only second 
generation agreement concluded so far by the EU, which can be considered to represent the EU-
model for this type of agreement.1038 The EU is currently negotiating a second generation agreement 
with Canada, and plans to initiate similar negotiations with Japan and later Korea. A second 
generation agreement with the US is currently not considered necessary in view of the needs of the 
case-handlers and a lack of political support due to the divergence of the competition law systems 
with regard to data protection. As an example pre-merger filing is mentioned. In the US such filing is 
criminally protected, while it is published in the EU.1039 
 
                                                          
1033 Ibid. Also see United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (DCC, 2001); DoJ Press Release, “Department of Justice 
and Microsoft Corporation Reach Effective Settlement on Antitrust Lawsuit”, 01-5692, November 2001; European 
Commission, Press Release, “Commission opens proceedings against Microsoft’s Alleged Discriminatory licensing and 
refusal to supply software information”, IP/00/906, Brussels, 3 August 2000; European Commission, Press Release, 
“Commission initiates additional proceedings against Microsoft”, IP/01/1232, Brussels, 30 August 2001.  
1034 Diane Wood, Luncheon speech, “Is cooperation possible?”, (2000) New England Law Review, Vol. 34:1, 109. Not only 
WOOD expressed her concerns about the lack of exchange of confidential information, also see OECD, Global Forum 
on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background Note, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 3, and ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition 
Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 5.  
1035 The 2012 ICN/OECD Joint Survey on International Competition Cooperation indicated that 52 respondents 
(including all OECD respondents) had rules that protect confidential information in possession of the national 
competition agency, and generally prevent the agency from disclosing this information to the parties to an investigation, 
to third parties, and to other enforcement agencies. OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International 
Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 89. In the EU the main relevant provisions 
are Article 339 TFEU, Article 28 of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 17 of Regulation 139/2004 (see below, Part II, 
3.2.1.1).  
1036 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 15.  
1037 In particular in a common law context. 
1038 Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of 
their competition laws, Brussels, 17 May 2013 (EU-Switzerland Agreement). Also see European Parliament Resolution 
on EU Cooperation Agreements on Competition Policy Enforcement – The Way Forward, 2013/2921(RSP), 5 February 
2014. A Commission official confirmed that the EU-Canada second generation Agreement will be similar to the EU-
Switzerland second generation Agreement and that The latter agreement can be considered a model for future 
cooperation. Interview with Commission official. 
1039 Interview with Commission official. 
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While the focus is on the EU’s approach to confidential information exchange among enforcers, the 
US-Australia second generation Agreement serves as an occasional point of reference throughout.1040 
Among the existing non-EU second generation agreements,1041 the US-Australia Agreement was 
selected inter alia because of its level of detail compared to information exchange provisions in other 
agreements.1042 Moreover, the US has long been a proponent of bilateral competition cooperation and 
concluded the Agreement with Australia already in 1999. This time-frame permits more than a mere 
theoretical assessment of the Agreement, and allows implementation issues to be included in the 
scope of scrutiny, which is rather difficult for the much more recent EU-Switzerland Agreement. 
Also, as will be demonstrated, the US has approached confidential information exchange in a 
different way than the EU. As the EU’s management plans indicated that second generation 
agreements would be used more often in the future, it is interesting to see how this type of 
agreement is conceptualised and implemented elsewhere, in particular when it involves a major 
trading partner of the EU and a competition law giant. It should be emphasised that it is not the 
intention to engage in a systematic comparison of the EU and the US model agreements. This would 
be both undesirable and methodologically unsound, considering the different legal contexts in which 
the agreements operate.  
 
3.1 A strong call for intensified cooperation 
 
Information exchange is a central feature of international enforcement cooperation and legally 
protecting information from being disclosed is crucial for competition agencies to be able to compel 
information in competition investigations. Confidentiality rules are therefore fundamental 
components of an agency’s ability to obtain information, be it from an undertaking or a foreign 
agency.1043 A balance must therefore be found between the different interests at stake. The OECD 
has been particularly active in this matter. In 1984, the OECD Competition Paper on International 
Co-operation in the Collection of Information underlined the importance of suitable procedures 
enabling competition authorities to obtain sufficient information to evaluate the effects and legality 
of commercial activities. It was therefore recommended that OECD members should exchange 
relevant information in so far the national interests permitted disclosure. It was added that in case 
                                                          
1040 Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the government of Australia on mutual 
enforcement assistance, Washington, 27 April 1999 (US-Australia Agreement).  
1041 The exchange of confidential information is also possible between the competition agencies of Denmark, Norway, 
Iceland and Sweden (Agreement between Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden concerning Cooperation in Matters of 
Competition, Copenhagen, 16 March 2001. Sweden acceded to the convention in an agreement on amendments, signed 
on 9 April 2003), as well as those of Australia and New Zealand (Cooperation and Coordination Agreement between the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the New Zealand Commerce Commission, Wellington, 31 July 
1994, updated in 2007 and 2013; Cooperation Arrangement between the New Zealand Commerce Commission and the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in relation to the Provision of Compulsory-acquired Information 
and Investigative Assistance, Sidney, 19 April 2013). In April 2015, the Japanese JFTC and Australian ACCC concluded 
an agreement allowing the exchange of confidential information among their competition authorities (Cooperation 
Arrangement between the Fair Trade Commission of Japan and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
Sydney, 29 April 2015). This is the first ‘second generation’ agreement for the JFTC. See European Parliament, 
Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A – Economic and Scientific Policy, Competition Policy in 
International Agreements – Study for Econ Committee, IP/A/ECON/2015-02, August 2015, 18. 
1042 Article IV of the Denmark-Norway-Iceland-Sweden second generation Agreement for instance merely states that it is 
in the common interest of the parties to exchange classified information (without providing a definition of the latter), and 
that this is subject to three requirements: a confidentiality obligation, a limitation on its use, and further transmission is 
only authorized after explicit consent of the competition authority that provided the information.  
1043 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 12.  
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confidentiality restrictions obstructed such cooperation, OECD members should consider the 
necessary and appropriate enabling measures and confidentiality assurances allowing for international 
information exchanges among competition authorities.1044 The OECD’s 1998 Council 
Recommendation Concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels goes beyond the 1984 
paper by advising members to gather confidential or non-confidential information on behalf of a 
foreign agency, if necessary even employing compulsory means. It equally recommended to share 
confidential or non-confidential investigatory information that was already on file.1045  
 
The OECD subsequently issued questionnaires to competition agencies on international cooperation 
in anti-cartel enforcement. The responses indicated that the main reasons for limited cooperation, in 
particular prior to 1999, were first, that many cartel cases prosecuted at that time did not have an 
international dimension, but second, “that where cooperation would have been useful it was significantly 
constrained by the inability of the members to disclose confidential information to foreign agencies.”1046 The Marine 
Hose cartel case for instance is often mentioned as an example of successful international cooperation 
between the UK, US and EU competition authorities.1047 Japanese representatives, however, pointed 
to the fact that cooperation in this case was limited to the coordination of dawn raids due to 
confidentiality constraints. The JFTC was finally only able to collect evidence from the foreign cartel 
participants pursuant to cooperation with their Japanese counsel.1048 The outcome of the more recent 
                                                          
1044 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 34. 
1045 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 25-26.  
1046 F. Jenny, “International cooperation on competition: myth, reality and perspective”, University of Minnesota law 
school conference on global antitrust law and policy, Minneapolis, 20-21 September 2002, 12.  
1047 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 25. Marine hose is a type of rubber hose used to transport crude oil 
in oil and defence industries. Suppliers of such hoses in Japan, the UK, Italy and France formed a global cartel lasting 
from 1986 to 2007 that engaged in price-fixing, market-sharing, customer allocation, restricting supplies and bid rigging 
for marine hose and ancillary products. The cartel was led by a full-time coordinator in the form of an independent UK 
consultant. Several competition authorities, including the OFT, the European Commission , the US DOJ and the JFTC 
took coordinated enforcement action, both during their initial investigations and subsequently. Arrests executed by the 
DOJ coincided with business and domestic searches carried out by the OFT, as well as on-site inspections by the 
Commission. (OECD, Global Forum on Competition, “Improving International co-operation in cartel investigations, 
Contribution from the United Kingdom, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)19, 23 December 2011.) In the US as well as in 
Europe raids were carried out at various premises. (Ince, Sarah & Christian, Gordon, “UK: The Marine Hose Cartel: A 
New Era In International Co-Operation”, Mondaq, 25 February 2008.) Following the completion of the OFT’s 
enforcement action, the ACCC successfully made a formal request for information in accordance with the relevant 
Memorandum of Understanding and Part 9 of the Enterprise Act. In the formal ACCC proceedings in the Australian 
Federal Court material disclosed to it by the OFT was used in evidence. Investigations were separate but coordinated. 
Ongoing coordination involved strategy and timing, simultaneous searches and arrests, and coordination of searches. 
Sources of evidence were both common and separate. While there were some constraints for sharing such evidence, use 
was made of waivers and ‘pragmatic solutions’. 
(http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc729.pdf (accessed June 2017)). The international 
cooperation in the Marine Hose case was remarkable for one particular aspect as well, in addition to the overall level of 
cooperation in the case. The Antitrust Division in 2007 filed plea agreements with three British nationals calling for 
severe jail sentences. For the first time, these agreements anticipated and addressed the criminal prosecution of the 
defendants for a cartel offense in a foreign jurisdiction. The resulting charges in the UK were the first criminal cartel 
offenses charged under the 2002 Enterprise Act. Global coordination and enforcement resulted in successful 
prosecutions and other actions in inter alia the United States, Australia, Japan, the UK and the EU. (Fox, Eleanor & 
Crane, Daniel, Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law, St. Paul, Thomson Reuters, 2010, 91-92.)  
1048 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 310-311. 
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OECD/ICN Joint Survey revealed a repeated call from agencies for a clear and common legal 
framework for the exchange of confidential information, with well-defined conditions and adequate 
safeguards. The area was identified as in need for improvement, in particular with regard to the 
identification of the type of information that can be exchanged, as well as the conditions for 
transmission and use. To address what is essentially a structural problem, solutions suggested were 
also structural, including the adoption of national legislation or international instruments, but these 
remained vague.1049  
 
In a 1999 Report to the OECD Council Concerning Hard Core Cartels, the benefits and costs of 
information sharing between enforcers in the context of cartel investigations were more elaborately 
discussed. Such benefits should not be seen as an immediate return-on-investment in every instance 
of cooperation. Exchange of (confidential) information should result in improved enforcement 
capacities in general due to enhanced evidence gathering abilities, increased awareness, and benefits 
from cases brought by foreign agencies as well as overall reduction in hard core cartel activity and 
quicker and more complete merger review. The report also mentioned that even purely domestic 
enforcement could benefit from confidential information received from a foreign agency as such 
information could contain ‘tips’ about previously unsuspected conduct, or could establish that 
domestic activities relating to an international cartel violated domestic laws and caused domestic 
harm.1050   
 
Some five years ago it was said that the spirit of cooperation was at its brightest ever,1051 and that the 
taboo on confidential information exchange in competition cases was less present than in the past.1052 
In the meantime, however, the US elections and impending Brexit may have dimmed this 
optimism.1053 The number of second generation agreements is scarce, and their use appears limited as 
well. States therefore still seem averse towards confidential information exchange. Many concerns are 
uttered by both governments and the business community to such cooperation.1054 According to the 
OECD confidential information exchange among competition authorities is one of the most 
sensitive areas of international cooperation.1055 This is demonstrated by OECD research on the 
factors considered by competition authorities when deciding whether or not to cooperate, which 
indicates that concerns about the protection of confidential information form the third most crucial 
consideration when deciding whether or not to cooperate, as demonstrated by the table below.   
 
                                                          
1049 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 101.  
1050 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 36.  
1051 J.F. Wayland, “International Cooperation at the Antitrust Division”, International Bar Association’s 16th Annual 
Competition Conference, 14 September 2012, Florence, 6.  
1052 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 144.  
1053 This again underlines the importance of formal, binding agreements in ensuring that political or administrative 
fluctuations do not disrupt the cooperative process. 
1054 One example is the discussion on confidential information exchange within BIAC, the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee to the OECD.  
1055 OECD, Issues paper by the secretariat, Limitations and constraints to international co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)8, 23 October 2012, 4-5.  
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Figure 8. OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 56. (x-axis = numbers of respondents in absolute terms) 
 
The origins of some of these concerns can be found in the differences in confidentiality rules, data 
protection rules, and competition rules across jurisdictions. One particular issue is the lack of a 
common definition of confidential information. As the exchange of confidential information is often 
prohibited or severely limited, the discussion consequently revolves around the qualification of the 
requested information. An added difficulty is that confidentiality rules are sometimes set in 
horizontal national legislation, or dispersed over different sets of rules, making the system even more 
difficult to grasp(see below, Part II, 3.4).1056 Similar problems arise as a consequence of differences in 
the scope and application of legal privileges, such as the legal professional privilege.1057 Some of these 
concerns will be rendered more concrete in the next section, where it is assessed whether the 
safeguards in the EU-Switzerland Agreement sufficiently address such issues.  
 
3.2 The EU-Switzerland second generation Agreement 
 
Before embarking on an assessment of the safeguards present in the EU-Switzerland Agreement, the 
present section first explores its content, with occasional reference to the US-Australia Agreement. 
Similar to the analysis of the first generation agreements in Part I, first the context of conclusion is 
sketched, followed by an analysis of the content and the legal nature of the agreements. Finally, the 
use of the agreements is scrutinized. This offers an understanding of both the EU’s and the US’ 
approach to confidential information exchange.   
 
                                                          
1056 OECD, Discussion on Limitations and Constraints to International Co-operation, Contribution of the European 
Union, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)41, 23 October 2012, 3-4.  
1057 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 44.  
174 
 
3.2.1 Context of conclusion 
 
3.2.1.1 Confidentiality rules in the EU 
 
In order to fully comprehend the scope of the EU-Switzerland Agreement, it should first be 
established to what extent confidential information is protected and the Commission is prevented to 
share confidential information with competition agencies in third countries in the absence of a 
second generation agreement.1058 While it is outside of the scope of this study to fully assess the EU’s 
confidentiality rules on their merit, it will be demonstrated that in the EU as well as in the US, 
confidentiality rules are very dispersed and allow for little transparency. It is important that this is 
remedied in second generation agreements.  
 
The General Court in Bank Austria Creditanstalt confirmed that open decision making is the principle 
in the EU (as it was enshrined in former article 1 TEC and reflected in former article 255 TEC – 
now article 15 TFEU), and that therefore any exception to this principle should be interpreted 
strictly.1059 This was confirmed in Pergan Hilfsstoffe.1060 The basic Treaty provision dealing with 
professional secrecy is Article 339 TFEU (former Article 287 TEC): “The members of the institutions of 
the Union, the members of committees, and the officials and other servants of the Union shall be required, even after 
their duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in 
particular information about undertakings, their business relations or their cost components.” The obligation of 
professional secrecy can therefore be summarised as a general responsibility not to disclose 
information that was received in an official capacity.1061 According to GIANNAKOPOULOS, 
confidentiality rules do not only aim to protect private parties from ‘indiscretions or leaks’ by the 
government, but also ensure that firms cannot use commercial sensitivity as an excuse for 
withholding relevant information from inspecting officials.1062 The Court also confirmed that the 
professional secrecy rules are intended to protect the rights of defence of undertakings.1063 The Court 
of First Instance at the time further clarified that what is now Article 339 TFEU does not require the 
Commission to prohibit third parties from producing, in national legal proceedings, documents 
received in the procedure before the Commission which contain confidential information and 
business secrets, but that it must take all necessary precautions to guarantee that during the 
transmission of documents to the national courts such information remains protected.1064 There is a 
presumption that the national courts will guarantee the protection of confidential information, “since, 
                                                          
1058 On the definition of confidential information, see below, Part II, 3.4. 
1059 “in the absence of provisions explicitly ordering or prohibiting publication, the power of the institutions to make acts which they adopt 
public is the rule, to which there are exceptions in so far as Community law, in particular through provisions ensuring compliance with the 
obligations of professional secrecy, prevents disclosure of such acts or of certain information contained therein.” Judgment of 30 May 2006, 
Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, EU:T:2006:136, paragraph 69. 
1060 “[…] in the absence of provisions explicitly ordering or prohibiting publication, the rule is that the institutions have a power to publish 
acts which they adopt. However, there are exceptions to that rule in so far as Community law, in particular through provisions ensuring 
compliance with the obligation of professional secrecy, prevents disclosure of such acts or of certain information contained in them.” Judgment 
of 12 October 2007, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission, T-474/04, EU:T:2007:306, paragraph 61. 
1061 OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the European Union, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)57, 29 October 2013, 2-3.  
1062 T. Giannakopoulos, Safeguarding companies’ rights in competition and anti-dumping/anti-subsidies proceedings, 2nd ed., Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 192.  
1063 Judgment of 17 October 1989, Dow Benelux NV v Commission of the European Communities, 85/87, EU:C:1989:379, 
paragraphs 17 and 18; Judgment of 16 July 1992, Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia v Asociación Española de Banca 
Privada and others, C-67/91, EU:C:1992:330, paragraph 35. 
1064 Judgment of 18 September 1996, Postbank NV v Commission of the European Communities, T-353/94, 
EU:T:1996:119, paragraph 89.  
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in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the provisions of Community law in accordance with the principle of 
cooperation […], these authorities are required to uphold the rights which those provisions confer upon individuals.”1065 
If Member State courts request information from the Commission, such information may be either 
public or confidential. The Postbank case, however, explained that this cooperation may not lead the 
Commission to breach its duty of professional secrecy, meaning that the Commission may only 
transmit information covered by its obligation of professional secrecy if the national court can 
provide sufficient guarantees of non-disclosure. If the court cannot do so, the Commission is entitled 
to refuse disclosure. In summary, the Commission does not breach its obligation of professional 
secrecy by allowing disclosure to national judicial authorities, but it does so if it does not take the 
necessary precautions.1066 Article 339 TFEU explicitly refers to the category of ‘information about 
undertakings, their business relations or cost components’, reflecting the distinction made in 
secondary legislation between ‘business information’ and ‘other confidential information’(see below, 
Part II, 3.4.2). The qualification of a document as confidential does not prevent its disclosure in 
proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, according to the Commission, if such information 
constitutes either an inculpatory document or an exculpatory document. In such a case, the rights of 
defence of the parties in the form of access to the Commission’s file may outweigh the interest in 
protecting confidential information.1067 Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights mentions 
that the right to good administration includes the right to have access to the file, while taking the 
legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy into account. This 
indicates again that there is no absolute protection, but that a balance needs to be established 
between the legitimate interests of the parties at stake. There is, however, some discussion on 
whether this right exists only for natural persons, or for undertakings as well (see below, Part II, 
3.4.3).   
 
The obligation of professional secrecy is implemented in the field of competition law and extended 
to member state officials via Articles 27 and 28 of Regulation 1/2003 and Articles 17 and 18 of 
Regulation 139/2004.1068 Access to confidential information is restricted to varying extent for both 
third parties as well as the parties to proceedings. The right of access to the file of a party to 
competition proceedings is not absolute. According to Article 27 (2) of Regulation 1/2003 it does 
not extend to ‘confidential information and internal documents of the Commission or the 
competition authorities of the Member States.’1069 Except with regard to a restricted form of 
information exchange within the European Competition Network (see below, Part III, 2.1.5) and 
cooperation with national courts, information collected under Regulation 1/2003 may be used only 
                                                          
1065 Ibid., paragraph 69.  
1066 Ibid., paragraph 92; also see I. van Bael, Due Process in EU Competition Proceedings, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters 
Kluwer, 2011, 388-389. 
1067 T. Giannakopoulos, Safeguarding companies’ rights in competition and anti-dumping/anti-subsidies proceedings, 2nd ed., Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 208.  
1068 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24, 29.1.2004.  
1069 This was confirmed in Judgment of 15 October 2002, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM), DSM NV and DSM 
Kunststoffen BV, Montedison SpA, Elf Atochem SA, Degussa AG, Enichem SpA, Wacker-Chemie GmbH and Hoechst AG and 
Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-
245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, EU:C:2002:582, paragraph 315; Judgment of 7 
January 2004, Aalborg Portland A/S, Irish Cement Ltd, Ciments français SA, Italcementi - Fabbriche Riunite Cemento SpA, Buzzi 
Unicem SpA and Cementir - Cementerie del Tirreno SpA v Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases C-204/00 P, C-
205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, paragraph 68; Judgment of 25 October 
2011, Solvay SA v European Commission, C-110/10P, EU:C:2011:687, paragraph 49.  
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for the purpose for which it was acquired. The Commission and the competition authorities of the 
Member States, their officials, servants and other persons working under the supervision of these 
authorities as well as officials and civil servants of other authorities of the Member States may in 
principle not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them pursuant to the regulation and of 
the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.1070 Similar rules apply in mergers cases 
falling under Regulation 139/2004. This obligation of confidentiality imposed on the Commission, 
however, is without prejudice to the provision of Article 27 of Regulation 1/2003, governing the 
right to be heard, as well as the right of access to the Commission’s file.1071Nevertheless, it will be 
difficult for (third) parties to obtain more comprehensive access to the Commission’s file than that 
to which they are entitled under the specific competition law regulations. The CJEU sees to it, when 
balancing the different interests at stake, that the arrangements for access to the file instituted by the 
specific regulations in the field of competition law are not undermined by a generalised right of 
access.1072 
 
In Commission Regulation 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission 
pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (currently Articles 101 and 102 TFEU), the 
protection of confidential information is repeatedly ensured.1073 According to the Regulation, when 
complainants participate in the proceedings, they shall only be given a copy of the non-confidential 
version of the statement of objections.1074 Furthermore, when the Commission intends to reject a 
                                                          
1070 Article 28 Regulation 1/2003.  
1071 T. Giannakopoulos, Safeguarding companies’ rights in competition and anti-dumping/anti-subsidies proceedings, 2nd ed., Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 195.  
1072 K. Lenaerts, “The interplay between Regulation No. 1049/2001 on Access to Documents and the specific EU 
Regulations in the field of competition law” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), 
Mundi et Europae Civic – Liber Amicorum Jacques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 490. 
1073 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 123, 27.4.2004. The regulation states that when 
complainants participate in the proceedings, they shall only be given a copy of the non-confidential version of the 
statement of objections (Article 6). Furthermore, when the Commission intends to reject a complaint, the complainant 
may request access to the relevant documents, but may not have access to business secrets and other confidential 
information belong to other parties in the proceedings (Article 8). Oral hearings are not public, and persons may be 
heard separately or in the presence of other persons invited to attend, having regard to “the legitimate interest of the 
undertakings in the protection of their business secrets and other confidential information” (Article 14 (6)). Also with regard to the 
recordings of the oral hearing, regard shall be made to these legitimate interests (Article 14 (8)). When access to the file is 
granted after the notification of the Statement of Objections, this access does not extend to business secrets or other 
confidential information or internal documents of the Commission or of the competition authorities of the member 
states (Article 15 (2)). Article 16 of the Regulation is dedicated entirely to the identification and protection of confidential 
information and states that information containing business secrets or confidential information will not be 
communicated or made accessible by the Commission. Furthermore, the opportunity is given to people expressing their 
views on the Statement of Objections or a rejection of the complaint, and to people submitting further information, to 
identify material which they consider to be confidential and to provide a non-confidential version. The Commission may 
also “require undertakings and associations of undertakings which produce documents or statements pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 to identify the documents or parts of documents which they consider to contain business secrets or other confidential information 
belonging to them and to identify the undertakings with regard to which such documents are to be considered confidential. The Commission may 
likewise require undertakings or associations of undertakings to identify any part of a statement of objections, a case summary drawn up 
pursuant to Article 27(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 or a decision adopted by the Commission which in their view contains business 
secrets.” If undertakings or associations do not comply with these rules, the Commission may assume that there is not 
confidential information contained in the documents or statements (Article 16). For this reason, the Commission issued 
an informal guidance paper for companies that are recipients of requests for information on how to make confidentiality 
claims for information contained in their submissions. DG Competition informal guidance paper on confidentiality 
claims, March 2012, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/guidance_en.pdf (accessed May 2017). 
1074 Article 6 Regulation 773/2004. 
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complaint, the complainant may request access to the relevant documents, but may not have access 
to business secrets and other confidential information belonging to other parties in the 
proceedings.1075 Oral hearings are not public, and persons may be heard separately or in the presence 
of other persons invited to attend, having regard to the legitimate interest of the undertakings in 
having their confidential information protected.1076 With regard to the recordings of the oral hearing, 
regard shall be made to these legitimate interests.1077 When access to the file is granted after the 
notification of the statement of objections, this access does not extend to business secrets or other 
confidential information or internal documents of the Commission or of the competition authorities 
of the Member States.1078 Article 16 of the Regulation is dedicated entirely to the identification and 
protection of confidential information. For this reason, the Commission issued an informal guidance 
paper for companies that are recipients of requests for information on how to make confidentiality 
claims for information contained in their submissions.1079 The Regulation was furthermore amended 
to be in line with the Damages Directive (see below, Part II, 3.5.1.3).1080  
 
The Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union as well prescribe that officials should 
refrain from the unauthorised disclosure of information that they received in the line of duty, unless 
it had already been made public or is accessible to the public. This obligation remains valid after the 
official has left the service.1081 No further clarifications are provided. The provisions of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice regarding access to the file of the case deserve to be mentioned as 
well.1082 Third parties to a procedure may not have access to the file unless the President of the 
General Court decides otherwise after hearing the former.1083 A request in writing should seek to 
establish that the applicant has a legitimate interest in obtaining information in the file. The 
concerned parties have the opportunity get their views across. The General Court may decide to 
omit the names of parties or third parties as well as specific information from the publicly available 
case, where there are legitimate reasons to keep them confidential.1084 Finally, the general Notice on 
access to the Commission’s file makes repetitive mention of the protection of business secrets and 
other confidential information,1085 as does the Regulation on protection of personal data.1086 The 
                                                          
1075 Article 8 Regulation 773/2004. 
1076 Article 14(6) Regulation 773/2004.  
1077 Article 14(8) Regulation 773/2004. 
1078 Article 15(2) Regulation 773/2004. 
1079 DG Competition informal guidance paper on confidentiality claims, March 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/guidance_en.pdf (accessed May 2017). 
1080 Commission Regulation 2015/1348 of 3 August 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 relating to the 
conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 208, 5.8.2015. 
1081 Article 17 Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of the Council of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff 
Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities and 
instituting special measures temporarily applicable to officials of the Commission, OJ L 56, 4.3.1968, as amended by 
Council Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No 723/2004 of 22 March 2004 amending the Staff Regulations of officials of the 
European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European Communities, OJ L 124, 
27.4.2004. 
1082 Rules of procedure of the General Court, OJ L 105, 23.4.2015. (New Rules of Procedure, NRP)  
1083 Article 38(2) NRP.  
1084 Article 66 NRP. Also see K. Andova, M. Barennes, V. Terrien, “New rules of procedure of the EU General Court: 
what are the new provisions that may specifically matter to competition lawyers?”, Concurrences, N°3-2015 (in 
Concurrences, Competition Law Review, English Edition 2016), 89. 
1085 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, OJ C 325, 22.12.2005.     
1086 See for instance Article 45 on professional secrecy. Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 8/1, 12.1.2001.   
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guarantees offered by the Transparency Regulation and Damages Directive will be discussed in the 
section dealing with discovery in private litigation (see below, Part II, 3.5.1.3).1087  
 
A quick excursion to US confidentiality rules is useful. Before the entry into force of the IAEAA, the 
US was, like many other nations, severely constrained to share confidential information such as 
business secrets, grand jury material, or amnesty information. The AMC confirmed that without an 
AMAA the US is generally prevented from sharing confidential information obtained from 
undertakings in the course of antitrust investigations.1088 The protection offered to this information is 
spread across various sources such as statutes, court orders, procedural rules, or the DoJ Antitrust 
Division’s policies.1089 Confidentiality and privacy is governed by several different laws and rules at 
the federal level, making a distinction inter alia between information received from individuals, 
companies, or other governmental bodies. As in the EU, both the disclosure of such information as 
its use is restricted.  
 
More precisely, the US antitrust agencies (DoJ and FTC) are legally obliged to treat as confidential all 
information obtained pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, revolving around mandatory 
premerger notification and review. The FTC cannot publicly disclose information obtained pursuant 
to compulsory process under the Federal Trade Commission Act, while the DoJ is under the same 
obligation for information obtained through civil compulsory process pursuant to the Antitrust Civil 
Process Act. Very limited exceptions apply. In DoJ criminal antitrust cases, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure prohibit members of the grand jury, government attorneys and their authorized 
assistants, and other grand jury personnel from disclosing matters occurring before the grand jury, 
again subject to limited exceptions. Moreover, in both criminal and civil procedures, some 
information is subject to confidentiality due to its content, such as information regarding privacy, 
national security information, and trade secrets.1090 The files of a competition authority are therefore 
often protected from discovery.1091  
 
Confidential treatment implies that information may only be disclosed in discrete circumstances and 
for specific uses. Confidential information produced by parties and third parties may for instance be 
used by all agencies in court proceedings. However, if the agencies file civil or criminal cases in 
federal court or issue a complaint in an administrative proceeding before an administrative law judge 
and seek to introduce evidence for use in court proceedings, a protective order may be granted on 
request of the parties or source of the confidential information to prevent such information from 
being disclosed beyond the court proceeding. Another option is to file the information under seal, or 
according to a similar process in administrative proceedings, to exclude it from the public record.1092  
 
                                                          
1087 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145, 31.5.2001. 
1088 D. Garza, J. Yarowsky, B.Burchfield, W. S. Cannon, D. Carlton, M. Delrahim, J. Jacobson, D. Kempf, Jr., S. Litvack, 
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ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 26.  
1090 OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)55, 29 October 2013, 2-3.  
1091 Global competition review, know-how, topics, private litigation, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ (accessed 
January 2015).  
1092 OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)55, 29 October 2013, 3.   
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As in the EU, the right of access, in this case to federal agency records, is the rule, while confidential 
treatment is the exception. This right is granted via the Freedom of Information Act. Exceptions to 
this right relevant to FTC or DoJ investigations include “(i) information withheld on the basis of other 
statutory confidentiality protections, including [Hart Scott Rodino] and Civil Investigative Demand materials; (ii) 
trade secrets and commercial or financial information identified as privileged or confidential; (iii) information compiled 
for law enforcement purposes to the extent that its disclosure could interfere with the proceedings, disclose a confidential 
source, or constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (iv) intra-agency and inter-agency memoranda or 
letters that would be routinely privileged in civil discovery, e.g., attorney work-product or attorney-client information; 
and (v) national defense or foreign policy information that is properly classified.”1093 Finally, information may also 
be protected via agency policies, for instance in the case of leniency information. The DoJ does not 
publicly disclose a leniency applicant’s identity or information provided by such an applicant, absent 
prior disclosure by or agreement with the applicant, unless required to do so by court order in 
connection with litigation.1094 Confidentiality legislation is therefore spread throughout a whole series 
of acts and policy.1095 This makes it a rather opaque system. 
 
3.2.1.2 Why Switzerland?  
 
The absence of a first generation cooperation agreement between the EU and Switzerland could 
make one to question why Switzerland was the first country to conclude a second generation 
agreement with the EU. The relationship between the EU and Switzerland is a complex, albeit intense 
one, with more than a hundred bilateral agreements concluded between both parties.1096 While an 
agreement entirely dedicated to competition law was lacking, other agreements did contain 
competition provisions, but confined to certain sectors.1097 In a contribution to the 2012 OECD 
Global Forum on Competition, Swiss officials mentioned four cartel decisions of COMCO where 
DG COMP had also opened investigations as examples of situations where enhanced cooperation 
would have resulted in a more efficient identification and elimination of the cartels concerned. The 
following paragraph from COMCO’s 2010 annual report indicated that the relationship between 
both agencies was indeed amenable for improvement: “One may ask why the Swiss proceeding is taking so 
                                                          
1093 Ibid.  
1094 Ibid.  
1095 15 USC §§ 6201-6212, International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act; 15 USC §§ 1311-1314, Antitrust Civil 
Process Act (applies only to DO]) ; 15 USC §§ 41-68, the Federal Trade Commission Act (applies only to FTC); 16 
C.F.R. § 3.1, et seq., FTC Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings (applies only to FTC); Rule 26 (c) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ; 5 USC § 552, Freedom of Information Act; 
28 C.F.R. § 16.7, procedure for processing requests for disclosure of information subject to the business information 
exemption to FOIA (applies only to DOJ); 5 USC § 552a, Privacy Act. 
1096 European Union External Action, Switzerland, http://eeas.europa.eu/switzerland/index_en.htm (accessed June 
2012); Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, COM/2012/0244 final - 2012/0126 
(NLE), Explanatory Memorandum, June 2012, paragraph 3.  
1097 The Aviation Agreement of 21 June 1999 contains cooperation provisions, restricted however to aviation matters and 
in the context of Switzerland adopting the EU acquis regarding international air traffic. The nature of the agreement is 
therefore different from typical cooperation agreements. (P. Kobel & D. Viros, “Cooperation Agreement – 
Investigations – Confidentiality obligations: The European Union and Switzerland reach the agreement concerning the 
application of their competition law entering in force on 1st December 2014”, Concurrences, N° 2- 2015, 211.) The Free 
Trade Agreement of 1972 contains general cooperation obligations. (Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Swiss Confederation, Agreed by Council Regulation (EEC) NO 2840/72 of 19 December 1972, 
Articles 23, 27; F. Hoffet, M. Dietrich & G. Brei, “Cooperation Agreement Switzerland – EU on Competition Law 
becomes effective on 1 December 2014, Facilitation of the Transmission of Confidential Information and Documents 
between Swiss and European Competition Authorities”, Homburger Bulletin, 6 November 2014, 
http://www.homburger.ch/fileadmin/publications/Homburger_Bulletin_20141106_EN.PDF, 1. 
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long and why it could not be wrapped up at more or less the same time as the European Commission's investigation. 
The reason lies essentially in the impossibility of co-operating with that institution [...]. Moreover, when a parallel 
proceeding is conducted by the European Commission, the Swiss competition authorities, in the absence of formal co-
operation, have no way of knowing before that investigation is completed what deeds the EU is going to prosecute and 
punish [...].”1098 Regardless of political will to cooperate, the absence of a formal legal basis rendered 
deeper cooperation impossible.   
 
The European Parliament stressed Switzerland’s strategic geographic location for the EU, the 
presence of many EU companies in Switzerland and vice versa, and the number of parallel 
investigations conducted by both jurisdictions in the recent past to demonstrate the need for a 
second generation agreement.1099 At the time of conclusion, Switzerland was the third-largest 
economic partner of the EU and the second largest FTI recipient.1100 More important, however, than 
the fact that the Swiss and European economies are deeply integrated, is that their competition 
regimes are largely similar in terms of both substance and procedure.1101 While reciprocity is not an 
explicit condition for the conclusion of a second generation agreement with the EU, both the 
Explanatory Memorandum as well as the preamble of the EU-Switzerland Agreement strongly 
underline the similarities between Swiss and EU substantive and procedural rules.1102 This might 
indicate that de facto reciprocity is a requirement to enter into a second generation agreement. It 
represents a reassurance for the EU Member States and the Swiss government that their interests will 
earn equal protection in the partner country. In the US-Australia Agreement a reciprocity 
requirement is explicitly made. The IAEAA clarifies that this reciprocity requirement requires that 
the assistance provided by the foreign antitrust authority should be comparable in scope to that 
which the national authorities provide and that the confidentiality laws of the foreign state should 
provide no less protection than the domestic laws.1103 
 
The EU-Switzerland second generation Agreement was rather optimistically labelled “a milestone on the 
path towards convergence and cooperation in the field of antitrust enforcement.”1104 The Agreement was to a large 
extent modelled after the aforementioned 1995 OECD Recommendation on international 
cooperation in the field of competition law as well as some provisions of both Swiss and EU 
agreements with Japan.1105 Both parties engaged in preliminary exploratory talks in 2006/2007, the 
                                                          
1098 OECD, Global Forum on Competition Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution 
from Switzerland, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)15, 7 February 2012, 4. 
1099 European Parliament Resolution on EU Cooperation Agreements on Competition Policy Enforcement – The Way 
Forward, 2013/2921(RSP), 5 February 2014, paragraph 2.  
1100 Opinion of the Committee on International Trade for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the 
proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, 12418/2012 – C7-0146/2013 – 
2012/0127(NLE), 17 December 2013.  
1101 Steptoe & Johnson LLP, “EU and Switzerland sign antitrust cooperation agreement of unprecedented depth”, 
Lexology, 29 May 2013. 
1102 Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, COM/2012/0244 final - 2012/0126 
(NLE), Explanatory Memorandum, June 2012, paragraph 4, 5, 10.  
1103 15 USC, section 6211(2).  
1104 B. A. Nigro Jr., T. Caspary & T. Vere-Hodge, “Antitrust cooperation agreement would permit EU and Swiss 
competition authorities to share evidence and confidential documents without the consent of the investigated party”, 
Lexology, 17 May 2013. 
1105 Message relatif à l’approbation de l’accord entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne concernant la coopération en matière 
d’application de leurs droits de la concurrence, 13.044, 22 mai 2013.   
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Agreement was signed on 17 May 2013, and eventually entered into force on 1 December 2014.1106 A 
large part of the discussions during the negotiation process revolved around the practical aspects of 
information exchange whereby speed and effectiveness for the authorities would be central, without 
however neglecting the confidentiality regulations and other procedural guarantees contained in the 
national legislation of the parties.1107 While overall the adoption process was smooth, the approval of 
the Agreement was delayed for a while due to concerns of a Swiss parliamentary committee that had 
postponed a debate on the text as it considered allowing companies to appeal against data-sharing 
decisions, in the context of a simultaneous reform of Swiss competition law.1108 This provision was 
eventually removed from Swiss law and replaced by prior notice to the companies involved when 
information about them will be transferred (see below, Part II, 3.2.4).1109    
 
Whereas in the 1991 EU-US Agreement the purpose of the agreement was described as the 
promotion of cooperation and coordination and the lessening of the possibility or impact of 
differences in the application of the competition laws of the parties,1110 a broader perspective is 
employed in the EU-Switzerland Agreement, seeing cooperation and coordination not as the goal, 
but as a means to achieve effective enforcement.1111 The EU-Switzerland Agreement aims to not only 
lessen the possibility of conflicts, but also to avoid it. Sound and effective competition law 
enforcement is presented in function of the operation of the respective markets of the parties, trade 
between the parties, and finally the economic welfare of the consumers. This last element is new 
compared to the 1991 EU-US Agreement. The explicit mention in the preamble of consumer welfare 
strengthens its value within competition policy. It is remarkable that the Explanatory Memorandum 
accompanying the Agreement mentions that via the Agreement the Commission can benefit from 
the results of information gathered by the Swiss Competition Commission, but does not explicitly 
state the reverse benefit for the Swiss authorities.1112 And yet, in the ‘Federal Gazette’ or 
‘Bundesblatt’, it is made clear that such benefits certainly exist for Switzerland. According to 
DUCREY, involved in the negotiations of the Agreement, this is simply an omission and does not 
point to an imbalance in the obligations flowing from the Agreement.1113 In the Gazette it is 
underlined that Switzerland has a particular interest in competition law enforcement cooperation, as 
it does not enjoy the benefits that other EU member states enjoy in this regard. The Agreement, 
according to the Swiss, will result in better protection of competition in both Switzerland as the EU, 
and is in the best interest of both parties. It is emphasised that due to the materially very similar 
competition legislation in both jurisdictions, it is very likely that the authorities will investigate 
identical behaviour and therefore possess useful information for each other. Finally, it is explicitly 
stated that the COMCO’s functioning will be improved because the agreement will allow it to use 
                                                          
1106 Ratification was delayed due to reasons not related to the Agreement itself, namely tensions between Switzerland and 
the EU revolving around a referendum held in Switzerland on an immigration ban. European Parliament, Directorate-
General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A – Economic and Scientific Policy, Competition Policy in 
International Agreements – Study for Econ Committee, IP/A/ECON/2015-02, August 2015, 21. 
1107 Message relatif à l’approbation de l’accord entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne concernant la coopération en matière 
d’application de leurs droits de la concurrence, 13.044, 22 mai 2013.   
1108 L. Crofts, “EU, Swiss antitrust accord hits snag as data-sharing comes under review”, Mlex, 2 December 2013.  
1109 M. Newman, “Swiss parliament aims to approve EU, Swiss data-sharing accord in June”, Mlex, 22 May 2014.  
1110 Article I 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
1111 Article 1 EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1112 Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, COM/2012/0244 final - 2012/0126 
(NLE), Explanatory Memorandum, June 2012, paragraph 4. 
1113 Telephone interview with Patrik Ducrey, member of the Swiss negotiating team for the EU-Switzerland second 
generation Agreement, 24 February 2017. 
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evidence provided by the European Commission, thereby minimising the ‘disadvantage’ the 
COMCO encounters by not being part of the ECN.1114     
 
3.2.1.3 Legal basis 
 
A legal basis to exchange confidential information among competition authorities can manifest itself 
in two ways. First, national enabling legislation may offer the legal basis for cooperation between 
authorities of different jurisdictions by either allowing for direct information exchange – so-called 
‘information gateways’ (see below, Part II, 4.1.2) – or by allowing competition authorities to enter 
into second generation agreements. Second, the legal basis can be directly provided via the 
conclusion of cooperation agreements, as is the case in the EU. 
 
The US preceded the EU in providing a legal basis to exchange confidential information by doing so 
already in November 1994. Under impetus of the CLINTON administration and with widespread 
bipartisan support, the US Congress enacted the aforementioned International Antitrust 
Enforcement Assistance Act. This act allowed the US to conclude so-called antitrust mutual 
assistance agreements (AMAAs), which permit the US to provide assistance to foreign authorities in 
both civil and criminal cases, and determine under which conditions such assistance can take 
place.1115 At the time of enactment of the IAEAA, the necessity of the act was strongly underlined, in 
particular because several jurisdictions such as Japan, the EU, and the UK, voiced their concerns 
regarding the Act.1116 BINGAMAN, Assistant Attorney General at the time, stated that “this legislation is 
vitally needed if we are to bring our antitrust enforcement tools into line with the realities of the global economy of today 
and tomorrow.”1117 It was announced as ‘a critical contribution’ to international competition law 
enforcement.1118 The term regional economic integration organization was moreover specifically 
included in the definition of an AMAA to make the conclusion of an agreement with the EU 
possible.1119  
 
According to ZANETTIN, the AMAAs that can be concluded under the IAEAA are executive 
agreements under US law. This would imply that they are subordinate to federal legislation.1120 
ZANETTIN therefore disagrees with PAPADOPOULOS, who claims that an AMAA, like a normal 
mutual legal assistance agreement, is not an executive agreement of a voluntary nature, but a binding 
                                                          
1114 Message relatif à l’approbation de l’accord entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne concernant la coopération en matière 
d’application de leurs droits de la concurrence, 13.044, 22 mai 2013. 
1115 M. Taylor, International Competition Law: a new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
115. Also see OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, 
Background Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 21-22. 
1116 P. White, “International judicial assistance in antitrust enforcement: the shortcomings of current practices and 
legislation, and the roles of international organizations”, Administrative Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2010, 273.  
1117 Statement of Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the Committee on the 
Judiciary U.S. Senate concerning the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, S. 2297, 4 August 
1994. 
1118 FTC Press Release, “First International Antitrust Assistance Agreement Under New Law Announced by FTC and 
DOJ”, P829612, 17 April 1997.   
1119 15 USC section 6211(9): “The term “regional economic integration organization” means an organization that is constituted by, and 
composed of, foreign states, and on which such foreign states have conferred sovereign authority to make decisions that are binding on such 
foreign states, and that are directly applicable to and binding on persons within such foreign states, including the decisions with respect to (A) 
administering or enforcing the foreign antitrust laws of such organization, and (B) prohibiting and regulating disclosure of information that is 
obtained by such organization in the course of administering or enforcing such laws.” 
1120 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 158.  
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treaty.1121 While neither author provides clear arguments on why they qualify the agreement as such, 
one is inclined to agree with ZANETTIN, as it is not the AMAA itself that alters federal laws, but the 
IAEAA that introduced several amendments to the federal legislation, which allows the cooperation 
under AMAAs to go further than the first generation agreements. The American Bar Association 
Section of Antitrust Law adheres to this view and qualifies the agreement as a bilateral, inter-agency 
agreement, and not an official US treaty.1122  
 
Almost twenty years after the introduction of the IAEAA, the US only entered into one mutual 
antitrust enforcement agreement.1123 The agreement with Australia remains the first and only 
agreement concluded under the IAEAA. The US and Australia were parties to an earlier competition 
agreement of 1982. The relationship between the two countries and their competition agencies 
allegedly markedly improved following the 1982 Australia-US Agreement. The enactment of the 
IAEAA was then a good opportunity for both parties to deepen and strengthen their relationship.1124 
Not every competition authority is eligible to sign an AMAA with the US authorities. For the US, 
Australia represented a suitable partner because the latter had similar legislation as the IAEAA in 
place, thereby fulfilling the reciprocity requirement.1125 
 
It was already established that Article 339 TFEU does not lead to an absolute prohibition for the 
Commission to transmit information covered by professional secrecy. In an intra-EU context the 
legal basis is provided via the duty of loyal cooperation in Article 4(3)TEU. This principle requires 
the Commission to provide EU national courts with whatever information the latter may seek, 
including information covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.1126 The legal basis for 
information exchange with the competition agencies of third countries takes the form of an 
international agreement. Contrary to the US, where enabling legislation in the form of the IAEAA 
provided the legal basis, in the EU the Agreement with Switzerland itself forms the legal basis for the 
exchange of confidential information. The 1991 EU-US Agreement states that nothing in the 
agreement can be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the existing laws, or as requiring any 
change in the laws of either parties.1127 This is nuanced in the EU-Switzerland Agreement, where it is 
stipulated that nothing in the Agreement “shall be construed to prejudice the formulation or enforcement of the 
competition laws of either Party.”1128 It was confirmed by an official involved in the negotiation of the 
Agreement that the emphasis on competition laws ensures that other laws, for example touching on 
                                                          
1121 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 85. 
1122 C. Laciak, International Antitrust Cooperation Handbook, Chichago Ill., ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2004, 47.  
1123 The 1992 Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act. P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A 
Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy 
Symposium on Competition Policy for International Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 56.   
1124 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 157-158.  
1125 FTC, Press Release, “First International Antitrust Assistance Agreement under New Law Announced by FTC and 
DOJ Agreement between U.S. and Australia Allows for Countries to Share Information and Provide Investigative 
Assistance”, 17 April 17 1997. Also see https://www.justice.gov/atr/annex-1-c (accessed June 2017). 
1126 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/state_aid_requests.html (accessed June 2017). More generally, see Article 
15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 allowing national courts to ask the Commission for information in its possession. This may 
include information of a procedural nature, such as whether the Commission has opened a case or whether case is 
pending, or whether it has taken a position. It may also encompass an estimation of the time required before a decision 
will be made, or factual information such as statistics, market studies or economic analyses. Also see Commission Notice 
on cooperation between the Commission and the Courts of the Member States, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, points 21-26b.  
1127 Article IX 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
1128 Article 13 EU-Switzerland Agreement.    
184 
 
the area of confidentiality, can therefore be overridden and that the legal basis for confidential 
information exchange can be found in this provision.1129 A downside of using agreements as a direct 
legal basis is that each time an agreement is concluded, approval of the legislature is needed. This 
approval is time- and resource-consuming, and may be influenced by the political agenda.1130 
National enabling legislation would in principle require legislative approval only once, which would 
offer more flexibility. The EU chose not to adopt enabling legislation similar to the US’ IAEAA as 
this would imply a delegation of power and autonomy to the Commission, which the Council did not 
want to give (see below, Part II, 4.1.4).1131 The proposal for a Council Decision referred to the first 
subparagraphs of Article 207(3) and (4), and Article 218(7) TFEU,1132 but the Council Decisions on 
the signing and the conclusion of the EU-Switzerland cooperation agreement both refer to Articles 
103 and 352 TFEU (the ‘catch-all’ legal basis for Union action), in conjunction with respectively 
Article 218(5) TFEU and Article 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU, requiring consent of the European 
Parliament.1133 The legal basis and procedure of conclusion are therefore the same as for the EU’s 
first generation agreements.  
 
3.2.2 Scope of the EU-Switzerland Agreement  
 
The scope of the EU-Switzerland Agreement in terms of the anti-competitive behaviour covered 
includes horizontal and vertical anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and 
concentrations.1134 State Aid, a field unknown as such under Swiss law, is not included.1135 It should 
be noted that the notification of decisions to undertakings in the territory of the other party is not 
regulated by the Cooperation Agreement. This is subject to a separate Exchange of Diplomatic 
Notes between the EU and Switzerland.1136 The reason for this exclusion is that in the EU this 
                                                          
1129 Interview with Commission official.  
1130 L. Laudati, Study of exchange of confidential information agreements and treaties between the US and Member States of the EU in 
areas of securities, criminal, tax and customs, Luxemburg, Office for Offiical Publications of the European Communities, 1996, 
5.  
1131 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 170. 
Interview with Commission official. 
1132 Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, COM/2012/0245 final - 2012/0127 
(NLE), 1 June 2012. 
1133 Council Decision of 21 October 2014 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Union and the 
Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws (2014/866/EU), OJ L 347, 
3.12.2014; Council Decision of 22 April 2013 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement 
between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their 
competition laws (2013/203/EU), OJ L 117, 27.4.2013. 
1134 Respectively Articles 101 TFEU, 102 TFEU, 105 TFEU and Council Regulation EC 139/2004 where the EU is 
concerned. The relevant provisions of the agreement on the EEA are also covered (Articles 53 and 54 EEA agreement 
io. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). With regard to Switzerland, the Agreement covers the Federal Act on Cartels and other 
Restraints of Competition (CartA) of 6 October 1995, its implementing regulations and amendments. Article II EU-
Switzerland Agreement.  
1135 P. Kobel & D. Viros, “Cooperation Agreement – Investigations – Confidentiality obligations: The European Union 
and Switzerland reach the agreement concerning the application of their competition law entering in force on 1st 
December 2014”, Concurrences, N° 2- 2015, 211.  
1136 These notes provide that EU Commission decisions regarding Art. 101, 102 and 105 TFEU or Art. 53 and 54 of the 
EEA Agreement will be notified by the COMCO to undertakings in Switzerland which have no notification address in 
the EU (See the Note drafted by the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, available at 
https://www.wbf.admin.ch/fileadmin/customer/wbf_internat/20140923_EN_Flyer_GSWBFKomm_WEB_Intern_No
te-Competition-rules_0001.pdf, accessed April 2017). The EU Commission on its side recognised the need to find an 
efficient way of notifying the decisions rendered by the COMCO regarding undertakings in the EU. The difficulty lay in 
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belongs to the competence of the Member States. Its inclusion would cause the Agreement to 
become a mixed agreement, which would significantly complicate the negotiation process.1137   
 
The EU-Switzerland Agreement does not contain a definition of confidential information, but rather 
refers to ‘information obtained by investigative process.’1138 The Agreement clarifies that 
‘information obtained by investigative process’ means any information obtained by a Party using its 
formal investigative rights or submitted to a Party pursuant to a legal obligation.1139 Such information 
includes for instance information obtained during dawn raids, responses to information requests or 
oral statements.1140 In the US, a similar definition is used, for what is called ‘antitrust evidence’. 
Antitrust evidence in the US-Australia Agreement includes “information, testimony, statements, documents 
or copies thereof, or other things that are obtained, in anticipation of, or during the course of, an investigation or 
proceeding under the Parties’ respective antitrust laws, or pursuant to the Parties’ respective antitrust laws, or pursuant 
to the Parties’ Mutual Assistance Legislation.”1141 Information obtained under the pre-merger notification 
procedure is excluded in the US-Australia Agreement, in contrast with the EU-Switzerland 
Agreement, where information concerning concentrations does fall under the scope of the 
agreement.1142 This exclusion seems strange, because cooperation occurs frequently in the merger 
sector, and confidentiality waivers are exchanged on a regular basis by the parties. This good practice 
could have been generalised in the Agreement. However, even in intra-US information exchange 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
the fact that Member States remained sovereign in matters of administrative assistance. (P. Kobel & D. Viros, 
“Cooperation Agreement – Investigations – Confidentiality obligations: The European Union and Switzerland reach the 
agreement concerning the application of their competition law entering in force on 1st December 2014”, Concurrences, N° 
2- 2015, 212.) 
1137 Message relatif à l’approbation de l’accord entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne concernant la coopération en matière 
d’application de leurs droits de la concurrence, 13.044, 22 mai 2013.   
1138 Article 7 EU-Switzerland Agreement. Reference is made to Articles 18 to 22 of Council Regulation 1/2003, as well as 
information acquired through the application of Council Regulation 139/2004. This concerns information gathered via 
Commission requests for information, through statements taken by the Commission, and by means of inspections of 
business or other premises by or on behalf of the Commission. For Switzerland reference is made to Articles 40 and 
42(1)(2) of the Cartel Act (CartA), and information acquired through the application of the Ordinance on the Control of 
Concentrations of Undertakings. The reference to the Cartel Act implies that the exchange of information is authorized 
even during a preliminary investigation, before a formal investigation has been opened (Article 26-27 CartA). At this 
stage of the procedure, the parties do not have access to the file and cannot assess the type of information that could be 
transmitted. (D. Mamane, “Competition law cooperation agreement EU/Switzerland”, Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 31 
July 2012.) 
1139 “(a) For the Union, this means information obtained through requests for information according to Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (1) 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation (EC) No 1/2003’), oral statements according to Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and 
inspections conducted by the European Commission or on behalf of the European Commission according to Articles 20, 21 or 22 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 or information acquired as a result of the application of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. 
(b) For Switzerland, this means information obtained through requests for information according to Article 40 Acart, oral statements 
according to paragraph 1 of Article 42 Acart and inspections conducted by the competition authority according to paragraph 2 of Article 42 
Acart, or information acquired as a result of the application of the Ordinance on the Control of Concentrations of Undertakings of 17 June 
1996.” Article 2(6) EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1140 S. Hammond, D. Wood, M. Healy, “New Swiss/EU Cooperation Agreement creates enhanced enforcement 
opportunities for antitrust regulators, but leaves uncertainty for companies”, Gibson Dunn Publications, 10 December 2014.  
1141 Article I US-Australia Agreement.  
1142 This provision has been inserted after concern of the business community about their international competitive 
positions. According to ZANETTIN“[this] provision is particularly regrettable. It is true that Hart-Scott-Rodino information is very 
sensitive, but the IAEAA provides strict confidentiality requirements, and the US authorities are specifically empowered, under the ‘public 
interest’ provision, not to disclose very sensitive information in specific cases. … The second main criticism is that it seriously constrains the 
scope of cooperation under the IAEAA and the usefulness of this act. The study of soft cooperation revealed that it is in the area of 
international mergers that such cooperation mainly takes place.” (Zanettin, Cooperation between antitrust agencies at the International Level, 
2002, 162-163.) 
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among the Antitrust Division and FTC and the States, merger information can only be exchanged in 
presence of a waiver.1143  
 
Other categories of information are similarly excluded from being exchanged under an AMAA 
according to the IAEAA.1144 The seemingly broad mandate given by section 6201 of the IAEAA to 
cooperate internationally in competition matters is quite significantly restricted by section 6204 of 
that same Act, by limiting the type of ‘antitrust evidence’ to which Section 6201 applies. It concerns 
first antitrust evidence that is matter occurring before a grand jury. This type of information cannot 
be exchanged, except when ‘a particularized need’ can be demonstrated.1145 More precisely, when an 
AMAA is concluded, foreign agency officials enforcing foreign antitrust law are considered as state 
officials enforcing state law in relation to requests to obtain grand jury materials in a Federal antitrust 
investigation, and can therefore take advantage of the exception in Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(iv) Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, which permits disclosure to state officials even at the investigative stage. 
However, the foreign agency must still demonstrate a particularized need, unlike state officials.1146 
There does not appear to be an objective reason why there is a positive presumption of the existence 
of this need when a state official makes a request, but not when a foreign government official does 
so.1147 Second, antitrust evidence meriting secrecy in the interest of national defence or foreign 
policy, and finally, antitrust evidence that is classified under section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 are not exchangeable with foreign antitrust authorities.1148  
 
One of the main differences between the EU-Switzerland Agreement and the US-Australia 
Agreement concerns the range of permitted assistance. Under the EU-Switzerland Agreement it is 
only permitted to exchange information that is already in the possession of the requested 
competition authority. The Commission or the Swiss competition authority may therefore not launch 
a dawn raid, send a questionnaire or hold hearings on behalf of the other.1149 Only information that 
was collected within the framework and for purposes of domestic proceedings can be shared with a 
foreign authority. Why the European and Swiss authorities decided to introduce this limitation is 
unclear, within the ECN for example it is allowed for one competition agency to use its investigative 
power on behalf of another ECN member authority.1150 Fact-finding measures are governed by both 
the substantive and procedural laws of the Member State where they take place. The results may be 
exchanged according to Article 12 of the Regulation (see below, Part II, 3.2.4). The system has 
allegedly worked well, and was used most often in the context of cartel investigations with regard to 
inspections, witness interviews and requests for information. Some resource and language issues did 
                                                          
1143 OECD, Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and enforcement, Relationship between public and private antitrust 
enforcement, Contribution of the United States, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2015)11, 15 June 2015, 2-8. 
1144 15 USC Section 6204.  
1145 This means that it must be demonstrated that “(1) the material is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another proceeding, (2) 
the need for disclosure outweighs the need to continue to maintain secrecy, and (3) the request covers only the minimal information required.” 
M. Chowdhury, “From paper promises to concrete commitments: Dismantling the obstacles to transatlantic cooperation 
in cartel enforcement”, AAI Working Paper No. 11-09, November 28, 2011, 11-12.  
1146 Ibid., 11-12. 
1147 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between antitrust agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 164; M. 
Chowdhury, “From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling the Obstacles to Transatlantic Cooperation 
in Cartel Enforcement”, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 11-09, 28 November 2011, 10-12.  
1148 15 USC Section 6204.  
1149 P. Kobel & D. Viros, “Cooperation Agreement – Investigations – Confidentiality obligations: The European Union 
and Switzerland reach the agreement concerning the application of their competition law entering in force on 1st 
December 2014”, Concurrences, N° 2- 2015, 211.   
1150 Article 22(1) Regulation 1/2003.   
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arise, however, as well as legal issues relating to the divergent national procedural frameworks 
relating to for instance the requirements to conduct an inspection or proceed with a request for 
information or regarding to varying powers to conduct IT searches, impeding the acquisition of 
evidence.1151 It is regrettable that the EU-Switzerland Agreement does not allow international 
investigative assistance, as this limits potential economies and goes against the latest 
recommendations of the OECD.1152 Perhaps a rapid and relatively informal procedure was preferred 
over broader and more intrusive forms of international assistance paired with greater procedural 
constraints. It cannot be excluded that pressure from the business community to limit certain forms 
of assistance played a role as well. According to a Commission official, this exclusion related to the 
fact that investigative rights are shared between the Commission and the Member States and 
therefore difficult to enforce, and because allegedly there was ‘no actual need’ to extend cooperation 
to this length.1153 According to DUCREY this policy choice was not an issue of conflict during the 
negotiations as both parties considered legal assistance as going too far. He confirmed that both 
parties did not see the need for ‘such far-reaching provisions’.1154  
 
The EU decidedly did not follow the example of the US-Australia Agreement, where this limitation 
does not exist. In the US-Australia Agreement competition authorities are given the opportunity to 
assist each other and cooperate in providing, or obtaining, antitrust evidence that may contribute to 
the determination of whether a person has violated, or is about to violate, the respective antitrust 
laws of the parties, or in facilitating the administration or enforcement of such antitrust laws.1155 In 
order to do so, they may actively gather information solely on behalf of a foreign jurisdiction. The 
IAEAA indeed empowers US enforcement officials to offer two types of assistance, on the one hand 
the sharing of antitrust information that the antitrust authorities have on file, and on the other hand 
the use of investigative authority to obtain evidence from private parties. Article II E clarifies what is 
to be understood by ‘assistance’ in the context of the US-Australia Agreement: “Assistance contemplated 
by this Agreement includes but is not limited to: 1. disclosing, providing, exchanging, or discussing antitrust evidence in 
the possession on an Antitrust Authority; 2. obtaining antitrust evidence at the request of an Antitrust Authority of 
the other party, including (a) taking the testimony or statements of persons or otherwise obtaining information from 
persons, (b) obtaining documents, records, or other forms of documentary evidence, (c) locating or identifying persons or 
things, and (d) executing searches and seizures, and disclosing, providing, exchanging, or discussing such evidence; and 
3. providing copies of publicly available records, including documents or information in any form, in the possession of 
government departments and agencies of the national government of the Requested Party.” The most controversial 
                                                          
1151 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009)574 accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 COM(2009)206 final, 29 April 2009, 
72.  
1152 OECD, Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning International Co-operation on Competition 
Investigations and Proceedings, C(2014)108, 16 September 2014. 
1153 Interview with Commission official. 
1154 Telephone interview with Patrik Ducrey, member of the Swiss negotiating team for the EU-Switzerland second 
generation Agreement, 24 February 2017. 
1155 Article II US-Australia Agreement. The American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law in its Report on the 
proposal of the agreement, expressed its concern on the inclusion of the word ‘administration’ apart from ‘enforcement’. 
It doubted the exact meaning of the word, and the compatibility with the IAEAA, which only mentions enforcement in 
its Section 6202(b)(2). (American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Report on the proposed agreement between 
the government of the United States of America and the government of Australia on mutual antitrust enforcement 
assistance). It is indeed unclear to what the administration of antitrust laws could point.   
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element in this list is the execution of searches and seizures, as the IAEAA does not mention search 
warrants clearly among the available discovery tools.1156  
 
3.2.3 ‘Traditional’ cooperation mechanisms 
 
The main content of the EU-Switzerland Agreement can be divided into two categories. A first 
category consists of those provisions generally also present in the EU’s first generation agreements, 
be it in a slightly adapted form. A second set of provisions regulates the exchange of information, 
including confidential information. This study focuses on the final category of provisions, as it 
constitutes the innovative element of the Agreement, but the traditional mechanisms will 
nevertheless be briefly addressed to indicate any evolution from the 1991 EU-US Agreement.1157  
  
When a competition authority considers that certain enforcement activities that it engages in might 
affect important interests of the other party, Article III obliges it to notify that party. An 
enforcement activity in this context is any application of competition laws via investigation or 
proceedings conducted by the competition authority of a party.1158 This notification should happen in 
writing, but it is explicitly added that this may be done via electronic means, allowing notifications to 
happen fast and informally, for example through e-mail. Other forms of communication between 
both parties may also take place via e-mail. Contrary to Article X of the 1991 EU-US Agreement, a 
confirmation in writing through diplomatic channels – which can be slow and burdensome – is no 
longer required.1159 While the initial judgment on whether important interests of a party might be 
affected lies with the notifying party, a non-exhaustive list of such enforcement activities is provided 
in the Agreement. This list is very similar to the one contained in the 1991 EU-US Agreement,1160 
with one new element: notification is also required for enforcement activities concerning 
anticompetitive activities (other than concentrations) against an undertaking incorporated or 
organised under the laws and regulations applicable in the territory of the other Party.  
 
The appropriate timing for the notification is specified. The Commission should notify, in the case 
of concentrations, when initiating proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)c of Council Regulation 
139/2004, and in other cases when initiating a proceeding referred to in Article 2 of Commission 
Regulation 773/2004. Focus is put on notification in the very beginning of the enforcement process, 
which creates more possibilities for useful coordination and cooperation from the start. Notification 
should be allowed on a voluntary basis at an even earlier stage as well, for instance when information 
requests are sent out or if dawn raids are held. Parties are free to notify more activities than those 
mentioned in the Agreement if they are of the opinion that their enforcement actions could 
                                                          
1156 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 
58; B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 160. For 
instance in 15 USC § 6202(d), 6203.  
1157 See V. Demedts, “International competition law enforcement: different means, one goal?”, Competition Law Review, 
Vol. 8, No.3, 2012, 223-253.  
1158 Article 2 (5) EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1159 Furthermore, Article XII of the EU-Switzerland agreement states that unless otherwise agreed, communications 
should be made in English. This language preference does not appear in any of the EU’s first generation agreements, but 
it eliminates possible costs of translation for the receiving party. In order to further facilitate communications, it is 
required that each competition authority installs a contact point. 
1160 Article II 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
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potentially affect the interests of the other party.1161 The 1991 EU-US Agreement contains far more 
detailed requirements for the timing of notifications, but does not specify the content of the 
notifications, in contrast to the EU-Switzerland Agreement.1162 In the former Agreement it is merely 
stated that notifications should include ‘sufficient’ information to permit an initial evaluation by the 
recipient party of any effects on its interests,1163 while Article 3(5) of the EU-Switzerland Agreement 
specifies that notifications should include the names of the parties to the investigation, the activities 
under examination and the markets they relate to, the relevant legal provisions and the date of the 
enforcement activities. This corresponds with the information that is published in Switzerland when 
a merger investigation is opened.1164 The obligation is broadened beyond the merger context in the 
Agreement. This additional clarity is to be applauded as it guarantees that the notification contains all 
relevant information.  
 
The competition authorities of both parties may coordinate their enforcement activities when they 
are pursuing related matters. ‘Related matters’ should be understood in a broad manner, allowing the 
authorities to cooperate as soon as they are faced with related facts, even at an early stage of the 
procedure.1165 The EU-Switzerland Agreement does not contain an explicit obligation to coordinate, 
but certain factors do need to be taken into account when considering whether or not to 
coordinate.1166 With some effort this could be read as an obligation to motivate any refusal. However, 
this does not seem to be the case. DUCREY clarified that neither party saw cooperation as an 
obligation, and that ‘neither party owes the other party an explanation.’ The issue allegedly was not a 
subject of discussion during the negotiations.1167 This is regrettable, as it thoroughly undermines the 
value and meaning of the Agreement. The parties would not give up any autonomy by committing to 
provide a justification for a refusal of assistance. Whereas the 1991 EU-US Agreement indicates the 
reduction of costs incurred by persons subject to enforcement activities as one factor to consider,1168 
the EU-Switzerland Agreement more broadly mentions the avoidance of both conflicting obligations 
and unnecessary burdens for undertakings subject to the enforcement activities. Specific mention is 
made of the coordination of the timing of inspections. At the same time, however, coordination may 
be limited at any time subject to ‘appropriate notice’. Whereas the 1991 EU-US Agreement explicitly 
allowed complete termination of the coordination,1169 the EU-Switzerland Agreement only refers to 
‘limitation’. The party limiting the coordination may proceed independently on a specific 
                                                          
1161 Message relatif à l’approbation de l’accord entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne concernant la coopération en matière 
d’application de leurs droits de la concurrence, 13.044, 22 mai 2013.   
1162 In the case of mergers and acquisitions, notification was required when the notice of the transaction was published in 
the Official Journal, when the competition authorities decided to initiate proceedings and in general “far enough in advance 
of the adoption of a decision in the case to enable the other Party’s views to be taken into account.” With respect to other matters, 
notification should be given as soon as ‘notifiable’ circumstances were present and far enough in advance of the issuance 
of a statement of objectives and the adoption of a decision or settlement. Notification under the 1991 Agreement is also 
required “whenever … competition authorities intervene or otherwise participate in a regulatory or judicial proceeding that does not arise from 
its enforcement activities”. Article II 1991 EU-US Agreement. 
1163 Article II (8) 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
1164 Message relatif à l’approbation de l’accord entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne concernant la coopération en matière 
d’application de leurs droits de la concurrence, 13.044, 22 mai 2013.   
1165 Ibid.  
1166 The use of the word ‘shall’ indicates an obligation. Article 4 EU-Switzerland Agreement. 
1167 Telephone interview with Patrik Ducrey, member of the Swiss negotiating team for the EU-Switzerland second 
generation Agreement, 24 February 2017. 
1168 Article IV (d) 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
1169 Article IV(4) of the 1991 EU-US Agreement mentions that “the competition authorities of either Party may limit or terminate 
their participation in a coordination arrangement and pursue their enforcement activities independently” 
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enforcement activity.1170 While the difference may not be that great in practice, semantically the focus 
seems to be on the termination of particular routes of coordination rather than the coordination 
process in its entirety. This semantic ‘nuance’, however, does little to lift up the Agreement, which 
fails to deliver when it comes to installing discipline in the cooperation process (see below, Part II, 
3.6.7). 
 
The concept of negative comity is formally integrated in the Agreement.1171 The competition 
authorities are to give ‘careful consideration’ to the important interests of the other Party. This is a 
relatively stronger obligation than in the 1991 EU-US Agreement, where the softer expressions 
‘taking into account’ and ‘considering’ are used.1172 The EU-Switzerland Agreement refers to the 
parties’ ‘respective interests’ rather than ‘competing interests’ when enumerating some relevant 
factors to be taken into account when seeking appropriate accommodation. This reflects a less 
hostile and more trusting attitude.1173 Factors to be taken into account in seeking appropriate 
accommodation differ in substance from the ones in the 1991 EU-US Agreement. As the lists are 
non-exhaustive, however, the practical relevance of these differences is limited.1174  
 
Despite the modest results that the positive comity principle has produced in the past (see above, 
Part II, 2.2.4.2 and 2.2.4.3), it is reiterated in Article VI of the EU-Switzerland Agreement. The 
principle is formulated in somewhat different terms than in the 1991 EU-US Agreement. More 
emphasis is put on the potential effects of certain behaviour.1175 The wording was inspired by the 
FTAs with Korea and Japan, and was not put into question.1176 Whereas in the 1991 EU-US 
Agreement enforcement action could be requested when a party believed that anticompetitive 
                                                          
1170 Article IV(4) 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
1171 Article V EU-Switzerland Agreement.   
1172 Article VI 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
1173 Both negative comity provisions differ from each other in other aspects as well, for instance regarding the principles 
that should be taken into account in considering the important interests of the other party (see Article VI(1) and (2) 1991 
EU-US Agreement). 
1174 The latter Agreement refers first of all to the relative significance of conduct within the enforcing party’s territory to 
the anticompetitive activities involved, compared to conduct within the other party’s territory. This factor is reiterated in 
the EU-Switzerland agreement, albeit in slightly different terms. The second factor in the 1991 EU-US Agreement, 
dealing with whether or not there is a purpose present when engaging in anticompetitive activities to affect consumers, 
suppliers or competitors within the enforcing Party’s territory, was not reiterated in the EU-Switzerland Agreement. The 
intent of the parties is thus no longer predominant. A third factor relates to the relative significance of the effects on the 
enforcing party’s interests of the anticompetitive behaviour as compared to the other party’s interests. This factor is also 
incorporated in the EU-Switzerland Agreement, although it is added that also potential effects should be taken into 
account. Whether enforcement activities would advance or defeat reasonable expectations constitutes another factor in 
the EU-US Agreement that has been left out of the EU-Switzerland agreement. The concept of ‘reasonable expectations’ 
constitutes a potential source of conflict due to its opacity. For this reason its omission in the EU-Switzerland Agreement 
is to be applauded. Another element that is not reiterated in the EU-Switzerland Agreement is the extent to which the 
enforcement activities and the other Party’s laws or articulated economic policies are consistent or conflicting. This might 
be related to the fact that it is also no longer required that important interests would normally be reflected in antecedent 
laws or other official documents. What has remained a factor to consider in both agreements is the degree to which 
“enforcement activities of the other Party with respect to the same persons, including judgments or undertakings resulting from such activities, 
may be affected.” A new element in the EU-Switzerland Agreement is exactly this undertaking-oriented focus, incorporated 
in an additional factor relating to the extent of possible conflicting requirements for undertakings. Article 5(3) EU-
Switzerland Agreement: “[…] the competition authority of the Party concerned should consider the following factors, in addition to any 
other factor that may be relevant in the circumstances.” 
1175 As was the case with the factors mentioned in Article V of the EU-Switzerland Agreement to take into account when 
looking for appropriate accommodation. This in contrast with the EU’s first generation agreements.  
1176 Telephone interview with Patrik Ducrey, member of the Swiss negotiating team for the EU-Switzerland second 
generation Agreement, 24 February 2017. 
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activities carried out on the territory of the other party were adversely affecting its important 
interests,1177 now it is already possible if a party believes that these activities may adversely affect its 
important interests. This does not seem to have led to more intensive application of the positive 
comity principle, but may indicate that at least informally both parties feel more comfortable in 
reaching out to each other. What constitutes ‘important interests’ is left to the appreciation of the 
competition authorities. The interests listed in Article 3(2) of the Agreement, on notifications, may 
serve as point of reference. Also, instead of ‘considering’ the request to initiate or expand 
enforcement activities, the obligation is made somewhat stronger in the EU-Switzerland Agreement 
by requiring from the signatories to ‘carefully consider’ taking action. The comity provision cannot 
be used, however by one competition authority to ask another competition authority to gather 
evidence on its behalf.1178 
 
Upon request, parties can consult each other about the implementation issues that may arise under 
the Agreement, and they can consider reviewing and refining its operation. Amendments to laws and 
regulations and changes in the enforcement practice of their competition authorities that could affect 
the operation of the Agreement should be communicated as soon as possible, and the parties should 
consult in assessing the potential impact on the Agreement. Meetings between the competition 
authorities of the Parties should occur at the appropriate level, on request of either competition 
authority.1179 Implementation of this provision is encouraged by the European Parliament, which 
considers the careful monitoring of the implementation of the agreement essential to draw lessons 
from the experience and test potentially problematic issues.1180 The OECD has labelled this provision 
as ‘rather unique’,1181 but it has been present (albeit in different sections of the agreements, not under 
‘consultations’, but in the final provisions) in the EU’s first generation agreements as well.1182 The 
provision moreover is not particularly strong, as there is no obligatory review after two or five years 
after entry into force for instance.    
 
Finally, to facilitate the communication process, it is stated that unless otherwise agreed 
communications should be in English, and that within the competition authority of each party a 
contact point should be designated, particularly to deal with any matter relating to the 
implementation of the agreement.1183 The inclusion of this type of ‘practicalities’ in the Agreement is 
to be applauded as they provide tangible guidance to agencies willing to cooperate. Competition 
authorities should be transparent in the designation of this contact point, for instance be clearly 
indicating such information on their website.  
 
3.2.4 Conditions for exchange or discussion of information 
 
                                                          
1177 Article V 1991 EU-US Agreement.  
1178 Message relatif à l’approbation de l’accord entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne concernant la coopération en matière 
d’application de leurs droits de la concurrence, 13.044, 22 mai 2013.   
1179 Article 11 EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1180 European Parliament Resolution on EU Cooperation Agreements on Competition Policy Enforcement – The Way 
Forward, 2013/2921(RSP), 5 February 2014, paragraph 6.  
1181 OECD, Report/Inventory on provisions contained in existing international co-operation agreements - Note by the 
Secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2014)10, 16 December 2014, 21. 
1182 Article 11(3) EU-Korea Agreement; Article 12(3) EU-Japan Agreement; Article XII(3) EU-Canada Agreement; 
Article XI(3) 1991 EU-US Agreement. 
1183 Article 12 EU-Switzerland Agreement. This will likely remain the case even after Brexit, as English remains the most 
spoken second language in Europe, even when compared to French. (http://languageknowledge.eu). 
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One particular type of investigatory assistance is information exchange.1184 Unlike other second 
generation agreements, the EU-Switzerland Agreement distinguishes between two types of inter-
agency contacts: the sharing of views or discussion, and the exchange or transmission of 
information. Both types of contact are treated differently, allowing for some flexibility. On the one 
hand, any information, including that obtained by investigative process, necessary to carry out the 
cooperation and coordination provided under the Agreement, may be orally discussed by the parties. 
Only two exceptions apply: leniency or settlement information may only be discussed with express 
consent in writing of the undertaking providing the information, and information of which the use 
would be prohibited under the applicable procedural rights and privileges of the parties cannot be 
discussed at all. Transmitting information in writing, on the other hand, is subject to several 
conditions. According to a cascade system, conditions for exchange gradually become stricter 
according to the level of confidentiality of the information involved.1185 First, in contrast with the 
US-Australia Agreement allowing active gathering of information on behalf of the partner 
authority,1186 the information must be in the possession of the competition authority. It must be 
collected within the framework and for the purposes of domestic proceedings. Second, information 
may only be transmitted when the undertaking that has provided the information gives its express 
consent in writing. When the relevant information involves personal data, the transmission of such 
data is only allowed in case the parties’ competition authorities are investigating the same or related 
conduct or transaction. The parties shall ensure the protection of this data in accordance with their 
respective legislations.1187  
 
The major innovation of the Agreement is that if consent by the party that provided the information 
is lacking, information can nevertheless be transmitted for use as evidence under certain 
conditions.1188 The value of this innovation does not so much lie in the actual exchange of 
confidential information or evidence, as this will likely only happen in a limited number of cases in 
which the conditions are fulfilled, but rather in the fact that in this manner competition authorities 
can truly speak freely with each other and have access in their daily work to information that was 
previously protected by official secrecy.1189Again, the information must be in the possession of the 
transmitting competition authority and may only be transmitted in case both competition authorities 
are investigating the same or related conduct or transaction, a restriction that seems to be unique to 
the EU-Switzerland Agreement.1190 The request should be made in writing and its content is 
determined by the Agreement.1191 These conditions mainly serve to ensure respect for the 
proportionality principle and to exclude the risk of fishing expeditions.1192 The decision whether 
                                                          
1184 OECD, Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 20 
November 2015, 14. 
1185 Message relatif à l’approbation de l’accord entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne concernant la coopération en matière 
d’application de leurs droits de la concurrence, 13.044, 22 mai 2013.   
1186 Article II E US-Australia Agreement.  
1187 Article 7(3) EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1188 Article 7(4) EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1189 P. Ducrey, “The Agreement between Switzerland and the EU concerning cooperation in the APplicaiotn of their 
competiiton laws”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2013, 444. 
1190 OECD, Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 20 
November 2015, 18-19.  
1191 It “shall include a general description of the subject matter and the nature of the investigation or proceedings to which the request relates 
and the specific legal provisions involved. It shall also identify the undertakings subject to the investigation or procedure whose identity is 
available at the time of the request […].” Article 7(4)(b) EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1192 Message relatif à l’approbation de l’accord entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne concernant la coopération en matière 
d’application de leurs droits de la concurrence, 13.044, 22 mai 2013. Fishing expeditions are not allowed in the EU in 
relation to products that appear to be out of scope of a Commission raid, as clarified in the Nexans case-law, even though 
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information is relevant and suitable for transmission should occur in consultation with the requesting 
competition authority. In contrast, the decision whether or not to actually exchange the information 
is left entirely to the discretion of the authority in possession of the information.1193 While some 
discretion is desirable and cooperation should not be forced upon an agency, this complete freedom 
for the authorities risks to thoroughly undermine the strength of this provision, in particular 
considering the strict conditions the Agreement imposes with regard to both the exchange and use of 
the information.  
 
While cooperation among competition authorities cannot be forced upon the latter, some ‘nudging’ 
towards cooperation would, however, be welcome.1194 As with first generation agreements, it would 
install a certain discipline in the cooperation process if authorities were at least obliged to state 
reasons for not cooperating. Nudging originally referred to the alteration of social or physical 
environments to make certain behaviours more likely without forbidding any options. Without 
relying on regulation, subtle alterations in the choices of people were aimed to change their 
behaviour.1195 People were guided towards the choice lining up with their best interest, but they 
remained free to behave differently.1196 Nudging typically excludes legislation, regulation, and 
interventions that would alter economic incentives and draws on behavioural economics and social 
psychology to explain why people deviate from economically rational behaviour to inform policy. A 
nudge is therefore liberty preserving, relying on the automatic, reflexive responses of those targeted, 
not involving overly overt persuasion or significantly changing economic incentives, but rather 
redesigning the choice context according to the findings of behavioural economics. The increased 
interest in behavioural economics when shaping policy was likely influenced by the 2008 global 
financial crisis, as insufficient regulation of the financial service sector at least in part lay at its 
roots.1197 The concept is aimed at altering the behaviour of individuals, but it is suggested here that it 
can be applied to enforcers as well.1198 A schematic overview is given of the information exchange 
system in the EU-Switzerland Agreement. Aspects of it will be discussed in more detail when 
addressing the concerns present regarding information exchange (see below, Part II, 3.5).  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
the Commission retains a wide discretion. The Commission may only examine product areas in which it has ‘reasonable 
grounds’ to suspect an infringement. See Judgment of 14 November 2012, Nexans v European Commission, T- 135/09, 
EU:T:2012:596; paragraph 67. On appeal, see Judgment of 25 June 2014, Nexans v European Commission, C-37/13, 
EU:C:2014:2030. 
1193 Article 7(5) EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1194 Guldborg Hansen, Pelle, “What is Nudging?”, Behavioral Science & Policy Association, 16 August 2016, available at 
https://behavioralpolicy.org/what-is-nudging/ (accessed March 2017). 
1195 A. Oliver, “From Nudging to Budging: Using Behavioural Economics to Inform Public Sector Policy”, Journal of 
Social Policy, July 2013, available at https://intranet.weatherhead.case.edu/document-upload/docs/1139.pdf (accessed 
March 2017), 1.  
1196 This freedom is relative. Nudging inevitably involves some covertness. The intention is that people face the changes 
in the choice architecture unconsciously. It is therefore difficult to see how they can make the conscious decision to opt-
out. A. Oliver, “From Nudging to Budging: Using Behavioural Economics to Inform Public Sector Policy”, Journal of 
Social Policy, July 2013, available at https://intranet.weatherhead.case.edu/document-upload/docs/1139.pdf (accessed 
March 2017), 3. 
1197 A. Oliver, “From Nudging to Budging: Using Behavioural Economics to Inform Public Sector Policy”, Journal of 
Social Policy, July 2013, available at https://intranet.weatherhead.case.edu/document-upload/docs/1139.pdf (accessed 
March 2017), 1, 4-5. The UK government even has a ‘nudge unit’, the Behavioural Insights Team, which has released a 
number of reports on theory, methods and applications in such areas as health-related behaviours, personal energy saving 
and reducing tax fraud (A. Oliver, “From Nudging to Budging: Using Behavioural Economics to Inform Public Sector 
Policy”, Journal of Social Policy, July 2013, available at https://intranet.weatherhead.case.edu/document-
upload/docs/1139.pdf (accessed March 2017), 8.)  
1198 T. Marteau, “Judging nudging: can nudging improve population health?”, The BMJ, Vol. 342, 29 January 2011, 1.  
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1199 Figure 9. Chart constructed by author.  
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In the summer of 2014, after the signing of the EU-Switzerland Agreement but before its entry into 
force, a new article 42b was added to the Swiss Cartel Act, regulating information exchange between 
the Swiss Competition Commission and its peers. The article entered into force on the same date as 
the EU-Switzerland Agreement and lays down some general conditions under which confidential 
information exchange with a foreign competition authority can take place.1200 Article 42b CartA on 
the disclosure of data to foreign competition authorities states:  
 
“1 Data may only be disclosed to a foreign competition authority based on an act, an international agreement or with 
the consent of the undertaking concerned. 
2 Without the consent of the undertaking concerned, the competition authorities may disclose confidential data, in 
particular business secrets, to a foreign competition authority on the basis of an international agreement only if: 
a. the behaviour under investigation in the recipient state is also unlawful under Swiss law;  
b. both competition authorities are investigating the same or related behaviour or transactions; 
c. foreign competition authority uses the data only for the purpose of applying provisions of competition law or 
as evidence in relation to the subject matter of the investigation for which the competition authority requested 
the information; 
d. the data is not used in criminal or civil proceedings; 
e. the foreign procedural law safeguards party rights and official secrecy; and 
f. the confidential data is not disclosed to the foreign competition authority in the context of an amicable 
settlement (Art. 29) or when assisting in the discovery and elimination of the restraint of competition (Art. 
49a para. 2). 
3 The competition authorities shall notify the undertaking concerned and invite it to state its views before transmitting 
the data to the foreign competition authority.”1201  
 
Remarkably, those conditions do not entirely coincide with the provisions of the EU-Switzerland 
Agreement. First, the article requires the competition authorities to notify the undertakings 
concerned of potential information exchanges. This is not the case in the EU-Switzerland 
Agreement. Second, while there is no ‘double illegality’ requirement in the EU-Switzerland 
Agreement,1202 the Swiss Cartel Act does require that in order to exchange confidential information 
without consent, the behaviour under investigation in the recipient state should also be unlawful 
under Swiss law.1203 It seems therefore that competition laws of a foreign nation that do not imitate 
US antitrust law are simply not considered ‘antitrust laws’ under the US’ AMAAs. Art. 42b CartA 
also provides a clearer restriction on the use of transmitted information in civil matters than the EU-
                                                          
1200 M. Meinhardt & B. Merkt, “Cooperation Agreement between Switzerland and the EU on competition law enters into 
force”, Lexology, 14 November 2014. 
1201 Inserted by the Annex to the Federal Decree of 20 June 2014 on the Approval of the Agreement between 
Switzerland and the EU concerning Cooperation on the Application and Implementation of their Competition Laws, in 
force since 1 December 2014. See https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19950278/index.html 
(accessed January 2017). 
1202 Article 2(4) of the EU-Switzerland Agreement defines ‘anticompetitive activities’ as “any activities that may be subject to a 
prohibition, sanctions or other relief measures by competition authorities under the competition laws of one of the Parties or both Parties.” 
1203 In the US-Australia Agreement it is stated that assistance may be provided to a foreign authority independently of 
whether the conduct at stake violates federal antitrust laws (15 USC Section 6202(c)). This way, US agencies can provide 
assistance without having to determine prima facie whether US laws would be violated (Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Report on the IAEAA of 1994, N° 103-388, 103rd Cong. 2d Sess, 30 September 1994, 11, as cited in Zanettin, 
Cooperation between antitrust agencies at the international level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 159). At first sight this facilitates 
and broadens cooperation possibilities, but this is severely limited by the definition of ‘foreign antitrust laws’ in the 
IAEAA. Such laws are defined as “the laws of a foreign state, or of a regional economic integration organization, that are substantially 
similar to any of the Federal antitrust laws and that prohibit conduct similar to conduct prohibited under the Federal antitrust laws.” (15 
USC Section 6211(7). Emphasis by author). 
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Switzerland Agreement, although this could be caught in the Agreement under Article 8(5), allowing 
that use of the information is subjected to certain terms and conditions as specified by the providing 
authority.1204 
 
Article 42b CartA was created during the ratification process of the EU-Switzerland Agreement. 
Some sceptical voices in Parliament raised concerns considering the EU-Switzerland Agreement, in 
particular concerning the extent to which the legal positions of the undertakings concerned were 
protected. For this reason Article 42b was proposed to amend the Swiss cartel act and ‘surround’ 
latter Agreement. More specifically some members of Parliament wanted to insert a possibility for 
intermediary appeal. It was raised that this would make cooperation with the EU impossible due to 
the time and efficiency problems this would entail. An appeal-possibility against information 
transmission was therefore considered impossible. As a concession, the third paragraph of Article 
42b contains the obligation to notify the parties. The competition authority must consult the 
company before sending confidential information. This gives the company the opportunity to 
comment and the competition authority the opportunity to consider the concerns of the company 
without blocking the process. The obligation is asymmetrical. The EU is not obliged to do this. It is a 
domestic measure, which was considered an appropriate and balanced solution for the protection of 
the interests of the companies concerned. 1205 The double criminality requirement is intended to 
exclude the possibility of criminal sanctions against natural persons.1206 In short, Article 42b CartA 
contains extra assurances for the Swiss intended to reinforce the legal position of the Swiss 
companies concerned. The exact interplay between Art. 42b CartA and the Cooperation Agreement 
will ultimately have to be addressed and clarified by the COMCO and possibly the courts. While 
generally international agreements take precedence over domestic statutes, the differences in 
language and the entry into force at the same time as the Cooperation Agreement, seem to indicate 
that Art. 42b CartA at least completes, or indeed ‘surrounds’ the Cooperation Agreement.1207 The 
fact that the Swiss felt the need to unilaterally ensure further safeguards points to the flaws an 
opacities of the Agreement. It is, to say the least, a bizarre way to engage in international 
cooperation.  
 
This crucial cooperation mechanism functions differently in the US. In the US requests for assistance 
should be addressed to and are decided upon by the Attorney General.1208 It is not explicitly specified 
whether an e-mail would suffice, the broader scope of assistance allowed by the US-Australia 
Agreement may require a greater level of formality. The EU-Switzerland Agreement is silent on who 
decides on requests and merely refers to the competition authorities of the parties as unitary actors. 
In practice, in Switzerland, it generally is the case team that decides. It is not a formal, contestable 
decision.1209 The Agreement does explicitly state that notifications may take place via electronic 
                                                          
1204 P. Kobel & D. Viros, “Cooperation Agreement – Investigations – Confidentiality obligations: The European Union 
and Switzerland reach the agreement concerning the application of their competition law entering in force on 1st 
December 2014”, Concurrences, N° 2- 2015, 213.  
1205 Conseil des Etats Session d'été 2014 - Quatrième séance 05.06.14 08h15 13.044 , Zweitrat - Deuxième Conseil. 
1206 Telephone interview with Patrik Ducrey, member of the Swiss negotiating team for the EU-Switzerland second 
generation Agreement, 24 February 2017. 
1207 P. Kobel & D. Viros, “Cooperation Agreement – Investigations – Confidentiality obligations: The European Union 
and Switzerland reach the agreement concerning the application of their competition law entering in force on 1st 
December 2014”, Concurrences, N° 2- 2015, 213.  
1208 15 USC Section 6202(a).   
1209 Telephone interview with Patrik Ducrey, member of the Swiss negotiating team for the EU-Switzerland second 
generation Agreement, 24 February 2017. 
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means.1210 Article III of the US-Australia Agreement describes in a detailed manner the elaborate 
minimum content of a request. Requests should moreover be accompanied by written assurances 
that the confidentiality laws and procedures, as described in Annex A of the Agreement, have not 
significantly modified.1211 The US should indicate in its requests whether the information sought may 
be used for criminal proceedings.1212 This requirement was included because the 1992 Mutual 
Assistance in Business Regulation Act (MABRA) applies certain constraints to information exchange 
when the investigation could result in criminal proceedings.1213 Some flexibility is nevertheless 
offered as requests may be modified.1214 
 
While the scope of assistance allowed under the US-Australia Agreement is quite broad, certain 
limitations apply. Article IV enumerates four grounds on which assistance may be denied in whole or 
in part, repeating what is stated in the IAEAA. The most controversial factor is the public interest of 
the requested party, as it holds great possibility for abuse due to its opacity. The central concept of 
reciprocity, however, forms a restraint to potentially abusive behaviour. If one authority would 
invoke this provision too often or in bad faith, the other authority could reciprocate and reduce the 
worth of the agreement altogether. The reciprocity requirement also plays on a different level. 
Theoretically the chance of important US interests being harmed by the sharing of information 
under the agreement is limited as the reciprocity requirement requires that the confidentiality laws 
and procedures in the partner country offer protection that is equivalent to that offered by the US. 
The Senate Report on the IAEAA enumerates some factors to be taken into account when assessing 
potential harm to US public interest, more precisely the nature of the evidence requested, whether 
unwarranted disclosure of information provided by uninvolved third parties will be avoided and, 
where the requested evidence is grand jury testimony from an immunized witness, whether the 
foreign authority will grant similar immunity. The House Report nevertheless mentions that the 
provision regarding the public interest should permit the antitrust enforcement authorities ‘wide 
latitude’ in determining whether the public interest would be served by providing the requested 
information in a given case.1215 Other grounds for refusal of a request for assistance are when the 
request is not made in accordance to the Agreement, if the execution of the request would exceed 
the executing authority’s reasonably available resources, or is not authorised by the domestic law of a 
party.1216 Consultation between the two parties is required before denying a request as well as an 
explanation. Compared to Article VII(5) of the EU-Switzerland Agreement this provision at least 
limits the parties’ discretion to a certain extent. In the EU-Switzerland Agreement parties are allowed 
to refuse a request for any reason, and a motivation is not explicitly required. As in the EU-
Switzerland Agreement, undertakings are not notified or offered the possibility of issuing an 
intermediary appeal. The House Report noted that giving prior notice to the concerned parties is 
advisable in some cases, but it is not required.1217   
                                                          
1210 Article 3(1) EU-Switzerland Agreement  
1211 Article III US-Australia Agreement.  
1212 Article III(B)(2) US-Australia Agreement.  
1213 P. Holmes, H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A taxonomy of international competition cooperation 
provisions”, Paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on ‘Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth, and Trade’, organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, December 9-10, 2005, 
59.    
1214 Article III(D) US-Australia Agreement.  
1215 Laraine L. Laudati, Study of exchange of confidential information agreements and treaties between the US and 
Member States of the EU in areas of securities, criminal, tax and customs (Laudati report), 1996, 13-14.  
1216 Article IV(A) US-Australia Agreement.  
1217 Laraine L. Laudati, Study of exchange of confidential information agreements and treaties between the US and 
Member States of the EU in areas of securities, criminal, tax and customs (Laudati report), 1996, 13-14.  
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As the US-Australia Agreement also allows active assistance, the execution of such requests is also 
regulated in the Agreement. The executing party must promptly provide an initial response, but it 
may also request additional information or may determine that the request shall only be executed 
subject to certain specified terms and conditions, which may relate to the way a request is executed 
or its timing, or the use or disclosure of any antitrust evidence that is provided. This means that 
Australia could, for instance, reject the use of the information it provides in criminal proceedings. 
Requests are executed in accordance with the laws of the requested party and according to the 
method of execution specified in the request, unless it is prohibited by the law of the requested party 
or unless the executing authority decides otherwise.1218 Once an authority has agreed to provide 
assistance, the agreement regulates the concrete execution of the different means to obtain evidence, 
such as the taking of testimony and production of documents, search and seizure, and the return of 
antitrust evidence.1219 The Agreement moreover provides that unless the parties agree otherwise, the 
requested party should pay for all execution costs of a request apart from the fees of expert 
witnesses, translation- and interpretation costs, transcription costs, and the allowances and expenses 
related to travel to the territory of the Requested Party by officials of the requesting party pursuant 
the agreement.1220 This important aspect of cooperation is not dealt with in the EU-Switzerland 
Agreement. This may be explained by the fact that information should already be in possession of 
the national authority if the authority wants to exchange it, and sharing such information will 
therefore not entail significant extra costs for the authorities. 
 
                                                          
1218 Article V US-Australia Agreement.  
1219 Article IX, X, XI US-Australia Agreement.  
1220 Article XII US-Australia Agreement.  
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1221 Figure 10. Chart constructed by author.  
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3.3 Limited use of existing second generation agreements  
 
Since the EU-Switzerland Agreement only entered into force in December 2014 it is too early to 
judge on its implementation. Up until February 2017 no confidential information was exchanged nor 
was there any official mention of the use of the EU-Switzerland Agreement. Nevertheless many 
contacts have since taken place between EU and Swiss colleagues, in particular with regard to 
financial markets.1222 It is therefore useful to look at the track record of the IAEAA and the US-
Australia Agreement, which have been in force since 1994 and 1999 respectively.  
 
The agreement with Australia remains the only agreement concluded under the IAEAA to date, even 
if in 2003 it was stated that ‘efforts were under way’ with Canada, France, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, among others.1223 While the IAEAA significantly broadened the scope of cooperation 
possibilities between competition agencies, its limited use indicates that some problems persist. 
Moreover, not only is the US-Australia Agreement the only agreement concluded so far under the 
regime of the IAEAA, the use of the agreement itself also appears to have been quite limited. While 
it is sometimes claimed that the US-Australia Agreement has been used ‘on several occasions’,1224 
others restrict themselves to saying that the agreement has been relied upon ‘at least once’, in 
particular in the infamous Vitamins cartel case.1225 The opacity surrounding the use of the Agreement 
is illustrated by the fact that the latter statement, originally from First in 2001, is still used in OECD 
reports of 2012.1226 In its 2012 contribution to the Global Forum on Competition, Australia provides 
an example of cooperation under the US-Australia Agreement, whereby it is made more clear how 
cooperation takes place in practice. It is described that the ACCC made a request under the US-
Australia Agreement for access to documents that were produced to a Grand Jury as part of a US 
DoJ investigation. Before a formal request was made, the ACCC liaised with the DoJ on an informal 
level to discuss the scope of the request and the documents sought. The relevant US District Court 
then released the documents after request by the DoJ. Next, Australian competition officials 
travelled to the US in order to inspect the relevance of the documents. The US Attorney-General 
approved release of the documents by the US DOJ to the ACCC on public interest grounds and 
following the terms of the Agreement, the documents were provided to the ACCC. The ACCC 
                                                          
1222 Telephone interview with Patrik Ducrey, member of the Swiss negotiating team for the EU-Switzerland second 
generation Agreement, 24 February 2017. 
1223 D. Klawiter & C. Laciak, “International Competition Cooperation: No Longer Just the Formal Agreements”, The 
Antitrust Review of the Americas, A Global Competition Review Special Report, 2003, 26.  
1224 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between antitrust agencies at the international level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 161; P.J. White, 
“International judicial assistance in antitrust enforcement: the shortcomings of current practices and legislation, and the 
roles of international organizations”, Administrative Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2010, 265. 
1225 H. First, “The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law”, Antitrust Law 
Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2001, as cited in OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel 
investigations, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 37; P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. 
Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation Provisions”, paper for the International Research and 
Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 59; M. Chowdhury, “From paper promises to concrete 
commitments: Dismantling the obstacles to transatlantic cooperation in cartel enforcement”, AAI Working Paper No. 
11-09, November 28, 2011, 12, footnote 69: “In relation to the Vitamins cartel ,the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) announced that it would be investigating the case and Chairman Fels noted the ‘recently signed antitrust cooperation 
treaty with the U.S.’ and disclosed that the ACCC already has contacted U.S. authorities about obtaining information ‘to further its 
considerations’.”   
1226 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 13.  
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respected the confidentiality of the documents and after they no longer had any use for the authority, 
they were returned to the DoJ.1227  
 
One of the reasons for the limited use of the IAEAA could be the high eligibility-threshold to 
negotiate an AMAA with the US, considering the strict reciprocity requirements imposed by the 
IAEAA. Few nations have a rule-set as elaborate and intricate as the US competition system, 
excluding them as a cooperation partner for the US under the IAEAA.1228 Another reason is a lack of 
credibility from the US authorities. The feeling may exist that states would gain little from an AMAA 
with the US. The aggressive extraterritorial approach of the US in the past has led countries to 
believe that that entering into an agreement under the IAEAA would imply asymmetrical benefits at 
a considerable sunk cost involved in the negotiation of the agreement.1229 This perception could be 
countered or at least diminished by active promotion of positive instances of cooperation under the 
existing US-Australia Agreement, but only very little information is available about the functioning of 
the Agreement. More generally, the OECD/ICN Joint Survey report indicated that the six 
respondents with information gateways or enabling legislation in place, could not provide useful data 
regarding their use.1230 According to TAYLOR the limited use of the possibilities offered by the 
IAEAA also reflects “the fact that most nations continue to guard their corporate information jealously, partly for 
fear of cross-border industrial espionage.”1231 Finally, some have pointed to the ‘rigidity’ or ‘compelled 
formality’ of the IAEAA as a source of trouble, and suggest single-case agreements or test protocols 
as a cautious way forward.1232 This would, however, undermine the whole idea of concluding 
cooperation agreements, as these should provide both the competition agencies as the companies 
involved with a clear and structured framework within which cooperation can evolve.  
 
3.4 A particular challenge: the concept of ‘confidential information’ 
 
Having outlined the scope and content of the EU-Switzerland agreement, as well as the limited use 
of existing second generation agreements, it becomes clear that one central issue arises. As 
mentioned, the main difference between first and second generation agreements is that the latter 
allow the exchange of confidential information. But what is confidential information? In first 
generation agreements reference is made to national legislation with regard to the confidentiality of 
documents, resulting in opacity with regard to what sort of information may and may not be 
exchanged. In second generation agreements the delineation of the term is important with regard to 
the protection offered once information has been exchanged. Before analysing the concerns 
regarding advanced international cooperation among competition agencies, this broader issue 
deserves to be addressed. What is understood as ‘confidential information’ is of high relevance 
because it implies that agencies are limited in whether, to whom, and how they can disclose this 
                                                          
1227 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution 
from Australia, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)36, 24 January 2012, 5.  
1228 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 21-22.  
1229 M. Martyniszyn, “Discovery and evidence in transnational antitrust cases: current framework and the way forward”, 
Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, University College Dublin - School 
of Law, September 2012, 41. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract/=2142978 (accessed August 2016).  
1230 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 89.  
1231 M. Taylor, International Competition Law: a new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
115.  
1232 D. Wood, “Is cooperation possible?”, Luncheon Speech, New England Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 110-111.  
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information.1233 International law firms state that a lot of effort is put in defining confidential 
information due to its strategic value and confirmed that what can be disclosed is very different in 
different parts of the world.1234  
 
There is no consensus on what constitutes ‘confidential information’ in the context of international 
competition cooperation.1235 Reference is often made to national confidentiality rules,1236 which 
results in opacity, as a definition of confidential information, if it exists, is not necessarily contained 
in a clear legal statute, but is sometimes developed via enforcement practice or via the courts.1237 The 
2014 ICN Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process found that the majority of 
responding agencies supplemented their statutory provisions on confidentiality with either agency 
rules, regulations, guidelines, or practices.1238 One example is the US, where the concept of 
confidential information in an antitrust context is constructed by various federal statutes, rules, and 
policies.1239 Also in the EU the rules are disperse (see below, Part II, 3.2.1.1 and 3.4.2). Even if a 
statutory definition exists, it may vary depending on the legal context, or may be imported from 
another legal framework.1240 Definitions can vary even within one jurisdiction, depending on the 
statutory provisions that the agency is applying. The existence of different conceptions of what 
constitutes confidential information presents an obstacle to effective cooperation. The fact that such 
conceptions are often opaque or difficult to find adds to the confusion. As mentioned, companies 
spend much time and effort trying to demonstrate that the information provided is in fact 
confidential.1241 The ‘resource impact’ of this process cannot be ignored. Whether it are the parties 
that need to produce redacted non-confidential versions or the competition agency that redacts the 
information received, it will often be so that competition agencies and submitters engage in extensive 
consultations to determine what information in the submissions can be labelled as confidential. This 
constitutes a significant workload for both the agencies as well as the submitters, with the potential 
to delay investigations.1242 Competition agencies themselves have indicated being confused about the 
distinction between commercially sensitive information constituting a business or trade secret, and 
non-public information that is not commercially sensitive but is nevertheless required to be treated as 
                                                          
1233 OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)55, 29 October 2013, 3.  
1234 Result of author’s law firm survey (see Annex I). 
1235 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 87. 
1236 As was done for instance in the questionnaire sent out by the ICN leading to the 2007 Report: “Confidential information 
refers to information which is defined as such by the law of the jurisdiction which is answering this questionnaire. For example, information 
could be defined as confidential if it constitutes business secrets of a company or if its disclosure in normal circumstances could prejudice the 
commercial interests of a company.” ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel 
Investigations, Report to the ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 33.  
1237 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 87.  
1238 ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process – Competition Agency Confidentiality Practices, April 
2014, 8.  
1239 OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)55, 29 October 2013, 3. 
1240 ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process – Competition Agency Confidentiality Practices, April 
2014, 13-14.  
1241 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 28; OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International 
Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 87.  
1242 ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process – Competition Agency Confidentiality Practices, April 
2014, 12.  
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confidential (see below, Part II, 3.4).1243 The problem is well-known. Multilateral forums such as the 
OECD and the ICN, as well as business organisations such as the ICC, have addressed competition 
agency confidentiality practice in an international setting.1244 The OECD/ICN Joint Survey report 
also indicated that the identification of the types of information that can be exchanged among 
enforcers was identified as an area in need for improvement. The lack of agreement on the types of 
information that can be made public regarding the status of investigations was identified as an 
important factor limiting international cooperation, apart from the lack of a uniform definition and 
uniform treatment of protected information in general. Differences between legal systems with 
regard to the scope of legal privilege or data protection systems may further complicate the exchange 
of information.1245  
 
Not only should the concept be clear for international cooperation to function properly, it should 
also be legitimate. Is confidential information ‘anything the companies don’t want in the 
newspapers’?1246 Not everything that companies do not want in the newspapers warrants legal 
protection. Businesses might want to label a document as confidential for many reasons, not all of 
them justified. To assess the legitimacy of limitations to disclosure one should indeed identify whose 
interests are being protected and whether such protection is warranted.1247 For instance, a document 
could implicate the people involved with the document in illegal conduct, or it could actually contain 
commercially sensitive information or business secrets that would harm the company’s 
competitiveness if revealed.1248 Undertakings seem to use the term ‘confidential’ rather loosely. Both 
over- and under-disclosure could cause harm to a competition agency and could result in legal 
challenges possibly leading to the invalidation of (a portion of) a competition agency decision. Over-
disclosure could moreover erode the trust companies have when cooperating with competition 
authorities, while withholding appropriate disclosures would for instance affect private 
enforcement.1249 It is beyond doubt that rules on professional secrecy serve a legitimate goal and 
ensure that undertakings feel secure in providing competition authorities with sensitive information. 
However, this requires that a delicate balance is struck between the protection of information and 
the need for effective enforcement and the principles of transparency and openness.  
 
The next section intends to illustrate the opacity surrounding the concepts of confidential 
information and professional secrecy in the EU. By way of introduction the various ways of 
classifying information as confidential are studied. The section then provides some insights de lege 
ferenda to broaden the scope of information exchange by exploring whether a more clear 
categorisation of ‘agency information’ is possible.    
                                                          
1243 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 36-37.  
1244 For examples of such work, see ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process – Competition Agency 
Confidentiality Practices, April 2014, 5.  
1245 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 79-80, 101.  
1246 Comment during 9th ASCOLA Conference on procedural fairness in competition proceedings, Warsaw, 26-28 June 
2014. 
1247 M. Chowdhury, “From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling the Obstacles to Transatlantic 
Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement”, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 11-09, 28 November 2011, 13.   
1248 As confirmed by S.D. Hammond, “Beating cartels at their own game – sharing information in the fight against 
cartels”, presented at the Inaugural Symposium of the Competition Policy Research Center - Fair Trade Commission of 
Japan, Tokyo, 20 November 2003, 6. 
1249 ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process – Competition Agency Confidentiality Practices, April 
2014, 10.  
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3.4.1 Substantive versus procedural approach  
 
The criteria according to which information is qualified as confidential are either of a procedural or a 
substantive nature. The procedural approach looks at information based on the way it was obtained 
to determine its status. This way of defining the concept does not necessarily correlate with the 
actual sensitivity of the information gathered, but allows for easier classification.1250 This could be 
information obtained by the agency in the course of the performance of its official duties and 
functions (a cartel or merger investigation for instance), obtained during non-public procedures, or 
obtained by other agencies.1251 Within a single jurisdiction, a distinction is often made between 
information submitted to an agency voluntarily, or information collected via compulsory means. 
Members of BIAC (the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD) and ICC 
(International Chamber of Commerce) believe that there should not be a generalised distinction 
based on whether information was submitted voluntarily or by compulsory means. They claim that 
the assumption that information provided voluntarily is commercially less sensitive will discourage 
companies from providing such information in the future.1252 Indeed, material that a party is forced 
to produce sometimes enjoys more stringent protection. However, in the context of the Damages 
Directive for instance, or in the EU-Switzerland Agreement, it is voluntarily submitted leniency 
information that is offered greater protection.1253 
 
Information can also be labelled confidential by the purpose for which the information was collected 
or submitted. Finally, some agencies claim that any information that the source has defined as 
confidential should be treated as such. This method is of course vulnerable to abuse.1254 While 
business can often indicate what parts of the information they submitted to a competition agency 
should in their view be considered confidential, they often do not and should not have the last say in 
this, for the reasons mentioned earlier.   
 
An alternative is to qualify information according to its nature and type. Harm (to commercial 
interests or competitive advantage) and secrecy are oft-cited factors in determining whether 
information is confidential. Within this category some variation applies. It could be limited to 
business secrets, trade secrets, commercial secrets, or more broadly encompass any information 
which is prejudicial to the commercial position of the subject, personal data, the source of 
information, or simply internal non-public documents and correspondence. The OECD Procedural 
Fairness and Transparency Report revealed that business secrets, trade secrets, and personal 
information are most commonly classified as confidential by competition agencies.1255 The OECD 
itself defined confidential information in the context of international competition law enforcement as 
“non-public business information the disclosure of which could prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of an 
                                                          
1250 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 121. 
1251 N. Ormonov, “Exchange of Information in the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws”, Asper Review of International Business 
& Trade Law, Vol. 6, 2006, 347. 
1252 BIAC/ICC, “Questions from business regarding the protection of confidential information in the context of 
international antitrust cooperation”, prepared by the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) 
jointly with the ICC Commission on Law and Practices relating to competition, 23 October 2000.  
1253 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Antitrust Division, ICPAC Final Report, 2000, available at 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ICPAC/finalreport.htm (accessed September 2015), Chapter 4, Footnote 91. 
1254 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 87. 
1255 ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process – Competition Agency Confidentiality Practices, April 
2014, 6, 13-14.  
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enterprise.”1256 In the US, typical categories of confidential information include trade secrets, privileged 
information, financial information, the existence of law enforcement investigations, and information 
about individuals.1257 Some agencies take their own and the public interest into consideration, apart 
from potential commercial damage to companies, by taking into account whether disclosure of 
certain information would affect future supply of information or would jeopardize an 
investigation.1258 More concretely this could include information on prices, sales volumes, costs, 
productions statistics, internal business strategies, financial data, terms of contracts or contract 
negotiations, information about new products or projects, proprietary information, profits, 
commercial strategies, customers, or suppliers.1259  
 
3.4.2 The EU’s obligation of professional secrecy: a transparent and consistent approach? 
 
3.4.2.1 Professional secrecy 
 
As mentioned, Article 339 TFEU contains the basic duty of professional secrecy for members of EU 
institutions and bodies, which is further elaborated upon in Article 28 of regulation 1/2003 and 
Article 17 of regulation 139/2004 (see above, Part II, 3.2.1.1).1260 None of these rules, however, 
contain a definition of the type of information covered by this obligation.1261 Without further 
elucidation, the concept appears wide enough to cover all information obtained by Commission 
officials in the course of their duties, even informally, except for information that was already in the 
public domain.1262   
 
The meaning of Article 339 TFEU (former Article 214 EEC Treaty) was first clarified in the 
notorious case of Adams v. Commission.1263 Apart from indicating the dramatic consequences that 
wrongful disclosure of confidential information and breach of the obligation of professional secrecy 
(in the judgement mention is made of a ‘duty of confidentiality’) can entail, the judgment stated that 
                                                          
1256 OECD, Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning International Co-operation on Competition 
Investigations and Proceedings, C(2014)108, 16 September 2014. 
1257 OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)55, 29 October 2013, 3.  
1258 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 87. 
1259 ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process – Competition Agency Confidentiality Practices, April 
2014, 13-14.  
1260 In Pergan Hilfsstoffe the court stated that Articles 20 and 21(2) of former Regulation no 17 were just the expression in 
secondary legislation of the obligation of professional secrecy contained in former Article 287 EC. Judgment of 12 
October 2007, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission, T-474/04, EU:T:2007:306, paragraph 62.  
1261 More specifically, information gathered according to these regulations should only be used for antitrust enforcement 
by the European Commission in that specific case. (Article 28(1) Regulation 1/2003 and Article 17(1) Regulation 
139/2004.) This restriction is further enforced by the second paragraph of both articles, prescribing that “The Commission 
and the competition authorities of the Member States, their officials, servants and other persons working under the supervision of these 
authorities as well as officials and civil servants of other authorities of the Member States shall not disclose information acquired or exchanged 
by them pursuant to this Regulation and of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.” The obligation also applies “to all 
representatives and experts of Member States attending meetings of the Advisory Committee pursuant to Article 14”. Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24, 29.1.2004.  
1262 T. K. Giannakopoulos, Safeguarding companies’ rights in competition and anti-dumping/anti-subsidies proceedings, 2nd ed., Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 192-193.  
1263 Judgment of 7 November 1985, Stanley George Adams v Commission of the European Communities, 145/83, EU:C:1985:448. 
The Commission was held to compensate the applicant for the damage suffered by the breach of confidentiality.  
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although former provision 214 EEC primarily referred to information gathered from undertakings, it 
nevertheless constitutes a general principle that also applies to information supplied by natural 
persons to protect the identity of an informant. It further clarified that this is ‘particularly so’ when 
information is provided voluntarily and accompanied by a request for anonymity. No criteria were 
given by the Court, however, to assess the legitimacy of this claim for confidentiality.1264 In practice 
the Commission uses what it refers to as ‘the grid’, which is a matrix of regular confidentiality claims 
of companies and the Commission’s response, to determine whether a particular confidentiality claim 
is grounded or not. In the case Postbank v. Commission, it was further clarified that information 
covered by professional secrecy could cover both business secrets and other confidential information 
(see below, Part II, 3.4.2).1265 This was later repeated in the Pergan Hilfsstoffe case and consolidated in 
secondary EU legislation.1266  
 
Confusion exists in the literature about what the notion of ‘confidential information’, or ‘professional 
secrecy’ entails. The General Court and the Court of Justice refer to an ‘obligation’ of professional 
secrecy.1267 The term ‘professional secrecy’ is therefore used when referring to the obligation of the 
authorities, while the concepts of ‘business secrets’ and ‘other confidential information’ denote the 
subject of protection.1268  
 
State aid is often excluded from the scope of cooperation agreements, and is therefore less relevant 
in the context of exchange of confidential information with foreign competition authorities. The 
obligation of professional secrecy nevertheless applies.1269 A special Commission communication on 
professional secrecy in state aid decisions explains how the Commission intends to handle requests 
from addressees of State aid decisions to not disclose parts of such decisions.1270 It states in particular 
that “[t]here is no reason why the notions of business secret and other confidential information should be interpreted 
                                                          
1264 Ibid., paragraph 34, 44 & 53.  
1265 Judgment of 18 September 1996, Postbank NV v Commission of the European Communities, T-353/94, 
EU:T:1996:119, paragraph 86; Judgment of 24 June 1986, AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v Commission of the 
European Communities, C-53/85, EU:C:1986:256, paragraph 27-28; Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt 
AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, EU:T:2006:136, paragraph 29. 
1266 “The Court would point out, next, that neither Article 287 EC nor Regulation No 17 state explicitly what information, apart from 
business secrets, is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. It is apparent, however, from the open wording of Article 287 EC […] 
from Article 13 (1) of Regulation No 2842/98 and from the case-law, that the concept of ‘information covered by the obligation of 
professional secrecy’ also includes confidential information other than business secrets.” Judgment of 12 October 2007, Pergan Hilfsstoffe 
für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission, T-474/04, EU:T:2007:306, paragraph 62-64. See, for instance, the Commission 
Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, which clarifies that the term ‘professional 
secrecy’ referred to in Article 28 of Regulation 1/2003 is an EU law concept that includes in particular business secrets 
and other confidential information. (Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition 
Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004.) 
1267 See for instance Judgment of 24 June 1986, AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v Commission of the European 
Communities, C-53/85, EU:C:1986:256, paragraph 27. In Pergan Hilfstoffe however, the Court referred to ‘the protection of 
professional secrecy’ (Judgment of 12 October 2007, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission, T-474/04, 
EU:T:2007:306, paragraph 80).  
1268The term ‘professional secrecy’ is used in Article 339 TFEU, Regulation 1/2003 and Regulation 139/2004, while the 
concepts of ‘business secret’ and ‘other confidential information’ are also used in Regulation 773/2004 and the 
Commission Notice on Access to the File.    
1269 Article 30 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of 
Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, (replacing Council Regulation 
(EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 
83, 27.3.1999). 
1270 Commission Communication C(2003) 4582 of 1 December 2003 on professional secrecy in State aid decisions, OJ C 
297, 09.12.2003. 
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differently from the meaning given to these terms in the context of antitrust and merger procedures. The fact that in 
antitrust and merger procedures the addressees of the Commission decision are undertakings, while in State aid 
procedures the addressees are Member States, does not constitute an obstacle to a uniform approach as to the 
identification of what can constitute business secrets or other confidential information.”1271 As will become clear 
below, however, some differences remain. The Commission further listed the types of information 
that are generally not covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. Such information, also 
relevant in the context of cartel and merger cases, includes:“(a) information which is publicly available, 
including information available only upon payment through specialised information services or information which is 
common knowledge among specialists in the field [...].The fact that information is not publicly available does not 
necessarily mean that the information can be regarded as a business secret; (b) historical information, in particular 
information at least five years old; (c) statistical or aggregate information; (d) [specific to the state aid 
context]”1272 While this list is non-exhaustive it is a welcome clarification. When information is 
considered as ‘public’ is not entirely clear, however, and can be subject to discussion. For instance, 
should information that was shared by a company with direct competitors, for instance, ever be 
qualified as confidential?1273 
 
3.4.2.2 Business secrets  
 
The first category of information that is protected by the obligation of professional secrecy are 
business secrets. The Court in Akzo Chemie clarified that “business secrets are information of which not only 
disclosure to the public but also mere transmission to a person other than the one that provided the information may 
seriously harm the latter’s interest.”1274 This was confirmed in later case-law.1275 Business secrets are 
defined in the notice on access to file somewhat more broadly as information about the business 
activity of an undertaking, the disclosure of which could result in serious harm to that undertaking. 
As mentioned, if information is already known outside the undertaking concerned (or group or 
association to which it has been communicated by that undertaking), or if the information has lost its 
commercial importance, for instance because it is dated, it will generally not be considered 
confidential.1276  
 
Even though the Commission communication on professional secrecy in state aid decisions stated 
that the concept of business secrets should not be interpreted differently than in cartel or merger 
cases, the communication defines business secrets as information that relates to a business with 
actual or potential economic value, that, when disclosed or used, could result in economic benefits 
for other companies. The definition does not mention damage to the undertaking itself. The fact that 
disclosure of certain information might harm the company is not sufficient to prove that this 
                                                          
1271 Ibid., 9.  
1272 Ibid., 14.  
1273 Unless it concerns information related to Research & Development, ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation 
between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 24.  
1274 Judgment of 24 June 1986, AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, C-
53/85, EU:C:1986:256, paragraph 28-29, as mentioned in Judgment of 18 September 1996, Postbank NV v Commission 
of the European Communities, T-353/94, EU:T:1996:119, paragraph 87. 
1275 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, 
EU:T:2006:136, paragraph 30. 
1276 “As a general rule, the Commission presumes that information pertaining to the parties' turnover, sales, market-share data and similar 
information which is more than 5 years old is no longer confidential.” OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential 
information, Contribution of the European Union, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)57, 29 October 2013, 5. 
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information constitutes a business secret.1277 The Commission enumerates a non-exhaustive list of 
criteria that it uses to determine whether certain information is a business secret or not, or, in other 
words, to determine whether the information could result in economic benefits and thus has actual 
or potential economic value. The list includes: “(a) the extent to which the information is known outside the 
company; (b) the extent to which measures have been taken to protect the information within the company, for example, 
through non-compete clauses or non-disclosure agreements imposed on employees or agents, etc; (c) the value of the 
information for the company and its competitors; (d) the effort or investment which the undertaking had to undertake to 
acquire the information; (e) the effort which others would need to undertake to acquire or copy the information; (f) the 
degree of protection offered to such information under the legislation of the Member State concerned.”1278 Factors both 
inherent to and independent from the company are therefore taken into account.  
 
The 2003 communication on professional secrecy in state aid decisions, released under 
Commissioner MONTI, and the 2005 notice on access to file, under Commissioner KROES, therefore 
contain different definitions of what constitutes a business secret. While the former defines business 
secrets in a negative way, as information whose disclosure could cause serious harm to the 
undertaking concerned, the latter employs a positive perspective by defining business secrets 
according to the economic value of the information and the economic benefits that it could bring to 
competitors. The difference is nevertheless not very problematic. While the way business secrets are 
defined differs greatly, the examples given do align to a very large extent, mentioning technical 
and/or financial information relating to an undertaking's know-how, cost-assessment methods, 
production secrets and processes, supply sources, quantities produced and sold, market shares, 
customer and distributor lists, marketing plans, cost and price structure, sales policy, and information 
on the internal organisation of the undertaking.1279 
 
In the Bank Austria Creditanstalt case the purpose of the distinction between business secrets and 
other information falling under the obligation of professional secrecy was clarified. The General 
Court stated that both categories of information are attributed different levels of protection. More 
precisely, while information covered by the obligation of professional secrecy may not be disclosed 
to the general public, when it concerns ‘other confidential information’ it may be disclosed to those 
having a right to be heard in the context of proceedings applying the competition rules, to the extent 
necessary to do so for the proper conduct of the investigation. This possibility does not exist with 
regard to business secrets, which are afforded ‘very special protection’,1280 in that third parties may 
never be given access unless the Commission or EU Courts decide that the rights of defence and the 
public interest in the administration of justice outweigh the protection of business secrets.1281 
 
3.4.2.3 Other confidential information 
                                                          
1277 Commission Communication C(2003) 4582 of 1 December 2003 on professional secrecy in State aid decisions, OJ C 
297, 09.12.2003, 10-12.  
1278 Ibid., 13.  
1279 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, OJ C 325, 22.12.2005, 
18; Commission Communication C(2003) 4582 of 1 December 2003 on professional secrecy in State aid decisions, OJ C 
297, 09.12.2003, 10. 
1280 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, 
EU:T:2006:136, paragraph 29. Also see I. van Bael, Due Process in Competition Proceedings, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters 
Kluwer, 2011, 181.   
1281 E. Beumer, “The colorful spectrum of fundamental rights in EU competition law procedures: overcompensation or 
undercompensation of fundamental rights protection? A case study on the right to be heard”, paper prepared for the 9th 
ASCOLA Conference on procedural fairness in competition proceedings, Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014, 18. 
209 
 
 
The second type of information that is protected by the obligation of professional secrecy is ‘other 
confidential information’. The Court in Bank Austria Creditanstalt recognized that what exactly is 
covered by the obligation of professional secrecy apart from business secrets is not clarified by EU 
law, and therefore established the factors that should be fulfilled if information is to be qualified as 
deserving the protection offered by the obligation of professional secrecy.1282 In this case, the Court 
had to pronounce itself on an application for the annulment of a decision of the Commission’s 
Hearing Officer to publish the non-confidential version of a Commission decision in case Austrian 
banks (‘Lombard Club’) in the Official Journal and on the Commission’s website.1283 The Court first 
referred to the aim of the provisions on professional secrecy in the context of a competition 
proceeding, which is to protect persons concerned by these proceedings from the harm potentially 
resulting from the disclosure of information obtained by the Commission in the course of such 
proceedings.1284 A first condition is that the information may only be known to a limited number of 
persons. It is not explicitly required that the person claiming protection must have taken steps to 
keep the information secret, contrary to what is stated for business secrets. Second, disclosure of the 
information must be liable to cause serious harm to the person who has provided it or to third 
parties. Finally, the interests that might be harmed via the disclosure, must be ‘worthy of protection’ 
in an objective manner.1285 According to the Court this implies a balancing of the legitimate interests 
opposing disclosure and the public interest that the activities of the EU institutions occur openly.1286  
 
These factors were later applied in the Pergan Hilfsstoffe case.1287 In the proceedings anticipating this 
judgment, the hearing officer specifically stated that “the risk [of actions for damages under national 
law] does not in itself cause serious and unjust harm to the applicant’s interests such as to justify protection of the 
disputed information. In the event that they are well-founded, actions for damages before national courts are in fact the 
acceptable consequence of committing an infringement of Community and national competition law.”1288 It was 
confirmed by the Court that interests in avoiding paying damages are not objectively worthy of 
protection. A ‘smoking gun’ document found somewhere in the kitchen cupboards of a CEO not 
containing any commercially sensitive information, should therefore not be subject to the same 
disclosure restrictions as the secret recipe for Coca Cola.1289 The former type of information will 
indeed also seriously harm the companies’ competitiveness if disclosed, but this is not an interest 
                                                          
1282 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, 
EU:T:2006:136. 
1283 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty, Case COMP/36.571/D-1: Austrian 
banks — ‘Lombard Club’, 11 June 2002. 
1284 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, 
EU:T:2006:136, paragraph 42.  
1285 This is a fairly universal approach, as reflected in the responses of the Japanese during the OECD discussion on how 
to define confidential information. The JFTC clarified that while all national public servants are under a general 
obligation of confidentiality, there is a specific obligation of confidentiality placed on staff members of the JFTC. In this 
context, the term ‘the secrets of enterprises’ covers information that contains “(1) non-public facts, (2) which are hoped to be 
kept secret by the enterprises and (3) for which there is an objective rational [sic] to keep them secret.” This definition differs from the 
general term ‘secret’, which is “any non-public fact which is found to be valuable essentially to be kept secret.” (OECD, Discussion 
on how to define confidential information, Contribution from Japan, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)40, 29 October 
2013, 2-3)  
1286 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, 
EU:T:2006:136, paragraph 71.  
1287 Judgment of 12 October 2007, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission, T-474/04, EU:T:2007:306, 
paragraph 65. 
1288 Ibid., paragraph 21.  
1289 Ibid., paragraph 21, 72.  
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objectively worthy of protection. In CDC Hydrogen Peroxide, a case relating to access to the 
Commission file on the basis of Regulation 1049/2001,1290 the General Court confirmed that the 
exception of the protection of commercial interests could not be relied upon because the interest of 
a cartel-participant to avoid damages actions is not a commercial interest and in any case does not 
constitute an interest deserving of protection.1291 More recently the General Court again 
unequivocally stated that the interest of an undertaking that has breached competition law in non-
disclosure to the public of details of the offending conduct does not merit protection.1292  
 
It is relevant in this regard that the information needed in cartel cases differs from the information 
sought in order to review a pending merger. In a cartel case competition authorities will look for 
evidence of meetings or certain communications between competitors on for instance pricing, or 
markets, or sales volumes. This type of data is most likely to be found in for instance handwritten 
notes, agenda’s or calendars, and phone logs. This is different from the information that is needed to 
assess a merger, where commercially sensitive details on the structure and figures of a company are 
pursued, such as business plans and strategies, market share information, data on sales and 
production costs, technical characteristics of a product, information on customers and suppliers, or 
financial data.1293 A study undertaken by the OECD confirmed that documents often needed in 
merger cases such as trade secrets or business plans are far more commercially sensitive than much 
of the evidence needed to prove a conspiracy, such as travel or telephone records.1294 This was also 
confirmed by senior antitrust division officials in the context of the ICPAC report.1295 Nevertheless, 
this information is often subject to the same confidentiality protection.  
 
In Regulation 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to 
[former] articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, it is further clarified that the category of ‘other 
confidential information’ includes information that does not constitute a business secret, but its 
disclosure would significantly harm an undertaking or person and it therefore deserves to be 
confidential.1296 The same definition is found in the notice on access to file.1297 The notice further 
adds that “[d]epending on the specific circumstances of each case, this may apply to information provided by third 
                                                          
1290 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, 43–48.  
1291 Judgment of 15 December 2011, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims (CDC Hydrogene Peroxide) v European 
Commission, T-437/08, EU:T:2011:752, paragraph 49. 
1292 Judgment of 28 January 2015, Akzo Nobel NV and Others v European Commission, T-345/12, EU:T:2015:50, paragraph 
80. 
1293 S. Hammond, “Beating cartels at their own game – sharing information in the fight against cartels”, presented at the 
Inaugural Symposium of the Competition Policy Research Center - Fair Trade Commission of Japan, Tokyo, 20 
November 2003, 6; L. Laudati, Study of exchange of confidential information agreements and treaties between the US and Member States 
of the EU in areas of securities, criminal, tax and customs, Luxemburg, Office for Offiical Publications of the European 
Communities, 1996, 11-12; B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart 
Publishing, 2002, 121. 
1294 OECD Reports, Global Forum on Competition, ‘ Preventing Market abuses and promoting economic efficiency, 
growth and opportunity’, 2004, http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/27892500.pdf 
(accessed March 2017), 68.   
1295 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Antitrust Division, ICPAC Final Report, 2000, available at 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ICPAC/finalreport.htm (accessed September 2015), Chapter 4. 
1296 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, recital 13.  
1297 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, OJ C 325, 22.12.2005, 
19.  
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parties about undertakings which are able to place very considerable economic or commercial pressure on their 
competitors or on their trading partners, customers or suppliers. [...] Therefore the notion of other confidential 
information may include information that would enable the parties to identify complainants or other third parties where 
those have a justified wish to remain anonymous.”1298 This category also covers military secrets.1299 The 
communication on professional secrecy in state aid decisions adds that in state aid cases in particular 
there could be other forms of confidential information that refer specifically to state-secrets or other 
confidential information having to do with the organisational activity of a state.1300 
 
As mentioned above, business secrets in the EU are defined as information about an undertaking's 
business activity that, when disclosed, could result in a serious harm to the same undertaking. Other 
confidential information includes information other than business secrets, the disclosure of which 
would significantly harm a person or undertaking. What the difference would be between serious or 
significant harm is not clear. In Bank Austria the Court pointed to the distinction that should be 
made between the protection of information in the context of the right to be heard in competition 
procedures, and protection from the general public. In the context of proceedings certain 
information that is not a business secret (enjoying absolute protection), can be disclosed to persons 
having the right to be heard, for the proper conduct of the investigation.1301  
 
3.4.2.4 Third category ‘of the kind’? 
 
Both the wording of Article 339 TFEU and the abovementioned case-law indicate that professional 
secrecy covers two types of information: business secrets and ‘other confidential information’. What 
is confusing, however, is that in both the Bank Austria and Pergan Hilfsstoffe cases mentioned above, 
the Court stated that the Hearing Officer should not only analyse whether a decision intended for 
publication contains business secrets or other confidential information, but also other information 
that cannot be disclosed to the public either on the basis of rules of EU law affording such 
information ‘specific protection’ or because it is information ‘of the kind covered by the obligation 
of professional secrecy.’1302 It is stated that “the confidentiality of information, for which professional secrecy 
requires that it be protected under Article 287 EC, may also stem from other provisions of primary or secondary 
Community law […].”1303 It appears therefore that a third category of information exists, which is not a 
business secret or ‘other confidential information’, but information ‘of the kind’ covered by the 
obligation of professional secrecy. Examples of such protection via secondary legislation were given 
in the form of Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 (access to documents) and Regulation (EC) 
No 45/2001 (personal data, now Regulation 2016/679).1304 It should be noted in this context 
however that legal persons do not belong to the scope, ratione personae, of the latter regulation.  
 
                                                          
1298 Ibid.  
1299 Ibid., 20.  
1300 Commission Communication C(2003) 4582 of 1 December 2003 on professional secrecy in State aid decisions, OJ C 
297, 09.12.2003, 17. 
1301 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, 
EU:T:2006:136, paragraph 29. 
1302 Ibid., paragraph 34; Judgment of 12 October 2007, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission, T-
474/04, EU:T:2007:306, paragraph 66.  
1303 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, 
EU:T:2006:136, paragraph 34-35; Judgment of 12 October 2007, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v 
Commission, T-474/04, EU:T:2007:306, paragraph 64. 
1304 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, 
EU:T:2006:136, paragraph 74-75.  
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This category could cover for instance internal EU institution documents, as such documents are 
sometimes granted ‘specific protection’ via secondary legislation in the context of access to the file. 
Regulation 773/2004 mentions that internal documents are not to be disclosed, but do not belong to 
either the category of business secrets or other confidential information.1305 The Notice on Access to 
the File clarified that access can be granted to all documents making up the ‘file’ as kept by DG 
Competition and its case handlers. An exception is made for an exhaustive list of ‘non-accessible’ 
documents.1306 These documents can be categorised as either documents containing business secrets 
and other confidential information on the one hand, and the Commission’s or the Member State 
competition authorities’ internal documents on the other hand,1307 in particular correspondence 
between the Commission and the NCAs or between the latter, or other correspondence with other 
public authorities from both member and non-member countries, in particular where there is an 
international agreement in place governing the confidentiality of the information exchanged, where 
such correspondence is contained in the file.1308 This was established in the Commission’s XIIth 
Report on Competition Policy of 1982 and was taken over in Regulation 1/2003.1309 Article 28 of 
regulation 1/2003 mentions that information acquired by the Commission, its officials and other 
servants as a result of the application of the regulation, and information of the kind covered by the 
obligation of professional secrecy, shall not be disclosed.1310 This again indicates that information 
acquired according to the Commissions powers of investigation, and information covered by the 
obligation of professional secrecy, are not the same. 
 
Originally there was some confusion regarding the types of documents protected as being ‘internal 
documents’, but this was clarified by the Notice on Access to the File. Non-incriminatory or non-
exculpatory documents such as drafts, opinions, memos, or notes do not constitute part of the 
evidence on which the Commission can rely in its assessment of a case and therefore a restriction on 
access to internal documents does not prejudice the proper exercise of the parties’ right of defence. 
While the Commission it not obliged to do so, it may choose to draft minutes of meetings with any 
person or undertaking. As such, they constitute the Commission’s interpretation of the meetings, and 
are therefore classified as internal documents. However, if the person or undertaking in question has 
agreed the minutes, a non-confidential version of the latter will be made accessible as they do 
constitute part of the evidence.1311 Internal documents thus enjoy to a certain extent the same 
protection as information falling under the obligation of professional secrecy (no access), but cannot 
be qualified as ‘other confidential information’ as they would not always fall under the definition.  
 
3.4.3 A balancing of interests  
 
                                                          
1305 Article 15(2) Regulation 773/2004: “The right of access to the file shall not extend to business secrets, other confidential information 
and internal documents of the Commission or of the competition authorities of the Member States.” [emphasis by auhtor] 
1306 As clarified in the Hercules case law. Judgment of 17 December 1991, SA Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission of the 
European Communities, T-7/89, EU:T:1991:75; Judgment of 8 July 1999, Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission of the European 
Communities, C-51/92 P, EU:C:1999:357. 
1307 I. van Bael, Due Process in Competition Proceedings, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2011, 178. 
1308 T. K. Giannakopoulos, Safeguarding companies’ rights in competition and anti-dumping/anti-subsidies proceedings, 2nd ed., Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 175-176, 189-190. 
1309 Article 27(2) Regulation 1/2003. See T. K. Giannakopoulos, Safeguarding companies’ rights in competition and anti-
dumping/anti-subsidies proceedings, 2nd ed., Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 187.  
1310 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, 
EU:T:2006:136, paragraph 2.  
1311 T. K. Giannakopoulos, Safeguarding companies’ rights in competition and anti-dumping/anti-subsidies proceedings, 2nd ed., Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 188-189. 
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The expansion of confidentiality legislation and legislation regarding access to documents can be 
compared to a tree, with interwoven branches and leaves, which renders the view opaque and the 
branches difficult to untangle.1312 To evaluate the legitimacy of a confidentiality claim it is necessary 
to identify the interests protected and whether such protection is warranted.1313 There is a systemic 
tension between the general objective of informing the public about government activities and the 
confidentiality rules that specifically apply to information obtained by competition agencies during 
their investigations.1314 In Pergan Hilfsstoffe the Court stated that the concept of professional secrecy 
should be interpreted in the light of the general principles and fundamental rights that are a 
constituent element of the EU legal order.1315 One way to shed some light on the interplay between 
the EU principle of open decision-making and the basic obligation of professional secrecy is to 
deconstruct the matter based on the different underlying fundamental rights that are implicitly being 
weighed. Disclosure is supported by the essential values of the EU that are transparency and 
openness, translated inter alia via the right of access to information. This should be weighed against 
the right of companies to see their confidential information protected so as not to incur (financial 
and reputational) damage. Such a right could in turn find grounds in the fundamental right against 
self-incrimination, the right to private life, and the right to have personal data protected. A careful 
balancing exercise is in order.  
 
3.4.3.1 The principles of openness and transparency 
 
The right of public access to EU documents is governed by the institutional and procedural 
principles of transparency and openness. Open decision-making is a fundamental element of the EU 
legal order that was enshrined in primary EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and is now reflected 
in Articles 1 TEU and 15 TFEU. The principle of openness functions as an ‘umbrella’ term covering 
both the principle of transparency and the principle of participation. It is further elaborated upon in 
Article 10 (3) TEU, linking the concept to that of ‘representative democracy’, and Article 11(2) TEU, 
which is aimed at the institutions.1316 The principle evolved from a prerequisite for the functioning of 
the Union to a right of its citizens. This has had an impact on its scope, which originally extended 
across the administration. Indeed, initially the principle of access to information was mainly an 
institutional challenge of the Union, requiring that institutions have the same amount of information 
when performing their duties, while it has now become a right of the individual. Article 298 TFEU 
conferred on the Union’s legislature the power to establish provisions to create an open, efficient 
and independent European administration.1317 In Kingdom of Sweden and Turco v Council, the Court “put 
the debate on transparency squarely in the camp of legitimacy and democracy.”1318 This respect for ‘democratic 
                                                          
1312 My gratitude goes out to PHILIP MARSDEN for coming up with this metaphor.  
1313 M. Chowdhury, “From paper promises to concrete commitments: Dismantling the obstacles to transatlantic 
cooperation in cartel enforcement”, AAI Working Paper No. 11-09, November 28, 2011, 13.  
1314 ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process – Competition Agency Confidentiality Practices, April 
2014, 15.  
1315 Judgment of 12 October 2007, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission, T-474/04, EU:T:2007:306, 
paragraph 75. 
1316 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C - Citizen’s rights and 
constitutional affairs, Justice, Freedom and Security, Openness, transparency and access to documents and information in 
the EU, PE 493.035, November 2013, 8.  
1317 Ibid., 8-12.  
1318 Ibid., 9; Judgment of 1 July 2008, Kingdom of Sweden and Maurizio Turco v Council of the European Union, Joined cases C-
39/05 P and C-52/05 P, EU:C:2008:374, paragraph 59. Earlier, Advocate General TESAURO had claimed that effective 
and efficient supervision, also at the level of public opinion, of the operations of the governing organization as well as 
genuinely participatory organizational models to evolve as regards relations between the administration and the 
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principles’, also integrated in the Treaty under Title II TEU, exerted new pressure on the institutions 
regarding access to information and documents. Rather than an abstract judgment call, the principle 
of openness evolved towards a ‘testable’ condition for the democratic legitimacy of the rules of the 
EU.1319 It was stated in Kingdom of Sweden v Commission that the effective exercise of democratic rights 
was meaningless without the possibility for citizens to understand the considerations underpinning 
legislative action.1320 The principle of openness therefore also encompasses disclosure in view of 
respecting a party’s rights of defence.  
 
The right to access to documents indeed follows from the notion of equality of arms and the right to 
an adversarial procedure, implying that parties should have knowledge of all evidence or 
observations filed and be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present the case under more or less 
equal conditions as the opponent. It is not explicitly included in article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Parties only have a limited right to access documents. The 
European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) confirmed that in civil procedures parties can only 
obtain disclosure of documents that can actually influence the judgment of the court. If documents 
have not been presented to the court, they must not be shared with the opposing party either. The 
right to have access to documents in possession of a court or administrative authority, which can 
influence the outcome of the case, is not absolute. However, a restriction on this right is only 
permitted when it is strictly necessary and the difficulties caused to the defence are sufficiently 
counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities.1321 The right to access and 
receive information is sometimes called ‘passive freedom of information’ and in this sense falls under 
article 10 of the ECHR on freedom of expression. The Article is primarily directed against 
interferences by the State and offers every person the right to try seeking information without being 
negatively impacted by the State. The State has to organize its information system in such a way that 
everyone can inform him- or herself about important questions. The right to receive information, 
however, is limited to publicly accessible information, Article 10 does not require that the State 
makes confidential information available to the public.1322  
 
The more specific ‘right of access to documents’ for third parties is now enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights under Article 42. The right is given to both natural and legal persons. Advocate 
General MADURO underlined that “[s]ince the right of access to documents of the institutions has become a 
fundamental right of constitutional import linked to the principles of democracy and openness, any piece of secondary 
legislation regulating the exercise of that right must be interpreted by reference to it, and limits placed on it by that 
legislation must be interpreted even more restrictively.”1323 Apart from this inclusion in the Charter, the Treaty 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
administered is only possible if the activities of the legislature, the executive and the public administration in general are 
appropriately public. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Kingdom of the Netherlands v Council of the European Union, C-
58/94, EU:C:1995:409, paragraph 14. 
1319 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C - Citizen’s rights and 
constitutional affairs, Justice, Freedom and Security, Openness, transparency and access to documents and information in 
the EU, PE 493.035, November 2013, 9.  
1320 Ibid., 10; Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission, C-64/05, EU:C:2007:433, 
paragraph 46.  
1321 E. Beumer, “The colorful spectrum of fundamental rights in EU competition law procedures: overcompensation or 
undercompensation of fundamental rights protection? A case study on the right to be heard”, paper prepared for the 9th 
ASCOLA Conference on procedural fairness in competition proceedings, Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014, 13-14.  
1322 C. Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights – Commentary, Munich, Beck (in Gemeinschaft mit Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden und Helbing & Lichtenhahn/Basel), 2014, 256. 
1323 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission, C-64/05, EU:C:2007:433, 
paragraphs 40-42.  
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of Lisbon introduced further changes by omitting the protection desired by Member States regarding 
the confidentiality of the Council’s work in Article 207(3) TEC.1324 The legislature does not, however, 
have full discretion to decide what the principles and conditions are that should govern this right, but 
should rather implement it in a way that EU citizens enjoy it.1325 For the parties to the case, the right 
is included in Article 41 of the Charter relating to the right to good administration, which 
encompasses “the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of 
confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy.”1326  
 
3.4.3.2 The underpinnings of the principle of professional secrecy 
 
The CJEU has explicitly established that the protection of business secrets is a general principle of 
EU law.1327 The concept that businesses have a fundamental right to the protection of their 
confidential business information, however, is not generally accepted.1328 This question is raised in 
particular in the discussion on the existence of human rights for companies and the assimilation 
between legal persons and natural persons.1329 Two such alleged rights can be discerned in the 
context of this study: the right against self-discrimination, and respect for private life, including the 
protection of personal data.  
 
While commercial entities can rely on the ECHR, as long as they are not closely related to the 
State,1330 the case law of the ECtHR suggests that the protection afforded to such entities must be 
framed in such a way as to avoid irremediably hampering the effectiveness of the regulatory 
structures in which they operate.1331 In this context, the ECtHR opined that “the Convention would allow 
for a somehow more ‘lenient’ approach to be applied in respect to the protection of rights enjoyed by commercial 
entities”.1332 Some rights can never be available to legal entities due to their nature, such as, for 
                                                          
1324 According to Article 15(3)(1) TFEU the right is “subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with this 
paragraph”. 
1325 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C - Citizen’s rights and 
constitutional affairs, Justice, Freedom and Security, Openness, transparency and access to documents and information in 
the EU, PE 493.035, November 2013, 11. 
1326 E. Beumer, “The colorful spectrum of fundamental rights in EU competition law procedures: overcompensation or 
undercompensation of fundamental rights protection? A case study on the right to be heard”, paper prepared for the 9th 
ASCOLA Conference on procedural fairness in competition proceedings, Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014, 17.  
1327 Judgement of 14 February 2008, Varec SA v Belgian State, C-450/06, EU:C:2008:91, paragraph 49; Judgment of 24 
June 1986, AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, C-53/85, 
EU:C:1986:256, paragraph 28; Judgment of 19 May 1994, Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-Produktiebedrijven (SEP) NV v 
Commission of the European Communities, C-36/92 P, EU:C:1994:205, paragraph 37.  
1328 P. Van Nuffel, “Human rights and competition law: do undertakings have a ‘fundamental right’ of protection of 
confidential information?” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – 
Liber Amicorum Jacques Steenbergen, Brussel, Larcier, 2014, 588. 
1329 For a discussion of this topic, see M. Emberland, The human rights of companies – exploring the structure of ECHR protection, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2006. 
1330 For instance where a legal entity is exercising public authority. See Article 34 ECHR mentioning that the Court may 
receive applications from “any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals”. Also see C. Grabenwarter, European 
Convention on Human Rights – Commentary, Munich, Beck (in Gemeinschaft mit Hart Publishing, Oxford, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden und Helbing & Lichtenhahn/Basel), 2014, 3.  
1331 A. Andreangeli, “Competition Law and Human Rights: Striking a Balance Between Business Freedom and Regulatory 
Intervention”, Edinburgh Research Explorer, 2009, 
http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/14818433/Competition_Law_Human_Rights_Striking_a_Balance_Between_
Business_Freedom_and_Regulatory_Intervention.pdf, (accessed February 2017), 5. 
1332 See, for instance, Beyeler v Italy, App. No. 33202/96, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep 52 (2001), paragraph 109; Lithgow v United 
Kingdom, App. No. 9006/80, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, (1985), paragraph 110.  
216 
 
instance, the right to life, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, or the 
prohibition of the death penalty.1333 The EU courts have adopted a somewhat more generous 
approach than the ECtHR. According to VAN NUFFEL “[i]t is fair to say that whenever undertakings are 
caught by the competition rules, the legal persons responding for their behaviour also enjoy the protection of the 
applicable ‘human rights’.”1334 Several guarantees enshrined in the ECHR as well as in the Charter have 
been extended to apply to legal persons involved in competition law proceedings.1335 
 
A) The right not to incriminate oneself  
 
The broader debate surrounding the assimilation of companies to individuals regarding human rights 
in the context of competition law enforcement is particularly acute with regard to due process rights 
such as the right not to incriminate oneself. WILS explained for instance that the privilege against 
self-incrimination originated from the threat of physical pressure that could be imposed on natural 
persons, a threat not present with regard to companies.1336 It is therefore open for debate whether 
the extension of human rights to corporations should be uncritical and complete, and whether in this 
manner the conception of due process protection in this area of law is not being overstretched. 
SANCHEZ GRAELLS and MARCOS claimed that while in a competition law context administrative law 
procedures should be sound and a strong system of judicial review should be in place, corporations 
should not have access to broader constitutional or human rights protections.1337 JONES likewise 
disagreed with the alignment of natural and legal persons. According to him the human rights 
context is one example of an area in which both are not fully congruent, and the premise that legal 
persons and natural persons should have the same privilege against self-incrimination in the 
administrative context is flawed.1338 
 
Both the personal and material scope of the privilege against self-incrimination are subject to 
discussion. One of the reasons why the scope of this privilege is so controversial is because it 
touches upon the constituent elements of competition law. There is a clash between a natural person 
                                                          
1333 C. Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights – Commentary, Munich, Beck (in Gemeinschaft mit Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden und Helbing & Lichtenhahn/Basel), 2014, 3.  
1334 P. Van Nuffel, “Human rights and competition law: do undertakings have a ‘fundamental right’ of protection of 
confidential information?” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – 
Liber Amicorum Jacques Steenbergen, Brussel, Larcier, 2014, 581.  
1335 See, for example, Judgment of 26 June 1980, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities, 
136/79, EU:C:1980:169, paragraph 19-20; Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in  
AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, 53/85, EU:C:1986:25, paragraph 25-
27; Judgment of 17 December 1998, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, C-185/95 P, 
EU:C:1998:608, paragraph 20-21; Judgment of 8 July 1999, Montecatini SpA v Commission of the European Communities, C-
235/92 P, EU:C:1999:362, paragraph 175-176.   
1336 X., “Discussion report (CARS)” in P. Nihoul & T. Scoczny (eds) Procedural fairness in competition proceedings, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, 330.  
1337 See, for instance, A. Sanchez Graells and F. Marcos, “‘Human rights’ protection for corporate antitrust defendants: 
are we not going overboard?” in P. Nihoul & T. Skoczny (eds), Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, abstract.  
1338 C. Jones, “Into the parallel universe: procedural fairness in private litigation after the Damages Directive”, 9th 
ASCOLA Conference Warsaw 2014 on Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, Centre for Antitrust and 
Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014, 21.  
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possessing a privilege against self-incrimination, and a legal regime that does not always target the 
natural persons who have acted on behalf of a legal person.1339 
 
The right against self-incrimination is not explicitly mentioned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU or the ECHR. Article 6 ECHR contains a list of additional rights that are applicable in 
criminal cases, but also here an explicit privilege against self-incrimination or a right to silence is 
lacking.1340 Nevertheless, the right against self-incrimination has been considered to be a part of the 
right to a fair trial as enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention according to the ECtHR.1341  
 
In the 1993 Funke v France case the ECtHR first recognised the privilege against self-incrimination, 
but did not elaborate on its scope, origins, or rationale.1342 In John Murray v United Kingdom a non-
absolute right of silence was recognised.1343 The privilege against self-incrimination was further 
elaborated upon in the controversial case of Saunders v. United Kingdom.1344 Most importantly, this case 
clarified that the privilege relates only to the admission of the evidence in criminal proceedings, but 
does not prohibit the use of compulsory questioning powers in the course of a purely administrative 
investigation.1345 Much ink has flown about the nature of competition law proceedings.1346 Even 
though EU competition law proceedings are ‘administrative’, as they do not take place before courts, 
the ECtHR recognized that they can nevertheless be ‘criminal’ in nature, given their general 
applicability in the public interest and the deterrent and punitive nature of the potential sanctions.1347 
The Court did not accept the Government’s argument in this case that the complexity of corporate 
fraud and the vital public interest in the investigation and punishment of such fraud could justify a 
marked departure from one of the basic principles of a fair procedure.1348 In the O’Halloran and 
Francis case it was confirmed finally that while the right to a fair trial was in itself absolute, its 
                                                          
1339 C. Jones, “Into the parallel universe: procedural fairness in private litigation after the Damages Directive”, 9th 
ASCOLA Conference Warsaw 2014 on Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, Centre for Antitrust and 
Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014, 19.  
1340 A. Ashworth, “Self-incrimination in European Human Rights law – a pregnant pragmatism?”, Cardozo Law Review, 
Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008, 751. 
1341 Found in Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. C. Jones, “Into 
the parallel universe: procedural fairness in private litigation after the Damages Directive”, 9th ASCOLA Conference 
Warsaw 2014 on Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 
University of Warsaw, Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014, 11.  
1342 Funke v France, App. No. 10828/84, 256 Eur. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
1343 John Murray v United Kingdom, App. No. 18731/91, 1996-I Eur. H.R. 30 (1996). While the privilege against self-
incrimination concerns the threat of coercion in order to make an accused yield certain information, the right of silence 
relates to the drawing of adverse inferences when an accused fails to testify or to answer questions. (A. Ashworth, “Self-
incrimination in European Human Rights law – a pregnant pragmatism?”, Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008, 754.) 
1344 Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (1996). 
1345 A. Ashworth, “Self-incrimination in European Human Rights law – a pregnant pragmatism?”, Cardozo Law Review, 
Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008, 756. 
1346 In particular relating to concerns as to their compliance with standards of due process laid down by Article 6 of the 
ECHR. See, for instance, Slater, Donald, Thomas, Sébastien & Waelbroeck, Denis, “Competition Law Proceedings 
Before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?”, European Competition Journal, Vol. 
5, No. 1, 2009; R. Nazzini, “Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition 
Law: A Comparative Contextual-Functionalist Perspective”, King’s College London Dickson Poon School of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series: Paper No. 2016-31; W. Wils, “The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial 
Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis”, World 
Competition: Law & Economic Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2004. 
1347 Ozturk v Germany, App. No. 8544/79, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 409, (1984), paragraph 55-56.  
1348 A. Ashworth, “Self-incrimination in European Human Rights law – a pregnant pragmatism?”, Cardozo Law Review, 
Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008, 758-760, referring to Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 
(1996), 2044, 2065. 
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features, among which the right to remain silent, should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account the circumstances of the case, the nature and the objectives of the proceedings, the 
intensity of the coercion exercised in taking the evidence, the existence of  relevant safeguards, and 
the use to which the material in question was put.1349 The rare departures from the principle call for a 
special justification, over and above the broader public interest. This very brief overview of the early 
case law already indicates that the Strasbourg jurisprudence on the privilege against self-incrimination 
was susceptible to criticisms of inconsistency and under-development.1350  
 
Apart from the aforementioned discussion on the scope ratione personae of the privilege, it is 
questioned as well whether the right encompasses an absolute right of silence, or rather allows a 
person or undertaking to be forced to respond to questions of a ‘factual nature’.1351 The only EU 
document in the context of competition law specifically mentioning self-incrimination is Regulation 
1/2003. It provides in recital 23 that the Commission may require information to be supplied in the 
context of investigations under Article 101 and 102 TFEU, and that while undertakings cannot be 
forced to admit that they have committed an infringement when complying with such a decision of 
the Commission, they are nevertheless obliged to answer factual questions and to provide documents 
that may be used to establish the existence of an infringement on their part. 
 
The CJEU considers that its judgements are consistent with Article 6 of the ECHR.1352 The case-law 
of both courts does, however, diverge. In Orkem and SGL Carbon, the CJEU clarified that obliging 
undertakings to produce possibly incriminating pre-existing documents does not violate the privilege 
against self-incrimination, as currently codified in Regulation 1/2003. The Court based itself on 
“whether and to what extent the general principles of Community law, of which fundamental rights form an integral 
part and in the light of which all Community legislation must be interpreted, require, […] recognition of the right not 
to supply information capable of being used in order to establish, against the person supplying it, the existence of an 
infringement of the competition rules.”1353 It concluded that Member State legislation generally only 
recognized such a right to a natural person charged with an offence in criminal proceedings, and not 
for legal persons committing economic infringements, in particular relating to competition law.1354 
On the contrary, undertakings under investigation are held to actively cooperate with the 
Commission and must make all information relating to the subject‑matter of the investigation 
                                                          
1349 A. Andreangeli, “Competition Law and Human Rights: Striking a Balance Between Business Freedom and Regulatory 
Intervention”, Edinburgh Research Explorer, 2009, 
http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/14818433/Competition_Law_Human_Rights_Striking_a_Balance_Between_
Business_Freedom_and_Regulatory_Intervention.pdf (accessed February 2017), 6-7; A. Ashworth, “Self-incrimination in 
European Human Rights law – a pregnant pragmatism?”, Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008, 763-764, referring to 
O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, App. No. 15809/02, 25624/02, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407 (2008), 410. 
1350 A. Ashworth, “Self-incrimination in European Human Rights law – a pregnant pragmatism?”, Cardozo Law Review, 
Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008, 760-762. For instance, in Jalloh v. Germany (Jalloh v. Germany, App. No. 54810/00, 44 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 32 (2007)) the Court stated that the weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the offence 
was a relevant factor. This contradicts the statement in Saunders that the privilege applies “to criminal proceedings in respect of 
all types of criminal offences without distinction from the most simple to the most complex.” (Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (1996), 2044, 2066) See A. Ashworth, “Self-incrimination in European Human Rights 
law – a pregnant pragmatism?”, Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008, 766-767.   
1351 See I. Van Bael, Due Process in Competition Proceedings, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2011. 
1352 C. Jones, “Into the parallel universe: procedural fairness in private litigation after the Damages Directive”, 9th 
ASCOLA Conference Warsaw 2014 on Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, Centre for Antitrust and 
Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014, 12.  
1353 Judgment of 18 October 1989, Orkem v Commission of the European Communities, 374/87, EU:C:1989:387, paragraph 28. 
1354 Ibid., paragraph 29. 
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available to it.1355 According to the Court, competition law in particular is a field that requires 
cooperation of undertakings more than other fields, due to the secretive nature of some 
infringements and the fact that competition law investigations are very fact-intensive. Firms involved 
in competition proceedings, despite not being entitled to ‘evade the Commission’s investigations’, do 
enjoy a limited degree of protection against self-incrimination in the course of the preliminary stages 
of the procedure to avoid irremediably damaging their rights of the defence.1356 In sum, the 
Commission is allowed to compel an undertaking to provide information and documents in the 
undertaking’s possession, even if such information may be used to establish the existence of a 
competition law infringement against that undertaking.1357 The CJEU recognised that an undertaking 
subject to an investigation relating to competition law may indeed rely on Article 6 ECHR, but 
claimed that neither the wording of the Article nor the ECtHR case-law indicated that it upheld the 
right not to give evidence against oneself.1358 However, the Court did nuance this by allowing the 
privilege to be asserted to prevent testimony in oral or written form in response to information 
requests or oral interview requests.1359 A company may remain silent to the extent that the 
information requested by the Commission can be considered as compelling the company to provide 
answers which might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an infringement, as it is the 
task of the Commission to provide proof.1360 This is a permitted exception to the aforementioned 
obligation of companies to cooperate with the Commission during competition investigations.1361 It 
is unclear whether a distinction should be made in the context of a leniency application between 
previously existing documents and oral or written testimony provided by individuals or undertakings 
respectively, as one could claim that the right against self-incrimination has been waived completely 
once a leniency application has been made. A similar approach is followed by the US judiciary with 
regard to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In the US, the privilege is a 
personal right of natural persons and applies only to spoken or testimonial communications.1362 The 
European Courts’ decision is motivated by factors relating to the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Commission’s enforcement powers. It is considered that an absolute right against self-incrimination 
would constitute an unjustified hindrance to the Commission’s role as enforcer of EU competition 
law and would go beyond what is necessary in order to preserve the rights of defence of 
                                                          
1355 Judgment of 29 June 2006, Commission of the European Communities v SGL Carbon AG, C-301/04 P, EU:C:2006:432, 
paragraph 40.  
1356 A. Andreangeli, “Competition Law and Human Rights: Striking a Balance Between Business Freedom and Regulatory 
Intervention”, Edinburgh Research Explorer, 2009, available at 
http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/14818433/Competition_Law_Human_Rights_Striking_a_Balance_Between_
Business_Freedom_and_Regulatory_Intervention.pdf (accessed February 2017), 7.  
1357 Judgment of 29 June 2006, Commission of the European Communities v SGL Carbon AG, C-301/04 P, EU:C:2006:432, 
paragraph 41.  
1358 Judgment of 18 October 1989, Orkem v Commission of the European Communities, 374/87, EU:C:1989:38, paragraph 30. 
1359 For a more detailed assessment of this case-law, see C. Jones, “Into the parallel universe: procedural fairness in 
private litigation after the Damages Directive”, 9th ASCOLA Conference Warsaw 2014 on Procedural Fairness in 
Competition Proceedings, Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014, 13, 18. 
Judgment of 18 October 1989, Orkem v Commission of the European Communities, 374/87, EU:C:1989:387; Judgment of 29 
June 2006, Commission of the European Communities v SGL Carbon AG, C-301/04 P, EU:C:2006:432.  
1360 Judgment of 18 October 1989, Orkem v Commission of the European Communities, 374/87, EU:C:1989:387, paragraph 35; 
Judgment of 15 June 2005, Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd, Intech EDM BV, Intech EDM AG and SGL Carbon AG v Commission of the 
European Communities, Joined cases T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03, EU:T:2005:220, paragraph 402. 
1361 I. Van Bael, Due process in competition proceedings, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2011, 158-160. 
1362 C. Jones, “Into the parallel universe: procedural fairness in private litigation after the Damages Directive”, 9th 
ASCOLA Conference Warsaw 2014 on Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, Centre for Antitrust and 
Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014, 14.  
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undertakings.1363 The above is in contrast, however, with the statement of the ECtHR stated that “the 
right not to incriminate oneself cannot reasonably be confined to statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks 
which are directly incriminating.”1364 There is conflict therefore between the approaches of both courts.1365 
 
B) Private life  
 
It is rightly stated by some that “[c]onceptually the cases of companies invoking the right to privacy in order to 
protect purely financial interests are […] far away from the notion of human rights conferred to safeguard one’s 
aptitude to establish and develop interpersonal relationships” and that therefore in the case of legal persons 
carrying out economic activities the application of fundamental rights should not too easily lead to 
the recognition of claims, if they are based simply on the prevention of the risk of reputational 
damage or on chilling incentives to denounce competition law infringements.1366 It was nevertheless 
established that legal entities may invoke the rights under Article 8 of the Convention.1367 Even if the 
ECtHR stated that the entitlement of public authorities to interfere with confidentiality rights might 
well be more far-reaching in the sphere of professional or business activities or premises,1368 it has 
equally confirmed that the right for a private life as contained in Article 8 ECRH (and Article 7 of 
the Charter) is applicable to both natural and legal persons. In its 2002 judgment Colas Est, the 
ECtHR confirmed that the rights contained in Article 8 of the Convention may, in certain 
circumstances, be held to include the right to respect for a company’s registered office, branches, or 
other business premises.1369 This case-law relates to the situation of inspections carried out in 
business practices. ECtHR case-law expressly considering a legal person’s right to have confidential 
business information protected under Article 8 ECHR is non-existent. The right of companies under 
Article 8 ECHR relates to arbitrary and disproportionate interference by public authorities, and 
seems to relate rather to the company’s ‘home’ and correspondence.1370  
 
The right to protection of reputation also constitutes a right which is protected by Article 8 of the 
Convention as part of the right to respect for private life. However, for Article 8 to come into play, it 
is required that the attack on the reputation must be significantly serious and cause prejudice to the 
personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life. The ECtHR has moreover stated that 
                                                          
1363 Judgment of 14 March 2014, Buzzi Unicem SpA v European Commission, T-297/11, EU:T:2014:122, paragraph 60.  
1364 Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (1996), 71.  
1365 A. Andreangeli, “Competition Law and Human Rights: Striking a Balance Between Business Freedom and Regulatory 
Intervention”, Edinburgh Research Explorer, 2009, 
http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/14818433/Competition_Law_Human_Rights_Striking_a_Balance_Between_
Business_Freedom_and_Regulatory_Intervention.pdf (accessed February 2017), 19.  
1366 P. Van Nuffel, “Human rights and competition law: do undertakings have a ‘fundamental right’ of protection of 
confidential information?” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – 
Liber Amicorum Jacques Steenbergen, Brussel, Larcier, 2014, 591-592. 
1367 C. Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights – Commentary, Munich, Beck (in Gemeinschaft mit Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden und Helbing & Lichtenhahn/Basel), 2014, 186. 
1368 Niemietz v. Federal Republic of Germany , App. No. 13710/88, 251-B Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1992), paragraph 31: “[…] 
to interpret the words "private life" and "home" as including certain professional or business activities or premises would be consonant with the 
essential object and purpose of Article 8 (art. 8), namely to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities […]. 
Such an interpretation would not unduly hamper the Contracting States, for they would retain their entitlement to "interfere" to the extent 
permitted by paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2); that entitlement might well be more far-reaching where professional or business activities or 
premises were involved than would otherwise be the case.”  
1369 Colas Est and others v France, App. No. 37971/97, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep 17 (2002).    
1370 P. Van Nuffel, “Human rights and competition law: do undertakings have a ‘fundamental right’ of protection of 
confidential information?” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – 
Liber Amicorum Jacques Steenbergen, Brussel, Larcier, 2014, 586. 
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“Article 8 cannot be relied on in order to complain of a loss of reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of one’s 
own actions […].”1371 A company can therefore not rely on the right of protection of reputation to 
oppose the disclosure of incriminating information. This was confirmed by the General Court in the 
Evonik case.1372  
 
The President of the General Court recognised in some recent orders the fundamental right of an 
undertaking to respect for its private life.1373 In the Varec case, relating to public procurement, the 
CJEU allowed legal persons to rely on Article 8 ECHR and the corresponding Article 7 of the 
Charter to protect confidential business-related information from disclosure. The Court first 
confirmed that the right to the protection of confidential information is in essence a substantive 
right, but that its application can have procedural consequences. The right to a fair trial in Article 6 
ECHR implies, amongst other things, that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal. The ECtHR has consistently held that one 
way to assess this ‘fairness’ is via the extent to which proceedings occur according the adversarial 
principle. The adversarial principle generally means that parties have the right to inspect and 
comment on the evidence and observations submitted to the court. The Court added, however, that 
in some cases it may be justified to withhold certain information in this process in order to preserve 
the fundamental rights of a third party or to safeguard an important public interest. It then continued 
that one of the fundamental rights that may be protected in this way is the right to respect for private 
life, a right flowing from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States and enshrined 
in Article 8 ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union. It 
recognised the case-law of the ECtHR that expanded the notion of ‘private life’ to the professional 
or commercial activities of either natural or legal persons and recalled its own case-law 
acknowledging that the protection of business secrets is a general principle. In the case at hand the 
right to confidential treatment should be balanced against the public interest of maintaining fair 
competition in contract award procedures, justifying that in the context of a review of a decision 
taken by a contracting authority in relation to a contract award procedure, the parties are not entitled 
to unlimited and absolute access to all of the information relating to the award procedure concerned. 
This right to protection of confidential information must, however, respect the requirements of 
effective legal protection and the rights of defence of the parties, as well as with the right to a fair 
trial in general.1374  
 
C) Personal data  
 
Article 8 ECHR has also evolved to contain the protection of personal information due to the 
possibilities of modern computer-based collection and data-analysis. Data-protection is seen as a 
                                                          
1371 Axel Springer AG v Germany, App. No. 39954/08, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 183 (2012), 83-84. 
1372 “I note that the appellant does not dispute the General Court’s finding that it cannot properly rely on the loss of its reputation resulting 
from the publication of the information relating to its unlawful activities, as that loss was the foreseeable consequence of its own actions.” 
(Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission, C-162/15, EU:C:2016:587, 
paragraph 171.) 
1373 P. Van Nuffel, “Human rights and competition law: do undertakings have a ‘fundamental right’ of protection of 
confidential information?” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – 
Liber Amicorum Jacques Steenbergen, Brussel, Larcier, 2014, 587. See Order of the President in Akzo Nobel NV and Others v 
European Commission, T-345/12 R, EU:T:2012:605, paragraph 32-33; Order of the President in Pilkington Group Ltd v 
European Commission, T-462/12 R, EU:T:2013:119, paragraph 44-45 (on the envisaged publication of a non-confidential 
version of an infringement decision); Order of the President in AbbVie v Ema, T-44/13 R, EU:T:2014:694, paragraph 47-
48 (on access to information submitted by an undertaking as part of its request for a marketing authorisation.)  
1374 Judgement of 14 February 2008, Varec SA v Belgian State, C-450/06, EU:C:2008:91, paragraph 28, 46-52.  
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particular aspect of the right to respect for private life where data of a subject are collected, recoded 
or analyzed and a person’s private life is thereby affected. This can also involve public information, 
where it is systematically collected and stored by the authorities. This entails that business matters 
may also be included rather than mere information on a person’s private life.1375  
 
The right to the protection of personal data is explicitly acknowledged in Article 8(1) of the Charter 
and Article 16(1) TFEU. EU as well as international instruments, however, are unanimous in 
indicating natural persons as the sole owner of the right to have personal data protected. Personal 
‘company’ data simply do not exist. The Annex to the OECD Recommendation containing 
guidelines on the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data, both in the original 
1980 and the revised 2013 version, defines ‘personal data’ as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual”.1376 Similarly, the Council of Europe Convention already in its title indicates that 
it only applies to individuals.1377 
 
The Commentary to the Charter explains that “Article 8 of the Charter is inspired by, and is based on, a 
variety of legal instruments although the protection of personal data is not recognized as a specific right in the 
framework of existing international instruments on the protection of human rights.”1378 It is based in particular on 
the protection of privacy and private life contained Article 8 ECHR and developed by the case law of 
the ECtHR.1379 It is not an absolute right, and must be weighed in particular against the right to 
freedom of expression and information, including “the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”.1380 The Commentary explicitly refers to the 
potential tension between the right of access to documents in Article 42 of the Charter and the right 
of individuals to protection of their personal data, suggesting that the weight of the respective rights 
should be defined and their application optimized in such a way that the right with less weight 
remains guaranteed as far as possible.1381 
 
Data protection was further elaborated upon in EU secondary legislation, which was recently revised 
entirely.1382 The original Data Protection Directive1383 defined personal data as “any information relating 
to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
                                                          
1375 C. Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights – Commentary, Munich, Beck (in Gemeinschaft mit Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden und Helbing & Lichtenhahn/Basel), 2014, 189.  
1376 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 23 September 1980, 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.ht
m#part1 (accessed February 2017); OECD, The OECD privacy framework, 2013, 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf (accessed February 2017).   
1377 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Strasbourg, 28 
January 1981.    
1378 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, June 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf 
(accessed June 2017), 90.  
1379 Ibid.  
1380 Article 10 of the ECHR, set out in Article 11 of the Charter.  
1381 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, June 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf 
(accessed June 2017), 91-92.  
1382 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/ (accessed February 2017).  
1383 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016.  
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physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”1384 The CJEU confirmed that its provisions 
were to be interpreted in the light of Article 8 ECHR, and should be seen as offering both 
substantive and procedural guarantees to individuals against risks relating to the processing of their 
personal data.1385 Both the new regulation and the new directive focus exclusively on natural 
persons.1386 The definition of personal data has not significantly changed in these instruments.1387 The 
Regulation further explains that the right to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right, 
but its function in society must be taken into account and it should be balanced against other 
fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 
 
3.4.4 Exchange of non-evidence 
 
These roots indicate that a delicate balancing act should take place between the protection of 
confidential information and ensuring wide access to information. A ready-made solution is not 
available. The ICN in 2007 distinguished four categories of information that competition agencies 
may wish to exchange. The first one was information that is already in the public domain, meaning 
that is has been published or otherwise made public.1388 The exchange of this type of information is 
generally only hindered by practicalities such as language or resource constraints.1389 Information that 
is not necessarily in the public domain, but is generated within the competition authority, so-called 
agency information, was identified as a second category.1390 Information that is provided by the 
parties (voluntarily or compulsory) and in the possession of the agency constituted a third category. 
The ICN recognised information obtained from the parties at the request of another agency as a final 
category.1391 The OECD came to a similar conclusion in 2012 and identified three types of 
information that agencies may wish to exchange in the course of an investigation, concurring with 
the first three categories identified by the ICN.1392 This typology was altered somewhat following the 
2012 OECD/ICN Joint Survey. Again, the first category was publicly available information. Quite 
                                                          
1384 Article 2(a) Directive 95/46/EC. 
1385 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, June 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf, 
(accessed June 2017), 92.  
1386 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016; Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016.   
1387 “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online 
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural 
person.” Article 4(1) Regulation 2016/679.   
1388 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 28-29. 
1389 OECD, Limitations and constraints to international co-operation, Issues paper by the secretariat, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)8, 23 October 2012, 4. 
1390 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 28-29; OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International 
Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 86. 
1391 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 7.  
1392 OECD, Limitations and constraints to international co-operation, Issues paper by the secretariat, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)8, 23 October 2012, 4.  
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surprisingly, only 49% of respondents (27 agencies) were authorised to freely share public 
information with other enforcement agencies. Next is the category of non-public agency 
information. This information was identified by 29% of respondents as information that is 
exchanged among enforcers. Confidential information was then identified as the third form of 
information that can be exchanged. Many respondents, 31,56%, can only exchange such information 
when there is consent form the parties, mostly in the form of a waiver, while 18% indicated that they 
cannot disclose this type of information to other enforcers unless they are part of a regional network 
that allows it. The next category, identified by 22% of respondents was non-confidential, case-related 
information. Finally, 4 respondents indicated the relevance of the publicly accessible reasoning 
provided in support of enforcement decisions, in which non-confidential information (or non-
confidential versions of confidential information) is made available.1393  
 
Where there is room for immediate improvement is the delineation of non-public, but also non-
confidential, ‘agency information’. Agency information can be defined as information that is 
generated within an agency and does not specifically identify confidential information of individual 
enterprises. Competition agencies are not legally prohibited from disclosing such information, but it 
is nevertheless generally kept from the public.1394 While such information is legitimately withheld 
from the parties to a case, there is no reason not to exchange such information among peers.1395 
There is confusion, however, on what this category of information encompasses, resulting in sub-
optimal exchanges. The ICN already in 2007 recognised that there is a lack of clarity surrounding the 
types of agency information that can be exchanged and used, and concluded that public information 
and agency information should be more widely exchanged. This area was identified as in need for 
improvement by the OECD as well.1396 While the focus has mainly been on the exchange of 
evidence, clarity on the exchange of information other than evidence may present an easier way to 
significantly increase information streams among competition agencies. Guidelines could be 
developed containing definitions as to what information normally can and cannot be exchanged 
between agencies in the absence of a specific agreement or party-authorisation, as well as 
clarifications as to the uses to which such information may be put and the conditions under which it 
may be exchanged. Categories of non-public, non-confidential information could be more clearly 
defined, permitting a more streamlined and transparent cooperation process. This could be 
complemented by statements from individual agencies as to what they can and cannot exchange.1397 
Language or resource constraints that hinder cooperation can also be addressed in bilateral 
agreements. Arrangements can be made with regard to potential translation costs, and work-sharing 
may limit the overall resource implications. Up until today, however, such recommendations have 
not received any follow-up.  
 
                                                          
1393 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 86-87.  
1394 OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)55, 29 October 2013, 7; OECD, Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the 
secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 20 November 2015, 5, footnote 6. 
1395 OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)55, 29 October 2013, 7. 
1396 “Improvements could also be made in understanding what constitutes “agency information” as opposed to confidential information to 
facilitate exchange of the former.” OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 55. 
1397 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 24, 28.  
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Examples of agency information that could be disclosed to another agency, following an agreement, 
and subject to disclosure and usage restrictions (respectively not to divulge the information outside 
the receiving agency and not to use it for any purposes other than the reason for which it was 
exchanged for instance) are: information about the existence or absence of an investigation (case-
related or sector-specific); the fact that an agency has requested information from outside its 
jurisdiction; leads and non-confidential background information; the provisional orientation of the 
agency in the case, general information on how the case is analysed, for instance concerning 
geographic and product market definition or the assessment of competitive effects or efficiencies, 
potential remedies being considered, the methods applied with respect to the setting of fines and 
other penalties; best practices, precedents, legal opinions; and the progress in an on-going case and 
the likely timing of key steps in the case.1398 Evidently also publicly available information should be 
exchanged freely.1399 Agencies could then diversify provisions with respect to the conditions and 
safeguards applicable to the exchange of non-confidential (public) information, the exchange of 
agency information and the exchange of confidential information. This further break down would 
allow for more differentiation and more information flow than is currently the case.  
 
3.5 Concerns about the exchange of confidential information and how they are addressed by 
the EU-Switzerland Agreement  
 
The exchange of confidential information between competition authorities, no matter in what way or 
to which extent,1400 faces a fair amount of scepticism and criticism. The exchange of confidential 
information has been met with misconception in the past, and is still beheld with suspicion today, as 
it represents a far-reaching form of cooperation that entails certain complexities. It is therefore 
important to identify these complexities and persistent concerns, and how they are addressed by the 
EU’s second generation agreement.  
 
3.5.1 First concern: increased liability and leakage of information   
 
3.5.1.1 Follow-on private litigation as main concern 
 
Is it so that business groups generally do not support the exchange of confidential information 
among enforcers out of fear for ‘vigorous and effective enforcement’ of competition laws? Perhaps 
some do not. However, there are far more companies that do wish to ‘play according to the rules’ 
and benefit from antitrust enforcement, than there are companies who engage in anticompetitive 
behaviour and do not wish to be uncovered. A company is far more likely to suffer damages due to a 
cartel than be a member of one, and enjoys the benefits of more efficient and effective 
enforcement.1401 Those opposing, however, are perhaps one of the reasons of stifling progress in the 
                                                          
1398 Compiled data from ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel 
Investigations, Report to the ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 28-29; OECD, Discussion on how to define 
confidential information, Contribution of the United States, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)55, 29 October 2013, 7; 
OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 
February 2013, 86. 
1399 ICN, Waivers of Confidentiality in Cartel Investigations – Explanatory Note, 2014, 5.    
1400 As is shown by the different approach taken by the EU and US, there is room for diversification in how to approach 
confidential information exchange among competition law enforcers, but both agreements suffer from criticism and 
under-use.  
1401 S. Hammond, “Beating cartels at their own game – sharing information in the fight against cartels”, presented at the 
Inaugural Symposium of the Competition Policy Research Center - Fair Trade Commission of Japan, Tokyo, 20 
November 2003, 8-9.  
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field of international cooperation, so this illegitimate concern nevertheless deserves attention, in 
particular as cooperation of undertakings is a vital aspect of the public enforcement system.  
 
So for some undertakings, an obvious concern revolving around information exchange among 
enforcers is that this will lead to increased and more effective public enforcement, as an investigation 
in one jurisdiction can more easily trigger or help advance an investigation in another one when 
information can be freely exchanged. More effective public enforcement is exactly one of the goals 
of the EU-Switzerland Agreement.1402 This ‘concern’ is therefore valid in the sense that this is a very 
likely consequence of the Agreement, but it has no legitimacy. Nevertheless, while information may 
be freely discussed under the Agreement, the exchange of information containing personal data, 
whether it occurs with or without the consent of the parties involved, is restricted to cases where 
competition authorities are investigating the same or related conduct or transactions. This not only 
ensures that the agendas of the competition agencies are not flooded with requests for assistance, it 
also entails that information cannot be exchanged ‘at random’.  
 
Second, the concern exists that liability in private (follow-on) enforcement could potentially increase. 
Private enforcement can take the form of stand-alone litigation, or follow-on litigation. In the latter 
case the anticompetitive conduct was already established by a public enforcement authority before 
the private case was brought before a court. The claimant in both cases will still have to prove the 
damage suffered from the anticompetitive conduct and the causation between the breach of the 
competition rules and the loss. To do so, access to confidential information held by the defendants, 
the European Commission or national competition authorities will often be sought.1403 Information 
exchange among enforcers is feared to lead to improved access to information by private parties via 
discoverability in the foreign jurisdiction of confidential information.1404 There is extensive literature 
on the interplay between access to the file or discovery and leniency programmes for instance.1405 In 
what follows, the concerns of the companies potentially facing private litigation will be addressed, 
while in the next section the concern of the public enforcers that private enforcement would 
undermine their leniency programmes will be scrutinized. Unbridled private enforcement poses a 
problem, in contrast to increased public enforcement, because the different national enforcement 
systems are not aligned, which presents issues with regard to due process.  
 
In both the EU and Switzerland, judicial remedial mechanisms are traditionally left unexplored by 
plaintiffs.1406 Between 2006 and 2012, less than a quarter of the Commission’s infringement decisions 
                                                          
1402 Article 1 EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1403 S. Peyer, “Access to competition authorities’ files in private antitrust litigation”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, 2015, 59.  
1404 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 97. 
1405 See, for instance, A. Caruso, “Leniency programmes and protection of confidentiality: the experience of the 
European Commission”, Journal of Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 1, No. 6, 2010, 453-477; A. Petrasincu, “Discovery 
revisited- the impact of the US discovery rules on the European Commission’s leniency programme”, European 
Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 7, 2011, 356-368; C. Nicolosi, “No good whistle goes unpunished: can we protect 
European Antitrust Leniency applications from discovery?”, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 31, 
No. 1, 2011, 225-260; C. Canenbley & T. Steinvorth, “Effective enforcement of competition law: is there a solution to 
the conflict between leniency programmes and private damages actions?”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 
Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011, 315- 326. 
1406 K. Moodaliyar, J. F. Reardon, S. Theuerkauf, “The Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement in 
Competition Law - A Comparative Analysis of South African, the European Union, and Swiss Law”, 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/10-year-review/parallel-3b/The-Relationship-between-Public-and-
Private-Enforcement-of-Competition-Law-SA-EU-CH.pdf (accessed February 2012).  
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were followed by damages actions. Among these actions, the vast majority were brought by large 
businesses, and generally only in three member states, namely the United Kingdom, Germany, and 
the Netherlands. In 20 out of 28 Member States no follow-on actions to Commission decisions 
whatsoever were reported.1407 Empirical evidence on the share of stand-alone versus follow-on cases 
is contradictory. BOTTEMAN and HUGHES claim that in the EU, most private damages actions are 
follow-on cases rather than stand-alone cases.1408 A study by RODGER, however, came to the 
opposite conclusion based on aggregate member state data.1409 Follow-on cases based on cartel 
decisions of the Commission have in any event significantly increased over the last few years. This 
was confirmed by private practice. It was said that “nowadays an important part of the advice we provide to 
customers in cartel cases refers to preparation vis-à-vis potential private claims.”1410 Until recently, private 
enforcement in the EU was relatively underdeveloped. Incentives for private parties to bring court 
actions are less pronounced than in the US, as national courts generally do not grant punitive/treble 
damages, but instead provide compensation or restitution while simultaneously the costs of litigation 
are higher due to for instance fee-shifting statutes. Access to evidence remains difficult (see below), 
and judges are often under-qualified to correctly assess the damage caused by an anti-competitive 
practice.1411 One reason why information exchange, and confidential information exchange in 
particular, is approached with extreme caution is linked to the adversarial and litigious nature of 
antitrust laws in certain jurisdictions.1412  
 
Concerns were heightened for instance after the Air Cargo case, which related to the conspiracy of a 
number of major international cargo airlines to inflate the price of shipping goods by air.1413 Between 
2000 and 2006 the airlines coordinated their actions on fuel and security surcharges. A dawn raid 
with global proportions led to the initiation of proceedings in the US, the EU, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada and Korea. While some participants of the cartel benefitted from leniency in the 
EU and elsewhere, other airlines were fined and 21 individuals faced prosecution. In the US, for 
instance, this resulted in fines of more than USD 1.8 billion, and the imprisonment of 6 executives. 
The way in which this cartel faced global prosecution demonstrated that a multinational must be 
prepared for actions in multiple jurisdictions, and must take all jurisdictions in account in which its 
conduct may have an effect.1414 The case was particularly worrisome to the defendants and cartelists 
generally due to the series of follow-on class actions that chased the infringers during the ten years 
following the dawn raids. In 2015 plaintiffs in the US won the right to proceed as a certified class 
against the remaining defendants, after settlements of more than $1 billion had already been reached 
                                                          
1407 D. Calisti & L. Haasbeek, “The proposal for a Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: the European Commission 
sets the stage for private enforcement in the European Union”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 8, August 2013, 2-3.  
1408 Y. Botteman & P. Hughes, “Access to file: striking the balance between leniency and private enforcement tools”, The 
European Antitrust Review, 2013, 3.   
1409 B. Rodger, “State of Play of Antitrust damages at Member State level – competition litigation and collective redress: a 
comparative EU analysis”, presented at 9th Annual Conference of the GCLC, Antitrust Damages in EU law and policy, 
7-8 November, Brussels.  
1410 Result of author’s law firm survey (see Annex I). 
1411 E. Elhauge & D. Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2nd ed., Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart 
Publishing, 2011, 12, 53-54. 
1412 N. Ormonov, “Exchange of Information in the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws”, Asper Review of International Business 
& Trade Law, Vol. 6, 2006, 364.  
1413 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and the 
Swiss Confederation on Air Transport, Case COMP/39258 - Airfreight Brussels, 9 November 2010. 
1414 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 26.  
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with 27 airlines.1415 Private enforcement was not limited to the US. Australia, South Korea, and the 
UK, are only some examples of jurisdictions in which follow-on (class action) claims were made.1416 
This case demonstrated that it may be uncertain how this information may be used in follow-on 
actions, which raised grave concerns among the business community.1417  
 
The survey sent out to international law firms in the framework of this study revealed that generally 
their clients are very concerned about the disclosure of sensitive or confidential information, as the 
practice of when information is or is not disclosed is often not clear, and there is a risk of exposure 
to more and wider claims. Some firms specified that it depends on the jurisdiction, with a particular 
concern about the US with its disclosure and discovery rules and extensive number of civil cases. 
Pre-trial discovery is an unknown concept in civil law countries, which led, by the late 1960s, to a 
clear conflict between the civil law world and the US discovery system. In civil law countries the 
courts take evidence, while in the US the litigants conduct discovery and depositions. The ‘personal 
jurisdiction plus control’-test implies that once a court finds it has personal jurisdiction, and 
possession, custody, or control over the documents or assets being sought are present, there are few 
limits on what it can order a party to produce.1418 Federal US discovery rules broadened over time 
under influence of court decisions ordering the production of documents held abroad. Rule 26 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for instance, allows broad discovery of ‘any nonprivileged matter 
that is relevant.’ Document subpoenas can moreover be issued according to Rule 45 by litigants to 
non-parties, only limited to the extent that it imposes an ‘undue burden’, fails to provide a reasonable 
time to comply, or if it requests privileged materials. The rules do not contain any limitation on the 
geographical scope of information discovery requests, in contrast to the limitations imposed on 
deposition subpoenas. Clients are less worried about disclosure to the European Commission. The 
concern with regard to US discovery exists regardless of international cooperation, however, as the 
discovery also occurs with regard to information located abroad to be used in US litigation or 
investigations. Several countries have, however, threatened the stability of bilateral relations with the 
                                                          
1415 M. Hausfeld, B. Landau, H. Scherrer, M. Coolidge, “Multi-Billion Dollar Air Cargo Price-Fixing Litigation Headed to 
Trial in Brooklyn”, Hausfeld, 31 August 2015, http://www.hausfeld.com/news/us/multi-billion-dollar-air-cargo-price-
fixing-litigation-headed-to-trial-in-b (accessed August 2016). 
1416 J. Evans & A. Booth, “What Price Cooperation? The Ever Increasing Cost of Global Antitrust Cases”, Bloomberg Law 
Reports, 2010. This is different in for instance fraud or securities cases, in which companies and the DoJ can negotiate stiff 
financial penalties and non‐prosecution agreements or pleas to less than felony charges. In contrast, a guilty plea to a 
felony violation of the Sherman Act renders a substantive defense of follow‐on US civil class action cases virtually 
impossible. Often companies will therefore settle, and those that do not, such as for instance British Airways, spend years 
fighting over the scope of the claims and the parameters of any certified class.  
1417 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 26; M. Hausfeld, B. Landau, H. Scherrer, M. Coolidge, “Multi-Billion 
Dollar Air Cargo Price-Fixing Litigation Headed to Trial in Brooklyn”, Hausfeld, 31 August 2015, 
http://www.hausfeld.com/news/us/multi-billion-dollar-air-cargo-price-fixing-litigation-headed-to-trial-in-b (accessed 
August 2016). 
1418 The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters had as its primary goal to 
“bridge differences between the common law and civil law approaches to the taking of evidence abroad.” (D. Zambrano, “A Comity of 
Errors: The Rise, Fall, and Return of International Comity in Transnational Discovery”, Berkeley Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 2016, 171) The drafting of the Convention was influenced by international comity. A system 
of Letters of Request was developed as the primary vehicle for the production of information abroad, placing national 
authorities of both the requesting country and the target country as gatekeepers. While the US ratified the Hague 
Convention, litigants hardly used its procedures over the next decade and Federal courts split over whether the Hague 
Convention provided a mandatory or an optional alternative to the Federal Rules. (Ibid., 172-173) In 1988 the Supreme 
Court, however, “ended any hope that the Convention might displace the Federal Rules as the primary method of transnational discovery” 
and affirmed the ‘personal jurisdiction plus control’-test, disregarding the Hague Convention as merely providing 
‘optional procedures’ for discovery. (Ibid., 174). 
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US due to overbroad transnational discovery requests and foreign companies may refrain from doing 
business in the US due to fears of overbroad jurisdiction assertions.1419 
 
3.5.1.2 Safeguards in the EU-Switzerland Agreement 
 
On top of the conditions that must be fulfilled before information exchange can take place (see 
above, Part II, 3.2.4), safeguards are in place in the EU-Switzerland Agreement concerning both the 
use of exchanged information and access of third parties.1420 First of all the transmitted or discussed 
information may only be used for the purpose of enforcing the requesting party’s competition laws 
by its competition authority. Such enforcement activities need to have regard to the same or related 
conduct or transactions. Information that is obtained without consent of the party, may only be used 
for the purpose defined in the request for the information. Under no circumstances shall it be used 
to impose sanctions on natural persons.1421 The competition authorities of the parties may 
furthermore subject the use of the information exchanged to certain binding terms and conditions 
that they specify. It is unclear what the scope of these terms and conditions could be.1422 This 
provision could potentially undermine the Agreement as there appears to be no limitation to such 
conditions. These safeguards secure that first of all domestic procedural safeguards cannot be 
circumvented and secondly that exchange of information between competition authorities cannot 
lead to a mushrooming of unrelated procedures.  
 
In the US-Australia Agreement the evidence that is obtained pursuant to the Agreement can 
principally only be used or disclosed by the requesting party to administer or enforce the antitrust 
laws of the that party.1423 More specifically, antitrust evidence obtained under the Agreement may 
only be used or disclosed by a requesting party in the investigation or proceeding and for the 
purpose specified in the request.1424 Antitrust evidence obtained according to the Agreement can, 
however, be used or disclosed for the administration or enforcement non-antitrust laws under two 
conditions: it must be ‘essential to a significant law enforcement objective’ and the authority that 
provided the antitrust evidence must give its prior written consent to the proposed use or 
disclosure.1425 Moreover, if antitrust evidence obtained under the Agreement has legally been made 
public, the requesting party can use that information for any purpose consistent with the parties' 
                                                          
1419 D. Zambrano, “A Comity of Errors: The Rise, Fall, and Return of International Comity in Transnational Discovery”, 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 2016, 157, 159, 164, 167-168, 171, 172. 
1420 The protection offered to leniency information in particular is dealt with in Part II, 3.5.2.4, below.  
1421 By prohibiting the sanctioning of natural persons, problems with regard to Article 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003 are 
avoided. This Article restricts the exchange of information between the Commission and the Member States with the 
purpose of imposing sanctions on natural persons. If the EU in its second generation agreements would allow a broader 
use of exchanged information, it would discriminate against its own Member States. It should be noted that the 
undertakings under investigation by the receiving Party will have access to the transmitted information and may choose 
to start civil proceedings to seek compensation for the harm suffered. The limits to the use of the transmitted 
information set out in the Agreement are only imposed on the contracting Parties and their competition authorities, not 
expressly on the undertakings under investigation. P. Kobel & D. Viros, “Cooperation Agreement – Investigations – 
Confidentiality obligations: The European Union and Switzerland reach the agreement concerning the application of 
their competition law entering in force on 1st December 2014”, Concurrences, N° 2- 2015, 213. 
1422 Article 8 EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1423 Article VII(A) US-Australia Agreement. The term ‘administer or enforce’ seems to be a fixed expression, but it is 
unclear what exactly the difference between the two activities entails.  
1424 It is moreover specified that when the requested Party is Australia, consent is subject to any necessary approval from 
the Attorney General.  
1425 “In the case of the United States, the Executing Authority shall provide such consent only after it has made the determinations required 
for such consent by its mutual assistance legislation.” 
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mutual assistance legislation.1426 Such widening of the use of exchanged information is not allowed 
for in the EU-Switzerland Agreement. It is a remarkable aspect of the US-Australia Agreement, that 
might be one of the reasons why only one agreement was concluded under the IAEAA.1427 The 
parties do, however, have the right to oppose to such wide use.1428 The AMC had even advised 
Congress to amend the IAEAA to clarify that it does not require AMAAs to include a provision 
allowing for non-antitrust uses of confidential information.1429 
 
Second, the competition authorities of the EU and Switzerland shall oppose any application of a 
third party or another authority for disclosure of information they received, subject to limited 
exceptions. Information received is generally treated as confidential according to the national 
legislation of the parties.1430 Information can be disclosed in four cases: in order to obtain a court 
order in relation to the public enforcement of the party’s competition laws; to undertakings involved 
in a competition investigation or proceedings in the framework of their rights of defence; to courts 
during an appeal; and to the extent that it is indispensable for the exercise of the right of access to 
documents under the laws of a party (transparency regulations), when the proceedings are closed.1431 
The context in which this last exception can be invoked is rather unclear, and seems to leave a large 
margin of discretion to the receiving authority with regard to the indispensability. Even when 
information is disclosed in such cases, the Agreement proscribes that the protection of business 
secrets should remain fully guaranteed. Regrettably, this concept is not further defined for the 
purposes of the Agreement and likely is defined according to the national legislation of the parties, 
which may cause problems if such definitions differ.  
 
In case information has been wrongfully used or disclosed, consultation should take place 
immediately between the competition authorities involved on steps to minimise any harm resulting 
from such use or disclosure and to avoid recurrence.1432 In the US-Australia Agreement this 
constitutes a ground for termination of the Agreement by the affected party.1433  
 
Important in the context of a cooperation agreement with the EU is the interaction with the Member 
States. A competition authority wishing to cooperate with the European Commission does not 
necessarily wish to cooperate at the same time with each of the national competition authorities. The 
interaction between the EU and the national competition authorities is therefore a relevant aspect to 
regulate in this context. The European Commission is closely linked with the national competition 
authorities (NCAs) of the Member States, via the European Competition Network and more 
precisely through its information obligations under Articles 11 and 14 of Council Regulation 1/2003 
                                                          
1426 Article VII(C)&(D) US-Australia Agreement.  
1427 D. Garza, J. Yarowsky, B.Burchfield, W. S. Cannon, D. Carlton, M. Delrahim, J. Jacobson, D. Kempf, Jr., S. Litvack, 
J. Shenefield, D. Valentine, J. Warden, Antitrust Modernization Commission - Report and Recommendations, April 2007, available 
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (accessed May 2015), 218.  
1428 Article VII US-Australia Agreement.  
1429 D. Garza, J. Yarowsky, B.Burchfield, W. S. Cannon, D. Carlton, M. Delrahim, J. Jacobson, D. Kempf, Jr., S. Litvack, 
J. Shenefield, D. Valentine, J. Warden, Antitrust Modernization Commission - Report and Recommendations, April 2007, available 
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (accessed May 2015), 214.  
1430 Article 9 EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1431 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A – Economic and Scientific 
Policy, Competition Policy in International Agreements – Study for Econ Committee, IP/A/ECON/2015-02, August 
2015, 22.  
1432 Article 9(2) EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1433 Article VI(C & D) & Article XIII(C) US-Australia Agreement.  
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and Article 19 of Council Regulation 139/2004.1434 Article 10 of the EU-Switzerland Agreement 
regulates this relationship, as well as the relationship with the EFTA Surveillance Authority. The 
Commission may inform the NCAs of the Member States of the existence of any cooperation and 
coordination of enforcement activities, and may inform the NCA of a Member State whose 
important interests are affected of the notifications sent to it by the Swiss competition authority. 
Transmitted information may only be disclosed to the Member States to fulfil the prior mentioned 
information obligations. Equally, transmitted information can only be disclosed to the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority in order to fulfil the obligations under Articles 6 and 7 of Protocol 23 of the 
EEA Agreement concerning the cooperation between the surveillance authorities. Information that 
is communicated in any of the above ways can only be used to enforce the EU’s competition laws by 
the Commission and cannot be disclosed, the competition authorities of the Member States or the 
EFTA can therefore not initiate proceedings on that basis. Information exchange with the EU will 
therefore not lead to excessive member state enforcement on the basis of exchanged information.  
 
3.5.1.3 Safeguards in domestic legislation: the Transparency Regulation and Damages Directive 
 
Once (confidential) information is exchanged, it falls under the protection offered in the receiving 
jurisdiction. As second generation agreements explicitly or implicitly require reciprocity, and 
therefore imply similar levels of protection, EU legislation provides a relevant image of the level of 
protection that will generally be valid for information exchanged under a cooperation agreement 
concluded by the EU.   
 
In the EU the so-called Transparency Regulation governs public access to information in possession 
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.1435 It was confirmed in case-law that 
this regulation aims to provide to the public the widest possible access to documents of the 
institutions according to the principles of openness and transparency in the Treaties (see below, Part 
II, 3.4.3).1436 Exceptions, to be interpreted restrictively, relate to situations in which a prevailing 
public or private interest demands confidentiality. Access to documents shall be denied to protect the 
public interest, in particular regarding public security, defence and military matters, international 
relations, and the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member State. It 
will also be protected in the interest of the privacy and the integrity of the individual, and, unless 
there is an overriding public interest, where disclosure would undermine the protection of 
                                                          
1434Article 11 Regulation 1/2003 regulates ‘Cooperation between the Commission and the competition authorities of the 
Member States’. Article 14 Regulation 1/2003 regards the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant 
Positions that is composed of representatives of the competition authorities of the Member States and is consulted by 
the Commission prior to taking decisions under Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 23, Article 24(2) and Article 29(1) of the Regulation. 
Article 19 Regulation 139/2004 deals with the ‘Liaison with the authorities of the Member States’ in merger cases.  
1435 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145, 31.5.2001 (Transparency Regulation).  
1436 See Judgment of 29 June 2010, European Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH, C-139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, 
paragraph 51. Judgment of 21 September 2010, Kingdom of Sweden v Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) and 
European Commission, Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) v European Commission and European Commission v 
Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API), Joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, 
paragraph 69-70; Judgment of 28 June 2012, European Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS, C-404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393, 
paragraph 111; Judgment of 28 June 2012, European Commission v Agrofert Holding a.s., C-477/10 P, EU:C:2012:394, 
paragraph 53; Judgment of 14 November 2013, Liga para a Protecção da Natureza (LPN) and Republic of Finland v European 
Commission, Joined Cases C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738. Also see C. Jones, “The quality of mercy and the 
quality of justice: reflections on the discovery of leniency documents and private actions for damages in the European 
Union” in N. Charbit, E. Ramundo, A. Chetova & A. Slater (eds) William E. Kovacic, An antitrust tribute, Liber Amicorum – 
Volume I, New York, Institute of Competition Law, 2012, 252. 
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commercial interests of natural or legal persons, court proceedings and legal advice, and the purpose 
of inspections, investigations and audits.1437  
 
Much debate has arisen, in particular in a competition law context, on the exact scope of two 
particular grounds for non-disclosure contained in Article 4(2) Transparency Regulation, namely 
commercial interest, and protection of the purpose of investigations.1438 In the Agrofert and Odile Jacob 
appeal cases it was recalled that Regulation no 1049/2001 and the specific regulation in the field of 
merger control have different objectives and should be applied in a compatible and coherent 
manner.1439 Due to the risk that generalised access to a merger file would undermine the merger 
control system, the Court claimed that disclosure of documents relating to merger control 
proceedings is presumed to undermine the protection of the commercial interests of the 
undertakings as well as the protection of the purpose of investigations in merger control 
proceedings.1440 Also in state aid cases such a presumption was found present.1441 The General Court 
in Netherlands v Commission established the existence of a similar presumption in cartel cases.1442 This 
was confirmed in the EnBW appeal case. Certain categories of documents1443 fall under the 
exceptions of Article 4(2) of the Transparency Regulation and there is no need to assess such 
documents on an individual basis.1444 The Court in EnBW concluded that generalised access under 
Regulation 1049/2001 would jeopardise the balance established in Regulations 1/2003 and 773/2004 
                                                          
1437 Article 4(1) and 4(2) Transparency Regulation. Internal documents in on-going cases shall be protected if the 
decision-making process would be seriously undermined by disclosure of such documents, save overriding public 
interest. If those documents contain opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations 
within the institution, protection is extended even after the decision has been taken, if disclosure of the document would 
seriously undermine the institution's decision-making process. With regard to documents originating from a Member 
State, the latter’s prior agreement is required. (Article 4(3) and 4(5) Transparency Regulation). 
1438 For example: Judgment of 15 December 2011, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims (CDC Hydrogene Peroxide) v 
European Commission, T-437/08, EU:T:2011:752; Judgment of 28 June 2012, European Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS, 
C-404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393; Judgment of 13 September 2013, Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Commission, T-380/08, 
EU:T:2013:480. Article 4(2) Transparency Regulation states: “The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure 
would undermine the protection of: - commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property, - court proceedings and 
legal advice, - the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.” 
1439 Judgment of 28 June 2012, European Commission v Agrofert Holding a.s., C-477/10 P, EU:C:2012:394, paragraph 51-52; 
Judgment of 28 June 2012, European Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS, C-404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393, paragraph 109-
110.  
1440 Judgment of 28 June 2012, European Commission v Agrofert Holding a.s., C-477/10 P, EU:C:2012:394, paragraph 61-64; 
Judgment of 28 June 2012, European Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS, C-404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393, paragraph 120-
123. 
1441 Judgment of 29 June 2010, European Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH, C-139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, 
paragraph 55-57 and Judgment of 28 June 2012, European Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS, C-404/10 P, 
EU:C:2012:393, paragraph 117-118. 
1442 Judgement of 13 September 2013, Netherlands v Commission, case T-380/08, EU:T:2013:480, paragraph 42.       
1443 The categories are: “(1) documents provided in connection with an immunity or leniency application, namely statements from the 
undertakings in question and all documents submitted by them in connection with the immunity or leniency application (‘category 1’); 
(2) requests for information and the parties’ replies to those requests (‘category 2’); (3) documents obtained during inspections, namely 
documents seized during on-the-spot inspections at the premises of the undertakings concerned (‘category 3’); (4) the statement of objections and 
the parties’ replies thereto (‘category 4’); (5) internal documents: (a) documents relating to the facts, that is, (i) background notes on the 
conclusions to be drawn from the evidence gathered, (ii) correspondence with other competition authorities, and (iii) consultation of other 
Commission departments that were involved in the case (‘category 5(a)’); (b) procedural documents, that is, inspection warrants, inspection 
reports, lists of documents obtained in the course of inspections, documents concerning the service of certain documents and file notes (‘category 
5(b)’).” Judgment of 27 February 2014, European Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG, C-365/12 P, 
EU:C:2014:112, paragraph 16.  
1444 Judgment of 27 February 2014, European Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG, C-365/12 P, 
EU:C:2014:112, paragraph 66, 68. 
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“between the obligation on the undertakings concerned to submit to the Commission possibly sensitive commercial 
information […] and the guarantee of increased protection, by virtue of the requirement of professional secrecy and 
business secrecy, for the information so provided to the Commission[…].”1445 The Commission may categorise 
documents deserving of protection from disclosure in view of the size of the Commission’s records. 
The heavy burden of proof is on the applicant, who must demonstrate that the interest in disclosure 
outweighs the interest in protection. The broad categories of documents that are protected cannot be 
disclosed until the decision in the case is final, including the entire time span of any potential appeal 
proceedings. This significantly limits private parties’ chances of successfully claiming damages, unless 
the period of limitation for bringing a claim in the national court is suspended.1446 According to 
Advocate General SZPUNAR in the Evonik appeal case, the abovementioned presumption was 
established in favour of the Commission and can therefore not be raised against the Commission 
itself. On the other hand, the Commission cannot presume that its entire file is confidential.1447 
 
Gaining access to the Commission’s file via the Transparency Regulation is therefore not an easy task 
for damage claimants. They can, however, benefit from the public versions of cartel decisions. The 
EU courts in recent case-law confirmed the significant margin of discretion belonging to the 
Commission when deciding to publish more extensive and detailed public cartel decisions, 
containing more information relating to the operation of the cartel and thereby serving as a better 
source of evidence in actions for damages.1448 In particular leniency related information may be 
included in the public version of a Commission decision, as long as such information does not 
permit, directly or indirectly, the identification of the source of the information.1449 The general 
presumption established in EnBW, however, does not apply to the publication of passages from the 
statements of applicants for leniency in the non-confidential versions of the Commission’s decisions. 
Regulation 1049/2001 does not apply in this context, nor can the case-law deriving from this 
Regulation be transposed to the context of the publication of infringement decisions.1450 This case-
law is considered as controversial, as allowing the Commission to reconsider the content of its 
decisions even a year after first publication severely affects the effectiveness of the aforementioned 
limits to disclosure set up by EU regulations.1451 This case-law does not, however, grant a carte blanche 
to the Commission. The Commission should take reasonable measures to conceal the source of the 
evidence obtained in the context of cooperation. Speculation by readers of the decision cannot be 
                                                          
1445 Ibid., paragraph 90.  
1446 S. Peyer, “Access to competition authorities’ files in private antitrust litigation”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, 2015, 65, 68-69.  
1447 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission, C-162/15, EU:C:2016:587, 
paragraph 154.   
1448 Judgment of 28 January 2015, Evonik Degussa GmbH v Commission, T-341/12, EU:T:2015:51; Judgment of 28 January 
2015, Akzo Nobel NV and others v Commission, T-345/12, EU:T:2015:50; Judgment of 14 March 2017, Evonik Degussa 
GmbH v European Commission, Case C-162/15 P, EU:C:2017:205. For a detailed account of the case-law on this matter, see 
I. Vandenborre, T. Goetz, & A. Kafetzopoulos, “Access to file under European competition law”, Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 6, No. 10, 747-756.   
1449 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission, C-162/15, EU:C:2016:587, 
paragraph 148. Judgment of 28 January 2015, Akzo Nobel NV and Others v European Commission, Case T-345/12, 
EU:T:2015:50, paragraph 109.  
1450 Ibid., paragraph 72, 77, 79.  
1451 Y. Anselin, D. Damaj, “The General Court of the European Union authorizes the Commission to communicate 
information submitted in support of its leniency program, through the publication of an new and more detailed version 
of its penalty decision in the hydrogen peroxide cartel (Akzo Nobel, Eka Chemicals)”, e-Competitions National Competition 
Laws Bulletin, N° 72350, 1-2. 
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sufficient to exclude publication of all leniency-related information, merely because such information 
was submitted voluntarily.1452  
 
Finally, the relatively recent Damages Directive deserves to be mentioned. The legislative saga 
leading to the Damages Directive had been stalled since the Commission’s proposal for EU-wide 
antitrust damages legislation and the Green Paper on the topic in 2005.1453 The proposed Directive 
regained momentum after cases such as Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie and finally entered into force on 
26 December 2014, to be implemented by Member States by 27 December 2016. In the Pfleiderer 
case, and confirmed by the Donau Chemie case, the Court established that in absence of EU 
legislation, following the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, national courts should decide 
on a case-by-case basis whether disclosure of leniency information is justified, by balancing and 
weighing the interest of the private litigant to recover damages on the one hand and the protection 
of the effectiveness of the leniency programme on the other hand.1454 According to the Court the 
right for private parties to obtain compensation for harm suffered due to anticompetitive behaviour 
stood in the way of an outright refusal to access leniency documents.1455 The Court explicitly stated 
that outright refusal to grant access to evidence cannot be justified by the existence of a risk that 
access to such evidence may undermine the effectiveness of a leniency programme. Competition 
authorities or opposing parties must show that there is more than a mere risk of undermining 
effective public enforcement.1456 This case-law has now been made obsolete by the entry into force 
of the Damages Directive.  
 
The Damages Directive, that is without prejudice to the provisions of the transparency 
Regulation,1457 aims to regulate and stimulate effective private civil enforcement of competition law, 
as well as organise the coordination between public and private enforcement.1458 Its focus is on 
compensation.1459 Most relevant in the context of this study are the provisions in the Damages 
Directive dealing with disclosure of evidence, in particular evidence in the file of a competition 
authority.1460 Regardless of the inherent value of the Damages Directive as a form of minimum 
harmonization,1461 the way information in the file of a competition agency is treated is a relevant 
                                                          
1452 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission, C-162/15, EU:C:2016:587, 
paragraph 151.  
1453 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014. (Damages Directive) 
1454 Judgment of 14 June 2011, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, C-360/09, EU:C:2011:389; Judgment of 6 June 2013, 
Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and Others, C-536/11, EU:C:2013:366, paragraph 31.  
1455 Judgment of 14 June 2011, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, C-360/09, EU:C:2011:389, paragraph 26-28, 30.  
1456 Judgment of 6 June 2013, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and Others, Case C-536/11, EU:C:2013:366, 
paragraph 46, 48.  
1457 Recital 20 Damages Directive.  
1458 Recital 6 and Article 1 Damages Directive. 
1459 D. Calisti & L. Haasbeek, “The proposal for a Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: the European Commission 
sets the stage for private enforcement in the European Union”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 8, August 2013, 3. 
1460 Evidence is defined as “all types of means of proof admissible before the national court seized, in particular documents and all other 
objects containing information, irrespective of the medium on which the information is stored.” Article 2(13) Damages Directive.   
1461 While the effect and impact of the Damages Directive will to a large extent depend on the implementation by the 
member states, the Directive has already faced a fair amount of criticism. It is claimed in particular that the Directive 
does not succeed in promoting private litigation, and on the contrary, has a negative effect on follow-on actions. See S. 
Peyer, “Access to competition authorities’ files in private antitrust litigation”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
2015, 86, and S. Peyer, “The European Damages Directive fails to deliver, but can it be fixed?”, ESRC Centre for 
Competition Policy Competition Law and Policy Blog, 3 March 2015, available at 
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indication of the protection currently offered to documents that entered the Commission’s file via 
exchange with a foreign competition authority. Claimants can request disclosure before national 
courts when they can present a reasoned justification containing reasonably available facts and 
evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of its damages claim. National courts should then be 
able to order the defendant or a third party to disclose relevant specified items of evidence or 
relevant categories of evidence, which lie in in the latter’s control, circumscribed as precisely and as 
narrowly as possible and to the extent that it is proportionate. Non-specific searches for information 
(so-called ‘fishing expeditions’) should be prevented, contrary to for instance the US practice. The 
Directive thereby mentions a non-exhaustive list of factors to take into account when considering 
the legitimate interests of all parties and third parties concerned.1462 It is explicitly stated that the 
interest of an undertaking that has infringed competition law to avoid actions for damages caused by 
that infringement shall not constitute an interest that deserves protection. National courts should 
have the means to protect confidential information and should give full effect to the applicable legal 
professional privilege under Union or national law. Parties from whom disclosure is sought should 
be given the opportunity to be heard before a national court orders disclosure. Member states are 
explicitly allowed, however, to maintain or introduce rules that would lead to wider disclosure.1463  
 
More stringent protection is offered to evidence that is included in the file of a competition 
authority,1464 for instance, a stronger proportionality test applies.1465 An added requirement is that 
disclosure is only possible where no party or third party is reasonably able to provide the evidence.1466 
The use of such evidence is restricted in case it was obtained solely through access to the file.1467 As 
the Damages Directive only provides for minimum harmonisation, these rules apply “without prejudice 
to the rules and practices under Union or national law on the protection of internal documents of competition authorities 
and of correspondence between competition authorities.”1468 Additionally, the following categories of evidence 
in a competition authority’s file enjoy protection until the closing of a competition authority’s 
proceedings: information that was prepared by a natural or legal person specifically for the 
proceedings of a competition authority, information that the competition authority has drawn up and 
sent to the parties in the course of its proceedings, and withdrawn settlement submissions.1469 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2015/03/03/the-european-damages-directive-fails-to-deliver-but-can-it-be-
fixed/, (accessed November 2015).  
1462 “(a) the extent to which the claim or defence is supported by available facts and evidence justifying the request to disclose evidence; (b) the 
scope and cost of disclosure, especially for any third parties concerned, including preventing non-specific searches for information which is unlikely 
to be of relevance for the parties in the procedure; (c) whether the evidence the disclosure of which is sought contains confidential information, 
especially concerning any third parties, and what arrangements are in place for protecting such confidential information.” Article 5(3) 
Damages Directive. 
1463 Article 5 Damages Directive.  
1464 Article 6(1) Damages Directive.  
1465 In addition to the factors mentioned in Article 5(3) Damages Directive, national courts should also consider whether 
the request has been formulated specifically with regard to the nature, subject matter or contents of documents 
submitted to a competition authority or held in the file thereof, rather than by a non-specific application concerning 
documents submitted to a competition authority; whether the party requesting disclosure is doing so in relation to an 
action for damages before a national court; and in certain circumstances the need to safeguard the effectiveness of the 
public enforcement of competition law. 
1466 Article 6 Damages Directive.  
1467 It can be used in an action for damages only by the person that obtained the information or by a natural or legal 
person that succeeded to that person's rights, including a person that acquired that person's claim. Article 7(3) Damages 
Directive.  
1468 Article 6(3) Damages Directive.  
1469 “However, the investigation in a given case must be regarded as closed once the final decision is adopted, irrespective of whether that decision 
might subsequently be annulled by the courts, because it is at that moment that the institution in question itself considers that the procedure has 
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According to PEYER, such categories likely encompass most relevant documents in the file of the 
competition authority. Evidence enjoying such temporary protection, obtained by a natural or legal 
person solely through access to the file of a competition authority is moreover either deemed to be 
inadmissible in actions for damages or is otherwise protected under the applicable national rules until 
a competition authority has closed its proceedings. This categorization has been criticised, as internal 
competition agency documents that have not been sent to the parties and therefore do not enjoy this 
temporary protection can nevertheless reveal strategies of the competition authorities. Documents 
gathered during inspections are therefore not blacklisted like leniency and settlement information 
(see below, Part II, 3.5.2.5). According to PEYER this is particularly surprising as companies under 
investigation are forced to surrender these documents.1470 Finally, a distinction is made with regard to 
the passing on of overcharges either as a claim or a defence to a claim. In the latter case the Directive 
seems to allow a lower threshold of entitlement to discovery than in the main discovery provisions of 
Art. 5.1471  
 
It can be concluded that while indeed information will be exchanged and will be subject to greater 
discoverability opportunities, safeguards are in place in both the EU-Switzerland Agreement and 
domestic legislation. This reinforces the legal security of would-be defendants, and ensures that 
information exchanges do not happen excessively or illicitly. Companies subject to an antitrust 
investigation or those considering to apply for leniency must take potential exposure to follow-on 
damages claims, and private litigation in general, into account. As such claims may be significantly 
higher than the total amount of fines imposed on them via public enforcement, undertakings have to 
consider carefully the interplay between their decision to cooperate with a competition authority and 
their ability to defend themselves properly in private litigation. Part of the analysis in this regard 
would be to identify the most likely claimants and the most likely jurisdictions for them to bring their 
claims, as well as the relevant national rules regarding access to documents and legal privilege. While 
indeed cooperation may in some instances harm a company’s defence on the merits in follow-on 
damages claims, or lead to it being a primary target for damages actions, the nevertheless substantial 
benefits of leniency should not be fully overlooked. Moreover, many other factors are taken into 
account when deciding on whether or not to initiate actions for damages, such as litigation costs and 
the availability of specialised courts.1472 In any event, fear for foreign follow-on litigation should not 
be overstated.  
 
3.5.1.4 Linked: concerns about leakage or misuse 
 
An additional concern in this context is that confidential information, in particular business secrets, 
once exchanged, could end up in the public domain due to more lenient public access rules or 
imprudence in the receiving jurisdiction. Access of competitors to sensitive information could then 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
been completed.” Judgment of 15 December 2011, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims (CDC Hydrogene Peroxide) v 
European Commission, T-437/08, EU:T:2011:752, paragraph 62.  
1470 S. Peyer, “Access to competition authorities’ files in private antitrust litigation”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, 2015, 80-82.  
1471 C. Jones, “Into the parallel universe: procedural fairness in private litigation after the Damages Directive”, 9th 
ASCOLA Conference Warsaw 2014 on Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, Centre for Antitrust and 
Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014, 10. See Articles 13 and 14 Damages Directive.  
1472 “Strategic Considerations in cartel follow-on litigation”, Concurrences Law & Economics Workshop, Brussels, 2 June 
2016. In the US, qualitative research indicated that private litigation relating to cartels has not transformed the 
risk/reward-calculation for individuals within many companies and that incarceration and reduced civil penalties from 
government enforcement matter more than private enforcement. D. Daniel Sokol, “Cartels, corporate compliance, and 
what practitioners really think about enforcement”, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 78, No. 1, 2012, 235. 
237 
 
cause additional commercial damage, apart from the damage caused by potential litigation.1473 A 
Commission official stated that with regard to private antitrust litigation in the EU, international 
cooperation between competition agencies is mainly affected due to a fear of leakage of information 
rather than the private litigation as such, because the latter remains a complex issue and causality and 
quantification are difficult to establish.1474 The perception exists that there is a high risk of leakage of 
trade secrets or business plans or the misuse of information that has been exchanged.1475 American 
firms have even expressed fear that foreign competition authorities may intentionally disclose 
confidential information to potentially state-owned rival companies.1476 
 
Such concerns seem to stem from a lack of knowledge of the tasks and incentives of competition 
authorities as well as the functioning of the cooperation process. Competition authorities have every 
incentive to be careful with sensitive information, as it is in their own interest to ensure future 
cooperation with businesses. As WOOD stated: “Those who think information cooperation is risky do not 
appreciate the restrictions on the uses to which information collected by the government for public enforcement proceedings 
can be put outside the litigation. The government does not turn over documents, depositions, or work product to any and 
every private plaintiff that walks along. […] [T]his is just not the way the system works.”1477 Fears about leakage 
generally relate to concerns about exchanges with less-experienced jurisdictions without established 
safeguards in place, for instance relating to access to confidential and business sensitive material,1478 
but have no place when exchanges of information occur among experienced jurisdictions with 
similar standards.  
 
Concerns surrounding leakage of information also appear to be founded in a general misconception 
regarding the prevalence of economic espionage.1479 BIAC for instance emphasized that information 
is becoming a more and more important business asset, that is becoming increasingly vulnerable to 
hacking, espionage and other illegal practices to extract data.1480 While no data are provided to back 
this claim up, it is moreover unclear how hacking and espionage would be made significantly easier 
when competition authorities exchange information under strict conditions and safeguards. It is not 
a valid argument against information exchanges in any event. There is no reason why the risk of 
leakage or undue use would be higher in competition cases than elsewhere. Senior Antitrust Division 
officials have confirmed that no leaks of information received from non-US firms have occurred and 
that such information is subject to the same protections under law as apply to information received 
from domestic sources.1481 Such concerns of leakage have no tangible basis as there is no evidence 
                                                          
1473 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 27. 
1474 Interview with Commission official. 
1475 For instance for non-competition purposes.  
1476 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Antitrust Division, ICPAC Final Report, 2000, available at 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ICPAC/finalreport.htm (accessed September 2015), Chapter 4. 
1477 D. Wood, “Is cooperation possible?”, Luncheon Speech, New England Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 109-10.  
1478 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Antitrust Division, ICPAC Final Report, 2000, available at 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ICPAC/finalreport.htm (accessed September 2015), Chapter 4. 
1479 M. Chowdhury, “From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling the Obstacles to Transatlantic 
Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement”, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 11-09, 28 November 2011, 18, fn 
105.  
1480 OECD, Global forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution 
from BIAC, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)57, 13 February 2012, 3.  
1481 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Antitrust Division, ICPAC Final Report, 2000, available at 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ICPAC/finalreport.htm (accessed September 2015), Chapter 4. 
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that leakage ever occurred.1482 Information is already being exchanged without stories of undue use. 
For instance, it happens that companies simultaneously seek leniency in several jurisdictions, and 
consent to the sharing of information between the competition authorities of these countries. Some 
competition authorities are even considering to make leniency conditional on waivers being granted 
by the applicant precisely because of their usefulness.1483 Safeguards are in place, and their 
effectiveness is a necessity not just for the undertakings concerned but also for the agencies counting 
on the latter’s cooperation. 
 
3.5.2 Second concern: collapse of the leniency system 
  
3.5.2.1 Important tool 
 
Both the US and the EU significantly rely on their leniency policies for cartel detection. In the EU 
virtually all enforcement is done by the European Commission or national competition authorities 
rather than private litigants,1484 and the leniency program is responsible for a large majority of cartels 
being uncovered.1485 According to JONES the leniency policy is the most effective cartel detection and 
punishment tool available to the DoJ.1486 According to one empirical study, the US leniency 
programme is responsible for a 42% cartel formation reduction and a 62% increase in cartel 
detection. The Amnesty Plus programme lies at the basis of half of the DoJ’s international cartel 
investigations. This programme offers incentives for firms already under investigation for collusion 
to report another conspiracy in another market.1487 Since 1996, over 90% of the fines for antitrust 
crimes in the US originate in investigations aided by leniency applicants, and over 50% of the 
international cartel investigations open at a given time are initiated or advanced by a leniency 
applicant.1488  
 
3.5.2.2 Fear of increased access to leniency information in private follow-on litigation 
 
                                                          
1482 M. Chowdhury, “From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling the Obstacles to Transatlantic 
Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement”, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 11-09, 28 November 2011, 18-19. 
However, while leakage is certainly the exception, it is also difficult to prove that it happened and under whose 
responsibility: “Antitrust enforcers discussed the track record of their agencies with respect to leaks, and indicated that they have had no such 
occurrences.” Panel on Current U.S. Bilateral Agreements, ICPAC Hearings (Nov. 2, 1998), Hearings Transcript at 106-160, 
in International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Antitrust Division, ICPAC Final Report, 2000, available at 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ICPAC/finalreport.htm (accessed September 2015), footnote 93.  
1483 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 22-23.  
1484 E. Elhauge & D. Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2nd ed., Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart 
Publishing, 2011, 11. 
1485 Commission Staff Working Document “Ten years of antitrust enforcement under regulation 1/2003” accompanying 
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “Ten Years of Antitrust 
Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives”, SWD/2014/0230 final, 9 July 2014, 8, 
figure 3; C. Nicolosi, “No Good Whistle Goes Unpunished: Can We Protect European Antitrust Leniency Applications 
from Discovery?”, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2011, 234. 
1486 C. Jones, “The quality of mercy and the quality of justice: reflections on the discovery of leniency documents and 
private actions for damages in the European Union” in N. Charbit, E. Ramundo, A. Chetova & A. Slater (eds) William E. 
Kovacic, An antitrust tribute, Liber Amicorum – Volume I, New York, Institute of Competition Law, 2012, 247.   
1487 D. Daniel Sokol, “Cartels, corporate compliance, and what practitioners really think about enforcement”, Antitrust 
Law Journal, Vol. 78, No. 1, 2012, 206.  
1488 C. Nicolosi, “No Good Whistle Goes Unpunished: Can We Protect European Antitrust Leniency Applications from 
Discovery?”, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2011, 234. 
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Competition authorities fear that the incentive for companies to apply for leniency will greatly 
diminish if information that is submitted in the framework of a leniency programme would become 
discoverable in (mainly private) enforcement actions in other jurisdictions with whom information 
was shared. Moreover, if information is shared among authorities, the chance of submitted evidence 
being novel and useful diminishes and with this the chance of a successful leniency application if the 
applications are not done simultaneously. Even if the possibility of multiple successful leniency 
applications exists, firms might still choose not to cooperate, as financial savings in public fines 
might not outweigh having to pay private damages claims in multiple jurisdictions.1489 Competition 
authorities have therefore voiced concern regarding the impact of information exchange among 
enforcers on their leniency systems. The Competition Committee of the OECD recognised that the 
effectiveness of amnesty programmes, and hard core cartel investigations more broadly, should not 
be inadvertently undermined by information exchanges and that for this reason many OECD 
member countries have a policy of not exchanging information obtained from an amnesty applicant 
without the applicant’s prior permission.1490 As stated by GUZMAN, participating in a leniency 
program of one jurisdiction means that a firm loses control over certain relevant information, which 
may increase the firm’s risk of prosecution in another state.1491 The Vitamins case was the first 
occasion where private plaintiffs sought discovery of corporate statements submitted by a leniency 
applicant to the European Commission in a treble damages case before a US federal court.1492 A joint 
resolution was released by all ECN competition authorities to point out the importance of 
appropriate protection of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions.1493 While it was a 
reaction to the aforementioned Pfleiderer case, which was an intra-EU case, it is also testimony of the 
importance competition authorities attach to discoverability of leniency information outside of the 
EU.  
 
The European Commission has, with mixed success, protested firmly against discoverability of 
leniency information.1494 It intervened in several US actions to protect information submitted under 
its leniency system, in order to safeguard the integrity of the latter,1495 via an amicus curiae brief, a 
letter to the court, or a more active intervention. Arguments varied from the act of state doctrine, to 
investigatory privilege, or attorney work-product protection, but considerations of international 
                                                          
1489 C. Jones, “The quality of mercy and the quality of justice: reflections on the discovery of leniency documents and 
private actions for damages in the European Union” in N. Charbit, E. Ramundo, A. Chetova & A. Slater (eds) William E. 
Kovacic, An antitrust tribute, Liber Amicorum – Volume I, New York, Institute of Competition Law, 2012, 246. 
1490 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of the European Communities, C-
511/06 P, EU:C:2008:604, paragraph 139.  
1491 A. Guzman, “International competition law” in A. Guzman and A. Sykes (eds), Research handbook in international 
economic law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007, 434. 
1492 I. Vandenborre, “The confidentiality of EU Commission cartel records in civil litigation: the ball is in the EU Court”, 
European Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No., 3, 2011, 116.   
1493 ECN, Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of the European Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012, Protection of 
leniency material in the context of civil damages actions, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf (June 2017).  
1494 To illustrate the importance of the leniency program to the European Commission: of the 52 Statements of 
Objection issued between 2002 and 2008, 46 were derived from information provided by leniency applicants. Ibid., 248. 
1495 For instance in Re: Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, Misc. No. 99-197 (DDC, 2002); Re: Vitamins Antitrust Litigation 
398 F. Supp. 2d 209, 226 (DDC, 2005); Re: Methionine Antitrust Litigation, No. C-99-3491, MDL no. 1311 (ND Cal. 
2002); Re: Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation No 06 –MD-1775, 2009 WL 3077396 (EDNY, 2009) (first 
round of settlements); Re: Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation No 06-MD-1775, 2011 WL 2909163 (EDNY, 
2011) (approval of nine further settlements); Re: TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation No M 07-1827 SI, 2011 WL 
723571 (ND Cal, 2011); Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (ND Cal. 2007). The Commission 
was successful in the Methionine and Rubber Chemicals cases, but unsuccessful in the Vitamins case.  
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comity have generally taken a central place. No mention is made whatsoever, however, of the 
cooperation agreements concluded between the EU and the US. While these do not relate to 
exchange of confidential information, they do clearly put forward that the comity principle will be 
applied between the two parties. While the judiciary is independent and is not a party to these 
agreements, the latter nevertheless provides the context in which the competition authorities agreed 
to function. It is regrettable that the agreements are not used in this supportive manner.1496  
 
Apart from intervening in foreign proceedings, the Commission also allows for oral leniency 
applications to minimize the risk of discovery. The practice of oral statements was already informally 
allowed since 2002 exactly because of concerns regarding discovery in the US. In both the 
Commission’s 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices the Commission underlined its commitment to 
maintain as much as possible the confidentiality of leniency documents.1497 The Commission in these 
notices stressed the importance of its leniency programme for anti-cartel enforcement, and stated 
that discovery possibilities in civil litigation should not discourage it. It considered that the public 
interest might be significantly harmed if potential leniency applicants are dissuaded from cooperating 
with the Commission out of fear this would impair their position in civil proceedings, compared to 
companies who do not cooperate. The 2006 Leniency Notice further clarified that only the 
addressees of a Statement of Objection receive access to leniency applications in the Commission's 
offices, without the right to make copies of these statements.1498 The ECN Model Leniency 
Programme equally allows for oral applications in all cases where this would appear to be justified 
and proportionate. According to the Model Leniency Programme no access will be granted to any 
records of any oral statements before the Statement of Objections has been issued and the exchange 
of such records between authorities is limited to cases where the protections afforded to such 
records by the receiving authority are equivalent to those afforded by the transmitting authority.1499  
 
However, also in the case of oral applications, there is no guarantee that leniency information is 
entirely immune from discovery in the US.1500 The written transcript of the oral statement is an 
internal Commission document which is not subject to discovery. The applicant will not be in the 
possession of any document detailing its corporate statement, which it could be ordered to produce 
in private litigation.1501 This fact is particularly relevant in case the investigatory privilege is invoked, 
the application of which rests on the fact that the privileged information is only in the control of an 
                                                          
1496 I. Vandenborre, “The confidentiality of EU Commission cartel records in civil litigation: the ball is in the EU Court”, 
European Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No., 3, 2011, 116, 118.  
1497 “in the 2002 version […] the Commission made it clear that any statement received by it in relation to that notice could not be disclosed 
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1498 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 298, 08.12.2006, paragraph 
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1499 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009)574 accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 COM(2009)206 final, 29 April 2009, 
69-70.  
1500 For a detailed analysis of the risk oral applications face, see A. Petrasincu, “Discovery revisited – the impact of the 
US discovery rules on the European Commission’s leniency programme”, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 7, 
2011, 365-69. 
1501 I. van Bael, Due process in EU competition proceedings, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2011, 271.  
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investigative body, and not in the possession of a private party. In case a defendant has prepared its 
own transcript, however, the privilege would arguably not apply to protect this document. Indeed, 
the Commission’s oral leniency procedure does not necessarily protect the applicant against a claim 
for production of the written materials that form the basis of the oral statement in the latter’s 
possession.1502 Additional protection is therefore only present in the event that the oral leniency 
application is not based on an advanced draft, which rarely occurs. In any event, the identity of the 
leniency applicants and a description of their participation in the cartel will inevitably be disclosed to 
greater or lesser extent in the final decision of the Commission.1503 Moreover, it is possible that 
private plaintiffs make the argument, and US judges require “that a leniency applicant make a ‘good faith 
effort’ to comply with a discovery request by asking the Commission to produce a transcript of its corporate 
statement.”1504  
 
3.5.2.3 Fear is overstated  
 
In the Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation (Interchange case) production 
was requested of a Statement of Objections issued to Visa and a recording of a MasterCard Oral 
Hearing. Visa and MasterCard were the defendants in the US class action, while the plaintiffs were 
merchants in the US who accepted Visa and MasterCard payment cards.1505 The District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York in 2010 referenced the aforementioned Aerospatiale comity 
balancing test, “noting that the plaintiffs had other means of obtaining information about the defendants activities in 
Europe and already had access to one of the defendants’ submissions to the Commission.”1506 The Commission had 
also filed an amicus brief objecting to the disclosure.1507 The District Court therefore ruled that the 
confidential documents prepared by DG COMP were not discoverable in US antitrust litigation, in 
contrast to the magistrate judge’s decision that had compelled production. Disclosure was considered 
to seriously undermine the Commission’s enforcement practice and the importance of confidentiality 
was underlined in obtaining the voluntary cooperation of third parties, but also in encouraging fuller, 
more open, and more sincere participation in compelled participation.1508  
 
A letter of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement in the Flat Glass 
Antitrust Litigation held that “[m]any leading members of the private antitrust bar who represent leniency 
applications have advised… that the Division’s promise of confidentiality is a critical, and in some cases determinative, 
factor that companies rely upon in making the decision to self-report pursuant to the Division’s leniency program.”1509 
While it is plausible that the prospect of increased civil liability would deter leniency applications, 
JONES claimed that there is no reported evidence of this being the case, and ample experience in the 
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Litigation”, Cleary Gottlieb Alert Memo, 14 September 2010.  
1508 ECN Brief, “European Commission: Recent Developments on Discovery following Amicus Curiae”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/04_2010/com_discovery.pdf (accessed June 2017). 
1509 Letter of S. Hammond, Deputy Assist. Att’y Gen. For Crim. Enf., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, In re Flat Glass 
Antitrust Litig., No. 08-180 (Doc. No. 200-6), 6 October 2009, 3.  
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US demonstrating that it is not.1510 Similarly, in the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide case, CDC claimed that 
there was no causal link between disclosure of the statement of contents in that case, on the one 
hand, and the danger to the Commission’s task of preventing anti-competitive practices, on the 
other. It emphasised that the number of requests for immunity was not decreasing notwithstanding 
an increase in the number of actions for damages.1511 It is indeed plausible that declarations of alleged 
cartelists suggesting to the Commission that cartel members would be less likely to participate in 
leniency programmes if they have to incur the expense of private damages litigation or payment of 
judgments or settlements, are to be considered as threats or negotiating positions.1512 There is no 
proof that the exchange of leniency information would have an impact on the number of leniency 
applications in a negative way. The argument that undertakings would be deterred from reporting 
infringements can moreover be opposed to the fact that compensations for loss caused by 
anticompetitive behaviour also significantly contribute to the maintenance of effective competition in 
the EU.1513 
 
If the risk of the leniency system being undermined exists, it does so regardless of information 
exchange among enforcers.1514 One of the conclusions of the ICN’s Working Group on Cartels was 
that fear of civil damages actions was only one factor among many in deciding whether or not to 
apply for leniency.1515 General divergences or contradictions between the leniency programmes of 
different jurisdictions may also discourage the use of such programmes.1516 It must not be forgotten 
either that protection from civil liability was never a goal of the EU leniency system,1517 even though 
it was developed at a time where private enforcement in the EU was virtually non-existent. The 
Leniency Notice explicitly states that leniency does not imply protection from the civil consequences 
of participation in a cartel.1518 Allowing otherwise would undermine the case-law of Courage and 
                                                          
1510 C. Jones, “The quality of mercy and the quality of justice: reflections on the discovery of leniency documents and 
private actions for damages in the European Union” in N. Charbit, E. Ramundo, A. Chetova & A. Slater (eds) William E. 
Kovacic, An antitrust tribute, Liber Amicorum – Volume I, New York, Institute of Competition Law, 2012, 256.  
1511 Judgment of 15 December 2011, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims (CDC Hydrogene Peroxide) v European 
Commission, T-437/08, EU:T:2011:752, paragraph 54.  
1512 C. Jones, “The quality of mercy and the quality of justice: reflections on the discovery of leniency documents and 
private actions for damages in the European Union” in N. Charbit, E. Ramundo, A. Chetova & A. Slater (eds) William E. 
Kovacic, An antitrust tribute, Liber Amicorum – Volume I, New York, Institute of Competition Law, 2012, 258.  
1513 Judgment of 28 January 2015, Akzo Nobel NV and Others v European Commission, T-345/12, EU:T:2015:50, paragraph 
82-84. 
1514 It is telling, for instance, that a 2016 Law & Economics Workshop organised by Concurrences on ‘Strategic 
Considerations in cartel follow-on litigation’, did not state anything relating to cooperation between competition 
agencies. Concurrences Law & Economic Workshop “Strategic Considerations in cartel follow-on litigation”, Brussels, 2 
June 2016. 
1515 ICN Cartels Working Group, Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement in Cartel Cases, Report to the ICN 
Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 43.  
1516 Such as the requirements as to how the facts should be established by the applicant, incompatible timelines, 
inconsistent approaches regarding marker policies, the extent of the jurisdictional nexus required to trigger an 
investigation, and the predictability of both the recognition of the contribution of second and subsequent applicants and 
the calculation of reductions and sanctions. OECD, Global forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation 
in cartel investigations, Contribution from BIAC, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)57, 13 February 2012, 3-5.  
1517 JONES emphasised the difference between the EU and US leniency programmes, and their relationship with private 
litigation, underlining that in the US the DoJ requires that, where possible, leniency applicants make restitution to victims 
as an express condition of receiving leniency. (C. Jones, “The quality of mercy and the quality of justice: reflections on 
the discovery of leniency documents and private actions for damages in the European Union” in N. Charbit, E. 
Ramundo, A. Chetova & A. Slater (eds) William E. Kovacic, An antitrust tribute, Liber Amicorum – Volume I, New York, 
Institute of Competition Law, 2012, 256.) 
1518 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 298, 08.12.2006, recital 39.  
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Manfredi that victims of anticompetitive conduct have a right to compensation.1519 It is pivotal to find 
an appropriate balance between protecting the effectiveness of cartel detection and prosecution and 
allowing the victims of a cartel to pursue restitution.1520  
 
There are some econometric arguments in support of the exchange of leniency information among 
antitrust authorities as well. CHOI and GERLACH explored the relationship between international 
competition coordination, cartel formation and the effectiveness of leniency programs, using 
repeated price game theory. In the first scenario antitrust authorities do not coordinate or share any 
information. In the second scenario the agencies do share information, but exclude all information 
that was obtained in the course of a leniency program. In the final scenario extensive information 
sharing is considered, including information from leniency applications. No distinction is made 
between the corporate statement and pre-existing information. They discovered that in the first 
scenario, it is easier for global firms to sustain a cartel compared to local firms, and they will self-
report less often. Leniency programs will therefore function less well in these circumstances, mainly 
due to the possibility of partial self-reporting-strategies. In the second scenario there is a higher 
chance of cartel detection and a higher chance of successful convictions in each relevant jurisdiction 
compared to scenario one, which results in higher self-reporting-rates and less scope for cartel 
formation. In the third scenario firms will either conceal the cartel from all relevant authorities, or 
reveal the cartel to all. The result depends on the height of the antitrust fine and the conviction 
probability. If both are low-to-medium, firms will not self-report. The result of this simulation is that 
for cartels that are active in jurisdictions such as the EU and the US, which impose high fines and 
have a relatively high conviction probability, firms will apply for leniency in all relevant 
jurisdictions.1521 
 
Another reason why information exchange among competition authorities via second generation 
agreements should not serve as a disincentive to apply for leniency is that an increasing number of 
companies grant waivers of confidentiality during the leniency process, meaning that information is 
already being shared without negative consequences.1522 JONES pointed to the fact that despite the 
Commission’s assertions in its Leniency Notice that it intends to guard leniency submissions so that 
cooperating cartel members will be no worse off in private litigation than they would be if they did 
not cooperate, “the fact that leniency recipients are found to be infringers in Commission decisions is a negative 
consequence of applying for leniency as compared to not applying, so if fear of civil liability were a deterrent to leniency 
applications, they would already be deterred under current practice.”1523 HAMMOND, former Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General US DoJ, underlined the importance of waivers in a speech in 2003, a period in 
which an increasing number of jurisdictions were considering adopting leniency policies. He stated 
that simultaneous leniency applications had become ‘the norm’ in many major jurisdictions, and that 
applicants ‘commonly’ waive confidentiality rights between the jurisdictions where they applied for 
                                                          
1519 Judgment of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others, C-453/99, 
EU:C:2001:465; Judgment of 13 July 2006, Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio Cannito v Fondiaria 
Sai SpA and Nicolò Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v Assitalia SpA, Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, EU:C:2006:461.   
1520 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution 
from the European Union, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)53, 9 February 2012, 6.  
1521 J.P. Choi & H. Gerlach, “Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation”, International 
journal of industrial organization, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2012, 529. 
1522 M. Chowdhury, “From paper promises to concrete commitments: Dismantling the obstacles to transatlantic 
cooperation in cartel enforcement”, AAI Working Paper No. 11-09, November 28, 2011, 15.  
1523 C. Jones, “The quality of mercy and the quality of justice: reflections on the discovery of leniency documents and 
private actions for damages in the European Union” in N. Charbit, E. Ramundo, A. Chetova & A. Slater (eds) William E. 
Kovacic, An antitrust tribute, Liber Amicorum – Volume I, New York, Institute of Competition Law, 2012, 256. 
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leniency.1524 This was confirmed in the contribution from the US to the 2012 Global Forum on 
Competition where it was stated that waivers are ‘routinely’ obtained from applicants in the case of 
simultaneous leniency applications.1525 Even in the event that these statements are exaggerated or 
enhanced, the fact that some level of exchange already takes place, adds to the argument that fears 
about the risks of such exchanges are inflated.  
 
3.5.2.4 Safeguards in the EU-Switzerland Agreement 
 
Despite the above arguments, the EU-Switzerland Agreement foresees that discussion or exchange 
of leniency information without express consent in writing of the undertaking providing the 
information is not allowed.1526 ‘Leniency information’ in the EU-Switzerland Agreement means for 
the Union, information obtained pursuant to the Commission notice on immunity from fines and 
reduction of fines in cartel cases, and information obtained pursuant to Article 10a of Commission 
Regulation No 773/2004. For Switzerland, this refers to information obtained pursuant to paragraph 
2 of Article 49a CartA and Articles 8 to 14 of the 2004 Ordinance on Sanctions Imposed for 
Unlawful Restraints of Competition, and information obtained pursuant to Article 29 CartA.1527 
Protection therefore seems to apply to all leniency information, the voluntarily provided leniency 
statement itself as well as evidence that the leniency applicant has submitted together with the actual 
leniency application.1528 However, it is reported that “[a]ccording to one of the Directors of the Secretariat of 
COMCO who took part in the negotiations of the Cooperation Agreement, this limitation covers only the leniency 
declaration itself and not the supporting evidence such as e-mails, correspondence, minute [sic] of meetings, etc. which 
may be communicated without the consent of the undertaking.”1529 DUCREY, a member of the Swiss delegation 
that negotiated the Agreement, equally clarified that only the leniency report itself is given special 
protection, not evidence that was submitted at the same time or that can also be obtained in the 
course of a search.1530 It is regrettable that the text of the Agreement is not more clear on this matter. 
It is unclear as well what would happen if a leniency application is withdrawn, or when it was late or 
incomplete.1531 The US-Australia Agreement nor the IAEAA foresee a formal limitation on the use 
                                                          
1524 S. Hammond, “Beating cartels at their own game – sharing information in the fight against cartels”, presented at the 
Inaugural Symposium of the Competition Policy Research Center - Fair Trade Commission of Japan, Tokyo, 20 
November 2003, as cited in OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel 
Investigations, Background Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 22.  
1525 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Contribution 
from the United States (DoJ), DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)46, 31 January 2012, 6.  
1526 Article VII(6) EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1527 Article 2(7) and 2(8) EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1528 F. Hoffet, M. Dietrich, G. Brei, “Cooperation Agreement Switzerland – EU on Competition Law becomes effective 
on 1 December 2014, Facilitation of the Transmission of Confidential Information and Documents between Swiss and 
European Competition Authorities”, Homburger Bulletin, 6 November 2014, available at 
http://www.homburger.ch/fileadmin/publications/Homburger_Bulletin_20141106_EN.PDF (accessed August 2016), 
3.  
1529 P. Kobel & D. Viros, “Cooperation Agreement – Investigations – Confidentiality obligations: The European Union 
and Switzerland reach the agreement concerning the application of their competition law entering in force on 1st 
December 2014”, Concurrences, N° 2- 2015, 212.  
1530 P. Ducrey, “The Agreement between Switzerland and the EU concerning cooperation in the APplicaiotn of their 
competiiton laws”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2013, 442.  
1531 M. Meinhardt & B. Merkt, “Cooperation Agreement between Switzerland and the EU on competition law enters into 
force”, Lexology, 14 November 2014. 
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or disclosure of leniency information, but it is US policy to treat such information with care.1532 It is 
unfortunate that this policy was not formalised in the Agreement.1533 
 
Settlement information is protected in the same manner as leniency information, although it is 
difficult to understand how this protection would apply in practice.1534 As a settlement can occur at 
several stages of the procedure, it is not clear what happens with information that was discussed or 
transmitted prior to the settlement. Furthermore, one cannot deduct from the provision whether it is 
the initiation of settlement talks that restricts the possibility of discussions and transmissions, or only 
the signature of the settlement agreement, as settlement negotiations can come to halt before their 
finalization.1535  
 
3.5.2.5 Safeguards in domestic legislation 
 
In most major jurisdictions around the world, leniency applicants in competition investigations do 
not receive any beneficial treatment in follow-on private antitrust cases, but there are some 
exceptions. In the US, for instance, leniency applicants can still face private litigation, but they are 
exempted from joint and several liability or triple damages (they are only held liable for restitution of 
actual damages) if the relevant court determines that the applicant has satisfied its cooperation 
obligations. Beneficial treatment is limited, however, as an applicant’s criminal plea or conviction 
following public enforcement may serve as prima facie evidence of the violation in a subsequent 
private action.1536  
 
If leniency information is nevertheless transmitted to the EU, it is protected via the aforementioned 
Damages Directive. This legislation was particularly welcomed by the Commission, which was 
burdened by the permanent need to monitor and follow-up on for instance US federal district court 
proceedings, intervening to call for the application of principles of comity on a case-by-case basis to 
counter the perceived negative effects of extraterritorial discovery of leniency documents.1537 Under 
Article 6(6) of the Damages Directive leniency statements and settlement submissions enjoy 
permanent protection from disclosure for the purpose of damages actions.1538 ‘Leniency statement’ is 
defined as “an oral or written presentation voluntarily provided by, or on behalf of, an undertaking or a natural 
person to a competition authority or a record thereof, describing the knowledge of that undertaking or natural person of 
a cartel and describing its role therein, which presentation was drawn up specifically for submission to the competition 
authority with a view to obtaining immunity or a reduction of fines under a leniency programme, not including pre-
                                                          
1532 The DoJ in its contribution to the OECD Global Forum on Competition ‘improving international co-operation in 
cartel investigations’ stated that leniency information is protected and cannot be exchanged unless there is a court order 
present (corporate leniency) or a waiver has been provided (individual leniency: “The DOJ’s policy is to treat as confidential the 
identity of leniency applicants and any information obtained from the applicant. The DOJ will not disclose a leniency applicant’s identity, 
absent prior disclosure by or agreement with the applicant, unless authorized by court order. Further, in order to protect the integrity of the 
leniency program, the DOJ has adopted a policy of not disclosing to other authorities, pursuant to cooperation agreements, information obtained 
from a leniency applicant unless the leniency applicant agrees first to the disclosure.”(OECD, Global Forum on Competition, 
Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Contribution from the United States (DoJ), 
DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)46, 31 January 2012, 6.) 
1533 15 USC Section 6211(2). 
1534 Article 7(6) EU-Switzerland Agreement.  
1535 D. Mamane, “Competition law cooperation agreement EU/Switzerland”, Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 31 July 2012. 
1536 Global Competition Review, Know-How, Topics, private litigation, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ (accessed 
January 2015).  
1537 C. Nicolosi, “No Good Whistle Goes Unpunished: Can We Protect European Antitrust Leniency Applications from 
Discovery?”, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2011, 247. 
1538 Article 6(6) Damages Directive.  
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existing information.”1539 The latter in turn is defined as “evidence that exists irrespective of the proceedings of a 
competition authority, whether or not such information is in the file of a competition authority.”1540 A leniency 
corporate statement includes a detailed description of the facts of the infringement. Such statements 
are drawn up specifically for submission to the Commission to benefit from the leniency 
programme. Via this statement the author admits the infringement and waives his right not to 
incriminate himself.1541 It is therefore rightly differentiated from other documents provided to the 
Commission in the course of an investigation, in particular pre-existing information.1542 A ‘settlement 
submission’ is understood to be “a voluntary presentation by, or on behalf of, an undertaking to a competition 
authority describing the undertaking’s acknowledgement of, or its renunciation to dispute, its participation in an 
infringement of competition law and its responsibility for that infringement of competition law, which was drawn up 
specifically to enable the competition authority to apply a simplified or expedited procedure.”1543 The protection 
granted therefore applies to leniency statements and settlement submissions sensu strictu, as well as 
verbatim quotations from leniency statements or settlement submissions included in other 
documents.1544 Leniency statements and settlement submissions in the hands of third parties are 
further protected in Article 7, which restricts the use of such evidence when it was obtained by a 
natural or legal person solely through access to the file of a competition authority. In this case the 
evidence is either deemed to be inadmissible in damages actions or is otherwise protected under the 
applicable national rules.1545 It should be noted that Swiss law does not include any similar provision 
preventing undertakings from using the leniency statements and settlement submissions transmitted 
by the EU Commission in civil proceedings.1546 The Damages Directive provides even more 
protection to leniency recipients by lowering the risk they face of being held jointly and severally 
liable to injured parties other than direct or indirect purchasers as claimants will have to sue other 
infringers in the same case first before being able to request full compensation from the leniency 
recipient(s).1547  
 
This protection does not prevent competition authorities from publishing their decisions in 
accordance with the applicable legislation. In the EU, the Commission can publish leniency 
information, without however including information that could lead to the identification of the 
leniency applicant(s).1548 According to Advocate General SZPUNAR in the aforementioned Evonik 
appeal case, the protection of leniency statements is justified by the public interest in ensuring that 
the leniency programmes remain attractive, and therefore cannot be relied on against the 
Commission. However, protection may also find its basis in the particular interest of the leniency 
applicant because of the way in which the leniency programmes function. The fact that it creates a 
legal framework which encourages an undertaking to spontaneously waive its right not to incriminate 
                                                          
1539 Article 2(16) Damages Directive  
1540 Article 2(17) Damages Directive.  
1541 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission, C-162/15, EU:C:2016:587.   
1542 Article 4(a) Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 123, 27.4.2004.  
1543 Article 2(18) Damages Directive.  
1544 Recital 26 Damages Directive. 
1545 Article 7(1) Damages Directive.  
1546 P. Kobel & D. Viros, “Cooperation Agreement – Investigations – Confidentiality obligations: The European Union 
and Switzerland reach the agreement concerning the application of their competition law entering in force on 1st 
December 2014”, Concurrences, N° 2- 2015, 214. 
1547 Article 11(4) Damages Directive, also see S. Peyer, Peyer, Sebastian, “The European Damages Directive fails to 
deliver, but can it be fixed?”, ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Competition Law and Policy Blog, 3 March 2015.  
1548 Judgment of 28 January 2015, Akzo Nobel NV and Others v European Commission, T-345/12, EU:T:2015:50, paragraph 
109. 
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itself creates a relationship based on trust between the applicant and the Commission.1549 While the 
Advocate General therefore accepted that there exists a legitimate expectation from the relevant 
undertaking that it will receive confidential treatment, this is limited to the “disclosure of the information 
obtained within the framework of cooperation in a context which enables the source of the information to be 
traced, and does not apply to the protection of that information as such.”1550 He explained that it is 
not the intrinsically sensitive content of the leniency information that justifies protection, but rather 
the combination of the content and the circumstances in which the information was communicated 
to the Commission. This in turn justifies that the restrictions on disclosure resulting from the 
legitimate interest of the leniency applicant apply only to the information that enables the connection 
with the leniency statement to be identified. While the case dates back prior to the Damages 
Directive, the Advocate General did make reference to it. According to him, the full protection 
afforded to leniency statements does not automatically mean that factual information concerning the 
infringement contained in those statements merits the same level of protection when the 
Commission’s decisions are published. This is justified by the fact that public access to information 
relating to the unlawful facts is a fundamental element of actions for damages. According to AG 
SZPUNAR the extension of absolute protection to such information would upset the delicate balance 
established by the Damages Directive. Such protection can moreover not be inferred from the 
Directive in the absence of any express provision to that effect, on the contrary, the Directive 
specifically states that the limitations on the disclosure of evidence should not prevent the 
competition authorities from publishing their decisions in accordance with the applicable EU or 
national law (recital 26). The Advocate General concluded that the information in leniency 
statements may be used in the public versions of Commission decisions, provided that identification 
of the source is made impossible, and the legitimate expectation of the applicant to confidential 
treatment only extends to the protection of the statement as such, of the verbatim quotations and 
other information that would permit that statement to be directly identified as the source, but not of 
factual information relating to the infringement. He finally, and rightly so, pointed out that the 
interests of leniency applicants are also protected by other means that are less harmful to the 
interests of injured third parties, for instance via the limitation of joint and several liability of leniency 
applicants.1551 Such an approach is preferable to one that restricts access to leniency documents as it 
reconciles to a certain extent both the functioning of leniency programmes and the right to 
compensation of damages as recognised by the ECJ.1552  
 
The Court confirmed the Advocate General’s assessment, clarifying that while verbatim quotations, 
of information from the documents provided by an undertaking to the Commission in support of a 
statement made in order to obtain leniency should be allowed to be published, subject to compliance 
with the protection owed to business secrets, professional secrecy and other confidential 
information, the publication of verbatim quotations from that statement itself is not to be published 
in any circumstances.1553 It further added that an undertaking cooperating with the Commission in 
the context of a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU can only rely on “the protection concerning (i) the 
immunity from or reduction in the fine in return for providing the Commission with evidence of the suspected 
infringement which represents significant added value with respect to the information already in its possession and (ii) 
                                                          
1549 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission, C-162/15, EU:C:2016:587, 
paragraph 119-122. 
1550 Ibid., paragraph 123. Emphasis by author.  
1551 Ibid., paragraph 124-125, 203-208. 
1552 J. Alfaro & T. Reher, “Towards the Directive on Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law: is the time ripe?”, 
The European Antitrust Review, 2010, 44.  
1553 Judgment of 14 March 2017, Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission, C-162/15 P, EU:C:2017:205, paragraph 87. 
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the non-disclosure by the Commission of the documents and written statements received by it in accordance with the 
2002 Leniency Notice.”1554 The Court therefore clarified that the case-law relating to the Transparency 
Regulation cannot be relied upon to contest the publication of information in an infringement 
decision. It finally stated that the appellant’s argument regarding the protection of the leniency 
programme’s effectiveness does not cast doubt on the foregoing considerations.1555 The Commission 
therefore enjoys a broad margin of discretion in determining what information will be disclosed in 
the public version of an infringement decision. 
 
The Directive provides more legal certainty for firms that cooperate with competition authorities, 
compared to the aforementioned Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie case-law. PEYER, however, stated that 
the pendulum is now on the other end and that rather than reducing litigation costs or incentivising 
legal action, thereby achieving the stated goal of compensation, the Directive rather seeks to 
safeguard public enforcement from private follow-on actions.1556 In this sense, information 
exchanged with the European Commission does not contribute to a higher risk of liability in private 
enforcement as the Damages Directive in fact attempts to maintain the incentives for companies to 
cooperate with competition authorities. The Damages Directive installs an entirely inflexible 
assessment when it comes to leniency statements and settlement submissions, which seems ill-suited 
for the multiple complex competing interests under EU law.1557 However, only the corporate 
statement is protected, and claimants in follow-on cases are aided by the fact that NCA’s final 
infringement decisions are considered binding, and more generally cartel harm and passing-on is 
presumed.1558  
 
In the US, the DoJ’s leniency program does not protect cartel participants from civil damages actions 
either. Regardless of leniency, court judgments obtained by the DoJ serve as prima facie proof of a 
violation in a Federal court and can serve as the basis for private treble damages claims under the 
Sherman Act. Moreover, if an undertaking succeeds in its leniency application, it is obliged to 
provide restitution to victims where possible. Relief from a treble-damages verdict (e.g. single 
damages without joint and several liability) by a leniency recipient is possible under the Antitrust 
Criminal Penalties and Enforcement Reform Act (2004), only if it has fully cooperated with the 
plaintiffs in the damages action, separate from any cooperation given to the DoJ.1559 The US similarly 
pursues a policy of not disclosing the identity of leniency applicants or materials or statements 
created or made in connection with a leniency application.1560 The DoJ bases this policy on the 
reasoning that corporations or individuals will not plead guilty voluntarily if their request and the 
information they supply is made public, but they rather expect such discussions to remain 
confidential. Protection is, however, equally limited to documents that have been specially created – 
                                                          
1554 Ibid., paragraph 97. 
1555 Ibid., paragraph 100.  
1556 S. Peyer, Peyer, Sebastian, “The European Damages Directive fails to deliver, but can it be fixed?”, ESRC Centre for 
Competition Policy Competition Law and Policy Blog, 3 March 2015.   
1557 C. Jones, “The quality of mercy and the quality of justice: reflections on the discovery of leniency documents and 
private actions for damages in the European Union” in N. Charbit, E. Ramundo, A. Chetova & A. Slater (eds) William E. 
Kovacic, An antitrust tribute, Liber Amicorum – Volume I, New York, Institute of Competition Law, 2012, 252. 
1558 Recital 34, Article 13, Article 17(2) Damages Directive. 
1559 C. Jones, “The quality of mercy and the quality of justice: reflections on the discovery of leniency documents and 
private actions for damages in the European Union” in N. Charbit, E. Ramundo, A. Chetova & A. Slater (eds) William E. 
Kovacic, An antitrust tribute, Liber Amicorum – Volume I, New York, Institute of Competition Law, 2012, 248.  
1560 Global competition review, know-how, topics, private litigation, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ (accessed 
January 2015). See footnote 1532 above.  
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or statements that have been specifically made – in connection with a leniency application.1561 With 
regard to discovery of foreign leniency-information, not belonging to the US authorities’ file, 
uncertainty remains with regard to the ability of the US or a foreign government to protect such 
materials from discovery in US damages litigation. There is no explicit rule that would clearly protect 
foreign leniency information. Instead, defendants and governments looking to protect leniency 
information from discovery in US civil proceedings must rely on ambiguous doctrines, such as 
comity, the doctrine of foreign or investigatory privilege, or even the act of state doctrine. As these 
doctrines require a balancing of interests and therefore cannot offer a guarantee of protection, it 
deprives parties of pre-litigation certainty. US courts have indeed not reached consistent conclusions 
in cases where antitrust plaintiffs seek discovery of material produced for or generated in an EU 
cartel proceeding. However, because sovereigns are more aggressively pursuing their interest in 
protecting confidentiality by intervening as amicus curiae, courts may be growing more sensitive to 
the risk posed by such discovery demands.1562  
 
3.5.2.6 Over-protection of leniency programmes? 
 
Leniency appears to be almost unique to competition law. Equivalent enforcement instruments are 
difficult to trace in other branches of law, but more than fifty jurisdictions have included a leniency 
policy in one form or another in their competition law enforcement system. The leniency policy is an 
instrument often zealously defended and advocated for by enforcers, and sometimes triggering 
defensive reactions in the face of criticism or perceived threats to the functioning of the programme. 
However, while the impact of leniency programmes should not and cannot be understated, they 
should not be treated as the holy grail. An increasing amount of questions emerges concerning their 
long term sustainability and effectiveness, in particular with regard to the effects of leniency policies 
on other aspects of the enforcement system, such as private actions, settlements, as well as 
international cooperation.1563 The question whether the benefits of the leniency program are indeed 
worth the cost is increasingly raised.1564 In recent years the apparent over-reliance on leniency policies 
and myopia in their use is questioned and attention is drawn to the potentially deleterious effects of 
such policies. Empirical research and practical experience increasingly cast doubt on the extent to 
which leniency policies actually contribute to cartel deterrence. Some studies have even pointed to 
the perverse effect of leniency policies promoting cartel activity rather than deterring it.1565  
 
Empirical research conducted by SOKOL indicated that firms regularly game the leniency program to 
punish their competitors. Economic literature suggests that if leniency is granted too easily, this may 
create incentives for strategic behaviour, whereby firms use the leniency program to punish rivals or 
to help enforce collusion. SOKOL furthermore pointed to the fact that leniency in a competition law 
context as it exists now is relatively unusual in terms of its detection ability for enforcers vis-à-vis 
other types of white-collar crime, in that what counts as ‘leniency’ may give the leniency program too 
much credit. Sometimes firms may apply for leniency when the cartel is already in the process of 
                                                          
1561 S.R. Miller, K. Nordlander, J.C. Owens, “U.S discovery of European Union and U.S. leniency applications and other 
confidential investigatory materials”, CPI Antitrust Journal, March 2010, 3.  
1562 Ibid., 5, 8. 
1563 C. Beaton-Wells, “Leniency policies in anti-cartel enforcement: critical review is well overdue”, Concurrences, N°3 – 
2015, 3 (in Concurrences Competition Law Review English Edition 2016).  
1564 G. Schnell & A. Dumas-Emard, “How to catch a thief – Corporate leniency and the irrepressible challenge of cartel 
detection; Finding a better way”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, September 2011, 3.  
1565 C. Beaton-Wells, “Leniency policies in anti-cartel enforcement: critical review is well overdue”, Concurrences, N°3 – 
2015, 4 (in Concurrences Competition Law Review English Edition 2016). 
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being revealed. The success of the leniency programme may not be overstated, as there still seems to 
be significant under-deterrence. Research is lacking on the timing of leniency applications, for 
instance. If leniency is most frequently employed strategically when a cartel is already dying, rather 
than when it is just beginning, this does not sufficiently deter firms from participating in cartels.1566  
 
An interesting argument is that the success of the leniency programme, at least in the US, may 
deliberately be exaggerated due to institutional reasons in the sense that there is political pressure to 
justify the DoJ’s budget. Criticism toward the leniency programme would imply that the DoJ is less 
worthy of political and financial support. Minimising criticism would then improve the standing of 
the agency in negotiations for funding. This would allegedly explain the reluctance of the DoJ to re-
examine its leniency programme and its unreceptive attitude towards any criticism of the programme. 
Additionally, agency prestige may be enhanced by mainly pursuing ‘easy’ cartel cases rather than 
more resource-intensive cases, in order to ‘amp up the numbers’. In some settings the leniency 
program may lead to under-detection and contribute to this problem by causing too few 
prosecutions outside of those cartels uncovered via leniency.1567 
 
The idea underpinning leniency programmes is not based on solid moral grounds: while cartels are 
commonly viewed as one of the most egregious forms of competitive misconduct, the system 
basically rewards these very wrongdoers that should be punished. The reasoning thereby seems to be 
that the end justifies the means. The program is reactive rather than proactive, and over-reliance 
might divert regulatory attention away from more proactive enforcement techniques, such as for 
instance more rigorous industry monitoring, more active review of relevant press, or more actively 
solicit help of those not involved in the wrongdoing.1568 According to SCHNELL and DUMAS-EMARD 
one should wonder whether ‘the almost obsessive focus’ on leniency programs took away potential 
focus on other enforcement mechanisms. Another issue is that it causes coordination issues with 
other elements of the enforcement system on a whole, such as private enforcement activity.1569 
MARSDEN rightly pointed to the fact that leniency is a concession for lawbreakers. Focus should 
remain on improving enforcement rather than making the process easier for them.1570 The decision-
making process of prospective leniency applicants, both at corporate and individual levels is a 
complex matter, that is necessarily simplified in the design of a leniency policy. Many of the variables 
may be unknown or unquantifiable. The rise in private damages actions has made this balancing act 
even more complex. If leniency information is excessively protected to the detriment of private 
damages claimants, this is problematic as it impedes the rights and potential recovery of an injured 
party in a private proceeding.1571  
 
                                                          
1566 D. Daniel Sokol, “Cartels, corporate compliance, and what practitioners really think about enforcement”, Antitrust 
Law Journal, Vol. 78, No. 1, 2012, 203-205, 207, 212-2014, 237.  
1567 Ibid., 203-205, 207, 213-214.  
1568 G. Schnell & A. Dumas-Emard, “How to catch a thief – Corporate leniency and the irrepressible challenge of cartel 
detection; Finding a better way”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, September 2011, 4-6. Also see C. Beaton-Wells, “Leniency 
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detection; Finding a better way”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, September 2011, 4-5, 7.  
1570 Intervention by P. Marsden during ECON Committee and European Commission Public Hearing on empowering 
the national competition authorities to be more effective enforcers of the EU competition rules, European Parliament, 
Brussels, 19 April 2016.  
1571 C. Beaton-Wells, “Leniency policies in anti-cartel enforcement: critical reeiw is well overdue”, Concurrences, N°3 – 
2015, 5 (in Concurrences Competition Law Review English Edition 2016). 
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The success of leniency policies might eventually cause their demise. The proliferation of leniency 
policies across the globe renders it virtually impossible that an applicant will be successful in all 
relevant jurisdictions.1572 It was remarked during the Thirty-Seventh Annual Fordham Competition 
Law Institute Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy that “in recent cases, where there was a 
leniency applicant in the major jurisdictions, another company, which was not the first, applied for leniency in a number 
of other, often unusual jurisdictions, and the authorities in these jurisdictions started cases as well. At the end of the day 
the system might collapse: no company can then afford to go for leniency anymore, because it will spend millions of 
dollars defending itself against allegations in other jurisdictions where it is not the first.”1573 In 2016 intensifying 
discussions in Brussels and beyond took place about a perceived decline in immunity applications.1574  
 
There seems to be some discord between the EU Courts and the EU legislator. The courts 
repeatedly stated that protection of leniency information should not stand in the way of private 
damages recovery and that the interest of a company not to pay damages is not worthy of protection. 
The European Parliament, however, “calls on the Commission to ensure the attractiveness of leniency 
programmes and settlement procedures, taking into account the general principle governing the exchange of confidential 
information […]; stresses, therefore, the importance of protecting documents relating to leniency applications or 
settlement procedures, in particular from potential future disclosure in the context of civil or criminal proceedings, in 
order to provide leniency applicants and parties to a settlement procedure with a guarantee that those documents will not 
be transmitted or used without their prior consent […].”1575 The EU legislator therefore appears to grant a 
rather generous amount of protection to leniency documents. 
 
All the above indicates that it is ill-advised to centre or form other enforcement mechanisms around 
the leniency policy, as seems to be happening with international cooperation whereby the exchange 
of leniency information is prohibited. Cooperation may even strengthen an authority’s ability to start 
ex officio cartel cases, and thereby prevent competition authorities from becoming overly dependent 
on their leniency programmes.1576 The current relationship between public and private enforcement 
in the EU competition law landscape is far from ideal, and has lead JONES to rightly state that a 
public enforcement system that draws from limitations on the damages that private plaintiffs can 
obtain, violating their EU rights, is fundamentally flawed.1577 In other countries such as Brazil, the 
level of confidentiality protection granted to leniency documents was diminished rather than 
enhanced.1578 The negotiators of the EU-Switzerland Agreement understandably accommodated 
                                                          
1572 Ibid.. 
1573 Hawk, Barry, 2010 International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law, Fordham University School of Law, 
New York, Juris Publishing, 2011, 93. By DE PREE (De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, Amsterdam). 
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Forward, 2013/2921(RSP), 5 February 2014. 
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Supervision, Liber Amicorum, Pieter Kalbfleisch, Rotterdam, Editor Ronald Kouwenhoven, 2011, 41-42. 
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private actions for damages in the European Union” in N. Charbit, E. Ramundo, A. Chetova & A. Slater (eds) William E. 
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1578 E. Molan Gaban, N. de Vicente Santos & F. Duarte Calmon Carvalho, “Brazil: STJ Restricts the Confidentiality 
Extension Granted to Leniency Agreement Provisions Entered into by CADE”, Tauil & Chequer Legal Update, 16 May 
2016; A. Ribeiro, M. Dias Soares, R. Carrilho Donas, “The Brazilian Superior Court of Justice limits the confidentiality of 
the Competition Authority’s leniency agreements (Electrolux)”, e-Competition Bulletin, May 2016-II, Art. N° 79729, 8 
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concerns of competition authorities that the leniency policy might be undermined if leniency-related 
information could be freely exchanged, but they have taken this concession a step too far by banning 
the exchange entirely. The fact that only the corporate statement is protected is not sufficiently clear 
from the text of the Agreement. Some authors suggest that voluntarily submitted information should 
receive the least protection from disclosure as the consequences of cooperation can be assessed in 
advance, in contrast to information that was taken via compulsory process.1579  
 
A balanced solution could be a more detailed categorization of documents deserving full or partial 
protection. Now the scope of leniency documents that is protected is not transparent or unspecified. 
Rather than de facto banning all information exchange or discussion of leniency documents, it would 
be a valid alternative to consider categorisation of relevant documents and accord different levels of 
protection. CHOWDHURY for instance suggested that if the rationale is a legitimate fear that leniency 
applicants will not self-report if doing so might increase their exposure elsewhere, an alternative to 
an outright restriction on agency powers to share confidential information could be that only 
information submitted by the leniency applicant that pertains to the involvement of other co-
conspirators could be exchanged without approval. This would ensure that the primary leniency 
applicant is protected and therefore not discouraged to self-report.1580  
 
3.5.3 Third concern: due process 
 
Discussions on procedural fairness, or due process, as well as on agency transparency more generally, 
have taken a central role in the competition law enforcement debate over the last years, and rightly 
so. Procedural fairness is crucial to increase trust in the international cooperation process.1581  
 
This focus on due process has also spread to the international level. Concerns have arisen for 
example as a consequence of differences in the scope and application of legal privileges, such as the 
legal professional privilege/attorney-client privilege or the privilege against self-incrimination.1582 For 
instance, the professional legal privilege may apply only to external lawyers (as in the EU) or also to 
in-house council (as in Switzerland to a certain extent, Canada and the US), or the duration of the 
protection may differ. These are issues that cause concern in the business community. BIAC, for 
instance, uses strong language by stating that “[i]t will remain impossible to achieve the highest possible level of 
co-operation in respect of international leniency cases, or indeed international cartel cases more generally, without 
recognition by all authorities concerned that businesses need to be able to seek advice in confidence from lawyers around 
the world to examine their conduct in the light of all applicable competition laws and to prepare an appropriate strategy 
for resolving any problems which may have arisen”1583 Another example is that in the US and Canada, only 
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individuals enjoy the right not to incriminate oneself, not companies. In the EU the right of 
companies not to admit an infringement is only recognised to a certain extent. Companies are under 
the obligation to cooperate with investigations. This includes providing evidence which can be used 
to prove an infringement (see above, Part II, 3.4.3.2, A).1584 The difference between countries where 
competition law infringements are mainly administratively punished and those where criminal 
sanctions apply, is relevant as well. Evidence obtained in the context of a civil investigation should 
not be used as the basis of criminal prosecutions as the same level of protection does not apply and 
higher procedural guarantees are applicable in the latter.1585  
 
3.5.3.1 What level of protection? 
 
Under the EU-Switzerland Agreement information obtained through investigative process cannot be 
discussed, requested or transmitted, if the use of this information would be prohibited under the 
procedural rights and privileges guaranteed under the respective laws of the parties.1586 The OECD 
Competition Committee Best Practices suggested that the higher level of protection valid in both 
countries is used. Also the Hague Evidence Convention favours this approach.1587 This method 
guarantees the fullest respect of the procedural rights.1588 Also in the 2014 OECD Recommendations 
concerning international cooperation on competition investigations and proceedings it is advised that 
“[t]he transmitting Adherent should apply its own rules governing applicable privileges, including the privilege against 
self-incrimination and professional privileges, when transmitting the requested confidential information, and endeavour 
not to provide information deemed privileged in the receiving Adherent.”1589 It could be understood that the EU-
Switzerland Agreement indeed adheres to what is stated in the Hague Convention and that the 
highest level of protection will apply in case information is protected by legal professional privilege in 
one jurisdiction but not in another.1590 However, according to DUCREY, the Hague Convention was 
not followed and it is the level of protection offered by the jurisdiction of the authority that wishes 
to ‘use’ the information that applies. The issue allegedly was not a point of discussion.1591 Whether 
information subject to Swiss blocking statutes, such as banking secrecy rules,1592 falls under this 
exception will depend on the exact meaning of the word ‘privileges’ in the Agreement. If it does not 
                                                          
1584 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
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254 
 
fall within that scope, “any ‘Swiss Finish’ […] will get lost upon transmission of information to the European 
Commission since the confidentiality of transmitted information will be governed by the law of the receiving 
authority.”1593 It is regrettable that this provision was not stated in more clear terms, by for instance 
taking over the exact formulation of the Hague Conference and exclude any ambiguity.  
 
In the US-Australia Agreement it is unclear as well whether the higher level of protection is applied. 
Article II (I) of the US-Australia Agreement states that nothing in the Agreement obliges a person to 
provide antitrust evidence if this would run against any legally applicable right or privilege. The 
meaning of ‘any legally applicable’ may be subject to debate. In case a request for information should 
result in the transmission of information that was privileged in the receiving jurisdiction, while it was 
not in the sending jurisdiction, this may constitute grounds for a court in the receiving jurisdiction to 
reject or overturn the case entirely on procedural grounds. The use of ‘taint teams’ to filter the 
information and avert this risk is very human-resource intensive.1594  
 
3.5.3.2 Personal data use  
 
The Agreement also lacks clarity with regard to the level of protection of personal data. The concept 
of ‘personal data’ is not defined for the purposes of the Agreement. Generally it entails ‘information 
relating to identified or identifiable natural persons’, such as names, contact details, or the position of 
the natural person in an undertaking or in an administration.1595 The protection of personal data is 
determined by the law of the receiving authority. It is unclear how the partner authorities will deal 
with the fact that Swiss data protection laws offer more extensive protection than some data 
protection laws in the EU and its Member States, as that law applies both to companies and natural 
persons. It might indicate that the data that are transmitted to the European Commission may not be 
granted protection of equal scope as Swiss data protection law.1596 The content of this provision may 
moreover fluctuate alongside changes in domestic personal data laws. As a case in point, the EU in 
2016 reformed the old 1995 data protection rules.1597  
 
3.5.3.3 Notice and intermediary appeal 
 
One particular point of discussion is the issue of notice and appeal against a transmission decision. 
Even within BIAC there is no consensus on these issues.1598 Many agencies do not give notice, either 
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before or after the fact, of interagency disclosure of confidential information. The lack of notification 
implies that parties are unable to verify in a timely manner whether the exchanged evidence was 
gathered in a legal manner by the transmitting authority or whether the qualification of certain 
information as confidential happened correctly. For instance, parties cannot assess in a timely 
manner whether Article VII (7) of the EU-Switzerland Agreement was complied with, prohibiting 
the discussion or transmission of information if using such information would be forbidden under 
the procedural rights and privileges guaranteed under the respective laws of the Parties.1599 They 
cannot object or request certain safeguards before a transfer.  
 
In the EU-Switzerland Agreement the parties under scrutiny are not notified when information is 
transmitted without their consent, and the Agreement does not offer undertakings a right to 
intermediary appeal or even prior consultation.1600 Undertakings will only be informed of information 
exchanges when required by national data-protection laws.1601 The Swiss Cartel Act, that was revised 
to accommodate the EU-Switzerland Agreement, however, provides in Article 42b dealing with 
‘disclosure of data to foreign competition authorities’ that “[t]he competition authorities shall notify the 
undertaking concerned and invite it to state its views before transmitting the data to the foreign competition 
authority.”1602 Undertakings should therefore be informed and be able to take position before any 
information is transmitted. The provision is silent, however, on the possibility of challenging such 
transmission. There is ambiguity with regard to whether or not the Agreement affects domestic 
remedies such as those provided for by Swiss law.1603 According to DUCREY, if an appeal is 
nevertheless filed, it is unclear whether appeal courts in Switzerland and the EU will follow the 
Agreement and will not provide for any legal protection with regard to the transmission of 
confidential information or evidence.1604 While the US-Australia Agreement is silent with regard to 
notice prior to or after transmission to the other enforcement authority, “U.S. antitrust enforcers have 
stated they are willing to provide notice after the fact in appropriate circumstances.”1605 Notice will be given for 
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instance when a US antitrust authority seeks information from a US firm that will be used when 
responding to a request for assistance from a sister antitrust authority, or, when requested by the 
producing party, in situations where information is voluntarily provided. The US’ International 
Competition Policy Advisory Committee recommended in its report that the US antitrust authorities 
consider providing a priori or ex post notice of an intent to disclose information to foreign antitrust 
authorities, unless doing so would violate a treaty obligation, a court order, or jeopardize the integrity 
of a domestic or foreign investigation.1606  
 
The ICN Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process confirmed that most competition 
agencies that may disclose information without the submitting party’s consent do not offer the 
submitter an opportunity to object to the authority’s decision to disclose information. A common 
justification is the threat such notice and review may pose to the investigation.1607 This takes priority 
as allegedly the rights and obligations of the undertakings are not determined by a transmission 
decision and a transmission decision does not bring a distinct change in the legal position of the 
undertakings concerned.1608 This statement could be challenged, however, as an illegal transmission 
of information may very well affect a company’s rights of defence, if the damage would be long done 
by the time appeal of the final decision is possible. While the risk of abuse is indeed real, this could 
be mitigated by only allowing intermediary appeal subject to a strict prima facie test whether the 
action is not unfounded or strategic, and merely intended to stall the process. The European 
Parliament in its Resolution on ‘EU cooperation agreements on competition policy enforcement – 
the way forward’ noted that allowing intermediary appeals, for instance against a decision to 
exchange information, could potentially block investigations and compromise the effectiveness of 
the agreement, but simultaneously called for a coherent approach to appeals against final decisions in 
both jurisdictions.1609  
 
ALBERS rightly expressed his disappointment concerning the fact that the jurisdictions creating legal 
platforms for more extensive information exchanges have remained vague with regard to how the 
rights of defendants and information providers will be safeguarded. Different timetables, 
investigative powers, and legal guarantees revolving around compulsory collection and treatment of 
information create uncertainty and distrust from companies towards the international cooperation 
process.1610 International cooperation agreements therefore can and should contribute to the creation 
of a more trusting environment, by providing clear and full information on due process.  
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3.5.4 Fourth concern: preserving national sovereignty 
 
Another concern, this time coming from rulemakers and enforcers, revolves around the will to 
preserve national sovereignty. On the one hand, there exists a fear of losing control over the 
enforcement agenda and the allocation of the, often scarce, resources due to an imbalance in the 
number of requests from one competition authority to another.1611 This challenge might not be as big 
as it appears, however, as existing second generation agreements generally limit cooperation to cases 
where agencies are working on the same or related cases.  
 
There is some reluctance to let national interests be harmed through cooperation.1612 The problem is 
double. One the one hand it relates to the design of national competition laws, that are intended to 
deal with practices harming domestic markets rather than foreign markets. On the other hand, the 
application of such laws may be biased towards the national interests.1613 It is believed that when 
confidential information is shared, this will lead to the prosecution and sanctioning of domestic 
companies in a foreign jurisdiction, potentially negatively affecting national welfare, regardless of the 
fact whether any harm has been caused on the domestic market.1614 FOX refers to this phenomenon 
as ‘the problem of myopic or bounded concern, or disregard’ and ‘the problem of parochialism’, 
which boils down to the adage ‘happy to hurt you and aggrandise me’.1615 Consumer interest is still 
interpreted as meaning the interest of domestic consumers.1616 More broadly than national consumer 
interest, the interests of certain ‘national champions’ also play a role.1617 Jurisdictions have a tendency 
to enforce competition laws mainly with the domestic interests in mind, disregarding potential effects 
on foreign markets.1618 Local welfare considerations continue to play a rule in competition rulings, to 
the detriment of the collective global welfare.1619  
 
CHOWDHURY believed that this desire to protect and preserve national sovereignty is one of the 
most important explanations for the lack of progress in establishing an international antitrust regime 
and for the non-compulsory nature of the already limited information-sharing provisions in first and 
second generation agreements. These concerns are more present with regard to second generation 
                                                          
1611 M. Chowdhury, “From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling the Obstacles to Transatlantic 
Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement”, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 11-09, 28 November 2011, 13.  
1612 Ibid.  
1613 M. Taylor, International Competition Law: a New Dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
121.  
1614 M. Martyniszyn, “Discovery and Evidence in Transnational Antitrust Cases: Current Framework and the Way 
Forward”, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; University College 
Dublin - School of Law, 2012, 33, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142978 (accessed 
August 2016), 33.  
1615 E. Fox, “Antitrust without borders: from roots to codes to networks”, E15 Expert Group on Competition Policy and 
the Trade System Think Piece, November 2015, 6. 
1616 M. Chowdhury, “From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling the Obstacles to Transatlantic 
Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement”, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 11-09, 28 November 2011, 19-20.  
1617 In this context a ‘national champion’ is meant to be an undertaking that is “subject to a particular treatment from 
governments because of some national dimension in their operation.” D. Neven, Chief Economist DG COMP, European 
Commission, “Ownership, performance and national champions”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/opnc.pdf (accessed August 2016), 1. 
1618 C. Leskinen, “The EU/US cooperation in the field of antitrust law enforcement – some challenges for future 
cooperation”, Working Paper IE Law School, 5 May 2010, 3. 
1619 B. Sweeney, "International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress", Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 10, 2009, 58-59; C. Leskinen, “The EU/US cooperation in the field of antitrust law enforcement – some challenges 
for future cooperation”, Working Paper IE Law School, 5 May 2010, 3. 
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agreements, as these allow for more elaborate forms of cooperation. The concern, somewhat 
understandable considering the interconnectedness of competition policy with industrial and trade 
policy, is nevertheless testimony of the reality that national interests still dominate the international 
scene, rather than an interest in a global level playing field. Advocacy therefore remains important to 
make sure all heads face the same direction, and to increase confidence in the cooperation process 
and the procedures of peers.  
 
It remains problematic that national authorities often lack the political clout to convince politicians 
that the sharing of information with a foreign peer is in the country’s best interest, in particular if no 
short-term benefits are involved.1620 As such, there is a paradox in keeping competition cooperation 
between competition authorities neutral and shielded from political influences, while at the same 
time depending on these politicians for further cooperation. Governments must listen to the 
concerns of their constituencies, while competition authorities should enforce the law regardless of 
national interest. It is crucial therefore that competition agencies can function in complete 
independence from political influence, be it directly or via budgetary means, but that at the same 
time a dialogue is established between the legislature and the executive.    
 
3.6 Assessment based on benchmarks   
 
As second generation agreements to a large extent reiterate the provisions in first generation 
agreements, the assessment valid for that kind of agreement is relevant here as well (see above, Part 
II, 2.5.2). In this section the benchmarks will be applied to the information exchange system 
contained in second generation agreements in particular.  
 
3.6.1 Limiting negative externalities: conflict avoidance 
 
More extensive information exchange broadens the path to consistent remedies and therefore 
conflict avoidance. The more freely agencies can share information, the more they can coordinate 
their investigations and remedies. Second generation agreements definitely bring added value with 
regard to the scope of information exchange as compared to the situation without an agreement. As 
mentioned, however, even when confidential information may be exchanged, conflicting remedies 
can never be entirely excluded, due to for instance different substantive rules, the fact that 
competition policy is intertwined with other policies and cultures, or simply a different factual 
context. Nevertheless, the agreement could have allowed for more extensive information exchange 
and cooperation mechanisms, such as active investigatory assistance.   
 
3.6.2 Rationalisation of resources 
  
As the EU-Switzerland Agreement does not allow active information gathering on behalf of the 
partner authority, but limits the exchange of information to that which is already on file with the 
authority, the costs of information exchange can remain limited and rationalisation of resources can 
occur due to a potential increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of the investigation. According to 
FONTEIJN and KEEFFE, “[t]he administrative savings to be gained by using information already lawfully gathered 
                                                          
1620 F. Jenny, “International cooperation on competition: myth, reality and perspective”, University of Minnesota law 
school conference on global antitrust law and policy, Minneapolis, 20-21 September 2002, 4.  
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by another government agency are considerable.”1621 The cost of a formal agreement is justified here, in 
contrast to first generation agreements, because the agreement forms the legal basis allowing the 
exchange of confidential information.  
 
On a more abstract level, the full cost of advanced information exchange will yet have to become 
clear. The suspicion with which second generation agreements are beheld will have to be overcome 
by successful practice. In particular the effects on the public-private enforcement balance are difficult 
to foresee.   
 
3.6.3 Increased effectiveness and efficiency of investigations 
 
The fact that confidential information can be exchanged will certainly increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of competition proceedings in both jurisdictions. As limits on the exchange of such 
information were identified as important impediments to international cooperation (see above, Part 
II, 3.1), their removal will certainly generate benefits.  
 
Some remarks must however be made. Efficiency gains might not reach their full potential as first of 
all information exchange is heavily conditioned. One aspect that does not seem to occur in other 
agreements of the kind is that information obtained by investigative process may only be transmitted 
where both competition authorities are investigating the same or related cases. Moreover, while not 
an insignificant step forward, only information exchange is developed in the EU-Switzerland 
Agreement, while other mechanisms stay behind. The lack of active assistance limits additional 
efficiency increases.   
 
3.6.4 Increased transparency and legal certainty 
 
The Agreement lacks overall transparency and clarity. Examples include the uncertainty revolving 
around the exchange of information originating from a failed settlement attempt, or the scope of 
data protection considering the fact that EU and Swiss data protection rules differ. As is the case in 
the US-Australia Agreement, the EU-Switzerland Agreement would benefit from an annex listing the 
relevant laws and procedures of both parties regarding confidentiality and data protection. Even 
though the EU’s law is largely defined by case-law, it would certainly provide a relevant starting point 
for parties to gain additional insight in the possibilities and risks offered by the Agreement. It is then 
equally important that a cooperation agreement requires the parties to notify each other as soon as 
possible when legislation or policy is subject to relevant change, currently present in Article 11 (2) of 
the Agreement. As stated by the OECD, thorough understanding of the respective substantial and 
procedural rules is imperative for different jurisdictions to cooperate effectively and efficiently.1622 
One particular aspect in this regard is what constitutes non-public yet non-confidential agency 
information. A cooperation agreement should create complete clarity on what information agencies 
can exchange.  
 
Another matter that deserves additional transparency is the issue of how the rights of defendants and 
providers of information are to be guaranteed when information is exchanged, for instance whether 
                                                          
1621 Chris Fonteijn and Siún O’Keeffe, “Information Exchange Between Authorities: Enhancing Enforcement”, 21st 
St.Gallen International Competition Law Forum ICF, May 15th and 16th 2014, 10. 
1622 OECD, Report/Inventory on provisions contained in existing international co-operation agreements, Note by the 
Secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2014)10, 16 December 2014, 22. 
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incriminatory information was gathered in a legal manner.1623 The EU has missed an opportunity to 
take the lead in taking international competition cooperation to the next level and to confirm its role 
as major player in the international competition scene. The EU-Switzerland Agreement appears to 
overly anticipate certain concerns, such as the protection of the leniency programme, while 
simultaneously failing to address other, more crucial, issues, such as due process. There is an 
apparent discord between the issues deserving to be addressed and the issues actually addressed in 
the Agreement.  
 
3.6.5 Practical issues  
 
As made clear throughout the above analysis, more practical guidance is needed with regard to 
bilateral cooperation. More concrete examples of cooperation should either be included in the 
agreement or in an annex. While presenting more than ‘practical’ problems, more explicit definitions 
would render cooperation much more practical. Bilateral agreements can flesh out multilateral 
recommendations. The countries engaging in such agreements are generally experienced competition 
law enforcers and need to assume their leading role.  
 
3.6.6 Decreased burden for companies 
 
The EU-Switzerland Agreement does not actively contribute to alleviating the procedural burden for 
companies, as the main goal is enhanced enforcement. However, as the Agreement applies to 
mergers, full and transparent information exchange does benefit the companies involved, although 
they will likely still provide a waiver. The Agreement could have gone further, however, by for 
instance also including a formal streamlining of the leniency process or the waiver system, 
considering the advanced similarity between both competition law systems.1624 This would increase 
public support for this type of agreements.  
 
3.6.7 Discipline  
 
Finally, the Agreement falls short when it comes to installing discipline in the cooperation process. 
The parties are left a large margin of discretion in deciding whether and to what extent to cooperate, 
despite several rather strict safeguards. Such caution may be understandable, however, as it is the first 
agreement of this kind for the EU. It would, however, be desirable to develop stronger language 
throughout the Agreement, as suggested above, expressing a firm commitment to international 
cooperation. As competition law affects a wide range of business activities, the credibility of hard 
commitments may at times be preferred to offer firms doing business internationally the clarity and 
consistency the competitive process deserves.1625 The fact that a cooperation agreement has been 
                                                          
1623 M. Albers, “National Competition Laws, International Cooperation and Procedural Rights” paper for Cauffman, 
Caroline, Hao, Qian (eds), Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China, China-EU Law Series, Vol 3., Berlin, 
Heidelberg, Springer, 2016, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567001 (accessed July 
2017), 14.  
1624 For an overview of the remaining differences, see http://uk.practicallaw.com/0-501-
3634?qaq=W_q1&qaq=W_q2&qaq=W_q3&qaq=W_q4&qaq=W_q5&qaq=W_q6&qaq=W_q7&qaq=W_q8&qaq=W_
q9&qaq=W_q10&qaq=W_q11&qaq=W_q12&qaq=W_q13&qaq=W_q14&qaq=W_q15&qaq=W_q16&qaq=W_q17&q
aq=W_q18&qaid=0-517-4976&qaid=5-500-5740# (accessed December 2016, all relevant questions selected, EU and 
Switzerland selected as relevant jurisdictions). A full analysis of both leniency systems is beyond the scope of this study.  
1625 Also see J. Wayland, “International cooperation at the antitrust division”, remarks as prepared for the International 
Bar Association’s 16th Annual Competition Conference, Florence, 14 September 2012, 9.  
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concluded with a particular jurisdiction should have a positive influence on the decision whether or 
not to cooperate.  
 
4. Alternatives and complements: workable or not?   
 
Bilateral cooperation via first and second generation agreements as it exists now evidently is not the 
only way in which international cooperation in the field of competition law enforcement can take 
place. While multilateral cooperation and cooperation via non-competition specific agreements will 
be scrutinised in Part III, the current section analyses some alternatives and complementary 
measures. A distinction is made between alternative cooperation mechanisms used in the field of 
competition law and lessons that may be drawn from other policy fields.  
 
4.1 Alternative cooperation mechanisms in the field of competition law  
 
Some alternative cooperation mechanisms outside bilateral agreements can be found in the field of 
competition law itself. Some of the suggested mechanisms below, in particular the use of waivers, 
information gateways, and investigative assistance, were included in the most recent 2014 OECD 
Recommendations concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and 
Proceedings.1626 
 
4.1.1 Waivers 
 
The most well-known alternative to second generation agreements for competition authorities 
wishing to exchange confidential information are so-called waivers of confidentiality.  
 
4.1.1.1 Definition and use  
 
The OECD/ICN Joint Survey on international competition cooperation defined a ‘(confidentiality) 
waiver’ as “any permission granted by a party under investigation or a third party in a case/investigation that enables 
investigating agencies in different jurisdictions to discuss and/or exchange information, which is protected by 
confidentiality rules of the jurisdiction(s) involved, and which has been obtained from the party in question.”1627 
Considering the limited use of second generation agreements and the strongly voiced protest against 
confidential information exchange between competition authorities, one might wonder why a party 
subject to competition law scrutiny would grant a waiver. In general the benefits of granting a waiver 
are that it allows the waiving party to understand the information-sharing process, and provides it 
with a certain level of control over the type of information that the investigating agencies may 
exchange. It also demonstrates a general intention to collaborate in the investigation, and it allows 
the agencies to make fully-informed decisions. Waivers often permit quick, easy, and early 
information exchange, thereby facilitating coordination of the investigation from the beginning.1628  
 
In the experience of both the EU and the US authorities, more than the actual exchange of 
information, it is the removal of constraints which would otherwise prevent the agencies from 
                                                          
1626 OECD, Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning International Co-operation on Competition 
Investigations and Proceedings, C(2014)108, 16 September 2014. 
1627 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 97. 
1628 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 38. 
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having a free and unfettered dialogue and which in other circumstances may lead to 
misunderstandings that is the main benefit of a waiver.1629 Waivers are mainly used to allow fully 
informed discussion by agencies in different jurisdictions of confidential information already in 
possession of the agencies. Most often cooperation therefore occurs orally.1630 Waivers are used for 
several reasons, however, including the exchange of specific documents disclosing anticompetitive 
behaviour, the disclosure of a Commission decision when it has not yet been made public, or 
similarly the provision of advance copies of official notices setting out the Commission’s analysis and 
the terms of the proposed settlement of a case, or the detailed discussion of all aspects of a pending 
case, including remedies.1631 It is confirmed by the ICN’s explanatory note accompanying its waiver 
templates that while the latter do not preclude the exchange of documents between competition 
agencies, such exchanges only occur exceptionally.1632  
 
In 2012 a trend was identified among the more experienced competition authorities to require more 
(and more expansive) waivers, allowing both the exchange of information and of evidence.1633 It was 
established that competition agencies increasingly relied on waivers to overcome statutory limitations 
preventing them from exchanging confidential information.1634 This increased reliance is only a 
recent occurrence, at least in non-merger matters. In 2010 still, it was said that “[t]he experience of EU-
US cooperation reveals that only in one case relating to abuse of a dominant position did a company offer a waiver of 
confidentiality, […] In the same period, there was not even one (publicly known) waiver of confidentiality with respect 
to a cartel case.”1635 Waivers are indeed most frequently used in merger cases. A Commission official in 
2014 stated that 70% of international mergers cases involve waivers.1636 The survey spread in the 
framework of this study revealed varied answers with regard to the use of waivers. Some firms 
claimed that that waivers are used in up to 20 % of both merger and cartel cases, while others 
claimed that waivers are used very frequently in the merger setting and work very well, although they 
are used far less frequently in cartel and unilateral conduct cases.1637 Parties to a merger have an 
interest in waiving confidentiality protection to enable free discussion among the authorities 
investigating the merger and thereby facilitating consistent analyses and compatible enforcement 
decisions.1638 Due to the nature of a merger proceeding, which constitutes an authorization process 
whereby the parties benefit from a quick decision based on complete and correct data, cooperation is 
easier to achieve in merger review than cartel investigations. In the latter, companies are investigated 
regarding an alleged grave infringement of the law, and incentives to cooperate can therefore be less 
                                                          
1629 Commission Report to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement between the 
European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their 
competition laws, 1 January 1999 to 31 December 1999, COM(2000) 618 final, 4 October 2000, 3.  
1630 OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)55, 29 October 2013, 6. 
1631 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement 
between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of 
their competition laws, 10 April 1995 to 30 June 1996, COM(96) 479 final, 8 October 1996, 10.  
1632 ICN, Waivers of Confidentiality in Cartel Investigations – Explanatory Note, 2014, 4. 
1633 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 39.  
1634 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 97. 
1635 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 80. 
1636 Chatham House rules.  
1637 Result of author’s law firm survey (see Annex I). 
1638 M. Błachucki & S. Jóźwiak, “Exchange of Information and Evidence between Competition Authorities and 
Entrepreneurs’ Rights”, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2012, 147-148.  
263 
 
present.1639 Within the context of cartel investigations, there is one situation in which waivers are 
more regularly issued, namely in the event of a leniency application with at least two jurisdictions. 
The Commission confirms the use of waivers in the case of simultaneous leniency applications but 
remains silent on the frequency with which this occurs. It does ‘systematically’ ask for such waivers 
from the outset.1640  
 
Some notable examples of cases in which waivers were used are the 1994 Microsoft investigation, in 
which Microsoft granted a waiver to the US and EU authorities as it was easier for the company to 
deal with the two authorities together,1641 and the Cisco/ Tandberg merger, which was highlighted by 
both then-Assistant Attorney General VARNEY and then-Vice-President ALMUNIA “as a model for 
future cooperation and also a blueprint for how parties – both merging parties and third parties in that case – can 
facilitate cooperation with waivers.”1642 Waivers do not, however, always guarantee a ‘successful’ outcome. 
During the 2011 Deutsche Börse/NYSE merger for instance, the parties waived their confidentiality 
rights, allowing for close and frequent cooperation between both investigative staffs and the 
leadership of the DOJ and DG COMP. However, while in December 2011, the DOJ settled with the 
parties, a few months later the EU prohibited the merger based on differences in the markets in their 
jurisdictions. Cooperation nevertheless allowed the agencies to understand and anticipate each 
other’s investigations.1643  
 
4.1.1.2 Types of waivers  
 
Experiences with waivers are quite extensive and overall positive. Cooperation based on waivers has 
generally been labelled as ‘excellent and very useful’.1644 However, their content and use are not 
uniform throughout different jurisdictions, or even within one jurisdiction. One firm in response to 
the survey sent out in the framework of this study claimed that waivers work ‘ok’, but that there is no 
real standard and it is not entirely clear what really happens.1645 Despite the existence of standard 
forms in certain agencies, the terms and conditions of confidentiality waivers are often negotiated on 
a case-by-case basis. ‘Personalisation’ occurs to a large extent.1646 Such personalised negotiations, 
however, dispense lengthy explanations by counsel to leniency applicants on the scope of the waiver 
and the use of the relevant information. 
 
Model waivers have therefore been developed. The most notable example is the ICN model leniency 
waiver template. It was rated as highly useful in the OECD/ICN Joint Survey,1647 even though it was 
also felt that the ICN should better promote its model confidentiality waiver, given that some 
                                                          
1639 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 3.  
1640 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution 
from the European Union, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)53, 9 February 2012, 7.  
1641 A. Jones & B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, 
1391. 
1642 OECD, Discussion on International Co-operation, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)24, 12 June 2012, 7. 
1643 Ibid., 5. 
1644 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 12. 
1645 Result of author’s law firm survey (see Annex I). 
1646 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 13, 98.  
1647 Ibid., 98, footnote 142.   
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agencies do not use waivers and that some do not have a waiver model (and rely on waivers 
produced by the parties).1648 While the EU makes reference to the ICN model waiver,1649 it also has 
an ‘EU model waiver’ specifically for merger cases.1650 The US authorities as well have published 
their own template to be used in international mergers and civil non-merger matters involving non-
US competition authorities.1651 The US model waiver is a broad waiver, applying to all confidential 
information that the party provided to the competition authority. The main substantive difference 
between the US and ICN model waivers is that the US model waiver adds a provision regarding the 
treatment of privileged information.1652 A difference with the EU model waiver is that the US model 
waiver does not restrict the use of information obtained following the waiver to the proposed 
transaction, excluding any other purpose. The US waiver allows for use of the information in 
potential downstream investigations by competition authorities.1653 While the EU on its merger 
webpage merely refers to the ICN website for more information on mergers,1654 the US authorities 
have published a set of Frequently Asked Questions to highlight the benefits of signing a waiver. The 
FAQ moreover outlines the process for submitting a waiver, and clarifies the protection afforded to 
the information in the process. It is for instance clarified that if the FTC or the DoJ disclose 
information to a non-US competition authority, the updated model waiver provides that the 
confidential information is protected by the laws of the non-US authority supported by a common 
understanding with the US agencies, for instance a bilateral or multilateral agreement. In the reverse 
situation, the same level of protection under US laws will be provided as if the information had been 
directly requested and obtained by the FTC or DoJ.1655 Such information-spreading practice is 
valuable as advocacy effort and should be taken up more broadly. Waiver templates potentially 
reduce the time and resources competition agencies and leniency applicants invest in negotiating 
waivers. They are, however, intended to address standard situations and often specific circumstances 
still require amendments.1656 
 
The fact that waivers are often tailored implies that many different kinds of confidentiality waivers 
exist. In the ICN model waiver it is clarified that its “language is intended for those situations where a waiver 
with respect to any and all documents and information provided to Agency X is contemplated. There may be instances 
where such a broad waiver is not desired.”1657 Limited waivers are indeed possible, for instance only aimed 
                                                          
1648 ICN Roundtable on Enforcement Cooperation, Roundtable Report & Questionnaire Response Summary, 
Washington, DC, 29 March 2011, 7-8. 
1649 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mergers.html (accessed June 2017). 
1650 European Commission Confidentiality Waiver, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/npwaivers.pdf (accessed June 2017). 
1651 Available at https://www.ftc.gov/policy/international/international-competition/international-waivers-
confidentiality-ftc-antitrust and https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/705856/download (accessed May 2015). 
1652 Most relevant, when the privilege rules of the non-US authority are different from the privilege legislation in the US, 
the model waiver foresees that the US agencies will not seek information protected by US legal privilege from non-US 
competition authorities in the course of an exchange of confidential information. If such information is transferred to the 
FTC or DOJ nonetheless, it will be treated as an inadvertent production, and it will be returned or destroyed.  
1653 J.G. Krauss, R.F. Baldwin & D.E. Shulak, “FTC & DOJ release updated model confidentiality waiver for use in 
cross-border investigations”, Hogan Lovells Antitrust, Competition and Economic Regulation Quarterly Newsletter, Autumn 2013, 
12.  
1654 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/international_cooperation.html (accessed June 2017). 
1655 J.G. Krauss, R.F. Baldwin & D.E. Shulak, “FTC & DOJ release updated model confidentiality waiver for use in 
cross-border investigations”, Hogan Lovells Antitrust, Competition and Economic Regulation Quarterly Newsletter, Autumn 2013, 
11.  
1656 ICN, Waivers of Confidentiality in Cartel Investigations – Explanatory Note, 2014, 2. 
1657 See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current/cartel/waiver.aspx (accessed May 
2017).  
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at allowing the agencies to discuss potential remedies, or in order to define the product market 
definition or barriers to entry. One particular distinction that can be made among waivers, as occurs 
in Canada, and as provided for on the ICN website for instance, is the one between full versus 
procedural waivers.1658 Procedural waivers relate to the timing of key investigative events and the 
nature of cooperation1659 and therefore allow competition agencies to coordinate on the procedural 
aspects of a cartel investigation, but do not allow for a substantive discussion between the listed 
competition agencies. They cover inter alia the identity of the leniency applicant or of the targets of 
the cartel investigation in a specific sector or the likely location of main evidence.1660 Full waivers 
additionally permit competition agencies to discuss the content of information, evidence, records, or 
statements provided by cooperating parties and exchange substantive information.1661  
 
4.1.1.3 Limitations 
 
The use of waivers is not under the control of competition agencies. Agencies cannot mandate 
waivers, which remain at the discretion of the parties.1662 Whether or not a party is willing to sign a 
confidentiality waiver, or to waive such rights orally, depends to an extent on the trust between the 
competition agency and the leniency applicant or more generally the undertaking under 
investigation.1663 Whether or not agencies will be able to fully discuss a case therefore depends on the 
goodwill of the parties, who will only denounce their confidentiality rights when it is in their own 
best interest to do so.1664 Authorities may try to incentivise the granting of waivers, however. The 
Canadian Competition Bureau for instance will expect a confidentiality waiver in the event of similar 
requests for leniency in several jurisdictions unless there are compelling reasons not to, and will 
favourably evaluate an applicant’s willingness to provide such a waiver when considering the value of 
cooperation provided by an applicant. A majority of respondents to the ICN/OECD Joint Survey 
indicated that they actively seek waivers from undertakings, while others refrained from doing so. 
Five respondents made leniency conditional on the grant of a waiver, in one case a marker was made 
conditional on the grant of a waiver.1665  
 
One reason for not granting a waiver is the fact that this results to a certain extent in loss of full 
control of the information flow, causing concerns regarding the use of waived information in private 
litigation, or in other words potential third party damage claims later on facilitated by different local 
document production rules.1666 Parties may be reluctant to grant a waiver because they worry about 
the scope of the waiver, which may be perceived as disproportionately large, or they may have 
concerns regarding waivers with newer agencies because of unfamiliarity and inexperience with these 
                                                          
1658 Ibid. 
1659 But is not required for competition agencies to discuss dates and time of envisaged inspections. 
1660 ICN, Waivers of Confidentiality in Cartel Investigations – Explanatory Note, 2014, 4.  
1661 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 99; ICN, Waivers of Confidentiality in Cartel Investigations – 
Explanatory Note, 2014, 3. 
1662 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
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1664 See, for instance, OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 310-311. 
1665 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 98-99.  
1666 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 25. 
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agencies’ confidentiality protections.1667 The lack of a waiver may also be justified for instance in case 
leniency programmes in different jurisdictions are not coordinated and the criteria for granting 
leniency are different.1668 During the ICN Roundtable on Enforcement Cooperation, some 
participants opined that bilateral cooperation agreements can provide some comfort to parties 
considering whether or not to grant a waiver, as such agreements can re-affirm a jurisdiction’s 
confidentiality commitments.1669  
 
A consequence of this dependency is that the negotiations surrounding waivers may result in costly 
delays in the process,1670 either as a result of strategic behaviour, or simply lengthy negotiations on 
the terms and conditions of the waiver. According to one respondent of the OECD/ICN Joint 
Survey, “[s]ome parties provide the [agency] with waivers that are based on another jurisdiction’s standard 
confidentiality waiver. This kind of waiver often does not accord with the terms required by the [agency]. Seeking to 
arrange acceptable waivers can result in substantial delays and tie up a disproportionate amount of resources.”1671 
When deciding whether or not to sign a waiver, the party concerned must be informed of the 
relevant differences in laws of the jurisdictions involved in the case, such as confidentiality or 
privilege laws, as this may require adding or modifying provisions in the model waiver. Apart from 
delays coming from information costs, parties may simply believe that delaying the decision on 
whether to provide a waiver is appropriate in their particular situation. Arguments made in one 
jurisdiction may adversely impact those to be presented in another. Providing a waiver therefore 
constitutes a strategic legal decision that is highly dependent on the facts of the case.1672  
 
Independent procedural hiccups may result in waiver delays. In Canada for instance a late marker in 
an international cartel investigation resulted in delayed waivers from leniency applicants, in turn 
preventing the Canadian Competition Bureau from executing search warrants and document 
production orders in coordination with other competition agencies. Generally the Bureau will require 
leniency applicants to provide a waiver as soon as evidence is being provided to another 
jurisdiction.1673 Such delays in turn result in a lack of predictability in the timing of the exchange of 
key information and difficulties where investigations are at different stages.1674 
 
Another limitation is that the exchange or discussion of information will be restricted to the terms of 
the waiver, which may vary on a case by case basis, as mentioned before, and evidently needs to be 
concluded for every case again.1675 Often a general limitation is that the waiver is confined to 
information submitted by the parties, but this seems to be stretched to internal documents that 
                                                          
1667 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 100. 
1668 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 23.  
1669 ICN Roundtable on Enforcement Cooperation, Roundtable Report & Questionnaire Response Summary, 
Washington, DC, 29 March 2011, 7-8. 
1670 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 79.  
1671 Ibid., 100.  
1672 J. Krauss, R. Baldwin III & D. Shulak, “FTC & DOJ release updated model confidentiality waiver for use in cross-
border investigations”, Hogan Lovells Antitrust, Competition and Economic Regulation Quarterly Newsletter, Autumn 2013.  
1673 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 99. 
1674 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 12. 
1675 ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process – Competition Agency Confidentiality Practices, April 
2014, 36.  
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mention the submitted information.1676 Even then, it was recognised that a broader authority to 
exchange confidential information would be desirable as confidentiality waivers only cover a limited 
amount of information.1677  
 
The fact that waivers may have a rather limited scope leads to the fact that even with waivers, 
suboptimal communication may occur. The differing terms and conditions in waivers may result in 
restrictions in the allowed exchange of information between agencies. This risk is particularly present 
when waivers diverge to a significant extent from the standard waiver form of the jurisdiction, if 
such a form is even in place. Suboptimal communication will also occur when parties do not provide 
waivers to all the agencies involved in the investigation of the case, resulting in coordination 
problems. In the OECD/ICN Joint Survey the need to further standardise the scope of waivers, and 
the terms and conditions under which information may be exchanged was identified as an area of 
possible improvement to the waiver system.1678 Second generation agreements therefore still offer 
added value as they allow a broader spectrum of communication to take place, and do not necessitate 
case-by-case negotiations about the scope of information exchange as waivers do.   
 
Finally, there is something to say on the legal value of waivers. While confidentiality waivers define 
the conditions under which the authority receiving the waiver can exchange confidential information 
with another authority, the Commission indicated that there is a risk that “the authority receiving 
information under that waiver could invoke national legislation in order to argue that it can use the information for 
other purposes […].”1679 Evidently, if the waiver system is to be fully effective, companies should be 
reassured that the conditions set out in the waiver will be respected.1680  
 
While waivers certainly are a useful tool, they are not always available,1681 and when they are, they are 
nevertheless plagued by some inherent limitations and therefore cannot fully substitute second 
generation agreements. International cooperation can play a role in aligning the model waivers more, 
so that the use and negotiation of waivers becomes even more attractive. Bilateral agreements could 
also promote the use of waivers, and the use of waivers may lead to more trust in the cooperation 
process, which leads to a mutually reinforcing dynamic.    
 
4.1.2 Unilateral ‘gateway provisions’ 
 
4.1.2.1 Definition 
 
                                                          
1676 See for instance the ICN Model Waiver. 
1677 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 37. “For example, where a competition authority obtains documents during a dawn raid 
that was triggered by information provided by a leniency applicant, any such documents are usually still subject to confidentiality protections and 
cannot be shared with authorities in other jurisdictions.” In 2002 the Committee published a report on ‘Fighting Hard Core 
Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes’, OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking 
Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 37-38.  
1678 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 100-101.  
1679 OECD, Discussion on Limitations and Constraints to International Co-operation, Contribution of the European 
Union, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)41, 23 October 2012, 4.  
1680 Ibid., 4.  
1681 This problem ranked 3rd in terms of importance and 6th in terms of frequency among the respondents of the 
OECD/ICN Joint Survey. OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 79.  
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‘Information gateway’ provisions are legal provisions that allow confidential information exchange 
between competition authorities without the need for prior consent from the source of the 
information. Such provisions may take the form of national law provisions.1682 Indeed, rather than 
concluding multi- or bilateral cooperation agreements, some jurisdictions unilaterally provide for so-
called gateway provisions.  
 
The domestic legislation in the UK, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Germany for instance 
has provisions enabling the exchange confidential information with other competition agencies 
without consent of the interested parties or the need to enter into cooperation agreements.1683 In 
Canada, Section 29 of the Competition Act is the key provision in this regard, further elaborated 
upon in the Competition Bureau’s 2007 Bulletin on the Communication of Confidential Information 
under the Act.1684 The Act distinguishes between information exchanged under a bilateral or 
multilateral cooperation instrument, which will be subject to the specific confidentiality safeguards 
contained in that instrument, and information exchanged in absence of such an agreement, where as 
a matter of practice the Bureau “will consider the communication of information only after it is fully satisfied of 
the assurances provided by the foreign agency with respect to the confidentiality and use of the communicated 
information.”1685 The Competition Act also allows the extension of mutual legal assistance beyond 
cartel cases and the provision of legal assistance to jurisdictions in which cartels are not treated as 
criminal conduct.1686 In Germany, paragraphs 50a and 50b of the Act Against Restraint of 
Competition allow the Bundeskartellamt to cooperate with ECN agencies and other agencies 
respectively, including the exchange of confidential information. In the UK Part 9 of the 2002 
Enterprise Act provides for a statutory overseas information gateway, allowing the UK Office of Fair 
Trading and Competition Commission to voluntarily disclose information gathered under their 
statutory powers of investigation, to facilitate the exercise by an overseas authority of any function 
relating to the purposes of civil or criminal antitrust cases in those jurisdictions. Exchange of 
information is allowed either where a ‘gateway’ exists in the Enterprise Act or where disclosure is 
permitted under other legislation.1687 The Dutch competition law regime allows the national 
competition authority to exchange information obtained during the course of an investigation with 
foreign competition authorities provided that the confidentiality of the information is sufficiently 
protected, and adequate assurance is given that the information will not be used for any purpose 
other than that for which it is provided, and finally, and quite remarkably, when disclosure of the 
information in question is in the interest of the Dutch economy.1688 In Australia, the ACCC, finally, is 
allowed to coordinate competition investigations with its counterparts and to comply with 
                                                          
1682 OECD, Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 20 
November 2015, 14-15.  
1683 This list was exhaustive in 2014. OECD, National and International Provisions for the exchange of confidential 
information between competition agencies without waivers, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)4, 2 
October 2014, 2. 
1684 OECD, National and International Provisions for the exchange of confidential information between competition 
agencies without waivers, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)4, 2 October 2014, 2, 5.  
1685 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 13.  
1686 Ibid. 
1687 OECD, National and International Provisions for the exchange of confidential information between competition 
agencies without waivers, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)4, 2 October 2014, 7-8. This provisions may 
come to play a larger role when the Brexit occurs, as the OFT will likely no longer be a part of the ECN.  
1688 Article 91 Dutch Competition Act, Act of 22 May 1997, Providing New Rules for Economic Competition, available 
at http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/competitionact.htm (accessed June 2017). Also see M. Dabbah, “Future 
directions in bilateral cooperation: A policy perspective” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 295. 
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information requests, including via the disclosure of protected information under Section 155AAA 
of the 2010 Competition and Consumer Act.1689 It is not compelled, however, to comply with a 
request for disclosure of protected information. The Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act 
of 1992 (MABRA) moreover allows business regulators, such as the ACCC, to assist peers with 
evidence gathering, such as compelling the production of documents or requiring a person to give 
oral evidence, but does not allow the business regulator to release information. A formal request for 
assistance is considered by the ACCC and referred to the Australian Government. Assistance is then 
authorized by the Attorney General if it is in Australia’s best interests and consistent with 
international law and comity.1690 Under this act, information exchanged may not be used in criminal 
proceedings. For this type of information exchange the 1987 Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
Act applies. Referral to both acts is necessary in cases where breaches of foreign antitrust law may 
result in both civil and criminal sanctions.1691 
 
4.1.2.2 Variation 
 
Information gateways can take many forms. A first vector along which they can vary is the amount 
of discretion given to the competition agencies to disclose or withhold information under the 
gateway provision. This ranges from being quite broad in the Canadian and Australian legislation to 
narrower scopes in the German and UK gateways, which regulate in detail the conditions that must 
be fulfilled for the transmission of information to be allowed.1692 The OECD/ICN Joint Survey 
revealed that the transmission of confidential information under an information gateway is generally 
conditional upon one or more of the following criteria: the seriousness of the offence, the existence 
of adequate downstream protections, the availability of reciprocal treatment, the importance and 
need for the disclosure in the receiving jurisdiction, the existence of rule of law in the receiving 
jurisdiction, and the existence of restrictions on the use of the received information.1693 
 
The ACCC may for instance decide on a discretionary basis whether disclosure to a foreign authority 
would enable or assist the body to perform its functions, or exercise its powers, and whether it is 
appropriate to disclose the information (or according to which conditions) in the circumstances. The 
Act does not specify any further factors to be taken into account by the ACCC when deciding 
whether or not to disclose. The ACCC’s policy indicates that such factors include Australia's 
relations with other countries and the impact of disclosure on domestic and international cartel 
programmes, such as the ACCC’s leniency policy,1694 as well as the confidentiality laws in the 
requesting country, the purpose of the request, and any existing agreements or arrangements with the 
requesting country or authority. A policy exception is that the Bureau will not disclose leniency 
information to a foreign agency without consent of the applicant. As mentioned, however, a waiver 
                                                          
1689 OECD, National and International Provisions for the exchange of confidential information between competition 
agencies without waivers, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)4, 2 October 2014, 3.  
1690 Section 155AAA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, as cited in OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving 
International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 36. Also see OECD, 
Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Contribution from New 
Zealand, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)14, 19 December 2011, 4.  
1691 OECD, National and International Provisions for the exchange of confidential information between competition 
agencies without waivers, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)4, 2 October 2014, 5.  
1692 Ibid., 3.  
1693 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 91.  
1694 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 36-37.  
270 
 
will be expected absent compelling reasons. The source of the information and relevant third parties 
are notified if required by the principles of natural justice or otherwise required by law. Australia’s 
legal professional privilege protection regime remains in place.1695  
 
In the UK on the other hand, the Enterprise Act sets out in detail the factors that must be taken into 
account when the competition agency is considering to disclose information to a foreign authority: 
“(a) whether the matter in respect of which the disclosure is sought is sufficiently serious to justify making the disclosure; 
(b) whether the law of the country or territory to whose authority the disclosure would be made provides appropriate 
protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings; (c) whether the law of that country or territory provides 
appropriate protection in relation to the storage and disclosure of personal data; (d) whether there are arrangements in 
place for the provision of mutual assistance as between the United Kingdom and that country or territory in relation to 
the disclosure of information of the kind to which section 237 applies.”1696 The Secretary of State can 
furthermore oppose permitted disclosure if he considers that, relating to any matter in respect of 
which the disclosure could be made, it is more appropriate that a potential investigation is carried out 
by a UK or an authority in another specified territory or that such investigation is brought in a court 
in the UK or in another specified territory.1697 
 
Some gateway provisions may be very detailed regarding the use that the receiving agency can make 
of the transmitted information. This constitutes a second vector of variation. This may either be 
determined by statute, or the transmitting agency may be left to decide whether to subject the 
transmission of the information to limitations on use, as is the case in for instance Australia, where 
the Chairman (or his delegate) may impose conditions on further disclosure of and dealing with the 
protected information. Information will normally not be disclosed if the Bureau is not certain that 
the confidentiality of the information will be maintained, and that the information will not be used 
beyond the purpose for which it was communicated. Standard conditions further include notification 
by the receiving authority of the ACCC of any third party request which relates, or may relate to the 
protected information as well as of any proposed use of the information in court proceedings, and a 
prohibition to disclose the information without the ACCC’s prior written consent, unless required to 
do so by law.1698 In Germany the Bundeskartellamt must guarantee that the receiving agency uses the 
information only for the enforcement of competition rules and only for the purpose for which the 
information was collected.1699 The receiving agency must also ensure the protection of confidential 
information and seek the Bundeskartellamt’s agreement if it considers to transmit the information to 
third parties. In the UK, information may be exchanged to facilitate the exercise by the overseas 
public authority of its law enforcement functions. The Office of Fair Trade may, but is not obliged 
to subject the transmitted information to the conditions that the information disclosed must not be 
further disclosed without the agreement of the discloser, and must not otherwise be used for any 
purpose other than that for which it was first disclosed. 1700 
  
                                                          
1695 OECD, National and International Provisions for the exchange of confidential information between competition 
agencies without waivers, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)4, 2 October 2014, 4, 7. 
1696 Section 29(6) 2002 Enterprise Act. Also see OECD, National and International Provisions for the exchange of 
confidential information between competition agencies without waivers, Note by the secretariat, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)4, 2 October 2014, 9.  
1697 Ibid.  
1698 OECD, National and International Provisions for the exchange of confidential information between competition 
agencies without waivers, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)4, 2 October 2014, 3-6.  
1699 Ibid., 8. 
1700 Ibid., 8-9.  
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Another vector along which gateway provisions may vary is the scope of information exchange they 
allow. Indeed, some gateways explicitly exclude certain types of information, or subject their 
exchange to stricter conditions. This is for instance the case for information received through a 
leniency program, as in Canada, self-incriminating information, as in the UK, or privileged 
information, as in Australia. Sometimes such an exclusion is determined in advance by the statute, 
other times this decision is left to the transmitting agency depending on the existing safeguards in the 
receiving jurisdiction. In Germany merger information is excluded from being exchanged under the 
gateway provisions, and can be transmitted only with consent of the parties. Finally, some gateway 
provisions require reciprocal treatment as a condition for the use of the gateway, such as those in the 
UK, while others do not.1701 
 
4.1.2.3 Limitations  
 
The benefit of unilateral gateway provisions is that there is no risk of ending up with an 
entanglement of bilateral agreements. However, they do not provide great transparency for 
undertakings. There is little information publicly available about the actual use of unilateral 
information gateways. The provisions do not seem to be used very frequently. One explanation put 
forward is that the enforcement of such provisions is quite burdensome due to the considerations 
that the disclosing agency must make in relation to each disclosure, for instance whether the 
disclosure of confidential information is necessary in the context of another agency’s case. It may 
take a long time before an exchange under a unilateral gateway provision is triggered, which may 
undermine their practical use.1702 They hold potential to form a full-fledged alternative for second 
generation agreements, but have their own limitations as well. Unilateral gateway provisions do not 
seem to offer substantial benefits in comparison to bilateral agreements. In the EU it would require 
new legislation. A treaty-change is likely not required, as a potential gateway provision could be 
included in regulation 1/2003. A delegated act drawn up by the Commission could draw up a list of 
countries with which information could be exchanged among the competition authorities, annexed 
to the regulation.1703 In any event the Commission cannot decide on Union policy, even in non-
binding MoUs (see below, Part II, 4.1.4).1704  
 
4.1.3 ‘Enhanced cooperation mechanisms’  
 
The OECD recently engaged in a discussion on ‘enhanced enforcement cooperation’.1705 ‘Enhanced 
cooperation’ was defined in the OECD/ICN Joint Survey as “identifying a lead enforcement agency, setting 
up joint investigative teams, or entering into work sharing arrangements. Enhanced cooperation does not involve a 
withdrawal of jurisdiction over a case; parallel enforcement action can be taken by more than one agency if one agency is 
not in a position to safeguard the interests of the other jurisdiction(s) affected.”1706 This definition seems overly 
restrictive, however. In practice, experience related to joint inspections and interviews, conducting 
                                                          
1701 Ibid., 3, 8.  
1702 The Australian ACCC indicated the use of information gateways in the Marine Hose case and the Fine Paper case. 
Ibid., 17. 
1703 As was done in a similar manner in the old Europol-Regulation.  
1704 While the Commission is exclusively competent with regard to EU competition policy, this is not the case for EU 
external relations policy. 
1705 See http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/enhanced-enforcement-cooperation.htm (accessed June 2017). 
1706 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 53.  
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interviews in another’s agency territory and joint negotiations and/or design of remedies.1707 In the 
OECD’s most recent discussion, three main tracks surfaced: cooperation among courts, mutual 
recognition, and a lead agency model.1708 These solutions are not new and have been mentioned in 
the past, for instance in the 2000 ICPAC Report, but their feasibility has never been thoroughly 
reviewed by the Committee.1709 The survey further exposed that currently, outside of formal regional 
networks, enhanced cooperation is limited to only a small number of agencies,1710 often, and not 
surprisingly, among agencies having a good prior relationship. An even smaller percentage of 
agencies indicated having successful experiences.1711 
 
4.1.3.1 Cooperation among courts  
 
Currently, binding and enforceable rules regarding international cooperation among courts do not 
exist, due to lack of agreement on what those rules should be. Informal cooperation mechanisms 
have therefore been developed to somewhat remedy the situation, in the form of the common law 
forum non conveniens doctrine for instance, which allows a court to decline to rule over a case in the 
event that a court in another jurisdiction would be substantially better placed to do so, although it is 
not clear whether this doctrine can be applied to competition cases according to the OECD. 
Another option is the lis pendens doctrine, which “allows courts to stay proceedings when a similar dispute on 
the same or a related matter is already pending in foreign court.”1712 It is unsure whether all competition cases 
could fall under the mechanism developed in the Hague Convention on Service of Process in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, allowing national courts to request and receive judicial documents from a 
foreign court in a simpler way than via letter rogatory. It is questioned whether competition law cases 
can generally be included in the category of ‘civil and commercial matters’,1713 likely because of the 
hybrid nature of the legal branch, with both (quasi-)criminal and administrative aspects.  
 
Within the EU, since 2002, there exists an Association of European Competition Law Judges 
(AECLJ). The Association is made up of judges from EU Member States who hear cases in their 
national courts involving both national and European competition law. Its main aim is “to promote 
knowledge and understanding of competition policy and law issues throughout the respective judiciaries of the Member 
States.”1714 A founding group of judges representing each of the then fifteen Member States of the 
EU at the time created the AECLJ in Luxemburg, with the participation of judges from the 
European Courts and the EFTA Court. The AECLJ provides a forum for the exchange of 
knowledge and experience, and discuss issues of common concern and best practice, in an effort to 
promote coherence and consistency, particularly in the context of the modernisation of the 
application of former Articles 81 and 82 under Regulation 1/2003, and more generally a consistent 
application of European competition law. It was created to mirror the regular meetings between the 
national competition authorities in the EU under the auspices of the ECN, as at the time no similar 
                                                          
1707 Ibid., 54.  
1708 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 53. 
1709 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 15.  
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1711 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 53. 
1712 OECD, Summary of discussion of the hearing on enhanced enforcement cooperation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/M(2014)2/ANN2/FINAL, 7 November 2014, 2-3. 
1713 Ibid. 
1714 See http://www.aeclj.com/ (accessed June 2017).  
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institutional arrangement was established for national judges, even though in other fields of 
harmonised law the European Commission organised conferences where judges could engage. 
Contrary to the cooperation in the ECN, however, no case-cooperation takes place within the 
AECLJ. The Commission being a competition agency itself, had to keep appropriate distance 
between itself and the European judiciary. Nevertheless, as EU competition law is applied by 
national judges, it is pivotal that there is a forum where such judges are able to communicate 
informally, discussing matters of common concern and enquiring about parallel proceedings.1715   
 
4.1.3.2 Mutual recognition  
 
International judicial cooperation also extends to the reliance on and enforcement of foreign 
judgments and decisions. Currently, a general multilateral treaty in this regard is lacking. In particular 
in competition law proceedings, such cooperation can be difficult, as for instance the enforcement of 
behavioural injunctions is more difficult than the enforcement of a monetary judgment.1716 If one 
looks at the US legal system, it becomes clear that judicial cooperation is difficult to achieve even 
within one nation.1717 
 
A ‘recognition of judgments mechanism’, meant to function as a form of international collateral 
estoppel was suggested by GAL.1718 The suggested system would allow domestic courts and antitrust 
authorities to rely on the factual findings in a foreign international hard-core cartel decision for their 
own decisions, provided that such reliance meets certain fairness and reasonableness criteria. While 
the mechanism is focused on the fight against international cartels, it could be extended to 
international abuse of market dominance cases and to some extent to merger decisions, but the 
application would be more difficult due to larger divergences in substantive competition laws. This 
system intends to reduce the resource constraint problem, both in terms of finances as in terms of 
human capital, by allowing jurisdictions to skip the allegedly costliest and most difficult stage in a 
cartel trial, namely to prove the very existence of an international cartel. The system is not entirely 
theoretical. In the Vitamins Cartel decision, the Brazilian competition authority relied on the findings 
concerning the worldwide cartel by US and EU antitrust authorities and treated these findings as 
facts, or factual documents. These findings were then corroborated with import data of the various 
types of vitamins imported by the alleged cartelists into Brazil, allowing the imposition of appropriate 
fines.1719 Delegation of decision-making to foreign bodies can furthermore be found in the system 
adopted in the Patent Cooperation Treaty, with regard to patent applications made through the 
International Patent Office. Patent offices of several pre-specified jurisdictions are designated as 
international searching authorities, which search for prior art that might block the patent application. 
Other domestic patent offices may then base their factual findings on those of the searching 
authorities when the applicant requests a domestic patent. The factual findings of a searching 
                                                          
1715 See http://www.aeclj.com/240/About-the-Association.html (accessed June 2017). 
1716 OECD, Summary of discussion of the hearing on enhanced enforcement cooperation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/M(2014)2/ANN2/FINAL, 7 November 2014, 2-3. 
1717 OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by Chief Judge Diane P. Wood, “Enhanced 
international cooperation in competition cases: the role of the courts”, DAF/COMP/WP3(2014)5, 26 May 2014, 3. 
1718 OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by Prof. Michal S. Gal, “Increasing deterrence of 
international cartels through reliance on foreign decisions”, DAF/COMP/WP3/(2014)4, 24 June 2014. 
1719 OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by John Temple Lang, “Aims of enhanced 
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authority, which constitutes a decision of a foreign patent institution, may therefore be binding in 
other jurisdictions.1720  
 
Informal acceptance by one agency of the decisions of another would amount in practice to mutual 
recognition. The system according to GAL should never be mandatory, as this seems unfeasible (for 
instance with regard to enforcement and contestability).1721 In any event this system requires 
guarantees of due process and assurances of strict judicial review among the participants.1722 Indeed, 
it is crucial that the foreign decision meets certain fairness criteria of both substantive and procedural 
nature. GAL suggested inter alia that the decision should be made in accordance with the foreign law 
and should be final, that the foreign court should meet judicial competence requirements and the 
defendant should have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and that the foreign decision 
should not be used as basis for criminal prosecutions in the adopting jurisdictions.1723 These 
conditions were drawn by analogy from the conditions set in international treaties and domestic laws 
with regard to the application and enforcement of foreign decisions as well as the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel.1724 
 
This purely voluntary mechanism is limited in the sense that authorities would still have to prove the 
effect on their national markets, which can remain difficult. Some also claim that mutual recognition 
that is limited to findings of fact and not legal assessments is first of all not useful and second of all 
very difficult as findings of fact cannot always be separated from legal conclusions, in particular in 
competition cases.1725 Reliance on factual information may moreover be achieved via traditional 
cooperation and discussion. It might also potentially lead to delays in stopping cartel infringements 
due to the risk that agencies would wait until other jurisdictions have made a decision eligible for 
recognition. The system would moreover require legislative reforms allowing the national 
competition agency or courts to give appropriate weight to judgments of foreign courts or decisions 
of foreign agencies without necessarily being bound by them.1726 It may also encounter political 
objections resulting from two concerns: that a foreign decision harms sovereignty and that the 
incentives of the foreign decision maker are skewed knowing that his decision might apply beyond 
his borders. Other concerns identified by GAL relate to over-and under-enforcement, fairness 
considerations, negative political externalities, and, again, reduced incentives to participate in leniency 
programs. With regard to this last obstacle, it is suggested to arrange the mechanism in such a way 
that firms enjoying leniency in the origin country would enjoy similar leniency in the adopting 
                                                          
1720 OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by Prof. Michal S. Gal, “Increasing deterrence of 
international cartels through reliance on foreign decisions”, DAF/COMP/WP3/(2014)4, 24 June 2014, 6-7.  
1721 It should be noted, however, that the EU Damages Directive foresees in its Article 9 on the effect of national 
decisions that “an infringement of competition law found by a final decision of a national competition authority or by a review court is 
deemed to be irrefutably established for the purposes of an action for damages brought before their national courts under Article 101 or 102 
TFEU or under national competition law.” Such a final decision may, in accordance with national law, be presented before the 
national courts of the member states “as at least prima facie evidence that an infringement of competition law has occurred and, as 
appropriate, may be assessed along with any other evidence adduced by the parties.” 
1722 OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by John Temple Lang, “Aims of enhanced 
international cooperation in competition cases”, DAF/COMP/WP3(2014)7, 28 May 2014, 2-13.  
1723 OECD, Summary of discussion of the hearing on enhanced enforcement cooperation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/M(2014)2/ANN2/FINAL, 7 November 2014, 4. 
1724 OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by Prof. Michal S. Gal, “Increasing deterrence of 
international cartels through reliance on foreign decisions”, DAF/COMP/WP3/(2014)4, 24 June 2014, 4. 
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country, on the condition that the leniency applicant provides the domestic competition authority 
with all relevant information concerning the application of the cartel and its harm in the domestic 
jurisdiction. If this is not granted, it is said that the foreign decision maker can also specifically limit 
the breadth of his decision, so it would be difficult to apply in other jurisdictions.1727 A lot of hurdles 
must be overcome for the system to be put in place, but such cooperation could significantly 
advance international competition law enforcement. It is an aspect of cooperation that is entirely 
missing from bilateral cooperation agreements as they stand today.  
 
4.3.1.3 Lead Jurisdiction Concepts  
 
One idea that repeatedly surfaces in the debate on international cooperation in competition matters, 
often raised by the business community, is the ‘lead agency’ approach, aimed at reducing the 
complexity of multi-jurisdictional enforcement. The idea surfaced in an environment where 
international enforcement cooperation is no longer aimed at mere prevention of conflict but rather at 
the creation of efficiencies. Mechanisms for determining enforcement priority could be introduced, 
for instance letting ‘the best placed’ jurisdiction investigate a case rather than all affected jurisdictions 
acting in parallel.1728 Some claim that informal lead-agency models are already employed in practice, 
but it is likely that this refers to an intense form of traditional cooperation more than a real lead 
jurisdiction model (see below, Part II, 4.3.1.3, B). It is often mentioned that this type of advanced 
cooperation should be explored and tested by experienced older agencies, who have to lead the way 
and trust each other to do the work.1729  
 
A) Definition  
 
In order to overcome some of the difficulties related to traditional and positive comity, the concept 
of ‘enhanced comity’ emerged in the late 1990s – early 2000s. This concept relates to the 
organisation of different types of work sharing arrangements, such as joint investigations, but also a 
‘lead agency’ model.1730 The American Bar Association named three principles of enhanced comity: 
non-binding deference to jurisdictions with greater interest in the case, avoidance of inconsistent 
remedies, and coordination of parallel proceedings.1731 Following these principles “jurisdiction should be 
allocated to the state whose competition regime is best equipped to establish an infringement and enforce any sanctions or 
remedies.”1732 A lead agency model was also among the ‘work-sharing’ recommendations of the US 
ICPAC for improving international cooperation.1733 Tax authorities have already successfully applied 
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1730 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 17.  
1731 B. Sweeney, "International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress", Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
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the mechanism in their international cooperation efforts.1734 With regard to antitrust, the system 
already exists as well in a national form in the US, where the so-called Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation, that was established already in 1968, entails the option of combining parallel antitrust 
procedures among US states into a single one.1735 A ‘lead agency’-model is also included in the ECN 
(see below, 2.1.5.1, D). 
 
The basic idea of a ‘lead jurisdiction’ model is indeed to identify the jurisdiction which is best placed 
to investigate a particular international case and to designate it to handle and decide on the case on 
behalf of all affected jurisdictions, with the intention to reduce the (transaction and regulatory) costs 
and risks inherent to multiple parallel proceedings, such as inefficiencies and inconsistent 
enforcement actions. The model therefore introduces a form of ‘common procedure’ led by one 
competition authority, rather than having multiple uncoordinated procedures.1736 The ICPAC 
suggested that the forum having the most contacts with the case would analyse the benefits and 
harms of the whole merger, host interventions by other involved jurisdictions, and grant relief able to 
cure problems worldwide ‘as if the world were in its nation’. It further opined that best or 
recommended practices could be worked out in the ICN, while the required extensions of law and 
process would need to be tackled on a national level.1737 It was suggested by BUDZINSKI that a 
‘threshold’ could be used in the form of an ‘x-plus rule’ of countries opening an independent review 
proceeding on a given case to determine when a multinational case would be potentially subject to 
the model. This rule would however also need to be refined according to the size of the relevant 
jurisdictions.1738 The OECD suggested that one-stop mechanisms could be introduced in model 
cooperation agreements, for instance in the section dealing with coordination. More concretely, an 
agreement may stipulate for instance that one party will accept filings/applications on behalf of the 
other parties and notify such parties of the filings/applications right after reception of the latter. This 
‘benefit’ for the applicant may be made conditional upon the granting of a full waiver to the 
authorities.1739 
 
B) Types of lead agency systems 
 
Different lead jurisdiction mechanisms exist. The main distinction is between a voluntary model, also 
referred to as advanced comity sensu stricto, and a mandatory model. In a voluntary model the ‘lead 
jurisdiction’, or in competition cases more concretely, the lead agency, will take on the role of 
coordinator, compiling and distributing case-related information and coordinating the interests of the 
different agencies involved. The lead agency will develop a common non-binding draft decision (a 
recommendation) regarding remedies, which should contain a coherent treatment of the 
anticompetitive behaviour at stake, while integrating the competition-oriented interests of the 
participating jurisdictions. After the initial discussion on whether the case could be dealt with under 
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the lead agency model, this initial consensus does not commit the other agencies to accept the result. 
The other agencies can either opt-in or opt-out at any stage, deciding whether or not, or to what 
extent, they will participate and follow the model and adopt the recommendation of the lead 
jurisdiction or will proceed on their own, depending on how satisfactory they find the proceedings 
and the result. The reviews of other involved jurisdictions are not suspended, but are coordinated, 
thereby aiming to ensure mutual respect for each other’s legitimate interests following the comity 
principle.1740 The lead agency would also take care of the logistics of the cooperation by for instance 
setting up joint conference calls or meetings. This already happens occasionally. Companies could 
then reciprocate by indicating one leading law firm.1741 This ‘soft’ or ‘informal’ approach does not 
delegate any actual powers to the lead agency. The latter would merely exercise its own, but in very 
close cooperation with the other agencies involved.1742 In this voluntary system multiple parallel 
procedures are not completely eliminated, but potentially reduced and at least streamlined.1743  
 
The mandatory model functions as a true one-stop-shop, whereby the lead jurisdiction handles the 
overall case. While it is assisted by the other affected agencies, it leads the investigation and makes a 
binding decision, applying its own competition law. However, while deciding on the case, the lead 
agency should act in a non-discriminatory way and take into account the anti-competitive effects in 
all relevant geographic markets. It should consider the interests of all the non-lead jurisdictions, who 
are obliged to assist with the investigation, and to accept the final decision.1744  
 
C) Limitations 
 
According to the OECD, the lead jurisdiction model gained little success so far, apart from its 
regional application within the ECN (see below, Part III, 2.1.5.1).1745 Several explanations can be 
found. A first reason is that there is insufficient research and consensus on the practical aspects of 
the model. According to BUDZINSKI, “[a]t the end of the day, the concept of a multilevel lead jurisdiction model 
is far from being comprehensively researched and completely developed.”1746 TEMPLE LANG in turn claims that a 
formal lead agency approach “would be so complicated that it does not seem desirable.”1747 When a lead 
jurisdiction model is employed on an international scale this entails particular difficulties with regard 
to first, the selection and appointment of the lead jurisdiction for a given case, second, the 
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monitoring and supervision of that jurisdiction, and third the development of a system for handling 
complaints against it.1748  
 
It is crucial in this system that the ‘right’ agency is selected as lead jurisdiction. It is suggested that to 
this end a forum or an international panel is established that would be in charge of deciding on the 
potential lead jurisdiction for a given case, taking into account a number of criteria. First, it should be 
determined which jurisdiction’s internal market represents the centre of gravity for the activities to be 
investigated (‘primary effects clause’). Secondly, it is important that the jurisdiction can effectively 
enforce competition law in a non-discriminatory matter, while disposing of sufficient resources and 
skills to do so. Finally, the jurisdiction must demonstrate, and must have a track record of 
demonstrating, that it is willing and has the experience to safeguard comity and other jurisdictions’ 
legitimate interests while investigating, handling and deciding on the case. All affected consumers 
and markets must be protected.1749 In this mandatory system, the lead jurisdiction’s decision is 
binding on the other affected jurisdictions.1750 BUDZINSKI, adding the vertical multilevel dimension to 
the lead jurisdiction concept, suggested introducing a referee authority, which would be tasked with 
allocating the lead jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis according to agreed-upon criteria, overseeing 
the impartiality of the assigned lead jurisdiction in its assessment, and providing conflict resolution 
when certain jurisdictions claim that their legitimate interests were overseen or disregarded by the 
lead jurisdiction. This referee authority could be established as an independent body within an 
international organization, or could take the form of an international forum or panel consisting of 
representatives of the participating competition policy regimes.1751 This solution would not provide 
supranational institutions with the power to materially decide cases, which, as established, currently is 
not realistic, but would still necessitate the conclusion of an international agreement on allocation 
criteria and monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms. The OECD suggested that provisions to 
this end, for instance identifying the factors to take into account when deciding on the lead 
jurisdiction or the requirements which the designated authority should follow in enforcing its 
competition laws, could be included in a model cooperation agreement in the provisions on comity, 
which already allow a party to request the other party to investigate and remedy anticompetitive 
activities. Lead jurisdiction provisions could expand these concepts.1752  
 
Another difficulty regards the question whether the decision of the non-lead jurisdiction to follow 
the lead jurisdiction’s decision would have to constitute a challengeable decision. If this is the case, it 
would significantly detract from the efficiencies created.1753 Would each non-lead jurisdiction remain 
accountable before its national courts for the final decision made, when it was not the one executing 
the comprehensive competition analysis of the case lying at the basis of it? Another issue is how a 
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potential fine would be distributed among the authorities involved. It is ill-suited that the lead agency 
would collect and retain a fine for the harm done in others states. According to TEMPLE LANG, a 
mandatory system for appointing a lead agency does not seem practicable and would introduce 
undesirable rigidity and scope for obstruction.1754  
 
Linked to the above criticism that a lead jurisdiction system would be overly complicated, the system 
might also be faced with the fact that too little agencies would be eligible to be a lead agency. As 
mentioned, an agency will need to adhere to certain standards with regard to independence and 
fairness, as well as resource and competence requirements to deal with major multijurisdictional 
cases, even if assistance of the other agencies is available. This might result in the same handful of 
big agencies leading all the cases. Regardless of such requirements, smaller agencies may struggle 
being selected as lead agency simply because a significant part of the relevant market activities will 
likely not fall within their domestic market. This is problematic because it may affect the acceptance 
of the overall system due to a (perceived) lack of participation. Moreover, a limited array of potential 
lead agencies may also complicate the enforcement of the principle of non-discrimination and may 
distort the focus on international welfare.1755 This may lead to significant sovereignty, accountability, 
and subsidiarity concerns for smaller jurisdictions, which may find relying on one or more foreign 
jurisdictions to remedy international behaviour with domestic effect politically unpalatable.1756 Finally 
there is the (albeit relatively minimal)1757 problem of free-riding by certain jurisdictions with small but 
open economies, who may count on saving resources by downgrading the own national regime.1758 
The lack of eligible lead jurisdictions is a tangible risk, which according to BUDZINSKI makes this 
system ‘intrinsically aspirational’ as it stands.1759 
 
Fourth, as mentioned, a lead jurisdiction model is sometimes referred to as advanced comity. It 
therefore suffers from the same illnesses (see above, Part II, 2.2.4.3), the main ones relating to a lack 
of incentive and political will. In the majority of international cases the anti-competitive effects in 
different jurisdictions will not be homogenous. This in turn means that the affected jurisdictions will 
not all have the same interest in investigating the case, and the lead jurisdiction cannot provide a 
positive externality. The existing divergences in substantive and procedural relevant laws only 
aggravate this problem, as this system is likely to function only in the event of far-reaching 
convergence.1760 Even authors advocating a lead jurisdiction model include a disclaimer on the 
political feasibility of it all.1761 The existence of political will to establish the necessary reforms is 
doubtful at best.1762  
                                                          
1754 OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by John Temple Lang, “Aims of enhanced 
international cooperation in competition cases”, DAF/COMP/WP3(2014)7, 28 May 2014, 7.  
1755 O. Budzinski, “Lead jurisdiction concepts – towards rationalizing multiple competition policy enforcement 
procedures”, Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers, Vol. 19, No. 87, June 2014, 16. 
1756 J. Fingleton, “Competition Agencies and Global Markets: The Challenges Ahead” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International 
Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 190. 
1757 This free-riding option has its obvious limitations because “[a]s soon as a jurisdiction experiences a non-negligible number of 
purely domestic antitrust cases (where it cannot rely on foreign agencies to protect competition and welfare), it is not rational to limit domestic 
competition policy activities to a free rider position.” O. Budzinski, “Lead jurisdiction concepts – towards rationalizing multiple 
competition policy enforcement procedures”, Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers, Vol. 19, No. 87, June 2014, 16.  
1758 Ibid., 16.  
1759 OECD, Summary of discussion of the hearing on enhanced enforcement cooperation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/M(2014)2/ANN2/FINAL, 7 November 2014, 7.  
1760 Ibid., 7.  
1761 “Whether there is a political will to establish the necessary reforms may be doubtful, at least in the short run. However, this shall not stop 
academic thinking about possible solutions, their institutional shape, working mechanisms and economic performance.” O. Budzinski, “Lead 
280 
 
 
While in theory states might agree to an allocation mechanism, which would de facto constitute some 
sort of conflict-of-law provision, “nothing achieved to date meets this description.”1763 Current agreements 
are testimony of the difficulties paired with imposing significant constraints on national regulatory 
power1764 and the limits inherent to state-to-state bargains.1765 There are no new incentives for 
potential lead jurisdictions, that are not altruistic actors, to take on the main burden for a case 
without privileging its own jurisdiction’s interests.1766 GUZMAN rightly claimed that the problem of 
local bias and trade-induced distortions of national substantive policies cannot be solved via what is 
essentially a choice-of-law system.1767 According to STEPHAN, the same issues and problems arise as 
in the case of substantive harmonization efforts, as “the jurisdiction issue simply recasts the question of 
preferences for substantive competition rules.”1768 The main issue is then that there does not exist a ‘neutral’ 
template transcending national interests, and therefore there is reason to believe that such interests 
will affect the structure of any international bargain.1769 ALBERS similarly foresaw that a lead 
jurisdiction model “would […] not seem to be a realistic next step, for much of the same reasons as those […] 
concerning a World Competition Authority.”1770 There is simply no consensus on the substantive and 
procedural rules to be applied by the lead jurisdictions. A lead jurisdiction system implies both a 
willingness to accept material decisions by another jurisdiction as well as procedural decisions by a 
type of supranational body.1771 During the OECD discussion the delegation from the US even asked 
whether the potential benefits of the system outweighed the difficulties.1772  
 
The ‘interchangeability’ over borders of evidence should moreover not be taken for granted. 
Evidence valid in one jurisdiction is not necessarily or automatically usable as evidence in another 
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jurisdiction.1773 Moreover, even if non-lead authorities are supposed to assist the lead jurisdiction, it is 
not said that they will do so. The lead jurisdiction concept does not offer a solution for cases where 
the lead authority cannot on its own gather all the necessary evidence, or implement a sanction or 
remedy for that matter.1774 Finally, again as is the case with comity, a lead jurisdiction model, in 
particular a non-binding one, results in a significant amount of uncertainty for the legal subjects. As 
agencies have the continuous possibility to opt-in or opt-out, they are not obliged to offer, nor is it 
realistic to expect, a guarantee at an early stage that they will accept the result. Therefore companies 
cannot predict whether they will have to deal with only one agency.1775 The system might struggle 
with transparency as well, and is likely to undergo difficulties where the competition impact and a 
potential sanction and remedy are different in all affected jurisdictions.1776  
 
4.1.4 The Commission on the leash: no autonomy to sign non-binding agreements (MoUs) on behalf 
of the EU 
 
A) Context  
 
It was established before that in the case of first generation agreements the formal, binding nature of 
the international instrument seems out of place (see above, Part II, 2.5.2.2, D). It is therefore relevant 
to inquire into the role potentially set aside for MoUs in international competition cooperation. The 
procedure of conclusion of bilateral competition cooperation agreements is quite time and resource 
intensive. The benefits of first generation dedicated competition agreements may therefore not 
outweigh the cost of concluding such agreements, which may explain why from 2009 onwards, the 
Commission began to conclude MoUs relating to competition cooperation with several partner 
countries, in particular with South-Korea in 2004, with Brazil in 2009, with Russia in 2011, with 
China in 2012, and with India in 2013, and plans to continue to do so in the future.1777 The 
Commission indeed frequently concludes agreements that revolve around operational cooperation, 
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outside the standard treaty-making framework laid down in Article 218 TFEU.1778 The Commission 
is not the only one to do so. According to the OECD, the number of competition authorities 
entering into agency-to-agency MoUs has steadily increased since 2000, as indicated by the table 
below. In April 2016 the OECD Secretariat had knowledge of at least 142 MoUs where one of the 
signatories was a competition authority of an OECD Member, Associate or Participant to the 
OECD Competition Committee, or the European Commission.1779 The US as well has an extensive 
track record when it comes to concluding competition MoUs, including with Russia, Chile, and 
China.1780   
 
 
Figure 11. Source: OECD, Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the secretariat, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 20 November 2015, 32.  
 
Strictly speaking, MoUs are non-binding agreements, sometimes labelled as ‘political agreements’, 
‘gentlemen’s agreements’, ‘non-legally binding agreements’, ‘de facto agreements’, or ‘non-legal 
agreements’.1781 Such agreements are concluded between administrative authorities and their foreign 
peers to establish some form of cooperation, and do not bind the state itself on an international 
                                                          
1778 “See, for instance, the Framework Agreement between the European Commission (the ‘Commission’) and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (the ‘IDB’) laying down the administrative and financial arrangements for their cooperation of 2011, [… ]; Framework 
Agreement between the European Commission (the ‘Commission’) and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) of 2009.” F. Coman-
Kund, European Union Agencies as global actors – a legal study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex, and 
Europol, Maastricht, Production print Datawyse/Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2015, 121. 
1779 OECD, Inventory of International Co-operation MoUs between Competition Agencies, List of Agency-to-Agency 
Memoranda of Understanding, available at https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mou-inventory-list.pdf (accessed 
July 2017).  
1780 OECD, Discussion on International Co-operation, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)24, 12 June 2012, 8-9. 
1781 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd ed., New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 28.  
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level, as the competence to do so is lacking with the signatories.1782 MoUs are placed more towards 
the soft law end of the continuum compared to first generation agreements, and are less formal. 
Generally such agreements are more flexible and easier to conclude or amend compared to 
government-to-government cooperation agreements, because their negotiation does not require the 
authorisation of legislative bodies or involvement of other governmental bodies, allowing them to be 
concluded in a timely manner based on current needs.1783 The fact that the MoUs are non-binding 
does not make them any less effective than bilateral formal first generation agreements, as the 
provisions in the latter agreements were inherently unenforceable.1784  
 
The diversification in the legal instruments used to achieve bilateral enforcement cooperation in the 
field of competition and the confusion this diversity can cause is illustrated by the terminology used 
for such instruments. Explaining the terminology of treaty-names becomes increasingly complex, as 
the names of formal and informal instruments are changeable and lack consistency.1785 One example 
of this changeability is the use of the term Memorandum of Understanding. Some agreements 
entitled MoU, are stricter than, or very similar to, agreements that are actually entitled international 
agreement. Some MoUs merely formalise existing working relationships, while others mark a new 
level of engagement between the parties.1786 The Treaty Office Database contains some MoUs, while 
it does not include others, such as the ones on competition law. The classification is based on the 
content of the agreements, which means that some MoUs are included because they constitute legally 
binding agreements. The institutions negotiating such agreements are themselves accomplice to the 
confusion. For instance, a press release of the EEAS announced that former Vice President 
ALMUNIA signed a cooperation agreement with the Russian competition authority, while in fact it 
was not a dedicated competition cooperation agreement, but an MoU, which is, from a legal point of 
view, a different instrument.1787 
 
In the context of international competition cooperation MoUs are often labelled as representing a 
mere ‘tentative first step’ towards further cooperation. They are defined as ‘getting to know you’ best 
endeavours agreements.1788 At the same time, however, the OECD confirms that most MoUs are 
modelled on intergovernmental cooperation agreements, with a similar structure, but with less 
detailed provisions. Most of the EU’s competition-related MoUs indeed go beyond ‘getting to know 
you’ provisions and have a content almost identical to that of the first generation agreements.1789 The 
OECD distinguishes between three types of competition MoUs, where some contain all basic 
                                                          
1782 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 76-77.  
1783 OECD, Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 20 
November 2015, 32.  
1784 OECD, Inventory of International Co-operation MoUs between Competition Agencies, List of Agency-to-Agency 
Memoranda of Understanding, available at https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mou-inventory-list.pdf (accessed 
July 2017). 
1785 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd ed, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 22.   
1786 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 37. 
1787 European Commission, Press Release, “Vice President Almunia signs cooperation agreement with Russian 
competition authority”, IP/11/278, Brussels, 10 March 2011.    
1788 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 35; also see OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on 
International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 37, where it is stated that MoUs 
between agencies or countries constitute nonbinding ‘best endeavours’ agreements. 
1789 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 35. On MoUs, also see V. Demedts, “International Competition law 
enforcement: different means, one goal?”, Competition Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2012, 242-243. 
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elements of comprehensive cooperation agreements, while others aim to establish a basic structure 
wherein dialogue between the two competition authorities can take place, but do not provide specific 
means of enforcement cooperation. Such MoUs may contain provisions on transparency and 
communication and/or technical cooperation. This could include conducting or participating in 
conferences, seminars, workshops or training courses, exchange of personnel or study trips, or 
providing assistance in advocacy activities.1790 A third category equally includes the basic elements of 
cooperation agreements, but in a simplified or less elaborate form.1791 Some important differences 
can nevertheless be found between the 1991 EU-US Agreement and the EU’s more recent MoUs, in 
order to avoid similar objections as those voiced by France in the past (see above, Part I, 2.4.2 and 
Part II, 2.3.1). First, it is DG COMP that is signatory to the agreements. Second, mention is no 
longer made of ‘the Parties’ to the agreement, but rather ‘the Sides’. There is generally no provision 
regarding the termination of the memorandum, with the exception, however, of the EU-China and 
EU-India memoranda.1792 Finally, the MoUs contain provisions explicitly stating that “[t]he provisions 
of the MoU are not designated to create legal rights or obligations under international law”,1793 and sometimes 
there is an additional provision stating that “[t]he Sides will apply the provisions of this Memorandum of 
Understanding on a voluntary basis”.1794 There can therefore be no confusion as to the non-legally 
binding nature.1795 
 
As mentioned, the apparent ‘shift’ in the Commission’s preferences from first generation agreements 
to MoUs is largely motivated by the lighter procedural burden to conclude the latter agreements. A 
recent judgement by the CJEU has however indicated the limits to this practice in addition to the 
aforementioned France v Commission cases (see above, Part I, 2.4.2 and Part II, 2.3.1).1796 It would run 
against Article 218 TFEU that the Commission, pursuant to its prerogative of representing the 
                                                          
1790 OECD, Inventory of International Co-operation MoUs between Competition Agencies, List of Agency-to-Agency 
Memoranda of Understanding, available at https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mou-inventory-list.pdf (accessed 
July 2017) 
1791 OECD, Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 20 
November 2015, 32. 
1792 Article 5.5 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Anti-Monopoly Law between on the one 
side the European Commission (Directorate-General for Competition) and on the other side the National Development 
and Reform Commission and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 
Brussels, 20 September 2012 (EU-China MoU); Article VIII Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate-
General for Competition of the European Commission and the Competition Commission of India on Cooperation in 
the Field of Competition Laws, New Delhi, 21 November 2013 (EU-India MoU). 
1793 Article VIII Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Directorate-General for Competition of 
the European Commission and the Council for Economic Defense, the Secretariat of Economic Law of the Ministry of 
Justice, and the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance of the government of the Federative 
Republic of Brazil, Brasília, 8 October 2009 (EU-Brazil MoU), Article 5.3 EU-China MoU, Article VIII EU-India MoU, 
Article VIII Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Directorate-General for Competition of the 
European Commission and the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia, Brussels, 10 March 2011 (EU-Russia MoU).   
1794 Article 5.2 EU-China Mou, Article VIII EU-India MoU.  
1795 MoUs may also constitute second generation agreements, as is the case for the Cooperation Arrangement between 
the New Zealand Commerce Commission and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in relation to the 
Provision of Compulsory-acquired Information and Investigative Assistance, Sidney, 19 April 2013 and the Cooperation 
Arrangement between the Fair Trade Commission of Japan and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
Sydney, 29 April 2015. Both agreements give effect to the domestic gateway provisions (Section 155AAA of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 for Australia and Article 43-2 of the Antimonopoly Act for Japan). (OECD, 
Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 20 November 2015, 
33.) This implies that the authorities may only exchange confidential information within the limitations of the domestic 
legal frameworks.  
1796 Judgment of 28 July 2016, Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2016:616. 
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Union externally, would sign agreements on behalf of the Union without having received the explicit 
authorization of the Council. However, would this situation change if the agreement in question is 
non-binding? There has been some discussion between the Council and the Commission on whether 
the latter may conclude nonbinding political agreements such as MoUs without prior authorisation 
of the former. In practice, the Council has retroactively authorised the Commission, but no longer 
wishes to subscribe to this practice. By bringing the Commission before the Court, the Council took 
action against a perceived increased tendency of the Commission to sign non-binding instruments 
containing EU policy commitments.1797 The question was put to the Court of Justice in Case C-
660/13, where the Council for the first time challenged this Commission practice before the 
Court.1798 The Council in casu asked for the annulment of the Commission decision of 3 October 
2013 on the signature of an Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding of 27 February 2006 
on a Swiss financial contribution to the new Member States.1799 If the length of a procedure is an 
indication of the complexity of the case, the Court in casu was faced with some very difficult 
questions: the proceedings were initiated in December 2013, but the Court only issued its judgment 
on 28 July 2016.  
 
This case is exemplary for the broader debate on the uncertain legal environment in which non-treaty 
agreements are concluded.1800 In several jurisdictions a distinction is made between important 
agreements requiring legislative approval on the one hand and less important agreements which may 
be ratified by the executive on the other hand.1801 This is even formalised in Article 101 of the 
Euratom Treaty.1802 In the EU, some instruments for international cooperation are explicitly 
provided for in the Treaties, whereas others are not. The latter instruments, such as opinions, 
recommendations, declarations, reports, MoUs, or working arrangements, are often used by the 
Commission for instance in the exercise of its external relations tasks. According to COMAN-KUND, 
the broad and vague phrasing of some of the treaty provisions suggests that there are other means 
for taking international action and therefore seems to include the possibility for such instruments. 
Despite widespread use (by both EU and non-EU states as well as the EU itself), so-called 
‘administrative agreements’ are surrounded by legal ambiguity.1803  
                                                          
1797 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2015:787, paragraph 79.  
1798 Judgment of 28 July 2016, Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2016:616. Disclaimer: this section draws from the 
following case-note: V. Demedts & M. Chamon, “The Commission back on the leash: no autonomy to sign non-binding 
agreements on behalf of the EU: Council v Commission”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2017, 245-262.   
1799 Commission Decision on the signature of the Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding on a Swiss financial 
contribution, C(2013) 6355 final, 3 October 2013.   
1800 “Whereas it is undisputed that the international agreements concluded by the Union according to Article 218 TFEU result in legally 
binding effects,, there is ambiguity concerning the legal nature and effects of the other international cooperation instruments used in the EU’s 
external relations practice (not mentioned by the Treaties). In particular, one may wonder about the legal nature and effects of the memoranda 
of understanding concluded by the EU with third countries […]. ” (F. Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as global actors – a legal 
study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex, and Europol, Maastricht, Production print Datawyse/Universitaire Pers 
Maastricht, 2015, 103.) 
1801 F. Morrison, “Executive Agreements”, in Max Planck Encylopaedia of Public International Law, available at 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1403 (accessed 5 August 2016). 
1802 Which states: “The Community may, within the limits of its competence, enter into obligations by means of the conclusion of agreements 
or conventions with a third country, an international organisation or a national of a third country. Such agreements or conventions shall be 
negotiated by the Commission in accordance with directives issued by the Council and shall be concluded by the Commission with the approval 
of the Council acting by means of a qualified majority vote. Agreements or conventions the implementation of which does not require action by 
the Council and can be effected within the limits of the appropriate budget shall, however, be negotiated and concluded by the Commission, 
provided that it keeps the Council informed thereof.”  
1803 F. Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as global actors – a legal study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex, and 
Europol, 2015, Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 102-103, 109, 147, 157.  
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More specifically for the EU, the case Council v Commission raised important issues related to the 
institutional balance in the EU’s external relations and the extent of the Commission’s powers of 
representation. The earlier France v. Commission cases already provided clarification on the situation in 
which the Commission respectively concluded a binding international agreement on the EU’s behalf 
and a non-binding international agreement committing only itself.1804 As mentioned, competition 
MoUs are generally concluded in name of the agencies themselves, in contrast to first and second 
generation agreements. Nevertheless, the case under discussion further completes the picture by 
embarking on the issue of non-binding agreements concluded by the Commission on behalf of the 
Union. Both the 2012 Common Approach on EU Agencies and the Commission’s Vademecum on 
External Relations voiced concerns about the incapacity of EU agencies more generally to commit 
the Union to international obligations.1805 The Common Approach calls for a clear strategy to be 
adopted in this regard in order to avoid issues both from an international law perspective and the 
EU’s institutional balance of powers post-Lisbon.1806  
 
B) Facts and arguments of the parties  
 
While Switzerland is not a member of the EU, it has access to the internal market based on a series 
of bilateral agreements with the EU.1807 Following the 2004 EU enlargement, Switzerland agreed to 
make a financial contribution to reduce economic and social disparities within the enlarged Union. 
To this effect it concluded an MoU with the EU in 2006,1808 which the parties intended to be non-
binding.1809 Through the MoU the Swiss Confederation committed itself to concluding a series of 
bilateral agreements with the EU Member States that joined the Union in 2004, whereby those 
agreements “must be in conformity with the guidelines laid down in the Memorandum.”1810 In their ‘hybrid’ 
conclusions, the Council and the representatives of the Member States meeting in Council further 
agreed that the MoU would be signed, on the part of the EU, both by the Council Presidency and by 
the Commission.1811 A first addendum to the MoU, to include Bulgaria and Romania in the financial 
mechanism, was concluded in 2008 and signed by the same parties as the original MoU.1812 At the 
end of 2012 the Commission was again mandated by the Council, and the Member States meeting 
                                                          
1804 Judgment in France v Commission, C-327/91, EU:C:1994:305 (France v Commission I); Judgment in France v 
Commission, C-233/02, EU:C:2004:173 (France v Commission II).  
1805 F. Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as global actors – a legal study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex, and 
Europol, Maastricht, Production print Datawyse/Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2015, 158-159. 
1806 A. Ott, E. Vos and F. Coman-Kund, “EU agencies and their international mandate: A new category of global 
actors?”, CLEER Working Papers 2013/7, 9. 
1807 On these agreements, see M. Maresceau, “EU-Switzerland: Quo Vadis?”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2011, 729-737. 
1808 For the text of the MoU, see Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on a financial contribution by the Swiss Confederation, 
Doc. 6283/06, 14 February 2006. 
1809 Although it is not entirely clear from the MoU itself. See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Council v 
Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2015:787, paragraph 32. 
1810 See Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States meeting within the Council on a financial contribution by the Swiss Confederation, 14 February 2006, 
Doc. 6283/06, 9. 
1811 Ibid., 3. 
1812 See Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States meeting within the Council on an Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
President of the Council of the European Union and the Swiss Federal Council of 27 February 2006, Doc. 8681/08, 5 
May 2008. 
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within the Council, to engage in the necessary negotiations on the adaptation of the Swiss financial 
contribution in light of the imminent EU accession of Croatia. However, unlike the previous 
addendum, the 2013 addendum was signed by the Commission alone, on behalf of the EU.  
 
According to the Commission, the Council’s 2012 conclusions constituted a political decision in the 
sense of Article 16 TEU, allowing it not only to negotiate but also to conclude the addendum with 
Switzerland. As a result, the Commission did not request the Council’s (or the Member States’) prior 
approval,1813 although it did keep the EFTA Working Party of the Council informed of the result of 
the negotiations. The legal basis cited by the Commission’s decision was Article 17 TEU, which gives 
the Commission a general competence to represent the EU internationally and to perform 
coordinating, executive and management tasks.1814 The Commission considered that the contested 
signature was no more than an act of external representation according to Article 17(1) TEU on a 
political position previously fixed by the Council and therefore did not require authorisation by the 
Council. It relied in this on Commission v Sweden where the Court found that it is not necessary for a 
common position to take a specific form in order for it to exist.1815   
 
The Council in turn claimed that the Commission’s action was illegal as it violated the principle of 
distribution of powers contained in Article 13(2) TEU and, consequently, the principle of 
institutional balance. Second, according to the Council, the Commission’s behaviour leading to the 
adoption of the contested decision as well as the signing of the 2013 Addendum violated the 
principle of mutual sincere cooperation. That this case was purely about procedure and not about the 
substance of the addendum was evidenced by the fact that the Council had requested the Court to 
order that the effects of the decision be maintained until it is replaced.1816 The Council based its 
arguments on the 2004 France v. Commission case (France v. Commission II), dealing with the non-binding 
Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency concluded with the US.1817 In that case the 
Court ruled that “[d]etermining the conditions under which such a measure may be adopted requires that the division 
of powers and the institutional balance established by the Treaty in the field […] be duly taken into account”1818, 
which is exactly what the Council reproached the Commission of not having done in the case under 
scrutiny. In France v. Commission II, the Court found the Guidelines non-binding, but immediately 
added that this did not make the Commission competent to conclude them. While the Court did 
exclude the application of what is currently article 218 TFEU, it did not further establish the 
applicable procedure and the respective power(s) of the institutions.1819 Instead, it simply stated that 
in absence of any explicit provision on the issue in the Treaties, the institutions are required to 
respect the general division of powers and the institutional balance established by the Treaty. 
 
                                                          
1813 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Council v Commission, C-660-13, EU:C:2015:787, paragraph. 40-42. Since 
the Commission was of the opinion that the 2012 conclusions were Council conclusions (hybrid acts not being possible), 
it did not require the consent of the Member States in any case. 
1814 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Council v Commission, C-660-13, C-660/13, EU:C:2015:787, paragraph 41.  
1815 Judgment of 20 April 2010, European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden, C-246/07, EU:C:2010:203, paragraph 77.  
1816 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2015:787, paragraphs 5, 53.  
1817 Judgment of 23 March 2004, French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-233/02, EU:C:2004:173, 
paragraphs 38-46. 
1818 Ibid., paragraph 40. 
1819 Ibid., paragraph 45. 
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According to the Council the Commission may not take it upon itself to decide on the policy of the 
Union, which is a power of the Council pursuant to Article 16 TEU.1820 While the Commission 
generally represents the Union’s position, it cannot determine that position’s content. It also cannot 
unilaterally disregard the role of Member States, in breach of the principle of conferral of powers of 
Article 4(1) TEU or intentionally act in a manner which renders efforts of the Council to correct the 
situation created by the Commission ineffectual.1821 The signing of an international agreement implies 
the Union’s acceptance of the agreement’s content, which cannot be predicted ex ante and therefore 
cannot be considered as being covered by an ‘established position’.1822  
   
C) Reasoning of the Court 
 
The Court did not address the issue of admissibility, but immediately addressed the substance of the 
case.1823 The Court did not enter into the existence of the EU’s competence as such either. In this 
regard, the Commission had argued that the contested decision, which mentioned Article 17(1) TEU 
as its legal basis, did not need to refer to a material legal basis given that it was non-binding. The 
repercussions of such an argument are clear: the purpose of identifying the legal basis of an EU 
action precisely is to allow the EU to act in accordance with the principle of conferral. Arguing that a 
legal basis is not required, because the act is non-binding, amounts to arguing that no EU 
competence needs to be shown which may further be translated conveniently into concluding that 
the EU may act to the exclusion of the Member States. As a matter of principle, such a reasoning 
should be rejected and the Court might have dealt with it similarly as in France v. Commission II in 
which it noted that the non-binding nature of the Guidelines did not confer a competence on the 
Commission to adopt them, but required that the division of powers and the institutional balance 
established by the Treaty should be taken into account.1824 Evidently the same approach should be 
followed when the competence of the Union (instead of that of an institution) is at issue. 
 
With regard to the first plea, the Court began by explaining the principle of conferral, further 
clarifying that article 13(2) TEU constitutes a reflection of the principle of institutional balance.1825 
The Council had put forward that Article 218 TFEU reflects the general distribution of powers 
                                                          
1820 Council of the European Union, Contribution of the legal service Subject: Procedure to be followed for the 
conclusion by the EU of Memoranda of Understanding, Joint Statements and other texts containing policy 
commitments, with third countries and international organisation, 5707/13, 1 February 2013.    
1821 T. Ramopoulos & J. Wouters, “Charting the legal landscape of EU external relations post-Lisbon”, Leuven Centre 
for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 156, March 2015, 14-15. 
1822 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2015:787, paragraph 89-91.  
1823 As it did in France v Commission, where it dismissed the case on its merits finding that it did not have to rule on 
whether the Commission’s decision to conclude a non-binding agreement with its US counterpart could be the subject of 
an action for annulment. See Judgment of 23 March 2004, French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-
233/02, EU:C:2004:173, paragraph 26. It is not the first time in recent external relations litigation that the Court has 
avoided the question of characterizing the contested act and elaborating on the admissibility of an action (see for instance 
Judgment of 6 October 2015, Council of the European Union v European Commission, C-73/14, EU:C:2015:663). While the 
Commission did not raise the issue of admissibility under Article 263 TFEU, which inter alia requires the contested act to 
produce legal effects, the Advocate General did enter into the matter of admissibility of the decision to sign a non-
binding agreement, but this falls outside the scope of this research. See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in 
Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2015:787, paragraph 61-71. For an analysis of the admissibility issue in this case, see 
V. Demedts & M. Chamon, “The Commission back on the leash: no autonomy to sign non-binding agreements on 
behalf of the EU: Council v Commission”, 2017, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1, 255-256. 
1824 Judgment of 23 March 2004, French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-233/02, EU:C:2004:173, 
paragraph 40. 
1825 Ibid., paragraph 32.  
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under Articles 16 and 17 TEU, conferring on it the power to define Union policy in external 
relations and thereby implying that the Council authorises negotiations and approves the international 
political commitments of the Union. The inapplicability in casu of Article 218 TFEU (since the 
addendum was not binding)1826 would therefore not preclude involvement of the Council. 
Regrettably, the Court, however, was silent on the application of Article 218 TFEU as the reflection 
of the institutional balance in external relations. It did not express itself on whether the procedure set 
out in Article 218 TFEU should be applied mutatis mutandis when non-binding agreements are 
concluded on behalf of the EU and thereby also left doubts on for instance the role of the European 
Parliament in all this, which would benefit from an interpretation of the Court’s ruling as confirming 
Article 218 TFEU as the ‘default’ provision for the EU’s external relations or as the lex generalis in 
this area. The Court did not explicitly apply an institutional balance test, but seems to have effectively 
followed up on the suggestion of the Council. While the Court did not refer to Article 218 TFEU 
itself, it did apply part of the institutional balance enshrined in that Article: Council mandates, 
Commission negotiates and Council approves (see below). The role of the European Parliament is 
relevant as well as obscure in the case of competition MoUs, even if the latter only commit the 
Commission on a political level. It cannot be denied that their content is quite similar to that of full-
fledged first generation agreements. The Framework Agreement on relations between the European 
Parliament and the European Commission regulates the relationship between the two institutions 
with regard to formal international agreements that require approval by the Council, but remains 
quiet concerning agreements where the Commission binds only itself, such as MoUs.1827 It is 
examined on a case-by-case level whether informing the European Parliament would be appropriate.     
 
At the centre of the first plea of the Council was the question of what constitutes policy making. In 
this regard, the AG noted that Union policy is adopted at the level of the European Council and 
Council, pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 TEU. Their prior intervention is needed for the Commission 
to know what Union policy to represent externally pursuant to Article 17 TEU. It is the Council who 
should decide whether the Union should initiate negotiations with a third State to reach agreement 
on a matter (related to) an area for which the Union is competent and to decide on the interests to be 
pursued.1828 The Commission put forward that the contested decision did not diverge from the 
Union’s position on the financial contribution for Croatia set out in the 2012 Conclusions and that 
there had been no margin of discretion on the matter for the Commission during the negotiations. 
The content of the final agreement therefore corresponded to the negotiating mandate. The AG 
countered that argument by finding that the Council is charged to verify the content of an 
agreement, the form of external action used, respect for relevant constraints, and to monitor the 
need for the Union to become a party to that agreement. It must decide whether the commitments 
made by the parties to an agreement contribute to the objectives pursued, whether they remain 
relevant, whether the Union is willing to accept it and whether it agrees to the consequences 
international and EU law may attach to the external action.1829 The Court equally found that the 
                                                          
1826 Neither of these elements were contested by the parties.  
1827 Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ L 
304/47, 20 November 2010, points 23-25.  
1828 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2015:787, paragraph 104-105, 108-
110. Such policy-making then also includes, as was the case in the situation at hand, “the decision that an objective for which the 
Union is competent can be pursued by obtaining a commitment (whether or not binding) from a third State to pay a financial contribution to a 
new Member State pursuant to a future bilateral agreement between those two parties (assuming no such decision has been taken earlier) and 
thus by participating in external action, in the form of negotiations and possibly the subsequent conclusion of an instrument to obtain that 
commitment.” (Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2015:787, paragraph 111.)  
1829 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2015:787, paragraph 44, 94-95, 113-
116.  
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decision to sign (even a non-binding) agreement cannot come under Article 17 TEU since it requires 
an assessment of the actual content of the agreement. As a result, it constitutes the making of Union 
policy and therefore falls under Article 16 TFEU. The Court does not find its conclusion affected by 
the fact that the content of the Addendum (as negotiated) corresponded to the Council’s original 
negotiating mandate. The negotiation and the signing of an agreement indeed entail an assessment of 
the Union’s interest on two different moments in time: even if the content of the Addendum 
corresponded to the negotiating mandate, the Union’s interests may have changed in the meantime, 
and a second assessment is required. It should be checked whether the agreement still reflects the 
Union’s interests, something that cannot be determined in advance.1830  
 
From this, the Court concluded that “the Commission cannot be regarded as having the right, by virtue of its 
power of external representation under Article 17(1) TEU, to sign a non-binding agreement resulting from 
negotiations conducted with a third country.”1831 The Court added that the 2012 Conclusions did not 
authorise the Commission to sign the addendum on behalf of the EU.1832 This may suggest that the 
Court would accept such a power on the part of the Commission if it were delegated to it beforehand 
by the Council. The procedure set out in Article 218 TFEU appears rather unwieldy for the purpose 
of concluding technical and/or non-binding agreements of limited importance. One option to allow 
for effective external action is to rely on a lex specialis prescribing a ‘light’ procedure. A suggestion to 
this end may then indeed be read in the Court’s discussion of the 2012 Council Conclusions since it 
noted, in a rather clear way in different language versions of the decision, that the Conclusions did 
not contain an authorisation to sign the addendum and that the Commission had not put forward 
any evidence showing the Council had intended to do so in its Conclusions.1833 It might therefore be 
inferred from the judgment that the Council could have granted such a power to the Commission in 
its Conclusions. While Article 218 (5) TFEU evidently allows the Council to authorize the signing of 
an agreement, it presupposes that the authorization follows the negotiations instead of preceding it. 
This also seems to be the understanding of the Council Legal Service.1834 In the US, executive 
agreements may be solely presidential (without Congress’ involvement) but they may also be 
concluded by the President acting pursuant to a congressional delegation.1835 By analogy then, the EU 
legal order does not recognize purely autonomous Commission agreements (binding on the EU) but 
it might accept autonomous Commission agreements adopted pursuant to a legislative mandate.1836 It 
                                                          
1830 Judgment of 28 July 2016, Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2016:616, paragraph 40-43, 47.  
1831 Ibid., paragraph 38.  
1832 Ibid., paragraph 37. 
1833 Ibid., paragraph 37. 
1834 See Council of the European Union, Contribution of the legal service Subject: Procedure to be followed for the 
conclusion by the EU of Memoranda of Understanding, Joint Statements and other texts containing policy 
commitments, with third countries and international organisation, 5707/13, 1 February 2013, paragraph 12. 
1835 See J. Arnold, “Executive Agreements in the Aftermath of Weinberger v. Rossi: Undermining the Constitutional 
Treaty-Making Power”, Fordham International Law Journal , Vol. 6, No. 3, 1982, 642. 
1836 In this context, it is worth mentioning that there are some occasions on which the Council has, in a single decision, 
authorised a Member State and/or the Commission to both negotiate and conclude an agreement on behalf of the Union 
(see for instance Council Decision 1999/97/EC of 31 December 1998 on the position to be taken by the Community 
regarding an agreement concerning the monetary relations with the Republic of San Marino, OJ L 30, 4.2.1999, resulting 
in the Monetary Agreement between the Italian Republic, on behalf of the European Community, and the Republic of 
San Marino, and Council Decision 2009/904/EC of 26 November 2009 on the position to be taken by the European 
Community regarding the renegotiation of the Monetary Agreement with the Republic of San Marino, OJ L 322, 
9.12.2009). One can wonder whether these techniques could be seen as an application of Article 216 TFEU, which 
allows the Union to enter into international agreements when this is provided for in a legally binding Union act (gratitude 
goes out to professor OTT for pointing out the general potential of Article 216 TFEU in this respect as a lex specialis to 
depart from the lex generalis contained in Article 218 TFEU). 
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should, finally, be stressed that the Court did introduce ambiguity in its ruling by suggesting the 
possibility of an ex ante Council delegation as the latter would appear inconsistent with the central 
reasoning of the judgment, namely that an assessment of the Union’s interests should take place both 
at the start (negotiating mandate) and at the end (conclusion of the agreement) of international 
negotiations. The Court deemed it unnecessary to assess the second plea relating to breach of the 
principle of sincere cooperation.1837 
 
The obvious risk following this judgment is that it may stifle the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
EU’s external action. Indeed, a consequence of the Court’s rather strict reading of the treaties in the 
France v Commission cases and the Council v Commission case is that any internationally agreement 
committing the Union, no matter how minor or technical, should be concluded under the heavy 
procedure of Article 218 TFEU. Even if this is the logical solution in the light of the formal Treaty 
provisions, it nevertheless raises important problems such as significant delays in the negotiation 
process and political issues in the event where on the other side, the authority concluding the 
agreement is a state agency fully competent for the matter within the scope of the agreement. 
According to COMAN-KUND it is therefore inevitable that the category of ‘technical-administrative’ 
agreements is acknowledged in the EU, since international practice de facto compels the EU to use 
such instruments in establishing cooperation. It is, however, essential that also in such cases, 
coordination with the Council and the Member States takes place.1838 The Council may still tolerate 
autonomous Commission action but that it now also has a big stick in reserve to exclude such 
Commission action in areas deemed too sensitive. Time will tell whether the efficiency of EU 
external action will suffer or whether the institutions will find a workable modus vivendi.1839  
 
It may be recalled here that in France v. Commission I the Court rejected the idea that the Commission 
could conclude binding administrative agreements on behalf of the EU. In France v. Commission II the 
Court found that the Guidelines concluded between the Commission and US authorities were non-
binding and that therefore Article 218 TFEU did not apply. It added however, that this did not mean 
that the institutional balance in the Common Commercial Policy could be disregarded. Still, since the 
Guidelines were embedded in the EU-US policy (as defined by the Council in the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership and the Action Plan), the Court did not find a violation of the institutional 
balance. In the present case the Commission had also entered into a non-binding agreement and this, 
differently from France v. Commission II, clearly on behalf of the Union.  
 
The brevity of the Court’s decision may have resulted in an intelligible judgment, but it also means 
that certain issues which merited the Court’s attention were (conveniently) glanced over. The Court’s 
decision did not provide the level of guidance it could have since the Court inter alia refused to 
explicitly recognize that the institutional balance as laid down in Article 218 TFEU reflects the inter-
institutional relations in the field of external relations and should therefore be applied by analogy to 
any situation not expressly covered by another Treaty provision. This raises the question of how the 
Court’s decision affects the existing institutional practice in the EU’s external relations. The Council 
                                                          
1837 Judgment of 28 July 2016, Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2016:616, paragraph 48.  
1838 F. Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as global actors – a legal study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex, and 
Europol, Maastricht, Production print Datawyse/Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2015, 160-164. 
1839 It should be noted that with regard to the non-legally binding letters of intent with Mexico in the field of industry and 
entrepreneurship, the responsible Commissioner was authorized to sign on behalf of the Union as a whole, with his 
counterparts signing on behalf of Mexico. P-J Kuijper, J. Wouters, F. Hoffmeister, G. De Baere, T. Ramopoulos, The law 
of EU external relations – cases, materials, and commentary on the EU as an international legal actor, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2013, 97. 
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brought proceedings as a test case in light of what it qualified as an increased Commission tendency 
to sign MoU’s on behalf of the EU without Council approval.1840 The Court’s decision will now have 
put a halt to this practice but it does not provide adequate guidance in relation to the Commission’s 
practice, for instance in the field of competition law, of concluding MoU’s on its own behalf in line 
with France v. Commission II.1841 This case leaves open the question to what extent the institutions 
might have recourse to the technique of legislative delegation in order to safeguard the effectiveness 
of EU external action. The rather heavy procedure of Article 218 TFEU was drafted with proper 
international agreements in mind but it is unsuited for the conclusion of mere technical agreements, 
which do not require the same level of political investment. As cooperation evolves, the Commission 
might feel the need to conclude MoUs on behalf of the Union rather than merely itself. Whether any 
type of delegation would be possible in this situation as to avoid the hassle of an Article 218 TFEU 
procedure remains unsolved.  
 
4.2 Cooperation in other policy fields  
 
TIMBERG asked whether there were particularities regarding the nature of restrictive business 
practices that render them more difficult to manage internationally compared to tariff and other 
trade barriers, monetary and exchange restrictions, and impediments to economic development. Such 
other fields are technical and nationally sensitive as well, but are subject to operational international 
organs for their control, in contrast to competition policy.1842 SCHAUB equally noticed the advances 
made in international cooperation in fields such as customs, securities, or the war on drugs where 
discrepancies between rules did not seem to have precluded effective cooperation.1843 Is competition 
law truly special? Is cooperation in the field of competition law entirely different than other areas of 
law, and does it merit special treatment? Are there particular problems or issues that only arise in 
competition law?1844 It is remarkable how the reluctance to exchange confidential information in the 
field of competition law contrasts with the extent of cooperation in other areas of law.1845  
 
The 1996 Laudati-Report studied confidential information exchange agreements between the US and 
Member States of the EU in the areas of securities, criminal, tax and customs, in preparation for 
possible negotiations between the EU and the US on a second generation agreement. The report 
stated that generally it is the type of assistance that is needed in each area that determines the content 
of the agreement whereby a distinction can be made between the exchange of background 
information, or the exchange of evidence for court proceedings. It indicated though that the enabling 
legislation in areas such as tax, securities and customs foresaw less powerful tools and was vastly 
simpler than the US IAEAA. It mentioned as an explanation, based on statements of Antitrust 
Division officials, a greater level of control from Congress in this area in response to concerns 
                                                          
1840 See Council of the European Union, Contribution of the legal service Subject: Procedure to be followed for the 
conclusion by the EU of Memoranda of Understanding, Joint Statements and other texts containing policy 
commitments, with third countries and international organisation, 5707/13, 1 February 2013, paragraph 1. 
1841 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/ (accessed 16 August 2016).  
1842 S. Timberg, “Restrictive business practices as an appropriate subject for united nations action”, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 
1, 1955-1956, 415-416.  
1843 A. Schaub, “International Co-operation in Antitrust matters: making the point in the wake of the Boeing/MDD 
proceedings”, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1, February 1998.  
1844 Analogous to the speech of WILS during 9th ASCOLA Conference Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, 
Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014. 
1845 B. Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 128.  
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expressed by the business community.1846 Concerns therefore seem to be stronger in the field of 
competition law than in other fields. At the same time, the Report established that “the tools specified by 
the IAEAA are more powerful than those established by the enabling legislation in other areas.”1847 The IAEAA 
created similar powers to those created by MLAT’s and tax treaties and attributed powers to 
competition law enforcement authorities going beyond those attributed to securities and customs 
authorities,1848 but in contrast to these other areas, the powers are not used as much.1849  
 
CONNOLLY hinted at the fact that the US might have strategically enacted the IAEAA to avoid the 
creation of a strict international code of minimum standards. This is in contrast, however, with the 
area of financial law, where the US did agree to the establishment of minimum standards in 
regulating financial institutions, in order to strengthen the confidence and integrity in the 
international financial system. In most financial law areas international cooperation is intensifying, 
likely to catch-up to market innovations, but this does not happen in competition law. He concluded 
that the US only pursues harmonisation when it benefits the nation, such as in the fields of securities 
regulation or banking, but refuses to do so when it is believed that harmonisation would hurt the 
national economy, as in antitrust or insider trading. He rightly underlined that this line of thought 
fails to recognise the interconnectedness of markets in a global economy.1850 
 
Some barriers therefore do not seem to exist when information is exchanged in the investigation of 
tax or finance-related violations for instance, which could be categorized as financial offences, as 
could competition law infringements.1851 HAMMOND, former Director of Criminal Enforcement of 
the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice and Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 
Criminal Enforcement, stated that “cartel offences are no different than other crimes of deceit or fraud”,1852 and 
yet, public perception of both types of offences seem to differ significantly. While the amount of 
global cartel overcharges has been greater in some cartel cases than in the biggest and most 
newsworthy accounting frauds, relative to other corporate crimes, newspapers, politicians, and the 
public seem to be indifferent to cartel crimes.1853 Cartels for some reason do not generate the same 
type of hostility as do perpetrators of securities or accounting fraud, at least in the US. Perhaps this is 
the case in part because wrongdoings are more obvious, while in competition law there can be 
ambiguity about the existence of a transgression and the government can even be seen to encourage 
them, for instance with regard to the exemption of export cartels.1854 Although the factual intricacies, 
the complexities of criminal versus administrative enforcement, parallel private and public 
enforcement, and the interconnectedness of competition policy with for instance industrial and trade 
                                                          
1846 L. Laudati, Study of exchange of confidential information agreements and treaties between the US and Member States of the EU in 
areas of securities, criminal, tax and customs, Luxemburg, Office for Offiical Publications of the European Communities, 1996, 
7-11.  
1847 Ibid., 11.  
1848 Ibid., 12. 
1849 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 12.  
1850 W. Connolly, “Lessons to be learned: the conflict in international Antitrust law contrasted with progress in 
international financial law”, Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. 6, No.1, 2001, 245-246.  
1851 S. Hammond, “Beating cartels at their own game – sharing information in the fight against cartels”, presented at the 
Inaugural Symposium of the Competition Policy Research Center - Fair Trade Commission of Japan, Tokyo, 20 
November 2003, 2.  
1852 Ibid., 6. 
1853 As measured by how newsworthy a story a cartel case is.  
1854 D. Daniel Sokol, “Cartels, corporate compliance, and what practitioners really think about enforcement”, Antitrust 
Law Journal, Vol. 78, No. 1, 2012, 218-219. 
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policy do make competition law a complex area of law with its own particularities,1855 it does not 
justify stepmotherly treatment in the international arena. 
 
This section explores the most commonly suggested possibilities for cooperation that may be 
transposed from other policy fields. It should, however, be clearly stated that such an undertaking, if 
done comprehensively, would merit a separate doctoral study. This section therefore comes with the 
clear disclaimer that it merely provides ideas for further multilateral work on this matter on an 
exemplary basis, and has no intention to be comprehensive both in breath or in depth.   
 
4.2.1 Previous efforts to look over the wall  
 
Already in 1993, an OECD Secretariat note on Mutual Assistance Agreements drew the attention to 
potential lessons to be learned from existing international agreements in fields as taxation, money 
laundering and securities, in particular how such agreements dealt with the treatment of confidential 
information, the types of assistance, the bilateral or multilateral nature of the agreement and 
common denominators.1856 The note showed that information exchange in these fields had not been 
hampered by confidentiality protections. Assistance was not limited to the transfer of information 
that was already in possession of the authority, various joint investigations were possible as well. The 
note also came to the conclusion that bilateral and multilateral agreements generally complemented 
each other.1857 In 1994 another paper was issued, dealing with Effective Co-operation in International 
Antitrust Enforcement: Confidential Information Sharing and other Essential Mutual Assistance.1858 
This paper developed a list of principles to guide and encourage confidential information exchange 
in the field of competition law enforcement. It did so by studying information exchanges in other 
law enforcement areas where international cooperation commonly occurred. The paper described the 
need for confidential information exchange as ‘pressing’.1859  
 
The aforementioned Laudati Report in 1996 again devoted attention to other policy areas as sources 
of inspiration for international competition cooperation. Potential lessons from other policy areas 
have reoccurred on a regular basis as OECD Competition Committee topic, most recently during the 
2012 Roundtable on Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, where the 
importance of multilateral instruments, the commitment to implement and enforce, and the 
development of common standard definitions were underlined.1860 The OECD background note to 
the 2012 Global Forum on Competition again stressed that certain challenges to international 
cooperation could be overcome by exploring avenues that were followed in other policy areas.1861 
This was also stated by the US in its contribution to the OECD Competition Committee discussion 
on international cooperation: “[f]or the future, OECD member agencies should look to incorporate new ways of 
thinking and new, or to date unexplored, ways of working together to facilitate cooperation. This includes thinking 
                                                          
1855 Interview with Commission official. 
1856 OECD, Mutual Assistance Agreements, Secretariat Note, DAFFE/CLP/WP3(93)3, 1993. 
1857 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 7-8.  
1858 OECD, Issues Paper Effective Co-operation in International Antitrust Enforcement: Confidential Information 
Sharing and other Essential Mutual Assistance, DAFFE/CLP/WP3(94)1, 1994.  
1859 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 11, 34.  
1860 Ibid., 33. 
1861 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012, 4.  
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creatively to learn from others’ experience, including from cooperation experience in other disciplines.”1862 JENNINGS, 
head of competition outreach at the OECD, equally considered that enforcement agencies should 
consider more revolutionary approaches towards more effective cooperation, whereby they could 
gather inspiration by looking at international cooperation in other areas of law enforcement, and 
approaches under multilateral frameworks with functioning information sharing systems.1863 Not 
much in-depth follow-up seems to have occurred since then. References to other policy fields have 
remained scarce and superficial.1864 They are often descriptive and do not analyse practical issues that 
may occur when attempting to transpose other systems. Indeed, the OECD Competition Committee 
for instance never went beyond a mere review of other policy experiences to discuss in detail if and 
how they could be transferred to international cooperation in competition cases.1865  
 
4.2.2 Tax policy 
 
4.2.2.1 Open multilateral initiatives supporting bilateralism 
 
As is clear from the above, one area of law enforcement often referred to as source of inspiration for 
competition law cooperation is tax policy. It is said that the challenges and obstacles that tax 
enforcers are confronted with when attempting to share information are very similar or even 
identical to those of competition authorities. Examples are double incrimination issues, (bank) 
secrecy restrictions, general legal restrictions to information exchange, such as the inability of the 
receiving jurisdiction to make full use of transmitted information, and the prioritisation of domestic 
demands over overseas information requests.1866  
 
Generally international cooperation among tax authorities takes the form of co-decision making 
among agencies in different policy areas, multilateral discussions aimed at reaching consistency in 
approaches to different issues, and cooperation in individual cases. It includes cooperation in 
assessing tax debts or auditing taxpayers, cooperation in investigating tax fraud, both civil and 
criminal, and intelligence sharing.1867 In 2000 the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes was established within the OECD.1868 It has manifested itself as the 
primary transnational venue for combating tax evasion and had important practical effects. It is seen 
as a typical transnational policy network (see below, Part III, 2.3.1), and uses best-practice standards. 
                                                          
1862 OECD, Discussion on International Co-operation, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)24, 12 June 2012, 10. 
1863 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 310. 
1864 See, for instance, OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 48-54. The report stated that it may be interesting to learn from 
cooperation experiences in other policy areas. The report itself only briefly touched upon cooperation in tax cases. No 
explanation is given for the choice for this policy area, rather than other areas where information is commonly 
exchanged, such as anti-corruption, securities, or money laundering. No mention is made either of the Laudati Report, 
which dealt with similar issues.  
1865 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 16. 
1866 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 53. 
1867 Ibid., 311.  
1868 See http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ (accessed June 2017). 
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However, to put pressure on countries to accept the standards on transparency and exchange of 
information, lists were created of compliant and non-compliant jurisdictions.1869 
 
The Global forum was further institutionalised in 2009. It was given increased independence from 
the OECD via the establishment of a self-financing mechanism based on member contributions, by 
inviting new members committed to implementing its standards, and via the establishment of a 
Steering Group, a Peer Review Group, and a permanent secretariat hosted within the OECD. This 
sets the tax forum apart from other Global Forums. It has also distinguished itself by giving greater 
attentiveness to inclusion and therefore legitimacy, by including developing country actors and issues, 
which according to KIRTON has contributed to its success.1870 Another feature that is distinctive is 
that the forum allows sub-sets of states to go beyond existing standards and require higher standards 
for their own taxpayers, creating upward pressure on the global standards. Moreover, the OECD 
underlined that a jurisdiction may not rest on its laurels when it has signed the minimum twelve 
bilateral agreements to be compliant with existing standards, but must continue to sign agreements 
even after it has reached this threshold.1871 It must be mentioned that in the context of tax 
cooperation power imbalances play a role as well. The twelve or more tax information exchange 
agreements that countries are required to sign have tended to be bilateral. Considering the resources 
that the negotiation of such agreement requires, this system favours more powerful countries that 
have a greater capacity to negotiate agreements.1872  
 
One of the Forum’s most significant accomplishments is the 2002 Model Agreement on Exchange 
of Information on Tax Purposes. The model agreement is not a binding instrument, but contains 
two models for agreements. It is presented as both a multilateral instrument and a model for bilateral 
treaties or agreements. What is interesting is that the multilateral instrument is not a traditional 
multilateral agreement, but provides the basis for an integrated bundle of bilateral treaties. A party 
that wishes to adhere to the multilateral Agreement must specify the party or parties vis-à-vis which 
it wishes to be bound. When the Agreement enters into force, it only creates rights and obligations 
between those parties that have mutually identified each other in their instruments of ratification, 
approval or acceptance that have been deposited with the depositary of the Agreement. The bilateral 
agreement is included as a model for bilateral exchange of information. What is interesting as well is 
that the model includes a detailed commentary intended to illustrate or interpret every provision. The 
model even suggests what parties should do if they wish to ensure that the Commentary is an 
authoritative interpretation, rather than its relevance being determined by principles of international 
law.1873  
 
While it is not relevant to discuss the entire Model Agreement at this point, some interesting 
provisions are selected that may be of use in bilateral competition cooperation agreements. Article 
4(2) for instance foresees that any concept that is not defined in the Agreement, will have the 
meaning that it has at when the Agreement is applied under the law of that Party, any meaning under 
the applicable tax laws of that Party prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of 
                                                          
1869 J. Kirton, “Global forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes” in T. Hale & D. Held 
(eds), Handbook of transnational governance – institutions and innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, 61-62.  
1870 Ibid., 62-63.  
1871 T. Porter & V. Rubio Vega, “Global forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes” in T. 
Hale & D. Held (eds), Handbook of transnational governance – institutions and innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, 65.  
1872 J. Kirton, “Global forum on Transparency and Echange of Information for Tax Purposes” in T. Hale & D. Held 
(eds), Handbook of transnational governance – institutions and innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, 63. 
1873 OECD, Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters, April 2002 (Model Agreement).  
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that Party, unless the context otherwise requires. Article 5 on the exchange of information upon 
request obliges the parties to provide information, while Article 7 mentions the possibilities to 
decline a request. This approach still allows the parties to refuse cooperation, but provides extra 
stimulus to do so, in comparison to the very discretionary provisions in competition cooperation 
agreements. The Model Agreement not only foresees information exchange, but also the execution 
of tax examinations abroad, more specifically the interviewing of individuals and the examination of 
records, with the written consent of the persons concerned.1874  
 
The Commentary to the Model Agreement clarifies that information exchange under the Agreement 
is limited following a standard of foreseeable relevance. The information that the applicant Party 
must provide to the requested Party in order to demonstrate the foreseeable relevance of the 
information requested is specified in the Agreement. This standard must ensure exchange of 
information in tax matters to the widest possible extent while at the same time countering fishing 
expeditions or requests of information that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given 
taxpayer. The Commentary gives some examples to illustrate the application of the requirements in 
certain situations. This requirement, implying that tax authorities requesting information from 
another jurisdiction must have a good documented reason to suspect an individual or firm and must 
limit their request to that case, was identified by some as a weakness of the agreement, since “tax 
evasion usually involves concealment of exactly the type of information that the authorities would need to document 
suspicions sufficiently to request assistance.”1875 A second limitation is that the Agreement only covers 
exchange of information upon request. This is explained to mean when the information requested 
relates to a particular examination, inquiry or investigation. Automatic or spontaneous exchanges of 
information are not covered. The Commentaries, however, do encourage Contracting Parties to 
consider expanding their cooperation.  
 
The Agreement furthermore aims to establish a balance between the rights granted to persons in the 
requested Party and the need for effective exchange of information. Rights and safeguards are for 
instance not overridden simply because they could operate to prevent or delay effective exchange of 
information, but they should not be applied in a manner that unduly prevents or delays effective 
exchange of information. An example are notification requirements: if a requested Party’s laws 
require prior notification, this party should ensure that this does not frustrate the efforts of the party 
seeking the information, depending on the circumstances of the case, by for instance permitting 
exceptions from prior notification in cases in which the information request is of a very urgent 
nature or the notification is likely to undermine the chance of success of the investigation.  
 
Apart from the Model Agreement, dealing with information exchange, the Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters was created. This convention was developed jointly by the 
OECD and the Council of Europe already in 1988 and was later amended by Protocol in 2010. It is 
labelled as the most comprehensive multilateral instrument available for all forms of administrative 
tax cooperation between states in the assessment and collection of taxes, to tackle tax evasion and 
avoidance. Apart from different forms of information exchange, also joint investigations are dealt 
with and other forms of work sharing. The Convention is made very accessible, providing a flyer in 
English and Spanish, which contains a brief overview on the Convention. The Convention itself is 
                                                          
1874 Article 6 Model Agreement.  
1875 T. Porter & V. Rubio Vega, “Global forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes” in T. 
Hale & D. Held (eds), Handbook of transnational governance – institutions and innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, 65.  
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available in English, French, and an unofficial Spanish and Portuguese translation.1876 Again, an 
explanatory report provides additional clarity with regard to the implementation of the 
convention.1877  
 
Another initiative deserving to be mentioned is the Manual on Information Exchange approved by 
the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs in 2006. It is intended to provide practical assistance to 
officials dealing with exchange of information for tax purposes and was developed with the input of 
both member and non-member countries. The Manual has a modular structure and evolves from a 
more general discussion of practical and legal aspects of exchange of information toe specific ways of 
sharing information included in various OECD instruments, dealing for instance with exchange of 
information on request, spontaneous information exchange, automatic (or routine) exchange of 
information, and industry-wide exchanges of information.1878 However, it also covers simultaneous 
tax examinations, tax examinations abroad, country profiles regarding information exchange, 
information exchange instruments and models, as well as a module on joint audits, an innovative 
form of cooperation between countries. A Joint Audit involves the coordination of an audit of one 
or more related taxable persons (both legal entities and individuals) between countries, where the 
audit focus has a common or complementary interest and/or transaction.1879 The way the manual is 
set up, with separate modules, allows countries to put together their own tailored manual, 
incorporating only the modules that are relevant to their specific information exchange 
programmes.1880 Joint investigations occur on a relatively frequent basis, and appear to be more 
documented than cooperation in competition cases.1881 Most recently, in the wake of the Panama-
paper revelations, tax officials from 28 nations met to develop a strategy for collaborative action, for 
one of the largest joint tax investigations in history.1882 
 
Tax authorities, finally, can count on access to information gathered by authorities other than their 
peers.1883 As an example so-called ‘operation green fees’ can be mentioned. This case involved the global 
prosecution of criminal networks involved in an estimated 5 billion Euro worth of damages to 
European taxpayers, caused by VAT-fraud within the EU Emission Trading System. Both law 
enforcement and tax authorities cooperated. According to the OECD, the success of the operation 
can be attributed to the fact that extensive use was made of international cooperation tools, taking 
advantage of the different legal bases used for both civil and criminal procedures, as well as the fact 
that cooperation on intelligence took place with Tax Administrations, Customs, Financial 
                                                          
1876 OECD and Council of Europe, The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 
Amended by the 2010 Protocol, 2011. 
1877 OECD, Text of the revised explanatory report to the convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters 
as amended by protocol. 
1878 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 52.  
1879 OECD, Sixth Meeting of the OECD Forum on Tax Administration, Istanbul, 15-16 September 2010, Joint Audit 
Report. 
1880 OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Manual on Information Excange, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/cfaapprovesnewmanualoninformationexchange.htm (accessed 
July 2017). 
1881 See for instance X., “Joint investigation by Dutch FIOD and British HMRC into hiding money in a different 
country”, 5 April 2017, available at https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten/@98616/joint-investigation/ (accessed 
May 2017).   
1882 M. Hamilton, “Global joint investigation to be proposed at special tax meeting”, 12 April 2016, available at 
https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160412-global-tax-officials-meeting.html (accessed May 2016). 
1883 See, for instance, OECD, Access for tax authorities to information gathered by anti-money laundering authorities, 
September 2007. 
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Intelligence Unit Authorities and police forces.1884 This does not seem to occur, or at least is not 
regulated to large extent for competition authorities wishing to use information gathered by other 
enforcement authorities.  
 
4.2.2.2 Inspiration   
 
The particularities leading to successful international cooperation in tax may serve as inspiration for 
further advancements in the field of competition law. A first aspect worth considering is further 
structuring exchanges of information. While information can indeed be exchanged on request, 
automated exchange of generic information could be more advanced. Automatic or routine exchange 
of information in tax cases involves the systematic and periodic transmission of ‘bulk’ taxpayer 
information by the source country to the residence country concerning various categories of income. 
Sector analyses could be shared in this manner among countries for instance. The variety of types of 
information sharing mechanisms in tax cooperation demonstrates the merit of formalising and 
categorising information exchange in a legal framework, with ensuing duties and obligations between 
authorities. It demonstrates a certain level of commitment that is absent in cooperation between 
competition authorities, at least as reflected in their formalised international obligations.1885  
 
Lessons could also be learned from the work sharing arrangements among tax officials. Both in the 
EU and internationally representatives of one country are allowed to be present and gather 
information during a tax inspection in the territory of another state, and joint audits and tax 
examinations abroad are held.1886 This type of investigative assistance is still excluded in most 
competition cooperation agreements. It is remarkable that tax officials have much more practical 
guidance to their disposal in the form of practical cooperation manuals but also explanatory 
statements accompanying international agreements, clarifying the exact meaning of the provisions via 
examples and other additional information. Such assistance should also be present in competition 
law. 
 
Most importantly, international cooperation in tax law enforcement is based on an open multilateral 
system encouraging bilateralism.1887 The bilateral and multilateral system are more interwoven than in 
the competition law system, and seem to generate benefits that are absent in the latter. The manner 
in which model agreements are set up allow for advanced tailoring, for instance via the modular 
approach, and while providing hard obligations, the system of opt-in ensures that countries are not 
forced into commitments they do not feel ready for. While most of the above suggestions are not 
unknown to the OECD, multilateral competition law forums should dare to dig deeper and build 
further on these ideas, to see what it would take to successfully transpose such a system to a 
competition law environment.  
 
4.2.3 Criminal law: MLATs  
 
4.2.3.1 Definition and use 
 
                                                          
1884 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 51. 
1885 Ibid., 50, footnote 135, 54, 319.  
1886 Ibid., 50, 54.  
1887 Ibid., 54.  
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Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are instruments with a broad horizontal application 
across multiple enforcement areas.1888 The UK-US MLAT for instance has been used in instances 
from money laundering to drugs offences.1889 This type of agreement has bloomed since the 1970s, 
mainly upon initiative of the US DoJ and State Department. The US has signed MLATs with 19 
American countries and is party to the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance.1890 
They are concluded in view of assisting cross-border criminal law enforcement, by permitting the 
sharing of investigative information and the obtaining of documents and evidence located abroad via 
the use of investigative powers for use in criminal prosecutions by the other nation.1891  
 
The OECD’s 2012 Policy Roundtable on Improving International Cooperation in Cartel 
Investigations stated that MLATs are generally “the most effective means of cross-border evidence gathering in 
competition cases.”1892 Nevertheless, competition law is often excluded from such agreements, either 
because of unwillingness to commit to the hard obligations contained in such agreements,1893 or due 
to the dual criminality requirements usually included in such agreements, excluding countries with 
civil competition law systems.1894 Criminal antitrust sanctions remain relatively rare,1895 which may 
explain why up to 2005 it was stated that “Multilateral Legal Assistance Treaties have not previously been 
studied by trade and competition specialists.”1896 Nevertheless, even though MLATs were initially intended 
for use in conventional criminal prosecutions, their scope has progressively expanded. Some more 
recent MLATs expressly contemplate competition law criminal prosecutions.1897 The most well-
known example of an MLAT applicable in competition cases, even if it does not refer to competition 
law specifically, is the one between Canada and the US.1898 It has been said that the confidential 
                                                          
1888 “They provide a mechanism for the signatories to obtain a wide variety of legal assistance for criminal matters generally, including the 
compulsory taking of evidence on oath and the execution of searches of domestic and business premises.” Ibid., 29. 
1889 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 
55. 
1890 Ratified by 13 additional American states. See http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/benchmarking/the-
investigations-review-of-the-americas-2017/1067471/international-cartel-investigations-in-the-united-states (accessed 
June 2017). 
1891 M. Taylor, International Competition Law: a new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
113. 
1892 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 29.  
1893 “MLATs oblige the parties to assist each other by obtaining evidence located on the requested nation’s territory and, it is not permissible 
for the requested country to refuse its aid unless the offence is political or military, or compliance would jeopardize national security or prejudice 
its own investigations.” Ibid., 29. One can therefore not rely on a lack of available resources for instance to refuse to 
cooperate, unlike in ‘soft’ enforcement cooperation agreements.  
1894 This requirement implies that the behaviour at stake should be characterized as a crime in all jurisdictions involved. 
W. Connolly, “Lessons to be learned: the conflict in international Antitrust law contrasted with progress in international 
financial law”, Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. 6, No.1, 2001, 218. 
1895 E. Swaine, "Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy: United States," in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, 
and Competition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 19. 
1896 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 
66.  
1897 See, for example, Treaty between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, Bern, 25 May 1973, entered into force 23 January 1977. M. Taylor, International Competition Law: a new 
dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 113. 
1898 Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Québec, 18 March 1985.  
301 
 
information exchange permitted by this MLAT enabled a number of successful cross-border criminal 
prosecutions against cartel behaviour. Because virtually all of the international cartels prosecuted by 
the US also operated in Canada in recent years, cooperation between the two countries has been 
crucial.1899 Canadian prosecutions of cross-border cartels uncovered by the DoJ allowed for the 
imposition of enormous Canadian fines, which would have been impossible in the absence of the 
MLAT. It was the success of the US-Canada MLAT that allegedly enticed the US to extend its ability 
to enter into competition law MLATs with other nations.1900  
 
The assistance that may be offered under an MLAT is extensive. The US-Canada MLAT, for 
instance, permits the coordination of enforcement activities, provides legal tools to jointly analyse 
documents, allows exchange of information and regular meetings to discuss matters of mutual 
interest.1901 An MLAT moreover allows one party to request assistance in gathering evidence located 
on the requested nation’s territory in a criminal investigation to the designated central authority of 
the other party.1902 Such an authority generally is a ministry of justice or its equivalent. While the US-
Canada MLAT does not explicitly mention antitrust authorities, the US Antitrust Division of the 
DoJ and the CCB actively contribute to the implementation of the MLAT.1903   
 
Assistance generally includes taking testimony and statements in the requested jurisdiction 
(subpoenas for documents or testimony and witness interviews), providing documents or records 
located in the requested jurisdiction, executing requests for searches and seizure, and in some cases, 
any other form of assistance that is not prohibited by the laws of the requested jurisdiction or 
consistent with the objects of the treaty.1904 In the US, such assistance may toll the statute of 
limitations for a crime while the request is pending.1905 MLATs usually define whether or not the 
information that is shared will be used for criminal prosecutions or civil antitrust cases.1906  
 
As mentioned, MLATs generally contain hard law commitments, obliging the parties to assist each 
other. Refusal by the requested jurisdiction of a request made in conformity with the treaty is 
                                                          
1899 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 
52. 
1900 M. Taylor, International competition law – A new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
114. 
1901 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 
52-54. 
1902 http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/benchmarking/the-investigations-review-of-the-americas-
2017/1067471/international-cartel-investigations-in-the-united-states (accessed June 2017).  
1903 Both authorities work together under the MLAT, but also under a Memorandum of Understanding, the 1995 
Bilateral Agreement on the Application of Their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws, and an 
Agreement on Positive Comity. P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International 
Competition Cooperation Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition 
Policy for International Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 
9-10 December 2005, 53.  
1904 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 15. 
1905 http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/benchmarking/the-investigations-review-of-the-americas-
2017/1067471/international-cartel-investigations-in-the-united-states (accessed June 2017).  
1906 W. Connolly, “Lessons to be learned: the conflict in international Antitrust law contrasted with progress in 
international financial law”, Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. 6, No.1, 2001, 233.  
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generally restricted to reasons of the offence being political or military, or if complying with the 
request would prejudice the sovereignty, security, important public policy, or essential interests of the 
nation or interfere with its own criminal investigations. If a request or assistance would relate to an 
offender who could not be proceeded against in the requested jurisdiction because of previous 
acquittal or conviction for the offence, aid may equally be refused.1907 If assistance is denied, the 
requested state is under the obligation to justify its decision.1908   
 
An ICN Report from 2007 revealed that the competition agencies of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, 
Switzerland and the USA had MLATs with other jurisdictions which can or potentially could be used 
for cartel cases.1909 In 1999, the US signed MLATs with Japan and Brazil aimed at opening up those 
markets to US competition.1910 Generally, however, even when the use of MLATs has been extended 
from classical criminal matters into the area of competition and antirust, it is still commonly required 
that criminal law applies in at least one jurisdiction to be used in competition cases.1911 A dual 
criminality requirement often prevents a criminal jurisdiction from cooperating with a civil or 
administrative jurisdiction.1912 However, the US-Italy and US-Spain MLATs for instance do not make 
dual criminality a prerequisite for assistance so they could be used to a certain extent in competition 
matters,1913 unless competition policy is explicitly excluded, such as in the US-Switzerland or Canada-
Germany MLATs.1914 The US-UK MLAT originally did not apply to competition investigations as 
clarified in the accompanying interpretative notes.1915 Seven years after the conclusion of the Treaty, 
                                                          
1907 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 16; P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy 
of International Competition Cooperation Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on 
Competition Policy for International Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 50. 
1908 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 
53-54. 
1909 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 16.  
1910 W. Connolly, “Lessons to be learned: the conflict in international Antitrust law contrasted with progress in 
international financial law”, Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. 6, No.1, 2001, 233.  
1911 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 
49-50.  
1912 Often the use of exchanged information is limited to the purposes for which it was collected, preventing “an authority 
from a civil/administrative system from sharing information with a criminal jurisdiction if the information can ultimately be used to impose 
criminal sanctions. Similarly this would prevent an authority from a civil/administrative system which provides only for corporate fines from 
sharing information with another authority (whether with a criminal or a civil/administrative enforcement system) which can impose sanction 
on individuals.” (OECD, Limitations and constraints to international co-operation, Issues paper by the secretariat, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)8, 23 October 2012, 10).  
1913 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 
50.  
1914 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 15. 
1915 Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Washington, 6 January 1994. 
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however, the provisions excluding criminal prosecutions in competition cases from the MLAT were 
deleted via an exchange of notes between the UK and US governments.1916  
 
4.2.3.2 Limitations  
 
While the US-Canada MLAT can be considered quite successful, this is not the case for all MLATs. 
While the US has concluded many MLATs allowing application in competition law, it is said that 
“their impact on antitrust investigations in the Americas is limited.”1917 Some American countries have simply 
not executed the MLAT with the US, and it is estimated that over half of the bilateral US MLATs are 
with small island nations unlikely to be involved in international cartel enforcement.1918  
 
Apart from the fact that the double criminality requirement often excludes parties from concluding 
an MLAT for competition law purposes, other limitations apply as well. Due to the intended use of 
the information exchanged in criminal cases, the process of requesting assistance under an MLAT 
can be slow and cumbersome.1919 MLATs indeed generally function via the more formal criminal 
justice enforcement channels rather than the somewhat more flexible administrative ones. This may 
result in longer proceedings, also due to the possibility of legal challenges.1920 The specific details and 
procedures of cooperation under MLATs can be subject to the requirements of both the requesting 
and the requested jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions may for instance require that evidence gathered by 
another jurisdiction needs to be gathered respecting the rights of defence applied in the requesting 
jurisdiction, such as the presence of a lawyer, in order to be valid in court. It is equally possible that 
certain investigatory methods available to the requesting jurisdiction may not be available to the 
requested jurisdiction, such as the interception of private communications.1921 
 
Finally, MLATs suffer from the same illness as bilateral cooperation agreements, namely that little 
information is available on their functioning. There is not much information in the literature either 
on the use of MLATs in competition matters as requests for information are not public. Most 
information is available on the US-Canada MLAT, but others have remained rather opaque.1922 Their 
limited availability excludes them from being an alternative to traditional cooperation agreements, 
but lessons can be learned in terms of the stronger commitment to cooperation included in MLATs.  
 
5. Intermediate conclusion Part II 
 
                                                          
1916 P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation 
Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International 
Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 December 2005, 
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1919 Ibid.  
1920 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
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This study answers the question whether and to what extent both first and second generation 
bilateral dedicated competition cooperation agreements have contributed to the enhancement of 
international antitrust enforcement, by improving the ability of competition authorities to cooperate. 
This in turn determines whether such agreements have added utility compared to other cooperation 
mechanisms and whether the EU should further invest in their negotiation and conclusion. Such an 
assessment evidently begins with the identification of appropriate benchmarks. A starting point in 
this process were the stated aims of the agreements themselves. An evolution was witnessed in this 
regard from a focus on mere conflict avoidance to the creation of additional effectiveness and 
efficiency in competition law enforcement. Seven benchmarks were developed for the purpose of 
this study. Because data on instances of cooperation are limited and superficial, and because 
counterfactuals are impossible to establish, benchmarks were created by breaking down described 
benefits from cooperation from earlier multilateral efforts to asses cooperation as well as feedback 
from practitioners. The aim was to assess the long-term potential of the agreements. It was thereby 
important to mainly analyse the text of the agreements, and its inherent value as a cooperation 
instrument.  
 
The cooperation mechanisms generally present in first generation agreements include best endeavour 
obligations regarding notification, exchange of non-confidential information, general cooperation 
and coordination of enforcement activities, a negative and positive comity principle, and consultation 
requirements. As mentioned, DG COMP’s recent management plans indicated that the EU no 
longer intends to invest in first generation agreements. The above analysis revealed that these 
agreements as they exist today indeed do not continue to offer added value, as the benefits of first 
generation agreements do not outweigh the cost of their negotiation. The 2012 OECD/ICN Joint 
Survey indicated that first generation bilateral competition agreements do not appear to be used very 
often, despite their availability and perceived relevance (see figure 2 above, Introduction).1923 A partial 
explanation is offered by the fact that a lot of cooperation is done informally and is not included in 
the overview. Nevertheless, this is an indication that the agreements generally served to formalise 
existing practice, fulfilling a mere symbolic role. This role should not be underestimated, however. 
First generation agreements have created momentum and did have an impact, as illustrated for 
instance by the increase in the number of notifications between the US and the EU. Nevertheless, 
first generation competition cooperation agreements generally only provide a formal framework for 
existing cooperation and do not overcome legal barriers.1924 The context in which and for which first 
generation agreements were developed is very different than the international environment in which 
they operate today. The number of competition authorities actively enforcing national competition 
laws has increased tremendously, with around 600%. Added to this is the rise in international 
                                                          
1923 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 8. Also see M. Martyniszyn, “Discovery and Evidence in Transnational 
Antitrust Cases: Current Framework and the Way Forward”, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University 
Chicago School of Law; University College Dublin - School of Law, 2012, 33, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142978 (accessed August 2016), 7-9. The numbers represent a 
score on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, 1 being ‘not relevant’ and 5 being ‘very relevant’. Agencies were asked to assign a 
score to each instrument. An average score was calculated by dividing the sum of scores provided by respondents by the 
number of respondents who provided a score for each instrument. Respondents did not mark a score for categories of 
legal instruments which they did not indicate as available to them, the average scores only represent the relevance of legal 
instruments to those jurisdictions to which they are available. 
1924 P. Marsden, “The curious incident of positive comity - the dog that didn’t bark (and the trade dogs that just might 
bite” in A.T. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, comity, and competition policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 304.   
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mergers and acquisitions with about 250 to 300%.1925 Cooperation has therefore become much more 
common, but simultaneously it has also become more complex, and the agreements as they exist 
now fall short in addressing such challenges. 
 
The hybrid legal nature of first generation agreements – formal and binding in form, but inherently 
unenforceable due to soft obligations – results in high negotiating cost with little added value. The 
level of legalization has not reached an optimal level compared to the goals and content of the 
agreement. Some of the benefits of soft law are lost in the context of international competition 
cooperation via first generation agreements as they exist now. The most obvious cost is that some of 
the flexibility in the procedure is lost, meaning that contracting and implementation costs will be 
higher. First generation agreements did, however, provide for a certain breakthrough in the deadlock 
that was present in the multilateral scene, and in that sense their formality might have been a benefit 
as it offered additional credibility. Moreover, after some initial struggles in the form of the France v. 
Commission case, first generation agreements did not cause a disruption in the institutional balance of 
the EU, a debate in which MoUs take up a more controversial role. The competence rules of the EU 
prevented the emergence of an agency-to-agency type agreement. MoUs concluded merely on behalf 
of the Commission remain possible, but the type of commitments that can be included in such 
instruments is limited as they cannot affect EU external relations policy. The formal nature of the 
agreements therefore has benefits in certain circumstances. According to a Commission official they 
provide a stronger framework regarding what is allowed and not allowed which reassures 
competition agencies, and they create a certain dynamic, in particular with newer agencies that feel 
restricted in their liberty to communicate. Cooperation agreements are not only important on a case-
level, but also in remaining a relevant player and in establishing credibility towards companies. The 
fact that the provisions are inherently unenforceable form an assurance against abuse according to 
the official. Flexible provisions ensure that there are no obligations to hold meetings or to consider 
the other’s interests or to respond positively to a positive comity request to partners that are 
important to cooperate with, but not entirely reliable.1926 
  
Substantively, the EU’s current first generation agreements do not restrict in any way the discretion 
of competition authorities in deciding whether or not to cooperate, which does not contribute to a 
predictable business environment for international corporations and severely limits the impact of the 
agreements. Obligations are formulated in terms of reasonable or best endeavours, a responsibility to 
motivate decisions is lacking, and the agreements are limited to generalities. It is telling that in the 
Sun/Oracle case for example,1927 the annual bilateral conversations between the US and the EU were 
cancelled by the DoJ in November 2009 three days before they were supposed to take place,1928 to 
display irritation at the EU for opening a second phase inquire into the Sun/Oracle transaction. 
Earlier, in October 2001, the US DoJ publicly scolded the EU for its treatment of the GE/Honeywell 
deal at the occasion of the opening of the OECD’s first Global Forum on Competition.1929 This 
                                                          
1925 S. Hataway, “Interview of Antonio Capobianco in the framework of the conference ‘Crossing merger control 
frontiers: what are the new borders?’”, Concurrences Review, 28 September 2015, http://us7.campaign-
archive2.com/?u=f48c739bee8a60152edc27c50&id=7c1280b87d&e=5adbabdbc5 (accessed September 2015).  
1926 Interview with Commission official. 
1927 Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of 
the EEA Agreement, Case No COMP/M.5529 - Oracle/ Sun Microsystems, C(2010) 142 final, 21 January 2010.   
1928 “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by Concurrences 
and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015. 
1929 W.E. Kovacic, ““Nine next steps for transatlantic antitrust policy cooperation”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 1, 
October 2011, 4.  
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should not be possible when a formal agreement is concluded committing both parties to 
cooperation, and is devastating for good relations between both authorities. It renders the conclusion 
of cooperation agreements entirely meaningless. The objective of conflict avoidance was therefore 
only marginally achieved. There is only conflict avoidance when no true conflict is present. If 
substantial analysis or policy objectives differ, the agreements do facilitate or stimulate reaching a 
mutually satisfactory solution. First generation agreements do not offer a proper forum to address 
disputes when these actually arise.1930 Politicization cannot be overcome by these agreements as true 
commitment to cooperation is lacking. Trust and good personal relations can easily be destroyed if 
there is no institutional trust. Shallow commitments that do not entail any compromise of control 
but only allow cooperation to take place when it suits all sides is “what one would expect from bureaucrats 
and regulators trying to protect their authority.”1931 This is disappointing. International cooperation 
agreements should be ambitious in setting the standard.  
 
Overall the benchmark-assessment yielded a rather poor result. Conflict avoidance could be 
increased if the agreements did not limit themselves to generalities, provided more concrete 
examples of cooperation, and expressed obligations in stronger terms, rather than excessively 
emphasizing the discretion of the parties. First generation agreements do not create substantial 
rationalisation of resources or added efficiencies. Little deference occurs, and information exchange 
is too limited to have a significant impact on the parties’ budget. Formalising existing practice does 
add to the transparency of the process and in that manner the agreements can be applauded. As 
parallel enforcement is not per se diminished, the procedural burden for undertakings under 
investigation has not been significantly reduced. Coordination between authorities does result in 
certain simplifications, but first generation agreements could do more to encourage such 
cooperation. New agreements could be supplemented with an annex focusing on positive examples 
of cooperation, and more details on how to implement the provisions. Currently, while agreements 
often call on states to take into consideration the impact of anticompetitive conduct on the other 
party, it is not explained how this sort of consideration should be carried out and no real discussion 
of how foreign interests should be weighed against domestic ones.1932 Moreover, additional emphasis 
could be put on the commitment to align timing to the extent allowed within the domestic 
framework. First generation agreements should dare to be more ambitious in scope, and not be 
restricted to minimally coordinating parallel procedures. If first generation agreements are to play a 
role in the future, more empirical information on their implementation is crucial, and currently 
largely missing. Reporting that cooperation took place without detailing how cooperation ensued and 
how extensive it was is of little use.1933 Transparency is crucial. If the counterargument is that 
reporting obligations would add to the administrative burden, it is still more productive to research 
one less cartel case, and be more open about the ones that were investigated, as the resulting trust in 
the process would generate significant return-on-investment. Implementation of the agreements 
should be publicised more widely and more thoroughly, for instance when considerations of comity 
have played a role, even informally. This would also provide guidance to the judiciary and lawyers, 
that currently do not take cooperation agreements into account in any way.  
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1932 Ibid. 
1933 M. Dabbah, “Future directions in bilateral cooperation: A policy perspective” in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, 
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With regard to second generation agreements, the OECD/ICN Joint Survey established that an 
effective legal framework for the exchange of confidential information should remove all doubt on 
the types of information that can and cannot be exchanged, and under what conditions. Also the 
allowed use of exchanged information should be clear.1934 It was demonstrated above that on all 
three accounts the EU’s first ‘second generation agreement’ falls short in terms of transparency as 
well as installing ‘cooperation discipline’ in the process. Examples of the remaining opacity include 
the uncertainty revolving around the exchange of information originating from a failed settlement 
attempt, the scope of data protection, and the application of privileges. Despite the safeguards 
present in the Agreement, it is difficult to predict what will happen with information once it is 
exchanged.1935 The level of commitment is too low. At a minimum, the legitimate reasons for refusal 
to cooperate should be listed, and a motivation should be required. The margin of discretion left to 
the parties in deciding whether and to what extent to cooperate, in the presence of several rather 
strict safeguards, is too wide. While cooperation should not be forced and requires a case-by-case 
assessment, it would, however, be desirable to develop stronger language expressing a firm 
commitment to international cooperation. The European Parliament expressed its disappointment in 
this regard, that “the agreement does not establish binding obligations as regards cooperation and leaves a broad 
margin for discretion, in particular by virtue of the reference to ‘important interests’, which can be invoked by either 
party as a justification for not complying with a request made by the other party.”1936 Considering the wide range 
of business activities affected by competition law, the credibility of hard commitments is 
preferred.1937  
 
While some concerns towards the exchange of confidential information are generated more by 
perception than by reality, others are justified, and current second generation agreements failed to 
tackle some of these pressing issues. Second generation agreements do not provide a clear definition 
of confidential information. Confidentiality rules are often dispersed and opaque, so transparency on 
the concept in international cooperation agreements is crucial. It is important that a correct balance 
is struck between the principle of openness and the fundamental rights of the companies. The EU-
Switzerland Agreement does not sufficiently address due process, and compared to other fields of 
international legal cooperation they lack a strong binding structure. Little inspiration seems to have 
been taken from other areas of law where more advanced cooperation is taking place. Overly 
restrictive safeguards impede international cooperation from truly moving forward. The risk of 
leaking or misusing exchanged information is not bigger than in other legal contexts, and the fear of 
an exponential rise in subsequent private actions in a foreign jurisdiction based on this information is 
not entirely grounded. The functioning of the leniency programme is protected to a large extent, but 
as mentioned, it is questionable whether leniency programmes deserve to be treated as the holy grail. 
There is an apparent discord between the issues deserving to be addressed and the issues actually 
                                                          
1934 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 16.  
1935 Concluding their study on international cooperation provisions, HOLMES et.al. remarked that “interesting as the texts are, 
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the absence of any binding dispute settlement it is hard to know what this implies.” (P. Holmes , H. Müller, A. Papadopoulos, & A. 
Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition Cooperation Provisions”, paper for the International Research and 
Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for International Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for 
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1936 European Parliament Resolution on EU Cooperation Agreements on Competition Policy Enforcement – The Way 
Forward, 2013/2921(RSP), 5 February 2014, paragraph 3. 
1937 J. Wayland, “International cooperation at the antitrust division”, remarks as prepared for the International Bar 
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addressed in the Agreement. More attention should go to the exchange of non-evidence as well, in 
particular as concerns so-called ‘agency information’.  
 
The EU had the opportunity to annihilate many of the concerns revolving around the controversial 
issue of information exchange among enforcers by developing a clear and transparent model-
agreement, containing appropriate safeguards. It could take the lead by modernising the approach in 
the US-Australia second generation Agreement, which is barely used. The Agreement sadly remains 
cloudy on some important issues and it is regrettable that investigatory assistance was excluded from 
its scope, as valid reasons to do so are not apparent. The criticism in this study by no means aims to 
diminish the importance of the EU-Switzerland Agreement, but rather serves as an encouragement 
to broaden the reading of Article 15 TFEU, which states that all EU institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies should ensure the transparency of their proceedings and should foresee specific provisions 
regarding access to its documents in their Rules of Procedure. This transparency requirement should 
also be present in the event procedural rights of parties are influenced by international agreements 
concluded by the EU or one of its agencies. Rather than necessitating additional clarification in 
complex and disperse rules of procedure, international enforcement cooperation agreements should 
provide sufficient information in the text of the agreement itself, and sufficient guidance as to their 
practical application. The aforementioned challenges should not form an argument against the 
sharing of confidential information, or a reason to minimize or overly constrain it. They rather make 
a case for clearer rules, thereby creating more certainty and predictability for competition agencies, 
businesses and governments alike. If not, the EU’s second generation agreement risks to remain 
un(der)used, as happened with the US’ second generation agreement. 
 
The importance of second generation agreements is even more highlighted when looking at the 
alternatives and complements that are available. Waivers are complex instruments and the goodwill 
of the parties is required. They can still lead to suboptimal communication and are subject to 
strategic use. Unilateral gateway provisions appear useful, but they lack transparency and their use is 
burdensome. Mutual recognition and lead jurisdiction mechanisms have many hurdles to overcome 
and are unrealistic options at the moment. Multilateral forums should not only mention other policy 
fields in which advanced cooperation takes place, but analyse in depth the feasibility of transposing 
such cooperation-mechanisms to a competition law context and which challenges this would entail. 
From international cooperation in tax policy for instance, inspiration can be drawn from the upward 
pressure that is created on voluntary global standards. The ‘multi-speed adoption’ of standards that 
allows countries that wish to take on more commitments to do so, and the peer pressure that is 
created by publishing lists of compliant and non-compliant countries could also become standard 
practice in the field of competition law enforcement cooperation. The novel way of concluding 
agreements, the detailed commentaries that are available to the implementing parties, the possibility 
of advanced investigatory support, and the emphasis on clear definitions are other examples of 
mechanisms that could benefit international cooperation in the field of competition law and policy. 
Tax authorities can also rely on information from other authorities, an area that is underregulated 
with regard to competition authorities. Remarkable as well is that in international tax policy 
cooperation the interplay between the multilateral and bilateral spheres is much more intense and 
mutually reinforcing. From MLATs the stronger commitment to cooperation and the stricter 
conditions for refusal may serve as an inspiration. A difference appears to be that in both tax and 
criminal law enforcement cooperation, the cooperation mechanisms seem to be more purposefully 
designed, whereas in competition law enforcement international cooperation was generated by 
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pressing needs.1938 This may relate to the perception that cooperation in tax or criminal matters 
delivers more direct results for the country concerned, and countries are therefore more motivated to 
cooperate internationally.  
 
This part of the study was opened by the following quote: “The basic prerequisite for any international 
cooperation in competition cases is the exchange of information and evidence between the national competition 
authorities. This lies at the centre of any efficient cooperation, and the level of its implementation may impede or enhance 
the activities of such authorities.”1939 While the complexities of international cooperation should not be 
underestimated, and information exchange rightly takes on a central role, caution is in place for a lack 
of ambition. Information exchange should be understood as more than the mere transmission of 
documents and intelligence among case-teams, which currently seems to be the case. It also 
encompasses the training of the judiciary in dealing with international competition matters, advocacy 
towards the public, or more broad investigatory assistance. Currently cooperation agreements 
improve channels of communication between regulators, lower the cost of obtaining information to 
a certain extent, and provide guidelines on how enforcers from different jurisdictions can interact. 
They should, however, not be limited to this function. Currently, there is not a single compromise of 
domestic control over enforcement.1940 Enforcement cooperation should not only focus on how to 
accommodate parallel unilateral enforcement, but also actively try to limit such enforcement. The 
level of cooperation among competition authorities generated over a relatively short period of time is 
impressive.1941 The amount of wisdom increased tremendously, but caution is in place for a standstill. 
Often, international cooperation amounts to “little more than an illusory promise of assistance when it is in the 
assisting nation’s interests to do so.”1942 If states refrain from applying their laws extraterritorially, more 
often than not such a decision is motivated by the pragmatic reason that a state lacks the power to 
enforce its laws abroad or the capacity to pursue that particular case, rather than comity 
considerations.1943 GUZMAN’s statement that “there is little indication that existing cooperation represents an 
effort to construct a sensible international approach to competition issues or address the ways in which domestic laws 
interact” is confirmed by the analysis in this study.1944 First and second generation agreements allow 
cooperation rather than installing a certain discipline in the cooperation process. While strong personal 
relationships have been developed among the personnel of for instance the US and the EU antitrust 
authorities, due to frequent interaction on cases as well as during conferences or bar association 
events, 1945 even among such similarly advanced systems institutional trust is often still lacking. 
Cooperation agreements ought to play a larger role in strengthening such trust. This can be done via 
stronger commitments, and more transparency in the application of such agreements. Bilateral 
                                                          
1938 “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by Concurrences 
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agreements should be living agreements forming advanced hubs for experimentation. KOVACIC 
rightly underlined that it are the older and wealthier jurisdictions that must lead experimentation 
efforts in favour of less mature agencies, because they have more room to make capital investment in 
policy research, development, and promotion. Experienced agencies should be encouraged to further 
invest in infrastructures and policy platforms leading to proper enforcement.1946 Bilateral agreements 
can serve as examples of successful cooperation and can take away reservations that may exist when 
certain ideas are pushed multilaterally.1947 While MARSDEN considered that regular interaction 
between competition officials is more valuable than the conclusion of treaties,1948 one can wonder 
whether the process is truly the product. The conclusion of agreements leads to legitimacy, anchors 
due process considerations, and creates foreseeability. The cooperation process must be trusted by all 
parties for it to work, and agreements can provide the transparency to generate that trust.   
 
Apart from the design of the cooperation instruments, goodwill must be in place by the parties 
signing a cooperation agreement. Such goodwill should be generated in multilateral forums (see 
below, Part III, 2.2.1.1, B). HOLMES et al. found in 2005 that information exchange by DG COMP 
with close partners had been scarce, but only Turkey found this to indicate lack of goodwill by the 
EU.1949 One competition official, when asked what in his view was the biggest achievement in 
international competition law enforcement cooperation up to date, answered that today the 
agreements are actually applied, in contrast to when they were concluded, indicating that a change in 
mentality has taken place.1950 Considering the effort it took to implement the rather weak obligations 
in the EU’s bilateral agreements, it is clear that more work remains to be done.  
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PART III: Dedicated agreements versus integration in a broader framework 
 
“The best practice in competition policy is the relentless pursuit of better practices.”1951 
 
Many instruments are available for DG COMP to cooperate internationally to enforce the EU’s 
competition laws more effectively. This study has so far focused on cooperation via bilateral 
dedicated cooperation agreements. As mentioned however, in the past, the EU has continuously 
promoted competition law within the multilateral context of the WTO.1952 After the demise of this 
endeavour, it has included competition provisions in a wide array of bilateral trade agreements. The 
first section of this part will analyse competition chapters in FTAs to see whether they represent an 
added value or valid substitute compared to dedicated bilateral cooperation agreements. The second 
section of this part will look at the multilateral forums in which the EU is engaged that deal with 
competition law and policy, and will analyse how the multilateral track can complement and enhance 
bilateralism. This part therefore contrasts the ‘dedicated’ approach, focussing solely on competition, 
to a more ‘integrated’ approach, both substantively as geographically.   
 
1. Substantive integration: competition in the global trade system – a cautionary tale   
 
1.1 Relevance and scope  
 
An analysis of competition provisions in the EU’s free trade agreements is relevant, first, because 
DG COMP’s management plans indicate a significant rise in FTAs including competition provisions. 
The prospectuses in the management plans for 2012–2014 indicated an increase from thirty-one to 
fifty FTAs containing competition and/or state aid clauses.1953 DG COMP’s 2016 Management Plan 
further revealed a target of 34 new competition cooperation agreements and free trade agreements 
containing competition and State aid clauses in 2019 compared to the baseline of 20 in 2014.1954 
Furthermore, the EU’s policy of linking trade and competition is typically presented as one of the 
most striking examples of its deep trade agenda. So-called ‘behind the border’ issues are no longer 
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DG Competition Management Plan 2014, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_management_plan/amp_2014_en.pdf (accessed August 2014), 
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total number of third countries with whom the EU has negotiated or is negotiating trade agreements containing 
competition/state aid clauses rose from 33 in 2013 to 39. Interestingly, the number of contributions to OECD, ICN and 
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1954 See http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/comp_mp_2016_en.pdf (accessed July 2017), 39.  
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solely a matter for domestic regulators.1955 Like national competition laws in general, competition 
provisions in FTAs have undergone a surge in popularity in a relatively limited amount of time.1956   
 
This section does not aim to provide a typology of the competition provisions in the EU’s FTAs. 
This has already been done on a much larger scale, by both academics and international 
organisations.1957 The OECD, for instance, has categorised the competition policy provisions in 86 
trade agreements dating from the period 2001-July 2005.1958 This study is considered to be the first 
attempt to systematically take stock of competition provisions in a significant sample of FTAs.1959 It 
had earlier issued another study containing a qualitative assessment of competition policy provisions 
of FTAs,1960 as did UNCTAD.1961 As the goal is not to develop a taxonomy or template of 
competition provisions in EU FTAs, the sample of agreements under scrutiny is relatively limited.  
 
What this section will do is assess the value of competition provisions in FTAs and thereby evaluate 
whether this ‘integration’ is to be applauded or not. The evolution of the global trade system, and in 
particular the place of competition law within this system, is complex and uncertain. This section 
aims to contribute to the debate on whether, and if so, how, competition regulation should fit into 
the global trade scheme, again from an EU perspective. It will do so by first looking at the 
emergence of competition chapters in FTAs in general. Then it will map out the alleged evolution of 
EU FTAs, from ‘traditional’ ones, over post-Global-Europe FTAs to mega-FTAs. Then several 
arguments favouring and opposing inclusion of competition provisions in FTAs will be identified 
and weighed against each other, in order to reach a conclusion as to the desirability of such 
provisions in FTAs.   
 
This section comes with the disclaimer that the analysis is limited to specific competition policy 
chapters in FTAs and does not touch on those chapters which may have incidental effects on 
competition policy. The aforementioned OECD study was criticised for focusing exclusively on 
competition chapters, as sector-specific chapters as well may contain competition policy provisions 
that may even go beyond the provisions foreseen in the competition policy chapter. It is indeed 
                                                          
1955 C. Damro, “The new trade politics and EU competition policy: shopping for convergence and co-operation”, Journal 
of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 6, September 2006, 868.  
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1957 Even if somewhat dated, see, for instance, S. J. Evenett, “What can we really learn from the competition provisions 
of regional trade agreements?”, 23 August 2005, available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.583.9612&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed February 2017), 1; 
J. Bourgeois, K. Dawar & S. J. Evenett, “A comparative analysis of selected provisions in free trade agreements”, 
Commissioned by DG TRADE, October 2007, 
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pdf (accessed February 2017), 190-191.  
1958 See O. Solano & A. Sennekamp, “Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements”, OECD Trade Policy 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 31, 2006, COM/DAF/TD(2005)3/FINAL, 7-9.    
1959 A. Bradford & T. Büthe, “Competition policy and free trade – Antitrust provisions in PTAs” in A. Dür, M. Elsig 
(eds), Trade cooperation – the purpose, design and effects of preferential trade agreements, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2015, 249.  
1960 See OECD, The Relationship Between Regional Trade Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System: 
Competition, TD/TC/WP(2002)19/FINAL, 7 May 2002.   
1961 See UNCTAD, A Presentation of Types of Common Provisions to be Found in International, Particularly Bilateral 
and Regional, Cooperation Agreements on Competition Policy and their Application, TD/RBP/CONF.6/3, 6 
September 2005, as referred to by D. D. Sokol, “Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-
Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2008, 253.  
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confirmed that important competition provisions frequently appear outside a designated competition 
policy chapter,1962 this would however lead this study too far. Furthermore, any other limitation 
would be equally artificial, as many provisions in a trade agreement indirectly contribute to increasing 
competition and stimulating the competitive process. One particular aspect that will not be examined 
as it would detract too far from the main intention of this study is the relationship between anti-
dumping provisions and competition law. Anti-dumping laws are often central when discussion the 
relationship between trade and competition and the inclusion of competition laws in to the WTO, as 
anti-dumping laws are the most obvious example of governmental trade measures allowed by WTO 
law, but detrimental to international competition.1963 Both anti-dumping and competition law aim to 
address the same market distortion, namely predatory price discrimination by producers between 
different markets and/or customers, from an external and internal, domestic point of view 
respectively. It should be noted, however, that trade defence measures mainly aim to protect 
producers, and not consumers.1964 Anti-dumping statutes promote competitor welfare rather than 
consumer welfare, and in this sense are in tension with antitrust.1965 It has been stated that the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties reduces competition within the Union.1966 Due to the fact that an 
increasing number of WTO members include competition provisions in their FTAs, the latter “could 
thus become a possible avenue for negotiating the interaction between trade defenses and competition laws.”1967 
Currently, only a small minority of the abundance of FTAs, such as the European Economic Area, 
ANZCERTA, EFTA- Chile, EFTA-Singapore, and Canada-Chile, preclude the parties from 
resorting to trade defences or replace them with competition provisions as the latter are believed to 
address the economic causes that lead to trade defences.1968 TAYLOR, however, comes to the 
conclusion that the substitution of anti-dumping law with competition law has clear advantages, but 
there are significant preconditions for doing so successfully.1969  
 
It should nevertheless be added that as with dedicated competition agreements, it is difficult to assess 
the value of competition chapters in FTAs, as little is known of their effect. It is generally claimed 
that competition chapters fulfil an important role in FTAs because they link antitrust with trade 
liberalization. SOKOL rightly second guessed this conventional wisdom, however, claiming that “until 
now, the effectiveness of antitrust and competition policy chapters has remained unanswered.”1970 Even if the effects 
of the provisions are measurable as such, it is difficult to know whether or to what extent the success 
                                                          
1962 A. Bradford & T. Büthe, “Competition policy and free trade – Antitrust provisions in PTAs” in A. Dür, M. Elsig 
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of a provision is due to the characteristics of the signatories, the circumstances surrounding the 
agreement, or the provision itself.1971 
 
1.2 Emergence of competition chapters in FTAs  
 
1.2.1 Link between trade and competition 
 
As mentioned, the effect of globalization on competition is twofold. On the one hand, it intensifies 
competition as markets that were once protected become accessible; on the other hand, it 
jeopardizes competition as it fosters anti-competitive behaviour on a large scale.1972 Competition laws 
therefore needed to supplement trade liberalization in order to protect its positive effects. The main 
purpose of introducing competition law provisions in international trade instruments is to make sure 
that the removal of state-made tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade are not replaced by barriers 
erected by private economic operators, in particular in the absence of international rules on 
competition applied on a non-discriminatory basis. It thereby aggrandises the benefits of such trade 
liberalization by ensuring a regulatory environment that fosters economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare.1973 In the EU competition provisions were instrumental to achieve efficient market 
integration, again illustrating the international trade origins of competition policy.1974  
 
Already since the 1920s attempts had been undertaken to embed competition issues in a trade 
context, such as the World Economic Conference of the League of Nations, the Havana Charter, 
and the ECOSOC initiative. The idea behind such ‘integrated’ initiatives was generally to revive 
global trade and stabilize global economic relations by addressing public as well as private restraints. 
However, all these multilateral attempts have failed to establish binding norms, because they were 
overly ambitious, because there was a lack of consensus on fundamental issues, or due to 
circumstances unrelated to the content of the agreement, such as parallel negotiations taking away 
the sense of urgency or even the outbreak of WWII. The US moreover consistently and 
paradoxically played the role of both initiator and destructor of many of these initiatives and the 
political nature of competition and trade negotiations quickly rose to the surface (see above, Part I, 
3). 
 
The link between trade and competition has only increased, due to the so-called ‘global value 
chain’.1975 The new international trade environment is characterised by the fact that trade policy has 
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28_GVC%20Primer%202016_2nd%20edition.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed February 2017).  
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lost a large part of its autonomy, as “international trade is now intrinsically part of the different stages of the 
conception, creation, and exchanging phases of the production processes.”1976 Classic trade liberalisation in the 
form of dismantling tariffs and other border barriers is gradually losing importance to so-called 
behind-the- border issues, where barriers to trade are present inside the national markets of the 
respective countries.1977  
 
1.2.2 WTO demise and moratorium 
 
During the 1990s, the EU was a fervent advocate and the main proponent of a multilateral 
competition policy initiative using the binding framework of the WTO.1978 The European 
Commission’s proposal was picked up by the WTO during its 1996 ministerial meeting in Singapore 
and a working group was created to study the interaction between trade and competition policy, 
driven by a wish for greater coherence between those policies.1979 The EU’s advocating efforts failed, 
however, with the collapse of negotiations in 2003 at the Cancun Ministerial Conference due to lack 
of agreement on the negotiation-modalities.1980 The US was one the main criticasters of the proposal, 
fuelled by a confidence in convergence towards the US standard. Its main argument was that the 
quid pro quo nature of the WTO would lead to a race to the bottom. A second group of opposition 
was formed by the developing countries. They feared that the regulatory cost demanded by the 
imposed changes would be too high, and the assistance and flexibility offered was not considered 
sufficient. Criticism did not only come from within, but also from external voices. For instance, the 
WTO’s lack of openness and accountability as well as its heavy bureaucratic nature allegedly made 
the venue less attractive for a multilateral agreement that included competition issues.1981 Another 
factor that may have contributed to the failure was that of timing. Stronger players in the 
competition field in particular may have been convinced that if they waited with the conclusion of an 
international agreement on competition law, this would be more favourable to them, believing that 
convergence towards their own system would take place over time (see above, Part I, 3.3.3).1982 
 
The EU imposed on itself an informal, de facto, moratorium from 1999 until 2006, based on a 
consensus of the Member States and the Commission, regarding the negotiation of preferential trade 
agreements during the preparations for the so-called ‘Millennium Round’ of the WTO and to focus 
attention on the negotiations in the Doha Development Round.1983 It thereby aimed to show its 
priorities in international trade and organised its resources accordingly.1984 In 2006, however, taking 
into account the stalemate in the WTO negotiations and given the pressure of the business 
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community,1985 as well bilateral initiatives taken by other major trading nations, the Commission 
published its Global Europe communication,1986 presenting a strategy to respond to the challenges 
faced by the EU in a rapidly globalizing economy.   
 
1.2.3 Rise of bilateral FTAs  
 
1.2.3.1 Global Europe 
 
In this Global Europe communication, that remains dedicated in the first place to the Doha 
development Agenda in achieving an ambitious, balanced and just agreement to liberalise world 
trade,1987 the Commission nevertheless emphasised the need for more international cooperation and 
for greater convergence in the competition area as it announced its intention to include stronger 
provisions on competition in a new generation of FTAs, which are “comprehensive and ambitious in 
coverage, aiming at the highest degree of trade liberalisation including far-reaching liberalisation of services and 
investment.”1988 In the accompanying staff working documents it was further explained that the 
Commission aimed to review the competition chapters of future FTAs in view of promoting greater 
convergence of competition laws and enforcement and ensuring that trade partners refrain from 
protecting their firms from international competition. The global competition challenge was 
mentioned first among the opportunities of globalisation.1989 This has led to the conclusion of so-
called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs). The term ‘deep and 
comprehensive’ was first coined in a Commission Communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy,1990 but later became used more 
broadly. According to the communication, a deep and comprehensive FTA should cover 
substantially all trade in goods and services and should include strong legally-binding provisions on 
trade and economic regulatory issues and should be tailored and sequenced carefully to take account 
of the economic circumstances and state of development of each partner country. In the context of 
the ENP, the ultimate objective is to create a common regulatory basis and similar degree of market 
access among partners. Even though focus is on a bilateral approach in this regard, the Commission 
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is careful to ensure that the concept remains fully consistent with the longer-term vision of an 
economic ENP community.1991  
 
FTAs negotiated after the Global Europe communication were therefore intended to contain 
provisions that are deeper, wider, and more reciprocal than previous FTAs. The EU moreover 
wished to focus more on its main trade interests, for instance with Asia, rather than on its 
neighbourhood and development objectives that were already relatively well served, even if the 
content of those agreements ‘remain limited’ according to the Commission. The latter therefore 
wished to “factor other issues and the wider role of trade policy in EU external relations into bilateral trade 
developments”, in order to create jobs and drive growth.1992 For this to be possible economic factors 
had to play a primary role in the choice of future FTAs. This is often phrased in market access terms, 
and improving the business climate of future major trading partners.1993 Indeed, partners with which 
DCFTAs would be concluded would be selected based on the economic criteria of market potential 
(economic size and growth) and the level of protection against EU export interests (tariffs and non-
tariff barriers).1994 Again the strategic aspect is emphasized, stating that negotiations of potential 
trading partners and priority targets with EU competitors should also be taken into account, in 
particular with regard to investment. These ‘competitiveness-driven’ FTAs were intended to be both 
comprehensive and ambitious in coverage.1995 On the one hand, the ‘comprehensive’ dimension of a 
DCFTA referred to the fact that the latter agreement aimed to have a broad range, both covering all 
relevant trade(-related) areas as well as going beyond mere tariff-dismantling of trade in goods. The 
‘deep’ dimension, on the other hand, referred to some more or less extensive form of integration 
into the EU Internal Market on the basis of legislative approximation.1996  
 
The expanded scope of ‘new’ trade agreements consists on the one hand of so-called ‘WTO plus’ 
provisions in the field of services, intellectual property rights or government procurement.1997 WTO-
plus provisions go beyond what the parties have already committed to at the multilateral WTO level. 
Furthermore, they contain commitments in policy areas not currently covered or regulated by WTO 
Agreements in a comprehensive way, so-called ‘WTO-extra’ provisions, for instance in the fields of 
investment, competition, environmental protection, labour laws, human rights, or movements of 
capital.1998 Among these WTO-extra policy areas, competition is the main one covered by preferential 
                                                          
1991 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European 
neighbourhood policy, COM/2006/0726 final, 4 December 2006, 4-5. 
1992 Commission Staff Working Document, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Global 
Europe: Competing in the World”, SEC(2006) 1230, 4 October 2006, 16. 
1993 Ibid. 
1994 G. Van der Loo, “Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the DCFTAs with Tunisia and Morocco”, EuroMeSCo 
Series, March 2016, 17.  
1995 Commission Staff Working Document, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Global 
Europe: Competing in the World”, SEC(2006) 1230, 4 October 2006, 14-17. 
1996 G. Van der Loo, “Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the DCFTAs with Tunisia and Morocco”, EuroMeSCo 
Series, March 2016, 17-18.  
1997 H. Tschaeni & V. Engammare, “The Relationship between Trade and Competition in Free Trade Agreements: 
Developments since the 1990s and Challenges”, European Yearbook of International Economic Law , Vol. 4, 2013, 39. 
1998 R. Ahearn, “Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications”, CRS Report for Congress, 
3 March 2011, 14, 17. 
318 
 
trade agreements.1999 The Global Europe communication is therefore seen as a dividing line in the 
EU’s FTA-policy.  
 
It was attempted to partially fill the gap created by the failure to include competition in a WTO 
context with competition chapters in FTAs, which have proliferated in recent years (see table 
below).2000 One third of EU trade is currently covered by regional trade agreements, if CETA and 
TTIP would be included in the calculation, this number would amount to two thirds.2001 Already in 
2010, over one hundred bilateral and regional trade agreements included provisions on competition 
law and policy.2002 In 2012, about 80% of all existing regional trade agreements listed on the WTO 
website contained competition provisions.2003 Almost 75% of FTAs with competition elements are 
bilateral.2004  
 
 
Figure 12. Source: http://www.designoftradeagreements.org/ (accessed July 2017). 
 
In the study of BRADFORD and BÜTHE 27,5% of their sample had a separate chapter devoted to 
competition law or policy. It was not required that the chapter had the word ‘competition’ in the 
title, but had to be substantively about competition law or policy. This percentage rose to 42,9% 
when asked whether the FTA simply contains separate articles substantively devoted to competition 
law or policy. A visual representation is offered below.2005   
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Figure 13. Source : A. Bradford & T. Büthe, “Competition policy and free trade – Antitrust provisions in PTAs” in A. 
Dür, M. Elsig (eds), Trade cooperation – the purpose, design and effects of preferential trade agreements, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, 254. 
 
1.2.3.2 New Trade Policy 
 
After the demise of the Doha Round, the European commission launched a ‘New EU Trade Policy’ 
in the autumn of 2010, further building on the Commission’s Global Europe Agenda. Trade is 
placed in the context of Europe’s 2020 Strategy, with a clear focus on job creation and sustainable 
growth in a period of economic recession. While the initiative may have resulted from the 
multilateral dry up, the EU’s priority commitment to the multilateral level still prevails,2006 even if it is 
often said that the EU “is motivated by a desire to achieve in FTAs what it has failed to achieve in multilateral 
negotiations”, both with regard to market access as well as the inclusion of the Singapore issues.2007 The 
factors that lead to this renewed trade policy have not reversed since. Ever-increasing globalisation 
has led to a somewhat “disorderly economic integration process, characterized by fragmented development and 
production processes of worldwide goods and services and foreign direct investment flows.”2008 The global value chain 
is marked by different intellectual property protection rules, government procurement policies and 
other more or less divergent regulatory regimes. In addition, trade policy decisions must increasingly 
take into account non- economic considerations.2009   
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The multilateral paralysis has, nevertheless, lead the Commission to pragmatically focus more on its 
bilateral relations, among other reasons because its main trading partners were doing the same 
thing.2010 The European Parliament, in its 2013 resolution on EU cooperation agreements on 
competition policy enforcement, while welcoming the EU’s efforts in this field via MOUs and 
cooperation agreements, nevertheless called “on the Commission and the Council to give greater priority to 
strengthening the competition policy section in FTAs” even though it regards FTA provisions as a mere first 
step towards cooperation.2011 As international anticompetitive behaviour was for a long time largely 
seen as a consequence of international trade liberalization, attempts to regulate such behaviour have 
long stood in the shadow of traditional trade negotiations. An additional reason why nationally 
sensitive competition laws were relatively late to the trade buffet was that traditional trade 
negotiations generally prioritise measures with little impact on national sovereignty in the 
negotiations process, while postponing more sensitive issues, in particular those associated with 
internal regulations.2012  
 
1.2.4 Several types of EU FTAs  
 
FTAs concluded by the EU are generally divided into several broad categories, along their primary 
motives, and with consequences for the competition provisions in them. 
 
A first category consists of agreements with (potential) candidate countries. These agreements are 
concluded in an EU enlargement context. They take the form of association agreements with 
geographically close neighbours for which the EU is prepared to offer accession or some slightly 
looser relationship. A second category indeed consists of trade agreements concluded in the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), both with regard to the Southern 
Mediterranean as well as the Eastern neighbours, concluded in order to promote economic 
development and political stability around the EU borders. They take the form of Europe 
Agreements, Euro-Med Association Agreements, and Stability and Association Agreements. The 
third category of agreements is largely motivated by (historical) development policy objectives. These 
are the Economic Partnership Agreements with 71 small and mostly poor developing countries in 
Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP states). Finally, some FTAs are concluded with other, 
more distant, trade partners, such as South Africa, Mexico, Canada, India, the Republic of Korea, 
and Chile, or the region-to-region negotiations with Mercosur, ASEAN, the Andean Community, 
and Central America. As a result of slow progress in regional negotiations, the EU has proceeded on 
a bilateral level with Peru, Colombia, Singapore, and Vietnam.2013 Such agreements are more 
commercially motivated and aim to neutralize (potential) discrimination against EU exports and 
investments resulting from FTAs between third countries or to achieve commercial benefits via 
preferential access to foreign markets.2014 This study will mainly focus on the latter category of more 
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commercially oriented FTAs with economically and geographically diverse partners, in order to 
better assess the relative value of competition provisions in FTAs as compared to bilateral 
cooperation agreements, which are also concluded outside of a broader programme.2015 This is also 
the reason why the European Economic Area and the Customs Union with Turkey are excluded 
from the analysis. The particular circumstances surrounding and characteristics of these agreements 
make any conclusion difficult to generalise. Finally, the recent ‘mega-FTAs’, such as CETA and 
TTIP, could be seen as forming yet another category of EU FTAs. DUSCHESNE stated that mega-
FTAs are “necessary artefacts of a more complex world economy where no amount of goodwill among 159 trading 
partners can help solve convoluted beyond-the-border commercial and financial issues.”2016 Such agreements will be 
scrutinised in this study as well.  
 
As becomes clear from the above categorization, the motivation underlying the conclusion of FTAs 
can be quite diverse. While some FTAs were shaped by development or foreign policy and security 
considerations, others were initialled based on commercially strategic reflections, in line with the 
above-sketched policy changes. Among such commercial factors, one can distinguish between 
neutralizing potential trade diversion resulting from FTAs between third countries, creating strategic 
links with countries undergoing rapid economic growth, and strengthening the implementation of 
existing international trade rules sensu lato. The EU–Central America FTA negotiations, EU–ASEAN 
and EU–South Korea FTA initiatives, for instance, have followed FTAs of those regions with the 
US (CAFTA, US–Singapore, US–Thailand, US–Malaysia, and US–Korea) and to a lesser extent 
Japan. Strategic (trade and investment) links with important emerging markets, such as Mercosur 
(which experienced rapid growth when the regional agreement was initiated), South East Asia, and 
India were strengthened. Generally, the EU will conclude an FTA when there is a clear economic 
rationale to do so, in the form of a real increase in market access in addition to that achieved at 
WTO-level.2017  
 
1.3 Competition chapters in bilateral EU FTAs: from traditional FTAs over post-Global 
Europe FTAs to mega-FTAs 
 
1.3.1 Traditional FTAs  
 
An analysis of three ‘traditional’ FTAs concluded prior to 2006, in particular the EU-Mexico Global 
Agreement together with Joint Council Decision 2/2000, the EU-Chile Association Agreement, and 
the EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement, provide a representative 
image of some characteristic competition provisions of traditional FTAs. 
 
The basis for the EU-Mexico FTA, the first agreement signed between the EU and a Latin American 
country, was formed by the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation 
Agreement (the ‘Global Agreement’), the Interim Agreement and a Final Act signed in Brussels on 8 
December 1997. Diplomatically, the FTA was a reaction to the increasing influence of the US 
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through the NAFTA.2018 The overall agreement covers a wide array of issues, ranging from political 
dialogue on democracy, human rights, poverty, terrorism, migration and regional development to the 
creation of a WTO compatible free trade area in goods and services, liberalization of capital 
movements and payments, mutual opening of the procurement markets, and adoption of disciplines 
in the fields of competition and intellectual property rights.2019 
 
In the main agreement, which came into force in 2000, only one article was dedicated to competition. 
The parties stated that they “shall agree on the appropriate measures in order to prevent distortions or restrictions 
of competition that may significantly affect trade between Mexico and the Community”.2020 Mechanisms of 
cooperation and coordination among the competition authorities, including mutual legal assistance, 
notification, consultation and exchange of information, were to be established by the Joint Council, 
which did so in Annex XV to its Decision No. 2/2000 of 23 March 2000.2021 The aim of such 
cooperation was to achieve transparency in the enforcement of competition laws and policies.  
 
Annex XV covers agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices between undertakings, the abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position, mergers, commercial state monopolies, and public undertakings and undertakings to which 
special or exclusive rights have been granted.2022 State aid is excluded. It contains relatively extensive 
and detailed coordination and cooperation clauses with regard to the parties’ competition policies.2023 
The objectives are to promote cooperation and coordination between the parties, to provide mutual 
assistance, and to avoid adverse effects on trade and economic development. Particular attention 
should be given by the Commission to agreements between companies, decisions to form an 
association between companies and concerted practices between companies, abuse of dominant 
position and mergers, and by Mexico to absolute or relative monopolistic practices and mergers.2024 
The Annex relies on the already existing ‘well-established’ competition laws and agencies. 
Notification and exchange of information are regulated in a detailed and binding manner. 
Information exchange even goes so far as to include assistance in collecting information on the 
respective territories of the parties. The Annex also deals with coordination of enforcement activities, 
consultations and a provision on avoidance of conflicts. It concludes with provisions on 
confidentiality and technical cooperation. Despite the rather clear obligations of the parties, there is 
some evidence indicating a rather asymmetrical implementation of the agreement. For instance, while 
by 2010 the Mexicans had notified the EU of their enforcement activity thirty-one times, they only 
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received notification of the EU on one occasion. This might indicate that the EU interprets the 
agreement quite narrowly.2025 
 
The Competition Policy section of the EU-South Africa Trade, Development, & Co-operation 
Agreement of 1999 equally relies on coordination and cooperation rather than including substantive 
competition clauses. It starts by outlining the behaviour that is considered incompatible with the 
agreement insofar as it affects trade between both parties. Given the limited experience of South 
Africa with competition policy at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, it was provided that 
“[i]f, at the entry into force of this Agreement, either Party has not yet adopted the necessary laws and regulations for 
the implementation of [the article mentioning the incompatible behaviour], in their jurisdictions it shall do so within a 
period of three years.”2026 If such measures should not exist or be inadequate, the parties may take their 
own appropriate measures. The agreement furthermore incorporates the comity principle and 
provides for technical assistance. Parties shall exchange information, taking into account the 
limitations imposed by requirements of professional and business secrecy. The Agreement also 
contains a section on public aid, although public undertakings are excluded from the rules. Parties 
may enter into consultations if they consider that an incompatible practice is not adequately dealt 
with, and they may invite the Cooperation Council to examine the parties’ public policy objectives 
justifying the grant. It is moreover explicitly stated that the principle of transparency should be 
respected. When the relevant rules or procedures do not exist, the agreement foresees that the 
relevant provisions of the GATT and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures shall apply.2027 South Africa was still in the process of implementing and fine-tuning its 
competition system, making a clear recognition of its competition laws by the EU, as done in the 
other two agreements, difficult.2028 This also explains why no substantive changes are required in the 
respective parties’ laws.2029 
 
The 2002 EU-Chile Association Agreement replaced the 1996 framework cooperation agreement, 
establishing a political and economic association between Chile and the EU. The 2002 Agreement 
was applauded for its level of detail and the fact that it established an intense level of cooperation on 
political and trade matters.2030 Like the EU-Mexico agreement, the EU-Chile agreement did not 
contain substantive obligations on competition policy, but focused entirely on cooperation, in 
particular via the regulation of notification, consultation, exchange of non-confidential information 
and technical assistance. In contrast to the former agreement, however, the obligations in the latter 
agreement are less detailed and contain only weak obligations, demonstrated by recurring use of the 
words ‘may’, ‘best efforts’, ‘full and sympathetic consideration’, and the continuous emphasis on the 
autonomy and freedom of the parties. It does provide for information exchange in the field of state 
aid, and subjects public enterprises and enterprises entrusted with special or exclusive rights 
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(including designated monopolies) to competition rules. Importantly, it is explicitly stated that the 
competition title is entirely excluded from the Dispute Settlement Mechanism.2031 
 
The diversity of the EU’s traditional FTAs is reflected in the competition chapters of those 
agreements. The EU-Mexico agreement for instance does not refer to public aid or state aid, while 
the EU-South Africa agreement is rather comprehensive on this issue. While the EU-Chile 
agreement foresees information exchange obligations in this field, the terms ‘public’ or ‘state aid’ are 
left undefined and WTO-conform countervailing measures are allowed. The latter agreement is the 
only one including relevant provisions with regard to public monopolies of a commercial character, 
and a provision on positive comity only appears in the EU-South Africa agreement.2032 What the 
agreements do have in common is their focus on cooperation, rather than substantive issues, and 
that mergers are consistently excluded. Recurrent competition provisions found in such ‘traditional’ 
FTAs relate to practices inconsistent with the agreement, notification and cooperation, provisions 
relating to respect for procedural rights of defence and the transparency principle, information 
exchange, consultations, comity, mutual recognition, and technical assistance. It is said that the EU-
Mexico Agreement (and its Joint Council Decision) and the EU-Chile Agreement can be considered 
the most complete EU FTAs of that time, containing rather similar obligations as those resulting 
from competition enforcement cooperation agreements.2033 Both the EU-Chile and EU-Mexico 
Agreements are currently being renewed.2034 
 
1.3.2 Post-Global-Europe FTAs 
 
Since 2006, DG Competition has been negotiating competition provisions in around forty trade 
agreements. The number and variety of such agreements justifies a comparative study. This section 
will analyse two post-global-Europe FTAs – the EU-South Korea and EU-Peru/Colombia/Ecuador 
FTAs – and six (completed or future) DCFTAs: with Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia, 
Singapore, and Vietnam.  
 
The 2011 EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement2035 was considered to be the first of a new 
generation of FTAs,2036 and at the time also the most comprehensive one concluded by the EU.2037 
                                                          
2031 Articles 172-180 EU-Chile Association Agreement; J. Bourgeois, “Competition Policy: the Poor Relation in the 
European Union Free Trade Agreements” in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege & S. Adam (eds), The European 
Union in the World – Essays in honour of Marc Maresceau, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, 386. 
2032 A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, 126-127, 134. 
2033 J. Bourgeois, “Competition Policy: the Poor Relation in the European Union Free Trade Agreements” in I. Govaere, 
E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege & S. Adam (eds), The European Union in the World – Essays in honour of Marc Maresceau, 
Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, 387; A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition 
Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 129-130. For a more elaborate analysis, see J. Bourgeois, 
“Competition Policy: the Poor Relation in the European Union Free Trade Agreements” in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. 
Van Elsuwege & S. Adam (eds), The European Union in the World – Essays in honour of Marc Maresceau, Leiden/Boston, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, 381-397.  
2034 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/mexico/ and 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/chile/ (accessed May 2017). 
2035 Free trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Korea, of the other part, Brussels, 6 October 2010 (KOREU FTA). 
2036 H. Paemen, “A new trade policy” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et 
Europae civis Liber Amicorum Jacques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 133.  
2037 See European Commission, Trade, “EU-Korea FTA – What’s in it for EU companies?”, 27 October 2011, available 
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=747 (accessed January 2012).   
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The main objective of the KOREU FTA is to liberalize (and facilitate) trade in goods, services and 
investment, as well as the government procurement markets of the parties.2038 Furthermore, the 
parties aim to protect intellectual property rights and to promote Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
as well as contributing to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and to 
sustainable development. Promoting competition is mentioned as an objective in the context of the 
economic relations between the parties. The agreement comprises fifteen chapters, of which one 
explicitly deals with competition. The parties are required to maintain comprehensive competition 
laws which effectively address restrictive agreements, concerted practices and abuse of dominance by 
one or more enterprises, and which provide effective control of concentrations between enterprises, 
and the activities restricting competition that are incompatible with the agreement are enumerated. 
The agreement covers restrictive agreements, concerted practices, abuse of dominance and 
concentrations.2039 The parties should also maintain a competition authority, respect procedural 
fairness and the rights of defence, and make public information available to the other party.2040 Two 
articles deal with public enterprises and enterprises entrusted with special rights or exclusive rights 
and with state monopolies.2041 The parties recognise the importance of cooperation and state that 
they shall cooperate through enforcement cooperation, notification, consultation and exchange of 
non-confidential information, based on the dedicated agreement of 2009.2042 This provision is rather 
atypical as indeed a detailed cooperation agreement was already concluded before the FTA, which 
makes the context in which the competition provisions were included in the FTA quite particular. 
Furthermore, it is specified in the FTA that in the absence of more specific rules in the dedicated 
competition agreement, a party shall, on request of the other party, enter into consultations regarding 
representations made by the other party, to foster mutual understanding or to address specific 
competition matters. It is also stated that each party shall endeavour to provide relevant non-
confidential information to the other party.2043 This is a very weak provision, as the parties do not 
commit themselves even though only non-confidential information is at stake. The section on 
competition matters does not fall under the DSM provided for by the FTA.2044 A distinct feature of 
this FTA is that the section dedicated to subsidies, which is remarkable in itself as it was the first 
time an EU FTA contained a prohibition on certain types of subsidies,2045 does fall under the DSM, 
even if it refers to types of subsidies not regulated on WTO level.2046  
 
Even though the FTA between the EU, Columbia and Peru is trilateral and thus does not fit 
perfectly in the scope of this study, its content is still worth discussing. The FTA with Colombia and 
                                                          
2038 Article 1.1(2) KOREU FTA. 
2039 The competition chapter covers Articles 11.1–11.15 KOREU FTA. 
2040 Article 11.3 KOREU FTA.  
2041 Article 11.4 & 11.5 respectively KOREU FTA.  
2042 Article 11.6 KOREU FTA.  
2043 Article 11.7 KOREU FTA.  
2044 Article 11.8 KOREU FTA. For an analysis of the reasons why competition chapters are kept out of the dispute 
settlement mechanism, see below, Part III, 1.2.5.3. Also see D. Daniel Sokol, “Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why 
Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 
Vol. 83, No. 1, 2008, 262-273. 
2045 Articles 11.9-11.15 KOREU FTA. European Commission, Report on Competition Policy 2010, COM(2011) 328 
final, SEC(2011) 690 final, 10 June 2011, 38-39; Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2011) 690 final accompanying 
the Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2010 COM(2011) 328 final, 10 June 2011, 113. Also see A. 
Jarosz-Friis, N. Pesaresi & C. Kerle, “EU-Korea FTA: A Stepping Stone towards Better Subsidies’ Control at the 
International Level”, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1, 2010, 78–80. 
2046 J. Bourgeois, “Competition Policy: the Poor Relation in the European Union Free Trade Agreements” in I. Govaere, 
E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege & S. Adam (eds), The European Union in the World – Essays in honour of Marc Maresceau, 
Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, 390-391. 
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Peru was the result of the slow progress in regional negotiations with the Andean Community.2047 In 
2014, the negotiations were finalized for Ecuador to adhere to this agreement as well.2048 In the 
agreement, similar general objectives are mentioned as in the KOREU FTA, although competition is 
mentioned less prominently: “The objectives of this agreement are […] conduct of economic activities, in particular 
those regarding the relations between the parties, in conformity with the principle of free competition.”2049 As in the 
KOREU FTA, one title is dedicated to competition.2050 The parties acknowledge the importance of 
free competition and dedicate themselves to applying their respective competition policies and laws. 
They agree on a list of practices inconsistent with the FTA,2051 and they recognize the importance of 
cooperation and coordination.2052 Furthermore, it is announced that each party shall maintain 
competition laws and authorities and adopt appropriate actions, with respect to the principle of due 
process and the rights of defence. However, it is equally underlined that each party shall maintain its 
autonomy.2053 The parties will make their best efforts to cooperate, and a party may request 
cooperation, but it is explicitly formulated that this shall not prevent the parties concerned from 
taking independent decisions. Competition authorities may exchange information, but only insofar as 
possible under domestic law. A party may request that another party initiates the enforcement 
activities established under its legislation. This provision can be interpreted as referring to positive 
comity.2054 Other articles deal with notification2055 and designated monopolies and state enterprises, 
which must be subject to competition laws insofar as their performance is not obstructed.2056 
Technical assistance is also offered. Final provisions deal with consultations, and the fact that no 
recourse can be made by any of the parties to the DSM provided by the FTA. The FTA states that 
the initiation of consultations shall be accepted, and that the fullest considerations must be given to 
the concerns of the requested party.2057 There is therefore no guarantee about the continuation of the 
consultations. It should finally be mentioned that the FTA includes provisions on subsidies in the 
trade remedies chapter in the section on anti-dumping and countervailing measures. In this context 
the notification obligations under the relevant WTO agreement are reaffirmed, but it is added for the 
first time that the parties are allowed to exchange information on subsidies to services upon 
request.2058   
                                                          
2047 R. Ahearn, “Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications”, CRS Report for Congress, 
3 March 2011, 8. 
2048 European Commission, Press Release, “EU and Ecuador Conclude Negotiations for Trade and Development 
Agreement”, IP/14/845, Brussels, 17 July 2014. 
2049 Title I, Article 4 FTA EU-Colombia-Peru. The title on competition is Title VIII FTA EU-Colombia-Peru, covering 
Articles 258-266. 
2050 Title VIII FTA EU-Colombia-Peru.  
2051 This list includes “(a) any agreement, decision, recommendation or concerted practice, which has the purpose or effect of impeding, 
restricting, or distorting competition in accordance with their respective competition laws; (b) the abuse of a dominant position in accordance with 
their respective competition laws; and (c) concentrations of companies which significantly impedes effective competition, particularly as a result of 
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in accordance with their respective competition laws.” Article 259(2) FTA EU-
Colombia-Peru. 
2052 Article 258 and 259 FTA EU-Colombia-Peru.  
2053 Article 260 FTA EU-Colombia-Peru.  
2054 Article 261 FTA EU-Colombia-Peru.  
2055 Article 262 FTA EU-Colombia-Peru.  
2056 Article 263 FTA EU-Colombia-Peru.  
2057 Articles 265 and 266 FTA EU-Colombia-Peru.  
2058 “Without prejudice to Article 6.5 of the Anti-dumping Agreement and Article 12.4 of the Subsidies Agreement, each Party shall ensure, 
as soon as possible in accordance with its domestic legislation after the imposition of provisional measures, and in any event, prior to any final 
determination, full and meaningful disclosure of the essential facts under consideration which constitute the basis for the decision as to whether or 
not to apply measures. The disclosure of such information shall be made in writing and allow interested parties sufficient time to make 
comments.” Article 38(3) FTA EU-Colombia-Peru. Also see Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2011) 690 final 
accompanying the Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2010 COM(2011) 328 final, 10 June 2011, 112.  
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The EU-Ukraine, EU-Georgia and EU-Moldova FTAs were announced as being the first in a series 
of so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs).2059 Their competition 
chapters are nevertheless very diverse. The EU-Ukraine FTA was the first of the announced series of 
deep and comprehensive free trade agreements.2060 It is somewhat particular as it provides for 
extensive approximation to the EU acquis with regard to competition law, and includes the scope of 
the EU acquis to which Ukraine should approximate its laws in the body of the agreement, while 
generally regulatory approximation is contained in an annex to the agreement. This implies that the 
procedure to change such competition provisions will be more difficult than if the latter were 
included in an annex. A formal treaty change will be required, which is more rigid and burdensome 
than the procedures generally foreseen for changes to annexes in the agreements themselves, only 
requiring a decision from a joint committee or association council where the agreement allows this. 
The DCFTA with Ukraine is described as “one of the most ambitious bilateral agreements that the EU has ever 
negotiated with a trading partner” and should offer Ukraine a framework for modernization of trade and 
investment relations and for economic development.2061  
 
What is characteristic of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA are indeed the provisions on approximation of law 
and enforcement practice, with strict deadlines and hard obligations regarding substantive 
requirements for the domestic regime. Ukraine will align its competition law and enforcement 
practice to that of the EU acquis in a number of fields. This type of commitment cannot be found in 
other DCFTAs.2062 The competition chapter is more elaborate than the other DCFTAs with Eastern 
European neighbours.2063 The first section on antitrust and mergers traditionally elaborates on the 
importance of regulating anti-competitive behaviour, and indicates the practices that are considered 
inconsistent with the agreement. Parties should maintain effective competition laws and authorities, 
respecting transparency, timeliness, non-discrimination, procedural fairness and rights of defence. 
More concrete obligations are imposed on the parties, such as explaining the setting of pecuniary 
sanctions and the principles used in the assessment of horizontal mergers. Provisions on public 
enterprises and enterprises entrusted with special or exclusive rights are foreseen, and state 
monopolies are also regulated. Parties should exchange information and cooperate on enforcement 
matters, although the obligations are again particularly weak, stating that “the competition authority of a 
Party may inform the competition authority of the other Party of its willingness to cooperate with respect to enforcement 
activity. This cooperation shall not prevent the Parties from taking independent decisions.”2064 The agreement 
foresees that the parties should consult each other, but this is not regulated in detail. While the 
parties ‘shall’, on request, consult each other, and ‘shall’ do so promptly, they should only 
‘endeavour’ to provide relevant non-confidential information to the other Party to facilitate 
discussion. Unsurprisingly, the entire section is excluded from the DSM.  
 
                                                          
2059 European Commission, “The EU’s Association Agreements with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine”, 
MEMO/14/430, Brussels, 23 June 2014. 
2060 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/ukraine/ (accessed January 2012).    
2061 EEAS, “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area - What’s it all 
about?”, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/virtual_library/vademecum_en.pdf (accessed 
July 2017), 9.   
2062 G. Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area - A New Legal 
Instrument for EU Integration without Membership, Leiden/Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 2016, 277-278. 
2063 Articles 253-267 EU-Ukraine DCFTA. 
2064 Article 259(2) EU-Ukraine DCFTA. 
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State aid distorting or threatening to distort competition is incompatible with the agreement, except 
when it serves a particular function listed in the agreement, in either the ‘white list’ or the ‘grey list’, 
indicating the types of state aid that ‘shall’ or ‘may be considered to’ be compatible with the 
functioning of the agreement. These factors are largely taken over from Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU, 
including objectives allowed under the EU horizontal block exemption regulations.2065 Ukraine 
commits itself to adopting a system of control of state aid similar to that in the EU and inspired by 
TFEU articles, including an independent authority entrusted with the necessary powers for the full 
application of the state aid provisions in the DCFTA. The level of detail in these provisions can also 
be considered quite novel, as several other recent EU FTAs build upon the WTO SCM Agreement 
(Subsidies and Countervailing Measures) rather than mirroring TFEU Articles. The fact that referral 
is made to the relevant jurisprudence of the CJEU as source of interpretation is remarkable, even if 
the obligation remains less strong than in for instance the chapter on services and establishment.2066 
The principle of transparency in this context is made tangible via concrete obligations. The total 
amount, types and sectorial distribution of state aid which may affect trade between the parties 
should annually be notified. Articles 106, 107 and 93 TFEU shall serve as sources of interpretation. 
Finally, concrete changes to the domestic system of state aid control are required and listed in the 
agreement.  
 
The competition chapters in the Moldova and Georgia DCFTAs are less detailed and comprehensive 
than the EU-Ukraine DCFTA. The competition chapter in the DCFTA with Georgia is very 
superficial.2067 Cooperation provisions are not foreseen. Principles governing anti-competitive 
business practices and state interventions as well as subsidies provide that parties should maintain 
comprehensive and effective competition laws, and implement such legislation via a functioning 
authority, respecting the principles of transparency, non-discrimination, procedural fairness and 
respect for the rights of defence. Some provisions deal with the regulation of state monopolies, state 
enterprises and enterprises entrusted with special or exclusive rights, mainly requiring transparency. 
Contrary to the Moldova and Ukraine DCFTAs, the Georgia DCFTA refers to the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing measures, without however introducing commitments to prohibit 
specific types of subsidies.2068 The provision on subsidies is not excluded from the DSM, in contrast 
to the rest of the competition chapter. There is no prejudice to the rights and obligations in the 
WTO agreement, and parties should adhere to domestic rules on professional and business 
secrets.2069  
 
The EU-Moldova DCFTA’s competition chapter is comprised of two sections, one dealing with 
antitrust and mergers, and one revolving around state aid.2070 Again the obligation exists to maintain 
competition laws and operational authorities. The provision on the implementation of competition 
laws emphasizes the independence of the competition authorities, a feature that is not present in any 
of the other DCFTAs. Again, state monopolies, public undertakings and undertakings entrusted with 
special or exclusive rights are regulated, in the sense that they should be subject to competition laws. 
                                                          
2065 G. Van der Loo, “Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the DCFTAs with Tunisia and Morocco”, EuroMeSCo 
Series, March 2016, 32. 
2066 G. Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area - A New Legal 
Instrument for EU Integration without Membership, Leiden/Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 2016, 278-279. 
2067 Articles 203-209 EU-Georgia DCFTA. 
2068 G. Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area - A New Legal 
Instrument for EU Integration without Membership, Leiden/Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 2016, 279-280.  
2069 Article 209 EU-Georgia DCFTA. 
2070 Articles 333-344 EU-Moldova DCFTA. 
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Furthermore, cooperation and exchange of information is foreseen. However, the relevant provision 
is rather weak, merely stating that “each competition authority may inform the other competition authority of its 
willingness to cooperate with respect to the enforcement activity of any of the Parties.”2071 Exchange of non-
confidential information is allowed, subject to the confidentiality laws of each party and limited by 
the national requirements of professional and business secrecy. The entire section is excluded from 
dispute settlement. The section on state aid does not apply to fisheries and agriculture. Within five 
years from the entry into force of the DCFTA, the assessment of state aid should take place 
following EU law, including case-law, and in particular Article 107 TFEU, and within two years the 
parties are to establish and maintain state aid legislation and an operationally independent authority, 
of which the main powers are made explicit in the FTA, while adhering to the transparency-principle, 
including a duty to report to the EU and an obligation to provide information on request with regard 
to individual cases that may be seen as affecting trade relations between the parties. An alignment 
period is foreseen for state aid schemes instituted before the establishment of the state aid authority. 
Again parties should ‘take into account’ limitations following from professional and business secrecy 
obligations, and a rather unique review clause is included.2072 Moldova’s competition agency as well as 
the judiciary are intensively guided by the Commission in correctly implementing these provisions.  
 
In short, while the Ukraine DCFTA contains an Approximation clause (Art. 256), TFEU inspired 
rules on antitrust and mergers (Art. 254) as well as detailed rules on state aid, including obligation to 
adopt a system of state aid control, similar to that in the EU (Arts. 262-267), the Moldova and 
Georgia DCFTAs lack an approximation clause. The former does contain general provisions on 
antitrust and mergers (Arts. 334- 335) and detailed rules on state aid, but no commitment to adopt a 
system of state aid control, while the latter does not even contain detailed rules on state aid but refers 
to WTO SCM Agreement (Art. 208).2073  
 
DCFTAs are underway with the southern neighbours as well, such as Tunisia and Morocco. 
Negotiations with Morocco started in 2013 after an independent Sustainability Impact Assessment, 
and will expand on the Free Trade Area created under the EU-Morocco Association Agreement, 
existing since 2000, by including novel issues such as trade in services and investment.2074 Tunisia 
only entered into negotiations in 2016. The negotiations will similarly build on the 1995 Association 
Agreement which created a Free Trade Area between the EU and Tunisia, already prohibited certain 
practices and transactions (e.g. cartels and abuse of a dominant position), and created rules for state 
aids that may affect trade between the EU and Tunisia. As was the case for the EU-Morocco 
DCFTA, the negotiations are intended to create new trade and investment opportunities and to 
further integrate Tunisia's economy into the EU single market by supporting on-going economic 
reforms in Tunisia and bringing Tunisian trade legislation closer to that of the EU.2075 The inclusion 
of a competition chapter, including state aid provisions, is justified by the EU be referring to the 
detrimental effects of anticompetitive activities on the benefits of trade liberalization as well as the 
need to ensure a level playing field for companies on both sides. The objective of the chapter is 
clearly stated in market-access terms.2076   
                                                          
2071 Article 337 EU-Moldova DCFTA. 
2072 Articles 340-342 EU-Moldova DCFTA.  
2073 G. Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area - A New Legal 
Instrument for EU Integration without Membership, Leiden/Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 2016, 317. 
2074 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/morocco/ (accessed July 2017). 
2075 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/tunisia/ (accessed July 2017). 
2076 “The objective of the chapter on competition of the Association agreement is to ensure that companies on both sides have fair and equal 
access to each other’s markets, unhampered by anti-competitive practices.” Negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
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It is worth mentioning that while the existing FTAs concluded in the framework of Euromed 
Association Agreements indeed already contained substantive competition law provisions on cartels, 
abuse of dominant position and state aid which had to be applied in conformity with the relevant EU 
provisions, the required decisions of the Association Councils, necessary for the implementation of 
such rules, were never adopted. VAN DER LOO therefore rightly suggests that “[t]he DCFTAs with 
Tunisia and Morocco could maybe take over some provisions of the EaP DCFTAs which are more detailed and focus 
more on the implementation and enforcement of competition legislation, including rules on procedural fairness and the 
right of defence.”2077 In the EU fact sheet on the EU-Tunisia FTA, the Commission indeed indicates 
that its proposal aims to operationalize the Association Agreement, in particular with regard to state 
aid. It intends to do so first by completing and clarifying the provisions in force via updated 
references to the Treaties as well as secondary legislation and case law of the CJEU. Second, by 
requiring antitrust, merger, and state aid legislation in line with the EU acquis as well as operationally 
independent competition and state aid authorities that hold the resources and powers to effectively 
enforce competition and state aid laws respectively.2078 Discussions on dispute settlement are still on-
going.2079 
 
The EU proposal for the DCFTA with Tunisia first underlines the importance of free competition 
and the importance of competition law in the framework of trade liberalization. The anticompetitive 
activities that are incompatible with the agreement in so far they affect trade between the parties are 
listed. It is specified that such activities are to be evaluated based on the criteria present in Articles 
101, 102, 106, 107 and 93 TFEU as well as relevant case-law of the CJEU. Certain exceptions are 
made with regard to state aid in the context of agriculture and fisheries. Transparency is required in 
the field of state aid, with a biennial notification obligation. The competition chapter also includes 
hard obligations with regard to the establishment of competition and state aid legislation and 
authorities. The chapter finally contains provisions on state monopolies as well as public 
undertakings and undertakings granted special or exclusive rights.2080 A joint report explained that the 
competition chapter would apply to government procurement above yet to be determined value 
thresholds. The EU will presumably aim to gradually liberalise the public procurement markets based 
on national treatment.2081  
 
Bilateral negotiations between the EU and Singapore on an FTA were started in 2010 after 
difficulties with the ‘region-to-region’ negotiations held between 2007 and 2009 between the EU and 
the ASEAN countries. The FTA with Singapore, the first deal between the EU and a Southeast 
Asian economy, is seen as by the EU as a building block in order to still reach a broader regional 
agreement and greater engagement between the EU and Southeast Asia, which remains the ultimate 
goal. The negotiations were completed in 2014, and the initialled agreement now awaits formal 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Area between the European Union and Tunisia, The EU Proposal on Competition and State Aid, Factsheet, April 2016, 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154505.pdf (accessed March 2017).   
2077 G. Van der Loo, “Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the DCFTAs with Tunisia and Morocco”, EuroMeSCo 
Series, March 2016, 31. 
2078 Negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Tunisia, The EU 
Proposal on Competition and State Aid, Factsheet, April 2016, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154505.pdf (accessed March 2017)  
2079 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154466.pdf (accessed July 2017). 
2080 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154481.pdf (accessed July 2017). 
2081 G. Van der Loo, “Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the DCFTAs with Tunisia and Morocco”, EuroMeSCo 
Series, March 2016, 32; Rapport conjoint du premier round de négociation sur un accord de libre-échange complet et 
approfondi (ALECA) entre la Tunisie et l’Union européenne, Tunis, 18-21 avril 2016, 22 avril 2016.  
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approval by the European Commission and the Council of Ministers as well as ratification by the 
European Parliament. The process was stalled, however, due to a case before the CJEU regarding the 
EU’s competence to sign and ratify the agreement, (see below, Part III, 1.4.2.4).2082 Following the 
EU-Singapore FTA, the, at times difficult, negotiations on an FTA between the EU and Vietnam 
were concluded end of 2015. The Agreement is seen as one of the most comprehensive and 
ambitious trade and investment agreements concluded between the EU and a developing country.2083 
The EU presented the competition chapter as ‘inherently pro-development’, underlining the 
vulnerability of developing country companies and consumers to anti-competitive practices and the 
benefits regarding the attraction of foreign investors. It moreover emphasized the positive effect that 
transparency obligations and basic control of subsidies may have on the spending of scarce public 
resources.2084  
 
Both agreements require that the parties adopt or maintain comprehensive competition legislation 
that can effectively address anti-competitive practices, but differ in the specifications of such 
practices. The autonomy of the parties in the development and enforcement of their competition 
laws is underlined, but they are required to maintain authorities that are responsible for, and 
adequately equipped to effectively enforce such laws. The laws should be applied in a transparent and 
non-discriminatory manner, respecting the principles of procedural fairness and rights of defence. In 
the agreement with Singapore the right of parties to be heard prior to deciding on a case is 
particularly underlined.2085 The competition chapter is excluded from the dispute settlement (and in 
the EU-Singapore FTA also the mediation) mechanism. An exception is made in the latter agreement 
for prohibited subsidies. Both agreements indeed contain a section on subsidies as well. However, 
while the EU-Vietnam agreement takes a positive approach by listing (non-exhaustively) the public 
policy objectives for which subsidies could by granted, the EU-Singapore Agreement opens with a 
description of the subsidies that are prohibited. In both agreements reference is made to the SCM 
agreement. The EU-Vietnam Agreement requires transparency in the area of ‘specific subsidies’, 
while the EU-Singapore Agreement does so ‘in the area of subsidies related to trade in goods and the 
supply of services.’ The commitment to notify not only subsidies to goods but also subsidies to 
services goes well beyond the WTO rules. Both agreements foresee the possibility of consultations 
between the parties. While the EU-Singapore Agreement frames such consultations as ‘fostering 
mutual understanding’ or simply ‘to address specific matters’, the EU-Vietnam agreement foresees 
the possibility for companies to alert their governments to potential subsidies with negative effects 
for their businesses, allowing the latter to engage in a consultation process with the other Party to 
assess the situation and in the affirmative case, to find a satisfactory solution. Both subsidy chapters 
are subject to review. The EU heralds the ambitious nature of the commitments regarding state-
owned enterprises in the EU-Vietnam FTA, in particular considering that such enterprises have 
traditionally been a backbone of the Vietnamese economy.2086 In the EU-Vietnam FTA the parties 
acknowledge that strengthening cooperation regarding policy development is in their mutual interest, 
yet subject to the availability of funding under cooperation programmes. The EU-Singapore 
Agreement provides that the parties shall endeavour to coordinate and cooperate in the context of 
the agreement.  
                                                          
2082 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/ (accessed July 2017). 
2083 O. Massmann, “EU- Vietnam Free Trade Agreement - market access opportunities”, Lexology, 7 October 2016.  
2084 Delegation of the European Union to Vietnam, Guide to the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, June 2016, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/june/tradoc_154622.pdf. (accessed July 2017), 33.  
2085 Article 12.2 EU-Singapore FTA. 
2086 Delegation of the European Union to Vietnam, Guide to the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, June 2016, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/june/tradoc_154622.pdf. (accessed July 2017), 33.  
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1.3.3 Mega-FTAs 
 
The last few years have been characterised by the extreme mediatisation and politicisation of so-
called ‘mega-FTAs’, or FTAs between important global players covering a lot of ground. An example 
is the debate on the investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms in these agreements.2087 Due to the 
attention of civil society and other interest groups the negotiations of these agreements have been 
characterised by an unprecedented level of transparency and openness. The commotion surrounding 
mainly the TTIP negotiations (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) spilled over to other 
negotiations such as the CETA-negotiations (EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement), which were in a more advanced stage even. Last minute changes were required for the 
latter’s signature, and its conclusion and provisional application are subject to several procedural 
uncertainties.  
 
The Brexit as well as the most recent US elections have added to the uncertainty regarding the 
viability of these long-negotiated agreements. With regard to the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP), for instance, the US government, only days after President TRUMP took office, 
already released at statement that the Office of the US Trade Representative “issued a letter to signatories 
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement that the United States has formally withdrawn from the agreement per 
guidance from the President of the United States.”2088 The TPP would have involved Australia, Brunei, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US, and Vietnam. After 
seven years of negotiations the final proposal was signed in February 2016. One particular aspect of 
the Agreement was the attention to SOE-related provisions, due to the prevalence of SOEs in East 
Asian economies.2089 No similar statement has been released regarding the European equivalent, 
TTIP, but its future is equally uncertain.2090 It nevertheless remains useful to analyse such mega-
FTAs. They all seem to have one thing in common at the outset: the controversy surrounding them. 
The competition-related chapters in three such agreements will be analysed here: CETA, TTIP, and 
TPP. These are not the only mega-FTAs on the agenda, the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership is another example,2091 but they can be considered to be the most influential ones.  
 
1.3.3.1 CETA 
 
The Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement is characterised by a new 
‘dynamic’ for the EU, in comparison to the trade negotiations the latter was accustomed to, as it was 
the first time the EU negotiated such an agreement with what can be considered as an ‘equal’. CETA 
is the first FTA between the EU and a G8 country. It constitutes more of a dialogue rather than the 
predominantly one-way conditionality dynamic by which previous FTAs were characterised. It 
                                                          
2087 B.A. Melo Araujo, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 238. 
2088 See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership# (accessed July 2017). 
2089 T. Sekine, “Competition Related Provisions in East Asian FTAs: Their Trends and the Possible Impact of Mega 
FTAs”, Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 86, 2014, 116. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (accessed July 2017).  
2090 Bradshaw, Julia, “What's the difference between TTIP and TPP and why does Donald Trump want them scrapped?”, 
The Telegraph, 22 November 2016; O’Grady, Sean, “By scrapping TPP and TTIP, Trump has boosted American jobs in 
the short term – and destroyed them in the long term”, Independent, 24 January 2017.   
2091 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), http://asean.org/?static_post=rcep-regional-
comprehensive-economic-partnership (accessed July 2017).   
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contains separate chapters for subsidies, competition policy, and state enterprises, monopolies and 
enterprises granted special rights or privileges.2092  
 
The chapter on subsidies aims to increase transparency by requiring notification of subsidies and the 
production of further information on request regarding subsidisation of services. A subsidy is 
defined as a measure related to trade in goods, in accordance with Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
With somewhat different rules for the sectors of agriculture and fishing, consultations should take 
place between both parties on subsidies that may negatively affect trade between them. Confidential 
information is protected. Both parties also agree not to engage in export subsidization of agricultural 
products. Subsidies or government support with respect to audio-visual services in the EU and with 
respect to cultural industries in Canada are excluded from the Agreement. The obligations of the 
parties under Article VI of the GATT, SCM Agreement, and Agreement on Agriculture are 
reaffirmed. The consultation provisions of the subsidies chapter are excluded from dispute 
settlement.  
 
The EU and Canada agreed to prohibit and sanction practices which distort competition and trade, 
in the form of cartels, abusive behaviour by companies with a dominant market position, and anti-
competitive mergers. The parties are to take appropriate measures to proscribe anti-competitive 
business conduct and exclusions from the application of competition law shall be transparent. The 
commitments made in the cooperation agreement of 1999 are reaffirmed and the parties agree to 
enforce their competition laws in a fair and transparent way, in accordance with the principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination, and procedural fairness. The entire chapter is excluded from 
dispute settlement. It can be noticed here that the EU somewhat diverts from its generally more 
prescriptive stance regarding competition law in FTAs,2093 likely exactly because it is dealing with ‘an 
equal’.  
 
While both parties have the full freedom of choice in the way they provide public services to their 
citizens, they commit not to intervene in or potentially distort the level playing field for private 
companies, by ensuring that state-owned enterprises, monopolies, and enterprises granted special 
rights will not discriminate against goods, services, or investments from the other party. Certain 
exceptions are foreseen.  
 
1.3.3.2 TTIP 
 
Negotiations for TTIP, an agreement between the world’s two largest advanced industrial 
economies, were launched in July 2013 and were inspired by both an economic and strategic 
rationale. The Agreement enables the EU and the US to jointly develop and promote common high 
standards in the global economy, levelling the playing field for producers, exporters, and workers.2094 
According to PAEMEN, TTIP should be seen as one of the efforts to promote the transatlantic 
exchanges in the wake of the Cold War, a reaction to the coincident acceleration of the globalization 
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2093 B.A. Melo Araujo, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 194.  
2094 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “U.S.-EU Joint Report on T-TIP Progress to Date”, 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/january/us-eu-joint-report-t-tip-progress-0 
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drive, and the financial and economic crisis.2095 JENNY explained that TTIP represented ‘a new type 
of trade negotiations’, as it focused more on regulatory issues than tariffs.2096  
 
DE GUCHT, former trade Commissioner, stated during a testimony before the European 
Parliament’s Committee on International Trade that the agreement would ‘set the standard’, both for 
the EU’s future bilateral trade and investment, as well as the development of global rules.2097 The 
American Chamber of Commerce as well referred to TTIP as a ‘precedent-setting agreement’, that 
could address the fact that the importance of the EU and the US in the global marketplace is being 
eroded.2098 Mega-FTAs can indeed be seen as ‘rule-makers’, aimed at shaping the global rules of 
international trade. The danger is, however, that these potentially global rules are created in a non-
global way.2099 As one US official allegedly put it, TTIP is about determining “the rules of world trade 
before others do it for us.”2100 This may render genuine multilateral integration more difficult, as a certain 
amount of path dependence is created by indeed taking advantage of being the ‘first mover’, and 
using prior action to impose an outcome on other states.2101   
 
AmCham noted that despite over twenty years of advanced experience in policy and enforcement 
cooperation, substantive policy and legal framework differences remain, such as US criminal 
enforcement and treble damages, EU focus on state aid and market integration focus as well as a 
formalistic approach in unilateral conduct cases, or US caution in the ability to predict future 
competitive outcomes, disagreements on procedural checks and balances, or legal privilege.2102 
According to them, TTIP should not attempt to bridge all differences between the EU and the US, 
but should rather “codify joint EU/US approaches in promoting best practices vis-à-vis third countries,”2103 
thereby sending ‘key messages’ to the rest of the world regarding antitrust enforcement.2104 The EU 
factsheet on the competition chapter in TTIP presents competition policy in TTIP as ‘a model for 
global policies to promote free and fair competition’.2105 LAITENBERGER, from DG COMP, 
confirmed that the aim of the TTIP competition provisions is to confirm the importance of 
competition policy, reinforce the shared commitment to the robust, transparent and non-
discriminatory enforcement of competition laws, and send this message to the rest of the world as 
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2097 K. De Gucht, Testimony before the Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament, Brussels , 21 
February 2013.  
2098 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A – Economic and Scientific 
Policy, Competition Policy in International Agreements – Study for Econ Committee, IP/A/ECON/2015-02, August 
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Governance Programme EUI, Fiesole, 16 October 2014.  
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2105 Factsheet competition: Competition policy in TTIP, Factsheet competition: 
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well as setting the standard for other international agreements.2106 TTIP represented an opportunity 
for the EU and the US to emphasize shared values in adopting and enforcing competition laws and 
affirm their existing high standards, thereby offering an example for other countries to follow.2107 
The remark could be made that in this manner the ‘rule-making processes’, if they can be identified 
as such, in multilateral forums are being circumvented and multilateral ‘standards’ are being set 
without genuine multilateral input, by presenting a ‘fait accompli’ to the world. Even though, at least 
with regard to competition law, the US and the EU are already dominant players in the multilateral 
forums, this undermines genuine global input. While TTIP was presented as potentially reinforcing 
understanding and support for the regulatory actions of both parties and preserving the ability of 
governments to regulate in the public interest, it was met with a lot of resistance.2108 The negotiating 
teams included the relevant regulators, allowing them to lead the way with regard to identifying 
opportunities for increased compatibility and cooperation as well as maintaining or strengthening 
existing protections. It is emphasised that cooperation under TTIP must be implemented in a way 
that is consistent with both US and EU domestic procedures. 
 
Both the EU and the US proposals for a TTIP Competition Chapter explicitly referred to the 
existing competition cooperation agreements between the competition authorities of both parties. 
The projected added value of the TTIP Competition Chapter lay in the fact that it would go beyond 
cooperation among competition agencies and to agree on a set of shared principles as a basis for 
extending and strengthening international cooperation.2109 According to the EU main issues to be 
resolved with regard to competition law revolve around state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
subsidies. The factsheet explicitly mentions that one of the goals is to ensure that SOEs with 
monopoly powers or special rights do not discriminate against private companies and that 
procedures to grant subsidies to companies supplying industrial goods and services become 
transparent.2110  
 
According to one Commission official, one of the main differences between the competition chapter 
in TTIP and previous DCFTAs is that the US strongly emphasises due process, and wants to go 
beyond mere statements of principle towards detailed provisions. Such concerns about (equalising) 
due process are relatively new and can only appear at an advanced stage of cooperation.2111 In this 
process the prosecutorial and administrative system sometimes collide.2112 Since the start of the 
negotiations, the parties have agreed on the importance of transparency and due process in trade 
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remedy procedures as well as competition policy.2113 However, procedural fairness is the main area 
where further work is needed according to the negotiators. It proves difficult to find language that 
takes into account the parties’ respective concerns as well as the particularities of the respective legal 
and administrative systems.2114 The competition working group of the business coalition for 
transatlantic trade (BCTT) publicly announced what according to them the objectives for the TTIP 
negotiations should be in the field of competition law. They rightly begin by stating that TTIP should 
clearly identify transparency and due process/procedural fairness obligations in antitrust proceedings. 
Competition agencies should not be represented as ‘black boxes’, and those under investigation 
should be able to regularly engage with enforcers to understand the evidence against them and the 
relevant theories involved. In this context TTIP should also codify OECD and ICN best 
practices. They finally touch upon the issue of the different scope of legal privilege in the EU and the 
US, which according to them should be addressed in TTIP.2115  
 
In the EU’s initial proposal text for the competition chapter,2116 the parties shall maintain antitrust 
and merger competition legislation, addressing in an effective manner horizontal and vertical 
agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises and concerted practices 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, abuses 
by one or more enterprises of a dominant position, and concentrations between enterprises which 
significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of 
dominant position. The chapter would furthermore require that the Parties shall maintain 
operationally independent authority responsible for and appropriately equipped for the effective 
enforcement of the competition legislation, in adherence to the principles of transparency and non-
discrimination, procedural fairness and the rights of defence of the enterprises concerned, 
irrespective of their nationality or ownership status. It can be assumed that both the EU and the US 
already fulfil these requirements. Their inclusion in the Agreement is evidence of the ‘standard-
setting’ value it is intended to have. SOEs should be subject to competition legislation, and are 
further regulated in a separate chapter, the main obligations relating non-discrimination, and high 
standards of transparency and corporate governance.2117 Cooperation should be strengthened, in 
accordance with the cooperation agreements already concluded between the parties. Confidential 
information exchange or investigatory assistance is not foreseen. The parties should adhere to their 
respective confidentiality legislation. A review clause is foreseen. The chapter is entirely excluded 
from dispute settlement. With regard to subsidies, reference is made to the SCM Agreement. 
Fisheries and agriculture are subject to exceptions. The proposal furthermore includes basic 
provisions on transparency and consultations. The latter provision is not subject to dispute 
settlement. A review clause is foreseen and the parties should again respect their national 
confidentiality legislation. In addition to the core elements mentioned in the negotiation text, the EU 
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(TTIP), 22-26 February 2016, Public Report–March 2016, 18-19.  
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2116 Textual Proposal, the European Union's initial proposal for legal text on ‘Competition’ in TTIP, tabled for discussion 
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would like to discuss the possibility to prohibit certain types of subsidies, such as those given to 
support insolvent or ailing companies without a credible restructuring plan.2118 
 
1.3.4 Non-EU FTAs 
 
While the focus here is solely on the competition chapters in FTAs concluded by the EU, it is useful 
to briefly contextualize such agreements in order to better assess the EU’s position on the 
international playing field. One relevant point of comparison are FTAs concluded by the US.  
 
1.3.4.1 US FTAs 
 
From about 2000 the US engaged in ‘competitive liberalization’ via FTAs as an alternative to 
multilateral liberalization, de facto forcing the EU to respond. Compared to the US, however, the 
EU has a more extensive history of including competition chapters in its FTAs.2119 SOKOL described 
the US’ stance on competition chapters in FTAs as one that does not oppose such chapters to the 
extent that they are non-binding and important to the other party.2120 
 
The EU works with an informal template that is tailored to a relatively large extent to the partner 
country,2121 also with regard to competition chapters. Some agreements are fairly detailed with regard 
to the required commitments in the field of competition law, while others simply refer to an 
undefined notion of ‘cooperation’.2122 The informal DG COMP templates were renewed in 2012 for 
competition chapters in future DCFTAs.1 The US, however, uses the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) as a model for all its FTAs. This results in a more structurally standardised 
scope and a fairly uniform content, based on symmetry and reciprocity.2123 Not all US FTAs contain 
a competition chapter. Often rather homogenous competition provisions are included in sector-
specific chapters such as government procurement or telecommunications services.2124   
 
Competition provisions in FTAs can largely be categorized in three sections: those containing 
procedural commitments, those relating to substantive commitments limited to trade between 
parties, and provisions proscribing substantive commitments concerning the domestic regime of the 
parties. EU FTAs were labelled as the main examples of FTAs that provide for substantive 
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commitments and even harmonisation of competition rules of the parties.2125 A famous OECD 
report identified two main families of competition provisions in FTAs, namely EU-style and US-style 
provisions. The former are more substantive in nature, aimed at harmonization and reform of the 
domestic competition system, while the latter focus on agency cooperation.2126 The EU-Singapore 
FTA may serve as one example that in EU-style agreements little emphasis is placed on coordination 
and cooperation provisions. The Agreement only contains a very simple cooperation and 
coordination clause at the end of the competition chapter.2127 The propensity to include 
comprehensive cooperation provisions can also be observed in FTAs concluded by Japan (see below, 
Part III, 1.2.4.2).2128 The OECD's characterisation has nevertheless been criticised as being overly 
simplistic, even if the divide was acknowledged by other authors as well.2129 Linked to this, it was also 
found that the EU’s FTA extended more frequently and more intensely beyond current WTO 
obligations than US agreements.2130 It is therefore sometimes concluded that the EU uses bilateral 
trade agreements both to address cross-border enforcement issues and promote fair competition, as 
well as to disseminate its regulatory model.2131 The US-Australia FTA serves as an example of the 
cooperation-focused nature of US-style FTAs. The agreement lacks mutually agreed competition 
rules beyond vague references regarding anticompetitive practices. Procedural provisions regarding 
cooperation, however, are far more specific. According to RENNIE, “[c]o-operation on these terms is 
inherently self-serving; it enhances national enforcement power while preserving the right of each country to pursue its 
own interests.”2132 SEKINE refers to statements of government officials that confirm US prioritisation of 
cooperation in instances where it has decided to enforce its own competition laws over how other 
country's competition laws would be enforced in cases of limited market access. This may be 
explained by the fact that if US industries’ export markets are restricted due to anti-competitive 
practices and the country does not satisfactorily enforce its competition laws, the US will apply its 
own antitrust laws extraterritorially. In terms of rationale, competition provisions in US FTAs are 
largely concerned with promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare, while EU-style 
competition provisions are included from a market access perspective, and focus more on export 
interests, externalised for instance in the exemplification of ‘anti-competitive business conduct’, 
which does not necessarily coincide with promoting economic efficiency or consumer welfare.2133  
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EU FTAs generally also include a wider range of state aid provisions than their US counterparts, a 
logical consequence of the fact that the US is less well acquainted with state aid rules.2134 US-style 
FTAs on the other hand have stronger provisions relating to SOEs.2135 US-style FTAs also tend to 
emphasise procedural fairness more in the competition chapter.2136 Finally, both EU and US style 
FTAs typically exclude or limit access to dispute resolution procedures for matters arising in 
connection to the competition. Often parties are allowed to ‘consult’ on issues arising under the 
competition chapter.2137   
 
Both in the EU’s and the US’ FTAs, competition cooperation provisions have become more 
important and more detailed, not only in the competition chapter itself, but also in other chapters. 
This development occurred in parallel with the expansion of the coverage of FTAs, in particular with 
regard to services, telecommunications or government procurement. In these chapters, EU and US 
FTAs are more similar than with regard to their competition chapter. This may be explained by the 
fact that such provisions are similar to those in the WTO, where competition provisions are 
lacking.2138  
 
1.3.4.2 East Asian FTAs 
 
SEKINE engaged in an elaborate study of competition-related provisions in East-Asian FTAs. He 
concluded that East Asian categories either fall into the category of US- or EU-style FTAs, or form a 
third, hybrid category. In general, along with the global trend, East Asian FTAs increasingly include 
competition related provisions, be it in a dedicated chapter or throughout the agreement, although to 
a varying extent.2139 FTAs concluded by China and ASEAN members in particular tend to avoid 
competition related provisions. According to SEKINE “this is most likely due to a certain ambivalence toward 
service trade, government procurement, and intellectual property provisions rather than a lack of interest in promoting 
competition in those areas”.2140 This ‘divide’ among East Asian FTAs likely finds its origins in the ‘hub-
and-spoke’ nature to the global web of FTAs and the respective influence of the EU and the US, as 
well as a similar influence with regard to the development of the East Asian national competition 
laws as such. SEKINE explains adherence by East Asian countries to US-style FTAs by the fact that 
the lack of substantive provisions allows the former to save implementation costs and avoid 
internationally committing to the expanded implementation of their competition laws that would be 
required under EU-style agreements, while those who do choose to adhere to EU-style FTAs with 
substantive provisions hope that such international commitments will serve as a catalyst for the 
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introduction, establishment, or development of national competition laws. As a final factor of 
influence SEKINE identifies the emergence of mega-FTAs.2141 
 
When zooming in on two major Asian players, Japan and China, the following characteristics can be 
discerned. Japan increasingly includes sophisticated competition provisions in its FTAs. A majority 
of the latter contains competition chapters. The content is relatively consistent. Chinese FTAs on the 
other hand until recently did not contain competition chapters. The Switzerland-China and Iceland-
China agreements that entered into force in 2014 each contain a competition law chapter consisting 
of one article.2142 The 2015 China-Korea FTA is the first one containing a sizeable competition 
chapter. The lack of competition chapters does not mean, however, that earlier Chinese FTAs did 
not contain competition law related provisions. Generally competition law issues are included in the 
chapter relating to cooperation, even if there is no stand-alone clause addressing such issues. Other 
competition related provisions can be found in the chapters dealing with services, government 
procurement, and intellectual property.2143 
 
1.3.5 Observations 
 
1.3.5.1 Evolution in the competition provisions of EU FTAs  
 
One evolution that can be seen between traditional FTAs and post-Global-Europe FTAs is the 
increased role of substantive provisions in the latter category as compared to cooperation or 
                                                          
2141 Ibid., 112, 114.  
2142 Switzerland-China FTA: “CHAPTER 10 COMPETITION - ARTICLE 10 Competition: 
1. Anticompetitive practices, such as agreements between undertakings that may prevent or restrict competition, abuse of a dominant market 
position and concentrations of undertakings which may have the effect of prevention or restriction of competition may cause adverse effects on the 
bilateral trade, and thereby hinder the functioning of this Agreement. The Parties undertake to apply their respective competition laws in that 
regard.  
2. This Chapter applies to all undertakings of the Parties. Such application shall not hinder undertakings with special and exclusive rights 
authorised by laws and regulations from exercising those rights. 
3. Nothing in this Chapter creates any legally binding obligations for the undertakings or intervenes with the independence of the competition 
authorities in enforcing their respective competition laws. 
4. Cooperation between the competition authorities of the Parties may have a significant effect on the enforcement of competition laws in matters 
affecting trade between the Parties. The competition authorities of the Parties shall cooperate with regard to anticompetitive practices. 
5. If a Party considers that a given practice continues to affect trade in the sense of paragraph 1, it may request consultations in the Joint 
Committee with a view to facilitating a resolution of the matter. 
6. Chapter 15 shall not apply to this Chapter.” 
Iceland-China FTA: “CHAPTER 5 COMPETITION Article 62 Rules of Competition: 
1. The Parties recognise that anti-competitive business conduct may frustrate the benefits arising from this Agreement. Such conduct is therefore 
incompatible with the proper functioning of this Agreement in so far as it may affect trade between the Parties. 
2. This Chapter also applies to undertakings with privilege and exclusive rights authorised by law. Such application shall not prevent the above 
undertakings from fulfilling their legal functions. 
3. The provisions of this Chapter shall not be construed to create any legally binding obligations for the u 
ndertakings and are also without prejudice to the independence of the Parties’ competition authorities according to their respective competition 
laws. 
4. The Parties undertake to apply their respective competition laws with a view to removing anti-competitive business conduct. The co-operation 
between the Parties may include the exchange of information in accordance with the respective laws and regulations of the Parties, as well as 
their confidentiality obligations. 
5. The competition authorities of the Parties shall co-operate and consult on matters pertaining to this Chapter. 
6. Any dispute under this Chapter shall be settled through consultation between the Parties. Neither Party may have recourse to dispute 
settlement mechanism under this Agreement in respect of any issue arising from or relating to this Chapter.” 
2143 T. Sekine, “Competition Related Provisions in East Asian FTAs: Their Trends and the Possible Impact of Mega 
FTAs”, Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 86, 2014, 88- 95.  
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procedural clauses. An overarching feature of these more recent FTAs is indeed that substantive 
provisions such as the requirement to maintain competition laws and (an efficient) competition 
authority, rules on state monopolies, state enterprises and enterprises entrusted with special rights, as 
well as adherence to the principles of transparency, non-discrimination, and due process, have 
complemented cooperation provisions. This is in line with the aim of greater convergence expressed 
in the Global Europe strategy. The importance of such competition principles, in particular in 
relations with parties that do not have a long experience of enforcing competition laws, is 
increasingly being recognised in multilateral forums such as the ICN.2144   
 
Some claim that there is little variation in the rules included in the EU’s DCFTAs, in particular with 
regard to the offensive interests of the EU. They conclude from this that there is not really a process 
of dialogue preceding this inclusion, but that it is rather the consequence of a recognition by the 
EU’s trade partners that this is the price to pay for enhanced market access.2145 Nevertheless, with 
regard to the competition law chapters, the post-Global-Europe FTAs that were analysed are very 
diverse. The agreements with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine can hardly be compared. The DCFTA 
with Ukraine is quite particular, and also has great strategic value due to the particular geopolitical 
position of Ukraine, explaining the enhanced focus on approximation. It should be noted that a 
certain amount of tailoring is desirable, but there should be some level of consistency throughout to 
convey a clear message.  
 
Overall a significant simplification has taken place in the sense that listings have generally been 
replaced by general descriptions. Details on cooperation actions are no longer set in the agreement in 
order to cover as much ground as possible. In particular, what exactly cooperation on a policy and 
case level implies is no longer specified. What could be considered to be negative and positive comity 
type-provisions have been omitted. While on the one hand this provides more freedom to the 
parties, one might wonder on the other hand whether parties would not benefit from somewhat 
more guidance in an interpretative annex for instance. Another example of this ‘streamlining’ is that 
the aim and use of consultations is stated, but the concrete implementation is left to the parties. A 
possible downside then is that parties are no longer enticed to engage in requested consultations as 
soon as possible ('promptly'), nor are they guided in what information should be mentioned in a 
request.  
 
Some claim that the rhetoric of the EU regarding the importance of competition policy in the 
context of its trade relations, is not reflected in the competition chapters of its DCFTAs. There is 
not always a straightforward obligation to apply national competition rules in a non-discriminatory 
manner, and often no clear prohibition of a listed set of anti-competitive practices. EU DCFTAs 
often limit themselves to stating that certain activities restricting competition are incompatible with 
the proper functioning of the agreement, sometimes only insofar as they may affect trade between 
the parties and not in general, regardless of an effect on trade.2146 Often the parties are simply asked 
to maintain effective domestic laws, leaving a lot of leeway to the signatories. A binding obligation to 
                                                          
2144 J. Bourgeois, K. Dawar & S. J. Evenett, “A comparative analysis of selected provisions in free trade agreements”, 
Commissioned by DG TRADE, October 2007, 
http://www.kamaladawar.com/userfiles/file/downloads/A%20Comparative%20Analysis%20of%20Selected%20FTAs.
pdf (accessed February 2017), 176.  
2145 B.A. Melo Araujo, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 236. 
2146 Ibid., 195; H. Tschaeni & V. Engammare, “The Relationship between Trade and Competition in Free Trade 
Agreements: Developments since the 1990s and Challenges”, European Yearbook of International Economic Law , Vol. 4, 
2013, 59. 
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apply the respective competition laws in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner is also 
frequently lacking, with the parties merely ‘recognising the importance’ of doing so. The parties 
therefore are only subject to best endeavour obligations.2147 On the other hand, it must be stated that 
the EU’s FTAs do go beyond provisions regarding hard core cartels, and also include other anti-
competitive practices. In this sense they go beyond what the EU wished to include in the WTO-
framework.2148 In short, while the scope is relative broad, the content of the provisions is rather 
limited.2149 Not only EU FTAs have been reproached of having weak content. The South-Asian Free 
Trade Area, the Australia-US FTA, and the Transatlantic Free Trade Area all have been accused of 
containing general platitudes about the desirability of competition law and regulating anti-
competitive business practices via declarations of intent.2150 
 
1.3.5.3 Unenforceability: exclusion from the Dispute Settlement Mechanism  
 
A dispute settlement mechanism offers several benefits. First of all, it helps interpret an agreement 
and reduce uncertainty about its content, in particular when dealing with complex issues where there 
is more scope for measures that fall in a grey zone between the straightforward allowed and 
straightforward illegal. In this way, the expectations of the parties may be aligned. In case 
adjudication is necessary, this can take place according to an agreed-upon procedure. Adjudication, 
or even the mere threat of it, may have strong reputational consequences.2151 SOKOL claims that “[t]he 
general perception of adjudication is that it creates compliance merely because of the threat of potential use.”2152 
According to international relations literature a formal DSM may increase enforcement of the 
agreement as it assists instilling a sense of ‘international obligation’ in the parties.2153  
 
An obvious downside of negotiating a DSM is the complexity it may bring to the negotiations, and 
the administrative cost of setting up the mechanism. A DSM is generally an issue of contention as it 
is likely to have a large case-load, due to the fact many provisions in and FTA are more or less 
unspecified, and it is likely to shape the practical ambit of the agreement to a large extent. Others 
have warned that it may weaken the forces maintaining system integrity. The reputational cost to the 
losing respondent is not compensated for by an equal gain for the other party, which results in net 
joint costs to the members of the agreement. The gains from situations whereby naming and 
                                                          
2147 B.A. Melo Araujo, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 195, 197.  
2148 S. J. Evenett, “What can we really learn from the competition provisions of regional trade agreements?”, 23 August 
2005, available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.583.9612&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed 
February 2017), 6.  
2149 J. Bourgeois, K. Dawar & S. J. Evenett, “A comparative analysis of selected provisions in free trade agreements”, 
Commissioned by DG TRADE, October 2007, 
http://www.kamaladawar.com/userfiles/file/downloads/A%20Comparative%20Analysis%20of%20Selected%20FTAs.
pdf (accessed February 2017), 171.  The scope in this context refers to the question of whether the competition 
provisions define the anti-competitive conduct they address and if so, what types of anti-competitive conduct, while the 
content refers to the procedural and substantive obligations these provisions entail with respect to the types of anti-
competitive conduct. 
2150 J. Rennie, “Competition regulation in SAFTA, AUSFTA and TAFTA: a spaghetti bowl of competition provisions?”, 
International Trade Law & Regulation, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2007, 32.  
2151 H. Horn and P. Mavroidis, “International trade: dispute settlement” in A. Guzman and A. Sykes (eds), Research 
handbook in international economic law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007, 185-187. 
2152 D. D. Sokol, “Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy 
Chapters in Free Trade Agreements”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2008, 260. It should be mentioned that 
Sokol’s study focuses on Latin American FTAs, but the conclusions are generalizable.  
2153 H. Horn and P. Mavroidis, “International trade: dispute settlement” in A. Guzman and A. Sykes (eds), Research 
handbook in international economic law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007, 186.  
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shaming leads to situations where members abide by the agreement where they otherwise would not 
have, must be weighed against the costs of cases where there is no compliance in any event. The cost 
of having a DSM may moreover by disproportionate, as parties realise that they may either be 
complainant or the respondent and therefore will not set punishments at a deterring level.2154 
 
A) EU- versus other FTAs: competition chapters (near-)universally excluded 
 
While it is generally considered that competition policy chapters in FTAs are binding, this is not 
actually the case in the facts. One feature common to all recent FTAs under scrutiny is that the 
competition provisions are almost consistently excluded from the dispute settlement mechanism 
(DSM), with the exception of some provisions on subsidies.2155 The reason why a distinction is made 
in this regard between competition provisions and subsidies provisions, relates to the fact that the 
EU Courts have exclusive competence to review the European Commission's antitrust and merger 
decisions, on the one hand, while on the other hand, in the context of the WTO SCM Agreement, 
dispute settlement arrangements already exist.2156 This observation does not only apply to FTAs 
concluded by the EU. In the US the DSM generally only applies to practices for which the state as 
the contracting party can be held accountable to a greater or lesser extent, such as the practices of 
monopolies and state-owned enterprises, or violations of transparency obligations.2157  
 
B) Why competition law is different than other chapters, and therefore excluded   
 
This exclusion is quite striking because it contrasts with other chapters in FTAs dealing with behind-
the-border policies, such as chapters on services and intellectual property, even if such chapters 
actually contain some competition elements. One main difference between competition policy and 
other areas of domestic regulation is that the WTO covers most of the latter issues under the 
General Agreement for Trade in Services and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights. For such issues the backstop of WTO-level commitments and dispute 
resolution exists. It is in contrast as well with earlier work on the use of dispute settlement in 
international agreements, which finds that as a problem covered by an international agreement grows 
more complex, its chances of being included in a dispute settlement mechanism grow as well.2158 
According to SOKOL, this exclusion “has created soft law within the guise of a hard law agreement.”2159  
 
The choice to exclude competition chapters from dispute settlement mechanisms is indeed surprising 
and requires clarification, as FTAs constitute full-fledged international treaties subject to burdensome 
procedures.2160 In the EU they are negotiated and concluded under article 207 TFEU. Additional 
legal bases of these agreements may be necessary depending on the content of the FTA’s, which can 
be quite varied. In case trade in services or commercial aspects of intellectual property rights are 
included, unanimity of the Council is required apart from the consent of the European 
                                                          
2154 Ibid., 184-189.  
2155 The EU-Mexico FTA is an example where the DSM seems to include competition.  
2156 Interview of Johannes Laitenberger by François-Charles Laprévote, Concurrences Review, mailing 12 April 2016. 
2157 H. Tschaeni & V. Engammare, “The Relationship between Trade and Competition in Free Trade Agreements: 
Developments since the 1990s and Challenges”, European Yearbook of International Economic Law , Vol. 4, 2013, 58.  
2158 D. D. Sokol, “Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy 
Chapters in Free Trade Agreements”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2008, 234, 254-255, 257.  
2159 Ibid., 256. 
2160 R. Ahearn, “Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications”, CRS Report for Congress, 
3 March 2011, 3. 
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Parliament.2161 Furthermore, sometimes elements are included in an FTA that constitute a 
competence of the member states, which can cause FTA’s to become mixed agreements (see below, 
Part III, 1.4.2.4).2162 The question therefore poses itself why such chapters are included in the first 
place (see below, Part III, 1.3.1).2163  
 
a. The means are unsuited for the end   
 
A first reason why competition provisions are excluded from dispute settlement, is that such 
conflict-resolution is simply not suited to reach what the provisions set forth. Competition chapters 
in FTAs may for instance aim to increase cooperation among competition agencies by creating space 
for and add legitimacy to repeat interaction. In such a situation formal dispute resolution does not 
add to this goal. Even more, such repeat interaction may in turn lead to the resolution of substantive 
competition law issues, decreasing the need for formal dispute-resolution even more. In an area in 
which cooperation and coordination between agencies is necessary, the legal battles that may occur 
within more formalized institutions dealing primarily with trade remedies might force agencies to 
side with their countries which in turn could create ill will between agencies. Another goal of the 
inclusion of competition chapters is to symbolically indicate the importance of competition and 
thereby create a certain reputational and branding effect. In this case as well, a lack of formal 
enforcement of competition policy chapters through adjudication does not detract from its value. 
Parties that do not comply with the commitments made in the agreement may suffer certain 
reputational effects, which may for instance result in unwillingness to enter into future agreements 
with that party. As such, mere reputational effects and social pressure, or ‘relational contracting’ can 
                                                          
2161 Art. 207(4) TFEU.  
2162 For instance, the KOREU FTA included a protocol related to cultural matters, making it a mixed agreement. “Mixed 
agreements are agreements to which both the EU and the member states are contracting parties on the basis that their joint participation is 
required, because not all matters covered by the agreement fall exclusively within EU competence or exclusively within member state 
competence.” P. Craig & G. de Búrca, EU Law - Text, Cases and Materials, 5th ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 
334. This is a very basic description of what is in fact a very complex matter. For more information, see C. Hillion & P. 
Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010. 
2163 While the exclusion of competition chapters from dispute settlement is rather straightforward in the Post-Global-
Europe FTAs, this is not the case in the ‘traditional’ FTAs. However, even if competition is not entirely excluded from 
the DSM, the application is often somewhat problematic. For instance, in the FTA with South Africa, which contains 
rather detailed and strict provisions on dispute settlement, in particular for trade or trade-related issues (including the 
clauses on competition), parties may take ‘appropriate measures’ if a practice is deemed incompatible with the agreement, 
but no further definitions are provided. The Agreement moreover explicitly recognizes the competence of both 
competition authorities to act, making it unclear how dispute settlement would apply. Finally, the Agreement does not 
define what happens in case a party does not comply with a Council decision. (J. Bourgeois, “Competition Policy: the 
Poor Relation in the European Union Free Trade Agreements” in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege & S. Adam 
(eds), The European Union in the World – Essays in honour of Marc Maresceau, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2014, 390–391, 395. Also see A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, 139.) Joint Council decision 2/2000 accompanying the EU-Mexico FTA equally 
introduces a rather sophisticated DSM that also applies to the provisions on competition law. Annex XV to this Joint 
Council Decision, however, establishes a cooperation and coordination mechanism among the states’ competition 
authorities, including the possibility for consultations when an investigation is considered to affect the interest of the 
other party. This emphasis on cooperation and coordination is reiterated in Article 7. BOURGEOIS deducted from this 
that “even though no express prohibition on the use of the arbitration procedure in this case exists, the generally worded co-operation provisions 
are regarded in practice as not legally binding by state officials”. (J. Bourgeois, “Competition Policy: the Poor Relation in the 
European Union Free Trade Agreements” in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege & S. Adam (eds), The European 
Union in the World – Essays in honour of Marc Maresceau, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, 390-391) 
Similarly to the EU-South Africa agreement, the EU-Mexico Agreement does not define what happens in case a party 
does not comply with a Council decision. (Ibid., 390–391, 395. Also see A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of 
EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 139.) 
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lead to credible commitments without having to result to ‘formal contracting’. When looking at 
international competition enforcement as a repeat game in which the number of repetitions is 
unknown and the discount rate is low, in a game theory model, the optimal strategy consists of 
cooperation.2164 Additionally, competition law mainly addresses private behaviour rather than public 
behaviour, while trade law is generally geared towards government restraints. Dispute resolution 
among states is therefore not useful.  
 
b. A priori unenforceable provisions  
 
One could say that competition provisions in FTAs are not enforceable because they are excluded 
from the DSM. However, one could also reverse the causality, and claim that the provisions are 
excluded because they are inherently unenforceable. The main factor explaining the exclusion of 
competition chapters from the FTA DSMs is perhaps simply the fact that while technically 
competition-related obligations in an FTA may be binding, they may nevertheless be 
unenforceable.2165 ARAUJO finds that there is “an apparent gap between the EU’s rhetoric, which emphasizes 
the importance of linking trade and competition policy, and the reality of the EU’s external trade practice in the EU 
DCFTAs,” evidenced by the fact that even though the TFEU competition rules have to a certain 
extent inspired the EU DCFTAs, most provisions are worded in general and unenforceable terms.2166 
 
Some interpret the exclusion from the DSM as evidence that competition chapters merely contain 
‘best endeavour’ commitments.2167 In this case, there is indeed not much to gain from “arbitrating ‘best 
endeavour’ principles that merely encourage the application of effective domestic competition laws or cooperation 
principles”.2168 Many of the competition provisions in EU FTAs do not lend themselves to dispute 
settlement proceedings as they are too vague or enforcement is difficult to monitor.2169 Norms of 
aspiration and norms of obligation are mixed, and the level of precision of the obligations varies 
considerably as well.2170 Many of the competition-related obligations in FTAs are not normative and 
do no proscribe clear standards or procedures, leaving many aspects open to interpretation. This in 
turn renders the establishment of non-compliance to be problematic. One could consider the 
competition chapters in the EU’s FTAs as ‘framework laws’, often characterised by declarations of 
                                                          
2164 D. D. Sokol, “Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy 
Chapters in Free Trade Agreements”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2008, 260, 265-266, 270, 281.  
2165 J. Bourgeois, “Competition Policy: the Poor Relation in the European Union Free Trade Agreements” in I. Govaere, 
E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege & S. Adam (eds), The European Union in the World – Essays in honour of Marc Maresceau, 
Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, 396. 
2166 B.A. Melo Araujo, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 180. 
2167 J. Bourgeois, “Competition Policy: the Poor Relation in the European Union Free Trade Agreements” in I. Govaere, 
E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege & S. Adam (eds), The European Union in the World – Essays in honour of Marc Maresceau, 
Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, 394. 
2168 Ibid., 392, footnote 56. On the debate on the qualification of obligations as hard or soft law, see V. Demedts, La 
coopération internationale entre les autorités de concurrence: ‘Entre le marteau et l’enclume’? Revue de l’Union européenne, Vol. 575, No. 2, 
2014, 101-109. 
2169 J. Bourgeois, K. Dawar & S. J. Evenett, “A comparative analysis of selected provisions in free trade agreements”, 
Commissioned by DG TRADE, October 2007, 
http://www.kamaladawar.com/userfiles/file/downloads/A%20Comparative%20Analysis%20of%20Selected%20FTAs.
pdf (accessed February 2017), 182. Also see J. Rennie, “Competition provisions in free trade agreements: unique 
responses to bilateral needs or derivative developments in international competition policy?”, International Trade Law & 
Regulation, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2009, 67. 
2170 On this matter, see J. Bourgeois, “Competition Policy: the Poor Relation in the European Union Free Trade 
Agreements” in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege & S. Adam (eds), The European Union in the World – Essays in 
honour of Marc Maresceau, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, 391-394. 
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intent, sometimes expanded on with vague standards and generalised clauses. While allowing 
maximum flexibility and responsiveness, they are inherently discretionary.2171 In this context 
CERNAT, after noting that there was no reliable information available on whether competition 
chapters in FTAs make a difference, came to the conclusion that the parties to FTAs seem more 
eager to conclude such agreements, rather than to implement them.2172 
 
The fact that competition provisions are generally unenforceable does not in itself however provide 
justification for the exclusion from the DSM. The Bruegel study ‘Beyond the WTO? An anatomy of 
EU and US preferential trade agreements’, found that EU FTAs scored lower than US FTAs with 
regard to the enforceability of their WTO-extra provisions, even if generally the EU agreements 
contain a larger number of such provisions. In US Agreements the exemption of competition-related 
disciplines from dispute settlement was identified as the main source of non-enforceability. In total, 
the study found only 13% of the covered US provisions to be non-enforceable, compared to nearly 
75% of provisions in EU agreements.2173 Not all of these ‘unenforceable’ provisions in EU FTAs are 
then automatically excluded from the DSM. 
 
c. Trade is not the same as competition  
 
When the EU suggested dispute settlement for competition matters within the context in the WTO, 
the fear existed that WTO panels would be empowered to undermine the decisions, and thereby the 
prosecutorial discretion, of national competition authorities and courts. It was never the intention of 
the EU, however, to provide panels with the power to second-guess individual decisions. The panels 
would rather focus exclusively on whether the legislation and enforcement structure of a member are 
in accordance with its WTO commitments and on cases where a ‘pattern of non-enforcement’ could 
be identified. These intentions, however, did not remove the doubts regarding the risk that such an 
arrangement could eventually dominate domestic competition laws.2174 It was confirmed by DG 
COMP officials that it is a politically highly sensitive issue.2175 The same rationale can be discerned 
with regard to the exclusion of competition chapters from the DSM in bilateral FTAs, in that those 
provisions should not impinge on the competence of the competition authorities to decide on the 
anti-competitive nature of a given practice. Moreover, in comparison to trade law, competition law is 
a relatively new policy field for many jurisdictions, which may also add to the fact that there is 
wariness from those partner countries towards hard adjudication.2176 Equally, the lack of existing 
international minimum rules means that the barrier to give up sovereignty is higher than if there was 
                                                          
2171 J. Rennie, “Competition regulation in SAFTA, AUSFTA and TAFTA: a spaghetti bowl of competition provisions?”, 
International Trade Law & Regulation, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2007, 32, 35.  
2172 L. Cernat, “Eager To Ink But Ready To Act? RTA Proliferation and International Cooperation on Competition 
Policy” in A.M. Alvarez & L. Cernat (eds) Trade and Competition Issues: experiences at regional level, UNCTAD, as mentioned 
in P. Holmes, A. Papadopoulos, B. Özgür Kayali & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition 
Cooperation Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for 
International Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 
December 2005, 6-7.  
2173 H. Horn, P. Mavroidis & A. Sapir, “Beyond the WTO? An anatomy of EU and US preferential trade agreements”, 
Bruegel Blueprint Series, Vol. VII, 2009, 25. 
2174 B.A. Melo Araujo, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 187-188.  
2175 Interview with Commission officials. 
2176 H. Tschaeni & V. Engammare, “The Relationship between Trade and Competition in Free Trade Agreements: 
Developments since the 1990s and Challenges”, European Yearbook of International Economic Law , Vol. 4, 2013, 62.  
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already some sort of international base-line representing some form of substantive convergence.2177 If 
there was such an agreement, the cost of a binding commitment would decrease as it would likely 
represent a smaller departure from the domestic system.2178  
 
Apart from the consequences for sovereignty from the submission to a DSM as such, the members 
composing the panels under such mechanisms may cause apprehension as well. Such panels will 
predominantly consist of trade experts. The latter may have a different approach and pursue 
different goals (see below, Part III, 1.3.2.2). While antitrust and international trade have overlapping 
concerns, they nevertheless remain distinct. Trade experts may focus more on producer welfare 
rather than efficiency concerns, which may lead competition authorities to be reluctant to let trade 
experts decide on antitrust matters and prefer that cross-border antitrust disputes are resolved via 
discussions at the inter-agency level, where agencies speak a similar language.2179  
 
D) Consultations  
 
The alternative for conflict-resolution via formal dispute settlement is often found in the form of 
consultations between the parties.2180 In earlier EU FTAs such consultations took place in Joint 
Committees with the clear objective of reaching a solution to the problem related to the competition 
provisions, while more recent EU FTAs as well as US FTAs generally provide in general terms for 
consultations to foster understanding between the parties and address specific matters, sometimes 
underlining the autonomy of the parties regarding the final decision on the issues subject to 
consultations.2181  
 
The consultations procedure is not seen as a second best solution. From negotiating drafts of EU 
FTAs is apparent that it is explicit EU policy to subject disagreements relating to competition law 
provisions to non-binding consultation procedures. It is not against the will of the EU that 
competition law is kept outside of the DSM, even if it advocated such a situation in the past. During 
the CETA-negotiations, Canada even advocated including the competition chapter under the DSM, 
but the EU stressed that competition issues should only be subject to consultations. In the final 
version of the Agreement there is even no mention whatsoever of a consultation procedure for 
issues arising under the competition chapter (apart from subsidies).2182   
 
The submission of competition issues to a consultation procedure does create some problems, 
however. As competition provisions may be spread throughout one agreement, both inside as well as 
                                                          
2177 D. D. Sokol, “Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy 
Chapters in Free Trade Agreements”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2008, 260-261.  
2178 J. Bourgeois, “Competition Policy: the Poor Relation in the European Union Free Trade Agreements” in I. Govaere, 
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outside of the competition chapter, for instance in sector-specific chapters, it may occur that the 
competition chapter is excluded from the dispute settlement procedures but the sector-specific 
chapter is not. The question then arises whether the other party should then have recourse to dispute 
settlement, or first allow consultations between competition authorities. This situation is generally 
not addressed by FTAs. One exception is the US-Singapore FTA, which states, with regard to the 
telecommunications services chapter, that when there is an inconsistency with another chapter, the 
telecommunications chapter shall override the other chapter to the extent of the inconsistency.2183   
 
1.4 The rationale for inclusion: pro’s and con’s   
 
The increased awareness of the importance of competition provisions has resulted in a growing 
emphasis on such provisions in FTAs. Many scholars claim that the main determinant for the 
inclusion of a competition chapter in an FTA, as well as a predictor of the success of such a chapter, 
seems to be the absence or presence of antitrust laws in the legal system of both parties at the time 
of concluding the agreement.2184 A study by GERADIN and PETIT confirmed that it is not so much 
the text of the agreement that determines its functioning as whether or not there is an operational 
competition authority present.2185 BOURGEOIS as well asserts that even though all recent bilateral 
FTAs concluded by the EU include competition provisions, the degree of detail seems to vary along 
the trading partners’ domestic competition legislation, combined with the occurrence and level of 
enforcement institutions and regulating bodies.2186 This is rather evident. Cooperation provisions or 
provisions demanding that a competition law system adopts certain qualities would be of little use if 
the partner country does not have competition rules to begin with.2187 An additional factor is whether 
or not parties to the FTA have concluded competition agreements outside FTAs, affecting the need, 
nature and urgency of competition provisions in FTAs. 
 
1.4.1 The different roles of competition chapters in FTAs 
 
There is much debate about the role of competition provisions in FTAs, because little is known 
about their functioning, and it is difficult to establish causality.2188 Only very few studies exist on the 
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actual effects of certain behind-the-border aspects of FTAs, including competition and state aid.2189 
In 2007, the ICN found that only very few of the respondents replying to their questionnaire on 
cooperation between competition agencies in cartel cases reported any examples of cooperation 
based on the competition provisions in FTAs, causing them to conclude that competition chapters in 
FTAs seem to have played only a limited role in such cooperation efforts.2190 Nevertheless, a few 
rationales for their inclusion may be discerned.   
 
1.4.1.1 Support trade enhancing objectives and avoid the undermining of trade liberalization 
 
Competition provisions are generally not included in an FTA for their intrinsic value. The most 
straightforward reason to include competition law provisions in a trade agreement is, as mentioned, 
that negotiators of FTAs are aware of the fact that the benefits of trade liberalization can be undone 
by private anti-competitive practices, and recognize the need to adequately address such actions, 
thereby guaranteeing that such private barriers do not undermine the removal of public restraints to 
local market access.2191 Competition is a powerful policy instrument able to shape the structure and 
operation of market economies.2192 Moreover, the development of economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare that comes along with competition laws contributes to the overall aim of trade 
liberalization.2193 This explains why the inclusion of competition provisions in an FTA is most often 
justified as a measure to support the trade enhancing objectives of the agreement. It aims to harness 
the potential synergies between trade and competition policy, and contributes a more just ‘balance’ in 
trade agreements between the rights of producers and the protection of consumers and other 
members of society.2194 Moreover, the inclusion of competition policy suits the aim of DCFTAs to 
create a true and encompassing ‘economic partnership’.2195 
 
1.4.1.2 Symbolic value  
 
As discussed, competition chapters are typically excluded from the dispute settlement mechanism 
included in an FTA. Why then, do countries spend time and resources in negotiating such chapters? 
The answer may lie in their symbolic value in promoting pro-competitive reform and a ‘competition 
culture’. This message may be addressed both to foreign investors, indicating that regulatory 
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liberalization and a competitive environment are considered important, as well as to the domestic 
institutions and the general population.2196 RENNIE, referring to REUTER, points to the distinction 
between the legal and sociological aspects of a treaty, whereby “The significance of the competition 
provisions cannot be judged from their effects in law alone. […] They need to be looked at through the paradigm of 
international law (rather than a more ‘legalist paradigm’).”2197 Aspirational statements in international 
agreements may in this way create compliance by helping to shape and implement norms.2198  
 
1.4.1.3 Facilitate relations between competition authorities 
 
The inclusion of competition chapters in an FTA may create opportunities for direct contact 
between antitrust agency staff, to develop personal and institutional ties. It may promote (voluntary) 
cooperation between the competition agencies of participating parties. According to HOLMES, 
PAPADOPOULOS, KAYALI and SYDORAK, cooperation between EU and South African competition 
agencies for instance functioned relatively well, but the intensity depended entirely on particular 
individuals. Research from 2005 showed that only one person in the South African Competition 
Commission had personal ties with a colleague in Brussels and that in the absence of a formal 
cooperation arrangement those were the only two people among which contact would be possible. 
From this perspective, a formal agreement facilitates (informal) relations between all officials 
involved.2199 FTAs in this sense offer a proper basis to cooperate and function as a catalyst, without 
which some agencies would not engage.2200 This is particularly useful for less experienced 
competition authorities, with whom no dedicated competition cooperation agreement would be 
concluded. It is therefore important that the implementation of such agreements is well-documented, 
to provide empirical evidence for such statements.  
 
1.4.1.4 Circumvent deadlock in multilateral or regional negotiations and precedent setting 
 
Some claim that the EU attempts to do in bilateral FTAs what it could not accomplish at the 
WTO.2201 FTAs then represent the ‘best alternative to a negotiated multilateral agreement’. FTAs 
may be strategically cultivated by states to enhance this best alternative, and therefore also their 
leverage in multilateral negotiations.2202 Overall the content of the EU DCFTAs is consistent with the 
EU’s position in the Doha Round. The DCFTAs pursue deep integration by addressing diverse 
regulatory issues apart from trade sensu stricto. It was confirmed that as it was not possible to unblock 
the WTO from the inside, the strategy is to do so from the outside, with the inclusion of competition 
chapters in FTAs as part of this strategy. The EU-US TTIP agreement is called ‘a necessary 
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condition’ to move forward in the WTO, and is compared to the Franco-German tandem dynamic 
within the EU.2203 The EU does face some criticism, however, that it is still striving to promote 
multilateral rules, but has given up on the multilateral process.2204 TSCHAENI and ENGAMMARE 
concluded that “[g]iven that it is reasonably clear that there will be no comprehensive multilateral rules on 
competition in the WTO in the near future, FTAs provide the natural venue to address such issues.”2205 Some 
believe that bilateral advocacy for a robust global competition policy is easier than in a multilateral 
context. It can be seen as a strategy to break up the WTO-deadlock from the outside rather than 
from within. FTAs can then be considered as laboratories for experimentation and the experience 
gained can be used to persuade others. FTAs could indeed entice other parties to join by developing 
new rules.2206 They could create advocates of a robust competition policy at the global level, which in 
turn may increase the chances that FTA may help set standards above those currently in the 
WTO.2207 
 
This justification for bilateral and regional trade agreements is known as the ‘building block theory’. 
It is referred to when explaining why regional trade agreements are tolerated by the WTO even 
though they have trade diverting effects. The building block theory itself is a manifestation of the 
broader concept of political consensus-building in public choice theory, under which consensus in 
smaller groups will lead to consensus among a larger cluster via negotiations, trade-offs and political 
logrolling.2208 In a Commission staff working document that formed an annex to the Global Europe 
Communication, it was stated that FTAs could, among other things, “prepare the ground for future global 
trade rounds,” thereby forming a stepping stone for multilateral liberalization.2209 Bilateral agreements 
do of course have their own particularities, and therefore their content cannot simply be transferred 
lock, stock and barrel to the multilateral level.2210 There is debate, however, on whether FTAs are 
truly beneficial to the development of multilateral trade rules. The building-block theory is opposed 
by the stumbling-block theory. Those opposed to bilateral FTAs are point to the discriminatory 
nature of such agreements, and the level of complexity and uncertainty they bring to the international 
business world. It is moreover claimed that competitive liberalisation has not boosted the multilateral 
trading system in the numbers.2211 
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According to ARAUJO “[t]he EU’s current external trade practice confirms the view that bilateralism is used by 
trading powers to override the irksome developing country opposition in the multilateral context”.2212 Because of a 
lack of binding multilateral rules in the field of competition law, sovereignty concerns are voiced 
more strongly, making the negotiation of enforceable clauses very difficult, resulting in a more 
flexible and indirect approach.2213 It is telling that many of the same countries that protested against 
the negotiations of a binding multilateral framework on competition policy during the Doha trade 
round, have indeed signed binding international rules on competition law and policy in bilateral or 
regional trade agreements.2214 HILPOLD equally pointed out that “states that have opposed the insertion of 
competition provisions in WTO law appear not to have had any problem in agreeing to such rules on a regional 
level.”2215 It has been claimed that “some developing country negotiators were well aware of the potentially precedent 
setting nature of competition provisions in RTAs for discussions on a multilateral framework in the WTO.”2216 
Perhaps after the collapse of such multilateral negotiations, this reticence has diminished in a bilateral 
context. Another explanation, put forward by TSCHAENI and ENGAMMARE, is that WTO 
negotiations failed due to feared imbalances in and overload of the agenda rather than true 
opposition on substantive issues.2217 This might explain why the same objections do not recur in 
FTA negotiations. Finally, there is less uncertainty today about the nature of international 
competition law enforcement and the ensuing challenges then there were at the time of WTO 
negotiations.2218  
 
1.4.1.5 Influence of business 
 
Multilateral companies are not mere bystanders in the process of globalisation. It is possible that 
international businesses have pushed for competition provisions in FTAs. Including a competition 
chapter in an FTA may have a certain reputational and branding effect about the importance of 
competition policy to a country’s economy. This in turn may result in incentives for foreign 
investors, who will prefer a competitively neutral business environment in an open economy with 
consistent regulation.2219 Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that FTA provisions relating to 
competition law, in particular those relating to transparency, positively influence the amount of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to a country. Competition provisions in FTAs seem to have 
a positive impact on the value of inward cross-border mergers and acquisitions, for instance.2220 On 
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the contrary, an OECD impact study indicated that competition-reducing policies resulted in less 
investments and consumption by approximately 15% compared to competitive levels.2221 However, 
other anecdotal evidence from an investment treaty context indicates that competition policy 
chapters do not influence country or agency behaviour.2222  
 
1.4.1.6 Regulatory export of own model and approximation to the acquis  
 
Engaging with newer competition authorities via specialized bilateral agreements can be risky, as the 
necessary trust might be lacking between the competition authorities. An alternative therefore can be 
the inclusion of competition provisions in FTAs to influence the content of competition laws in 
countries with a dissimilar competition system, while at the same time increasing the importance of 
one’s own competition system in the global scheme.2223 In the context of the ENP in particular, 
FTAs can form a suitable vehicle to approximate the signatories’ competition laws to that of the EU. 
The EU in particular has the reputation of using its negotiating power in FTAs to export its acquis, in 
particular in the case of association agreements. Bilateralism can then be regarded as “a strategy used by 
economically strong states in order to increase their power over their weaker co-signing parties”.2224 ARAUJO does 
find, however, that the EU fails to recognize that not all disciplines it seeks to include in its DCFTAs 
are necessarily welfare enhancing for developing countries.2225 The EU is therefore vulnerable to 
accusations of packaging self-interested regulatory reforms as development-friendly policies.2226 
 
Even though competition provisions are not always very detailed in the FTA itself, this does not 
necessarily mean that there is no approximation in reality. Young competition jurisdictions such as 
Moldova for instance, may count on continued guidance of the EU Commission in the development 
of their competition laws and enforcement, in particular with regard to state aid (the EU-Moldova 
Agreement explicitly refers to Article 107 TFEU, and foresees that the matters of the competition 
chapter should be kept ‘under constant review’, and the implementation should be assessed every 
two years). However, one could say that this type of integration is rather the exception. The EU does 
not seem to use its DCFTAs to aggressively promote its own norms, even if competition policy has 
become a regular component of FTAs and even if evidently the acquis shapes the EU’s negotiating 
position.2227 Moreover, in many instances, the EU’s trade partners have already enacted EU-inspired 
competition legislation. In this case, the competition provisions in FTAs mainly serve then to lock in 
domestic competition law systems and to disseminate more broad international regulatory principles 
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(see below, Part III, 1.4.1.7).2228 Most often the broad-termed competition provisions in the EU’s 
FTAs will not entail any significant harmonisation.2229   
 
1.4.1.7 Promote and lock-in domestic reform 
 
It is rightly claimed that domestically, one of the main benefits of behind-the-border measures in 
FTAs is that they may facilitate domestic policy reforms, by providing the means to overcome 
domestic constituencies that could otherwise block the reform process.2230 SOKOL agrees that 
competition law chapters in FTAs are aimed in particular at strengthening domestic antitrust 
systems. They do so by creating an international lever to push reforms and commitments that would 
not be possible in absence of international support, due to objections and political capture by 
domestic interest groups.2231 Support of other competition authorities that are better equipped than 
sector regulators to oppose such capture may increase domestic independence. Such domestic 
support is all the more important because “the contribution of competition policy to the management of 
globalization is inevitably less direct and more difficult to bring across than trade policy measures”, in particular 
after the financial crisis, necessitating competition authorities to defend and advocate the legitimacy 
of their policies.2232 Including competition provisions in the broader framework of an FTA may 
decrease the risk of misusing or instrumentalising competition law to advance goals which go beyond 
the competitive process as understood by many, such as industrial policies or to advance political 
agendas and protectionism, as was allegedly the case for instance when Coca-Cola’s bid for China 
Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd was blocked.2233 When such instrumentalisation is coupled with politically 
dependent enforcement structures, this may lead to arbitrary and unpredictable competition 
policy.2234 The impact will, however, remain relatively limited as the provisions are excluded from the 
dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
Apart from pushing for domestic reform, it may also increase domestic legitimacy in general, and aid 
competition agencies to pursue their mission.2235 The inclusion of a competition chapter in a high-
profile FTA may strengthen the legal status of the competition agency, thereby increasing popular or 
interest group-based support for the enforcement of competition law, which may in turn lead to 
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more resources being granted by the national legislature to such an agency.2236 Competition 
provisions in FTAs may create political imperative to act. They have the ability to provide 
competition law with a higher profile and greater legitimacy, thereby creating some sense of 
urgency.2237 More than that, they may even offer guidance in the agenda setting of younger agencies, 
thereby stimulating the emergence of legislation.2238 Finally, the inclusion of competition provisions 
in an FTA makes it politically and economically more costly for successive governments to depart 
from the policy choices made at the time of the agreement.2239  
 
Domestic reforms can therefore be pushed, locked in, or reinforced via FTAs.2240 As younger 
competition agencies lack a significant track record, concluding dedicated agreements might be too 
risky and difficult. Including competition chapters in FTAs with these countries might then even the 
path for possible further cooperation in the future, and may even lead to a domino effect, spreading 
a competition culture even further and increasing opportunities for more cooperation.2241 When the 
regulators, in casu the competition agencies, are involved in the negotiations, this may moreover lead 
to more suited tailoring, which is responsive to agency concerns and a country's political economy 
situation, and therefore also lead to increased buy-in and better implementation, even without 
dispute settlement.2242 This potential for domestic reform is often referred to as one of the principal, 
if not the primary, benefits of trade agreements aimed at measures beyond the border.2243  
 
1.4.1.8 Genuine desire to safeguard market competition  
 
According to TSCHAENI and ENGAMMARE, the shape of cooperation provisions should be moulded 
by their particular purpose, whether it is case-cooperation, generally improving the parties’ 
knowledge of each other’s competition regime, or providing technical assistance. Accordingly, the 
emphasis and the wording of the provisions should be different, depending on whether the 
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2243 See J. Bourgeois, K. Dawar & S. J. Evenett, “A comparative analysis of selected provisions in free trade agreements”, 
Commissioned by DG TRADE, October 2007, 
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agreement focuses on eliminating anti-competitive practices that undermine the benefits of trade 
liberalization or assisting the respective authorities to cooperate with each other.2244 
 
While it was mentioned before that competition provisions in FTAs are often included in support of 
trade objectives, a study by BRADFORD and BÜTHE indicated that the type of competition provisions 
most often found in FTAs, namely those promoting transgovernmental regulatory cooperation and 
effective competition law enforcement more generally, indicate a genuine desire by governments – or 
at least regulators – to safeguard market competition in an international environment. According to 
them transgovernmental cooperation presupposes substantial capacity of a competition regulator, 
which would be translated in provisions that ensure or increase regulatory capacity at the national 
level. Such commitments could include the devotion of resources to enforcement, the establishment 
and maintenance of an independent enforcement agency, and reciprocal or unilateral technical 
capacity-building assistance. On balance provisions suggesting a deep concern with enhanced 
enforcement cooperation were observed with greater frequency.2245 Provisions aimed at constraining 
competition regulators and aimed at forestalling strategic use of domestic competition policy for 
protectionist purposes and discriminatory enforcement of competition law appear less frequently in 
the sample of FTAs used by BRADFORD and BÜTHE.2246  
 
1.4.2 Reasons not to integrate competition provisions in FTAs  
 
While competition chapters in FTAs certainly have a role to play, one should ask whether the 
benefits are worth the costs. Such costs are certainly present. BOURGEOIS, DAWAR, and EVENETT in 
2007 interviewed representatives of leading European civil society organisations about the merits of 
competition and state aid provisions in FTAs. Reactions ranged from minor enthusiasm to outright 
opposition. Many preferred other venues in which cooperation between competition agencies should 
be furthered and considered competition provisions to be a distraction from the central negotiating 
agenda of FTAs. Other concerns related to the effect of non-discrimination clauses in competition 
and state aid provisions on developing countries, preventing them from taking measures to promote 
their promising industries.2247   
 
1.4.2.1 Larger Political Economy Context – Issue Trading  
 
The decision to include a competition chapter in trade negotiations depends on the priorities and 
desires of potential signatories (moulded to a smaller or larger extent by the interests of lobbyists and 
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business groups) and how these desires play out within a larger political economy context. This may 
entail that competition chapters risk to become just another pawn in the game of issue-linking.2248 An 
unpopular policy reform proposal is linked with popular policy reforms in other sectors in a ‘package 
deal’ in an attempt to secure domestic acceptance. The downside of this mechanism, however, is that 
the negotiated compromise often does not reflect commonly defined supranational interests or a true 
compromise, but rather the relative bargaining power of the parties. In this manner, by using 
competing interests between policy realms as functionalist trade-offs to achieve political equilibrium, 
politics to a certain extent dictates the content of the resulting policy.2249 While this may lead to 
benefits and progress in the negotiations, the opposite may also be true. SOKOL finds, based on 
discussions with trade and antitrust negotiators, that the inclusion of competition chapters in FTAs is 
sometimes indeed explained by more ad hoc, case-specific reasons.2250 An agreement that combines 
elements of both industrial policy and state aid issues, is unavoidably complex and requires certain 
choices. FTAs may be used by more powerful parties to spread the reach of certain domestic 
standards, not because they are the preferred better practice, but because of the increased leverage in 
bilateral negotiations of that stronger party.2251 The generic benefit of having one more pawn in the 
game of issue-trading by including competition provisions in an FTA does not outweigh the risks of 
incorporating a matter where there is substantial disagreement on the fundamentals into an already 
complicated trade context. 
 
This was illustrated by the attempt to include competition in the WTO. The main reasons that the 
WTO-negotiations failed were not directly correlated to substantial competition law-related 
objections. An agenda relating to industrial policy, and dissatisfaction with the negotiations on 
agriculture, combined with a level of information asymmetry will have played a large role in the 
opposition of developing countries as well. DAMRO in this context points to the dangers of issue-
linkage. GALLAGHER rightly identified the so-called ‘single undertaking’ as the main culprit. As 
mentioned, not everyone agreed with the priority given to the new Singapore issues, with many 
unresolved matters still on the table, and felt that it was an attempt to hastily force certain issues 
through (see above, Part I, 3.3.3.2).   
 
On the one hand, in the context of the TTIP negotiations it has been said that while two thirds of 
the agreement consists of non-tariff barriers, this does not necessarily mean that there will be a give-
and-take that will automatically result in a lowering of standards.2252 On the other hand, the fact that 
some element of give-and-take plays when negotiating an FTA can be deducted from the fact that 
some FTAs concluded by developing countries contain elements to which the latter opposed during 
the WTO negotiations and therefore do not match up with the earlier stated preferences of those 
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developing countries.2253 If competition provisions are included in an FTA as a consequence of issue-
trading, in particular if this happened as a result of an imbalance in negotiation power, this may lead 
to “an imbalance in expertise in fields requiring detailed knowledge and training.”2254 It is crucial then that there 
is sufficient follow-up and guidance, or the agreement may actually undermine a healthy competition 
culture. If competition rules are ‘imposed’ on countries that are not ready because they are included 
in an ‘FTA-package’, this will not contribute to the development of strong and convergent 
competition regimes.”2255   
 
1.4.2.2 Trade and competition are not the same 
 
As mentioned, while trade and competition law may complement each other, they are not the same, 
nor are the preferences of the respective negotiators. Competition rules in competition cooperation 
agreements are seen by DG COMP as means to avoid conflicting regulatory decisions among 
proliferating national competition regimes, while DG Trade promotes competition rules in FTAs as 
a means to open markets and prevent private barriers from replacing public barriers to trade. The 
priorities and issue-linkage preferences of DG Trade, when pursuing non-trade goals within the 
WTO for instance, were different than those of DG COMP. According to DAMRO, DG COMP is 
wary of issue linkages as they potentially increase the likelihood of political intervention. 2256 Some of 
the US’s reservations during the WTO talks on the potential inclusion of competition law were in 
fact shared by officials from DG COMP, who, according to ARAUJO considered their colleagues at 
DG Trade ill-equipped to fully apprehend the complexities surrounding competition issues.2257   
 
Competition rules cannot be negotiated through the conventional procedure used for removing trade 
barriers, namely exchanging concessions, as competition law enforcement depends on the domestic 
agency’s enforcement capacities.2258 While the regulators are involved in the negotiations of 
DCFTAs,2259 the fact remains that DG Trade is the main DG in charge of these negotiations, not 
DG COMP. The Commission indeed is not a unitary actor, and combines different policy objectives 
and consequently differing preferences concerning the most appropriate venue for international 
cooperation.2260 Depending on who takes the lead in drafting the initial template, potential 
commitments in competition policy chapters may be different, and their effectiveness depends on 
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competition agency support. Trade negotiators may also experience a different kind of pressure to 
reach agreement, which may influence their policy choices. In this way “[t]he inclusion of provisions that 
may create contention in what is a second order chapter […] may not be a priority for the trade negotiators.”2261 Even 
if intra-institutional consultations are held, the final trade-offs may still be to the dissatisfaction of 
DG COMP. 
 
1.4.2.3 Politicisation  
 
Operational independence of competition authorities is recognised international standard.2262 Cases 
with conflicting decisions, such as Boeing/McDonnell Douglas underlined the importance of economic 
analysis and legal rules, wary of political influence and intertwined issues of trade policy, which 
should not come into play when scrutinising a transaction.2263 Former EU Competition 
Commissioner MARIO MONTI declared that competition decisions are “a matter of law and economics”, 
and should be resolved as such, without political intervention to resolve a dispute.2264 Competition 
law, however, is not apolitical. On the contrary, it entails the use of political power to constrain or 
even redistribute economic power and is therefore inherently political.2265 Politics can come into play 
via the allocation of resources, the appointment of officials, etcetera. In the US in 1971, president 
NIXON even threatened to pursue the television networks ABC, NBC, and CBS on antitrust grounds 
in order to decrease their negative media coverage, turning the threat of an antitrust suit into a 
political tool.2266 The effect that competition legislation may have on undertakings’ strategies and 
profit margins, makes it a central target of lobbying efforts, both with regard to the discouraging or 
encouraging enforcement action as well as with regard to the analytical framework prescribed by the 
law and economic theory and followed by the competition agency.2267 One particular risk that comes 
along with the inclusion of competition provisions in trade agreements is increased exposure to such 
politicisation, while simultaneously it is a good reason to include them in an international agreement. 
 
Some claim that trade policy has become more political after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
treaty. Trade policy has always been closely intertwined with (geo)politics. Trade agreements cover a 
wide array of topics, thereby attracting the attention from different interest groups. RENNIE rightly 
states that free trade agreements are not merely trade documents, but have become multifaceted 
political documents.2268 Thereby, trade itself is creating political waves. The move to a more 
regulatory-aimed trade policy has influenced the treaty-making process. Some consider the 
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involvement of the Parliament a nuisance due to its lack of technical capacity and therefore its lack 
of informational autonomy. The attention that the negotiation of mega-FTAs such as TTIP have 
drawn may result in an enormous increase in the political cost of concluding FTAs.2269 Due to their 
pervasive influence over the economic activity and growth of a nation, FTAs increasingly find 
themselves subject to public debate, as well as the target of advocacy by both governmental and non-
governmental stakeholders. The negotiation of international trade agreements is under growing 
political and social scrutiny, which makes their conclusion even more complex.2270 Competition law 
provisions thereby are not immune to such influences. The Business Coalition for Transatlantic 
Trade for instance, who’s Steering Committee is co-chaired by major companies with significant 
equities in the transatlantic economy as well as many multi-sectorial industry organizations, has a 
Competition Working Group that focuses on the elements of a traditional competition chapter of a 
trade negotiation. Priority areas include transparency and due process as well as state-owned and 
state-favoured enterprises.2271 The Commission itself stated that “competition policy cannot be pursued in 
isolation, as an end in itself, without reference to the legal, economic, political and social context.”2272 While 
competition law is often seen as a stable discipline, based on economic considerations and wary of 
external social, or political objectives, competition law, as any other branch of law, is capable of 
absorbing external influences, particularities, and being subject to intellectual and regulatory 
capture.2273  
 
1.4.2.4 Mixity  
 
The increased complexity of trade negations in terms of topics covered has had an effect on the 
treaty-making process. One very tangible example is the issue of ‘mixity’. The expanding scope of 
FTAs has led to an increased role of the Member States in EU-trade policy. Topics that do not 
belong to the exclusive competence of the EU, such as investor-state dispute settlement, necessitate 
that EU FTAs are concluded as ‘mixed agreements’, whereby individual Member States have to ratify 
the agreement alongside the EU according to their national procedures. The result of the Dutch 
referendum concerning the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (that also contains a trade 
agreement) demonstrates the risks that this may bring.2274 The Agreement was moreover rejected not 
so much because of its content, but rather a general dissatisfaction with the Dutch government or 
more broadly concerns regarding migration or against the EU as such. Romania and Bulgaria 
similarly threatened to block CETA if the visa-requirements for their citizens were not 
abandoned.2275 The Belgian region of Wallonia equally attempted to block CETA.2276 VAN DER LOO 
rightly pointed out that a ‘common’ trade policy that is being steered from 28 capitals is not a viable 
way to address the modern-day challenges.2277 
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The Commission, considering the broad and deep material coverage of the EU-Singapore DCFTA, 
asked the Court in October 2014 to clarify whether it had the competence to conclude the 
Agreement on its own or whether it had to involve the Member States. Building on Opinion 1/76, 
Opinion 2/15 therefore had the potential to end the lengthy parallel ratification procedures required 
by ‘mixity’ and allow ‘EU-only’ trade and investment agreements. The most contentious policy areas 
in this case were transport, investment, intellectual property rights, and sustainable development. It 
was the Commission’s aim to reach the most expansive possible interpretation of Article 207 TFEU 
and of the expansion of the Common Commercial Policy exclusive external powers by the Lisbon 
Treaty. It relied on a broad application of the ‘centre of gravity’ theory and the provisions of Article 
3(2)TFEU to advocate for implied exclusivity of otherwise shared competences.2278 With regard to 
competition law, the Advocate General began by stating that a comprehensive WTO policy on 
competition and trade has not yet been adopted. She underlined the goal of the competition chapter, 
which is to comprehensively address the harmful effects on trade between the EU and Singapore 
which might result from public or private anticompetitive conduct or practices. She then explored 
the link with international trade, by focussing on Articles 12.7.2 and 12.8.1 of the agreement, dealing 
with subsidies, in particular. Importantly, SHARPSTON underlined that in her opinion the provisions 
concerning cooperation and coordination sensu lato are all ancillary to the main substantive 
obligations set out in Chapter Twelve and therefore do not undermine the conclusion that that 
chapter is aimed at promoting, facilitating or governing trade and thus has direct and immediate 
effects on trade in goods and services. She therefore concluded that Chapter Twelve falls entirely 
within the scope of the European Union’s exclusive competence under Article 207(1) TFEU.2279 
 
The Court, with regard to the commitments concerning competition, underlined that Articles 12.1.2 
and 12.2 form part of the liberalisation of trade between the EU and Singapore, specifically relating 
to  the combatting of anti-competitive activities. It therefore finds that such provisions fall within the 
field of the common commercial policy and not the field of the internal market. It is demonstrated 
that the competition provisions in the agreement do not relate ‘in the slightest’ to harmonisation of 
the laws of the EU member states or to trade between member states, but relate to trade between the 
EU and Singapore. The Court therefore concluded that Chapter 12 of the agreement falls within the 
exclusive competence of the EU.2280 However, overall, the Court was of the opinion that the EU-
Singapore FTA as it stood could only be concluded by the EU and the Member States together, on 
account of the fact that two elements of the EU-Singapore did not fall under the exclusive 
competence of the Commission according to the Court, namely non-direct foreign investment and 
investor-state dispute settlement.2281 
  
2. Geographical integration: the multilateral approach  
 
It is clear that bilateral contacts are not enough to face the challenges that international competition 
law cooperation is facing, in particular since the EU-US duopoly is being challenged by the growth 
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and development of competition law and agencies in other countries. A European Commission 
Group of Experts on Competition Law noted in 1995 already that it would be “difficult to imagine the 
emergence of a level playing field if this were to be founded only on a group of inevitably heterogenous [sic] bilateral 
agreements.”2282 New competition agencies have entered the playing field and existing ones have gained 
in experience and strength. The increasing power of emerging economies, combined with their 
fledgling efforts in the field of competition law, has led to a shift in international power relations 
between competition agencies. The enforcement and policy agenda can no longer be determined 
solely from Washington D.C. and Brussels, but requires input from Beijing, Brasilia, Moscow, 
Ottawa, Pretoria, Seoul, Tokyo, and others.2283 Regardless of the remaining impact and influence of 
the two most experienced jurisdictions, a transatlantic agreement no longer suffices to tackle global 
issues and set the international standard.2284 The duopoly has shifted to an oligopoly with several 
power centres.2285  
 
One example of the implications of multiple power centres is the P3 Shipping Alliance case. The US in 
early 2014 had approved a proposed alliance of three major European shipping liners. Ocean 
shipping carriers Maersk Line, MCS, and CMA CGM wanted to conclude an operation agreement, 
that would not entail cooperation on commercial aspects, such as pricing or customer relationships, 
but would involve the day-to-day management of vessels worldwide. For this purpose a joint 
corporate entity overseeing these operations would be created. This was not considered a ‘full 
function’ joint venture under EU law because it had no customer facing activities and only 
performed a limited function. Other jurisdictions, however, including in Germany, Poland, Korea, 
and China, did consider the operation to be a full merger and evaluated it as such. In the US, P3 was 
exempt from the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, but was subject to review under the Shipping Act. While 
the EU decided not to open an investigation (the operation was informally approved), the operation 
was approved in both the US and other jurisdictions, so it was expected that the merger would take 
place. In June 2014, however, China’s MOFCOM rather unexpectedly blocked the transaction under 
their merger control regime. The fact that the decision appeared as somewhat of a surprise indicates 
that the communication among the agencies did not proceed entirely smoothly.2286  
 
The importance of multilateralism can be seen in the general enforcement trends as well, where 
cross-border cases become increasingly international. In 2010-2011 for instance, an average of 4 
agencies was involved in each cooperation case concerning cartels. A similar trend can be seen in 
merger cases. The Thermo Fisher/Life Technologies case involved 7 non-EU agencies, while the Holcim 
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cement merger involved 8.2287 This implies that rather than being in a period of conflict, the 
transition has been made to a period of forum shopping, whereby competition authorities are in 
competition with each other.2288 This has both positive and negative implications, but in any event 
requires multilateral coordination. The meaning of ‘multilateralism’ is at times subject to debate. 
Some, mainly political scientists, consider an agreement multilateral even when it is regional, 
including three parties or more, while others consider only global agreements to be multilateral. This 
study adheres to the former approach.  
 
2.1 Different multilateral forums with distinct yet overlapping roles 
 
The European Parliament in 2013 called on the Commission to “actively promote competition enforcement 
cooperation at international level, mainly in multilateral fora such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
International Competition Network (ICN) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)” as it believed this to be the most effective means of cooperation.2289 This section does not 
aim to provide an exhaustive description of the main multilateral venues where competition law 
issues can be discussed. It rather provides an analysis of the main distinctive features of each venue, 
in order to come to an optimal work-sharing system among the bilateral and the multilateral planes, 
as well as among the multilateral venues themselves.  
 
2.1.1 OECD: competition for the developed world 
 
2.1.1.1 Origins, membership, and functioning  
 
One of the oldest and most well-known multilateral venues for competition law and policy 
discussions is the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The OECD was 
founded in 1961. The Committee on Restrictive Business Practices, the predecessor of the 
Competition Committee, was one of the first OECD committees to be established.2290 The OECD’s 
mission was to expand free trade and improve development in its member countries.2291 Its 
headquarters are in Paris, but the OECD also has regional centres. It is led by a secretary-general, 
and has a secretariat to its disposition with a staff of about 2500. It obtains it operating budget from 
member contributions.2292 Currently the OECD describes its mission as promoting “policies that will 
improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world.”2293 The task-set is very diverse, ranging 
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from explaining certain economic, social, and environmental changes, as well as predicting future 
trends, based on measurements of productivity and global flows of trade and investment. One of the 
main tasks, however, in particular in the field of competition law, is international standard-setting.2294 
Its strategic orientations vary over time, and are published on the website.  
 
The OECD currently consists of 35 member countries. The rather stringent membership criteria 
form one of the OECD’s most characterising features, as full participation is only granted to 
governments of developed countries. The freedom of officials from government agencies or 
departments to manoeuvre and express their views in the OECD is therefore not entirely 
uninhibited, as they act as representatives of their governments, rather than spokespersons for their 
own institutions.2295 However, exactly because OECD recommendations are adopted by 
governments, they represent powerful tools for advancing competitive principles at government-
wide levels.2296 While most member states of the EU are a member,2297 the EU itself is not, but 
nevertheless regularly participates in the OECD’s work as a ‘quasi-member’.2298 Countries can also 
have the status of OECD observer. While the OECD is comprised of developed country 
governments, its output is not confined to the latter. This limited membership, however, while it has 
the benefit of gathering countries with a broadly similar attitude, allowing for easier consensus-
building, has the drawback that its work-product may not be perceived as legitimate by developing 
countries, who are deprived of significant input.2299 Concerns about under-inclusiveness played a 
major part in the creation of the Global Forum on Competition (see below).2300 Even though there 
have been expansions in the membership, according to PIILOLA, the OECD has not been able to 
formulate a coherent new role for itself.2301  
 
OECD decisions are made by consensus by the OECD Council, which consists of one 
representative per member country, as well as a representative of the European Commission. The 
Council also meets once a year at ministerial level, to discuss key issues and set priorities. 
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Representatives meet in specialised committees. There are about 250 committees, working groups 
and expert groups. The OECD Secretariat carries out the work mandated by the OECD Council and 
supports the activities of the committees.2302 This a great source of analytical strength, but the size of 
the OECD’s bureaucracy is subject to criticism, as it can significantly slow down the process.2303  
 
Competition-related work was originally conducted by the Joint Group on Trade and Competition 
and the Global Forum on Competition. Since the 1990s the Joint Group on Trade and Competition 
was mandated to study the linkage between trade and competition policy, engaging in consultations 
with developing countries, business, consumers, other international organisations, and non-
governmental organizations. The Joint Group’s work fell under the auspices of both the OECD’s 
Trade Committee and Competition Committee, until its mandate was cancelled in 2006. Since then, 
the Competition Law and Policy Committee forms the primary site for discussions about 
competition policy within the OECD, providing a variety of means for countries to share their 
relevant best practices.2304 The primary goals of the Competition Committee are to identify best 
practices, to foster convergence, and to promote increased cooperation among competition 
agencies.2305 It consists of representatives of national antitrust enforcement agencies and represents a 
form of intergovernmental, institutionalized governance, even if its operation is more reminiscent of 
a trans-governmental network of national competition authorities.2306 The Committee formed the 
first significant post-World War II international forum for antitrust issues, allowing for information 
exchange, discussion of experiences, and relationship-building.2307 Participation by senior competition 
officials and attendance by observers are usually high, and it is widely regarded as one of the most 
successful OECD committees.2308 The role of the Competition Committee changed somewhat over 
time. Previously, the work of the Committee largely consisted of periodic examinations of national 
laws and enforcement systems, collective reports on substantive issues and the adoption of 
recommendations. The reports were later on replaced by the publication of background papers and 
member states’ contributions to roundtables. During such roundtables delegations as well as external 
experts present their views on particular issues that were selected based on current competition 
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interests, ranging from theoretical to practical topics. The secretariat often provides a comprehensive 
background paper.2309    
 
In 2001 an outreach program in the form of the Global Forum on Competition was founded, which 
allows around 90 competition agencies, which is far more than the OECD membership, to meet 
annually and to permit the OECD to expand its expertise beyond its member states, to promote best 
practices, and to hear non-member views about problems faced by developing economies.2310 The 
World Bank, UNCTAD, and the WTO also participate.2311 The issue of international cooperation 
among competition agencies was addressed already during the first Global Forum for merger cases, 
and again the next year, when it discussed the results of an earlier survey on international 
cooperation in both merger and cartel investigations.2312  
 
In 2011 the Chairman of the OECD Competition Committee consulted with the delegates 
concerning long-term strategic planning, and possible themes for the coming two years. In 2012 one 
of the main topics of the Global Forum was ‘Improving International Co-operation in Cartel 
Investigations’, indeed as part of a long term strategic project. During this roundtable, 
representatives from competition agencies, private practice and enforcers from other policy areas, i.e. 
tax and anti-corruption were heard.2313 The strategic project furthermore included a review and 
revision of the 1995 Cooperation Recommendation, and identification of other instruments or 
Committee outputs that could enhance international cooperation between competition agencies as 
strategic themes for the OECD from 2012 onwards.2314  
  
2.1.1.2 Competition-related accomplishments and work product 
 
The OECD has a public webpage entirely dedicated to international cooperation in competition 
matters.2315 It has published extensively on the subject. In 2012, it undertook a stocktaking exercise 
regarding the Competition Committee’s past work on international cooperation over the past twenty 
years (going back to 1991 when the work on the recommendations of 1995 started, although some 
older documents, going back to 1967 are also included).2316 The aim was to gather insight on key 
issues that had already been dealt with, and to better determine the scope of future work. The 
OECD recommendations on international cooperation were central in the stocktaking exercise. 
What is peculiar is that while the Committee generally reports to the Council on the application of 
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recommendations, it did not do so for the recommendations on international cooperation, nor did it 
review the experiences with the 2005 Best Practices until more recently.2317  
 
The most significant output of the OECD in the field of competition law are indeed its 
Recommendations and Best Practices.2318 These instruments, as their name indicates, are not binding. 
All the key OECD recommendations related to competition law and policy address international 
cooperation. The 2005 Recommendation on Merger Review, for instance, suggested cooperation and 
coordination among members in order to avoid inconsistencies in merger review, and suggested to 
eliminate or reduce impediments standing in the way of this cooperation and coordination. Similarly, 
the 1998 Recommendation concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels devoted 
significant attention to the principle of positive comity, and put forward principles on the modalities 
of cooperation with regard to hard core cartels, including guidance regarding the exchange of both 
non-confidential and confidential information, as well as investigatory assistance.2319 KLAWITER and 
LACIAK in 2003 referred to these recommendations as ‘the major international policy statement to 
date.’2320 The 1995 Recommendation concerning cooperation between Member Countries on 
Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade (Recommendation on International 
Cooperation), however, focuses exclusively on international cooperation.  
 
Globalisation and technological advances have brought international enforcement cooperation back 
on the policy agenda, which led to the revision and repeal, in 2014, of the 1995 Recommendation on 
international cooperation (which itself evolved from a first recommendation adopted in 1967). The 
revision was also part of the follow-up of the OECD/ICN Joint Survey. The 2014 report ‘Challenges 
of International Co-operation in Competition Law Enforcement’2321 was labelled the first attempt to 
gather empirical evidence on the need for closer cooperation between enforcers. It provided support 
to the negotiations of the 2014.2322 The 2014 Recommendation focuses on offering new and 
innovative solutions to international enforcement problems. It is divided into two sections, one on 
information gateways, calling for the adoption of national provisions allowing the exchange of 
confidential information among competition agencies without prior consent from the source, and 
another encouraging enhanced cooperation via extensive investigative assistance. Other 
recommendations include a commitment to effective cooperation, minimising the impact of 
legislation that might restrict cooperation between competition authorities, strengthened mechanisms 
of notifications and more flexible means, and increased efforts towards coordination of 
investigations.2323 The new recommendations therefore contain significantly expanded provisions on 
information exchange, and recommend the adoption of tools to allow the exchange of confidential 
information.2324  
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Also worth mentioning are the 2005 OECD best practices for the formal exchange of information 
between competition authorities in hard core cartel investigations.2325 These best practices were 
largely based on former OECD recommendations concerning Co-operation on Anticompetitive 
Practices Affecting International Trade and Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core 
Cartels.2326 They provide for procedural safeguards for formal exchange of information, in particular 
concerning confidentiality, use (for other public law enforcement purposes), and disclosure of the 
information concerned.2327 It is underlined that a margin of discretion should always be available to 
the requested jurisdiction. There is no obligation to act on a request, for instance when this would 
imply a violation of domestic laws or based on public policy concerns. With regard to the protection 
of the rights of parties under the laws of member countries, such as the legal professional privilege 
and the privilege against self-incrimination, the best practices state that the higher level of protection 
should be applied. The best practices advise against giving prior notice to the source of information, 
unless required by law, because this may disrupt or delay the investigation.2328 Some have criticised 
the Best Practices as not being ambitious enough, and “[giving] even more ground to decline a request for 
information sharing than did the 1995 Recommendations regarding anticompetitive practices affecting international 
trade […].”2329 
 
The OECD has conducted several surveys on international cooperation.2330 The authority of the 
OECD guarantees response rates that cannot easily be obtained by smaller organisations. The 
reports analysing the results of these surveys help understand past and current practice, indicate areas 
of improvement, and help predict future tendencies. They also inquire about the usefulness and 
implementation of the OECD recommendations and best practices, and can provide the basis for 
draft Council Recommendations.2331   
 
As mentioned throughout this study, the OECD also engaged in a joint survey with the ICN on 
‘International Enforcement Co-operation – Status Quo and Areas for Improvement’. Because the 
OECD’s strategic project regarding international competition cooperation coincided with the ICN 
project on international enforcement cooperation, “the Competition Committee asked the Secretariat to 
coordinate with the ICN on a single questionnaire that would support the needs of both the OECD Competition 
Committee’s long-term project on International Co-operation and the ICN Steering Group project on International 
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Enforcement Co-operation.”2332 The Survey was addressed to all the ICN member agencies, which include 
all agencies of OECD member and observer countries, amounting to 120 competition agencies all 
over the globe. It was launched in July 2012, with responses due in September of the same year. A 
total of fifty-seven responses were sent to the OECD Secretariat. The response rate among OECD 
members and observers was around 90%, while the ICN member response rate amounted to 47%. 
55% Of responses were received from European competition agencies. The main objectives of the 
survey were to gain an understanding of the experiences of competition agencies with international 
cooperation in case-related enforcement activities, and to elicit the opinions of respondents on 
several related topics, in particular in view of future ICN and OECD work.2333 The OECD/ICN 
Joint Survey offers a broad picture of international enforcement cooperation. It engaged in a 
qualitative assessment of international cooperation, instructed about the different legal bases for 
formal cooperation and the experiences with it, it provided information over the frequency of 
cooperation, elaborated on regional and multilateral cooperation, addressed limitations and 
constraints on international cooperation, focused on the exchange of information and confidentiality 
waivers, and finally it engaged in self-reflection by informing about the OECD’s role in fostering 
international cooperation and inquiring about possible areas of improvement and future work for the 
OECD.  
 
Most recently, in 2015, the OECD Competition Committee created an inventory of international 
cooperation agreements. It focuses on fifteen bilateral agreements where at least one of the 
signatories is an OECD country. MoUs or agency-to-agency agreements are listed separately but do 
not form the focus of the inventory. In the inventory useful options can be found for the negotiation 
or interpretation of competition cooperation agreements. It can be considered as a catalogue of 
provisions in existing cooperation agreement. Along with each section of the inventory, the relevant 
provision of the 2014 OECD Recommendation concerning International Co-operation on 
Competition Investigations and Proceedings is mentioned, as well as a list of the relevant clauses out 
of the scrutinised agreements.2334 This rather extensive work on bilateral agreements indicates the 
continued belief in this form of cooperation and demonstrates the interplay between international 
OECD guidelines and bilateral cooperation agreements. With the creation of the inventory, the 
OECD somewhat catered to the request (that had surfaced from the joint survey) to develop a 
model bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreement.2335 
 
Another type of instrument issued by the OECD aiding convergence and cooperation is its in-depth 
Peer Reviews & Country Reports of national competition laws and policies.2336 The OECD has 
conducted these reviews since 1998. While the US’ competition laws were the first to be reviewed, all 
OECD members have been peer reviewed at least once, as well as many observers to the 
Competition Committee, on a voluntary basis.2337 The in-depth peer reviews provide valuable insights 
into areas for improvement. They assess how countries deal with competition and regulatory issues 
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in a broad sense, ranging from the soundness of competition laws to the structure and effectiveness 
of competition institutions. The detailed country reports are then peer reviewed before they are 
published. While the peer reviews do not contain a completely uninhibited assessment of the 
examinee’s legislation and institutes due to the nature of the OECD membership, the ‘airbrushing’ 
nevertheless does not undermine the value of the exercise.2338 Peer assessment reports typically 
include recommendations for changes in legislation or policy, and quickly become part of the 
national public debate. The Reports are part of the OECD's Horizontal Programme on Regulatory 
Reform,2339 which in turn is part of the OECD’s efforts to build a common base of experience and 
encourage the adoption of superior techniques.2340 The OECD indeed has established an ‘Outreach 
Program’ intended to assist developing countries with broad-based regulatory reform. Another part 
of this program consists of allowing representatives from developing countries to attend OECD 
Competition Committee meetings and providing assistance in the development of legislation and 
institutions, including the training of officials, and the implementation and enforcement of their 
competition policies.2341 Peer reviews are also conducted by other competition policy networks, such 
as UNCTAD.2342  
  
Finally, not all OECD work results in recommendations or best practices. Such discussions are 
nevertheless very useful to elevate the knowledge base and can have an equally significant impact.2343 
With regard to international cooperation, the example of the 1999 Report on Positive Comity, or the 
2013 discussion on remedies in cross-border merger cases can be mentioned.   
 
2.1.1.3 Implementation 
 
While the recommendations and best practices are valuable instruments on their own, their main 
merit lies in the extent to which they are implemented. With regard to the implementation of the 
most important recommendations the OECD has itself issued reports. It concerns the 
recommendations dealing with bid rigging in public procurement, competition assessment, merger 
review, and hard core cartels.2344 Information on implementation can also become apparent in the 
surveys that are occasionally undertaken.  
 
While it is confirmed that the OECD plays an important role in shaping the framework for 
international enforcement cooperation, implementation varies from one document to another. The 
OECD/ICN Joint Survey for instance revealed that the 2005 OECD Recommendation on 
International Cooperation played a more effective role than the 2005 Best Practices on the exchange 
                                                          
2338 H. M. Hollman & W. E. Kovacic, “The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role” in P. 
Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 
2011, 66. 
2339 See http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/countryreviewsofcompetitionpolicyframeworks.htm (accessed July 
2017). 
2340 H. M. Hollman & W. E. Kovacic, “The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role” in P. 
Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 
2011, 65. 
2341 A. Piilola, “Assessing theories of global governance: a case study of international antitrust regulation”, Stanford Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 39, 2003, 243.  
2342 H. M. Hollman & W. E. Kovacic, “The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role” in P. 
Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 
2011, 66. 
2343 See http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/internationalco-operationandcompetition.htm (accessed July 2017). 
2344 See http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/reportsbythecompetitioncommittee.htm (accessed July 2017). 
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of information in cartel investigations.2345 The recommendations on hard core cartels mainly played a 
role with regard to the individual enforcement programs of the member states, while the call for 
cooperation was responded to much less.2346 It is remarkable that even though the 2005 Best 
Practices are widely regarded as successful, the OECD/ICN Joint Survey revealed that the majority 
of respondents reported a lack of experience with the Best Practices or simply did not answer this 
question.2347  
 
As mentioned, experiences with implementation may lead to suggestions for reform. The 
ICN/OECD Joint Survey allowed some members to identify areas for improvement regarding the 
1995 Recommendations, in particular to make it reflect the current status of international 
cooperation. Some suggestions related to implementation specifically, namely that the OECD should 
encourage greater compliance and that members should be stimulated to make more use of the 
Recommendations. Linked to this it was also suggested that the effectiveness of the 
Recommendation could be improved by more regular monitoring of experiences with it.2348  
 
2.1.1.6 Future: focus on solutions rather than challenges 
 
The OECD will remain an important player in international competition law and policy 
development. It is important that it keeps following-up on its existing instruments. The main 
requests towards the OECD emerging from the Joint Survey was to update the existing OECD 
instruments to align them with current practice and needs.2349 As an example, STEENBERGEN 
mentioned the necessity to update guidelines with regard to simplified procedures, which are 
currently not mentioned, despite their widespread use.2350  
 
Comments from OECD member countries in the ICN/OECD Joint Survey regarding projects 
which should have a ‘high priority’ indicated a preference for the development of model cooperation 
instruments and/or agreements. Many respondents underlined that the OECD should focus on its 
specific strength, namely that it consists of governments, therefore is well placed to deal with legal 
obstacles to effective cooperation.2351 This call for action is not that surprising. The OECD 
Competition Committee has devoted significant attention to identifying the challenges that 
international competition cooperation faces, both legal and practical. The next step should now be to 
analyse in a more focused manner the possible solutions, which so far have been ignored to a large 
extent. Some challenges have been repeatedly identified, but no practical solutions have come 
forward that go beyond vague principles.2352 As was stated in the stocktaking exercise, the inability to 
                                                          
2345 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 14. 
2346 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 28.  
2347 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 108. 
2348 Ibid., 106-107. 
2349 Ibid., 16.  
2350 J. Steenbergen, “Keynote address: defining the new frontiers of merger control regimes: what’s on the regulators’ 
radar”, “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by 
Concurrences and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015: Brochure. 
2351 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 119.  
2352 Already in 1992 the Whish-Wood Report offered recommendations on the improvement of coordination and the 
alignment of procedures in merger cases, upon which an agreed ‘Framework for a Notification Form’ was issued. The 
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engage in information sharing for instance is repeatedly identified as the one constraint that limits 
international cooperation, “despite the many sessions devoted to addressing this sensitive issue over a long period of 
time.”2353 The lack of an internationally accepted definition of ‘confidential information’, is another 
example of an issue that is since long indicated as an obstacle for international cooperation, but was 
never fully addressed by the Committee (see above, Part II, 3.4). While there has been a discussion 
on how to define confidential information, no analysis of the different existing approaches was done 
and no recommendations were made.2354 More analytical work could be done on the definitions used 
in different jurisdictions and on the different rules regarding protection of such confidential 
information, rather than merely providing an overview.2355  
 
 While it will be suggested later in this study that more cooperation should take place among the 
different multilateral forums where competition policy discussions take place (see below, Part III, 
2.2.2), cooperation within the OECD should be increased as well. Currently there is relatively little 
interaction among the different OECD committees. Some consultation takes place, but committee 
members are not closely involved, and there is little awareness about what each committee is dealing 
with. More interaction and cross-fertilisation could lead to the creation of synergies, as there are 
pools of knowledge that currently remain untouched, such as, for instance, the work done in the 
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes.2356 It is finally 
suggested that the OECD open up its membership. Any instrument developed without significant 
developing country input is necessarily flawed from the start in its ambitions to become a global 
standard.2357  
 
2.1.2 WTO: trade and competition  
 
The latest attempt to include competition law issues in the framework of the World Trade 
Organisation was discussed earlier (see above, Part I, 3.3.3). What will be addressed here is whether 
there is any reason to believe that the WTO is a suitable venue to host international cooperation in 
the field of competition law to begin with. The WTO, established in Geneva in 1995, proclaims that 
it is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. It is 
run by its member governments. All major decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either 
by ministers or by their ambassadors or delegates. It has a secretariat with a staff of 640 persons. Its 
functions include the administering WTO trade agreements, providing a forum for trade 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
aim of the Wish-Wood Report was to be more empirical. The Report asked for increased general cooperation, and more 
clear guidelines on how to implement the OECD recommendation of 1986 (valid at the time). It also recommended the 
establishment of a waiver system and requested that member states would commit to develop national confidentiality 
guidelines, for internal as well as public dissemination. It required the parties to notify other agencies, and promoted 
more efficient dissemination of information in the public domain. Furthermore, one or two model filing forms should be 
created according to the report, “which request common information in a single format, and which use different country annexes as 
appropriate.” Finally, harmonization of deadlines was encouraged. (OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking 
Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 9, 23. See OECD, 
Whish-Wood Report, DAFFE/CLP/WP3(93)6/PART1, 1994).  
2353 OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012, 15.  
2354 Ibid., 15.  
2355 OECD, Discussion on Limitations and Constraints to International Co-operation, Contribution of the European 
Union, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)41, 23 October 2012, 4. 
2356 See http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/automaticexchangeofinformation.htm (accessed July 2017).  
2357 A. Piilola, “Assessing theories of global governance: a case study of international antitrust regulation”, Stanford Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 39, 2003, 249.  
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negotiations, handling trade disputes, monitoring national trade policies, providing technical 
assistance and training for developing countries, and cooperating with other international 
organizations.2358 The Secretariat is headed by a Director-General. It has no decision-making powers 
as decisions are taken by Members only. It mainly supplies technical and professional support for the 
various councils and committees, and to developing countries, and monitors and analyses 
developments in world trade. It moreover provides information to the public and the media and 
organizes the ministerial conferences. The Secretariat also provides legal assistance in the dispute 
settlement process and advises governments that want to become WTO Members. The WTO 
currently has 164 members, developed as well as developing and least developed countries. 21 More 
countries have observer status. The EU is a full member as well as all the EU member states. The 
European Commission speaks for all EU member States at almost all WTO meetings.2359 
 
It is remarkable that in the study of the European Parliament for the Econ Committee in 2015 that 
listed the priorities for EU competition policy, the WTO was not mentioned in the section on 
engagement in multilateral forum.2360 At the same time, however, in the opinion of the Committee on 
International Trade regarding the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the EU-
Switzerland second generation Agreement, it was stated that “[s]ooner rather than later the WTO will have 
to return to competition policy and use multilateral instruments to fight these practices with transborder consequences to 
create a level playing field.”2361 The EU itself therefore does not seem determined on which way it wishes 
to go regarding the WTO and competition law.  
 
2.1.2.1 Existing WTO competition provisions and cases 
 
While much debate exists on whether a future competition law agreement should be included in the 
framework of the WTO and if so what that agreement should look like, the WTO legal framework is 
currently not void of competition provisions.2362 Such provisions are largely aimed at governmental 
actions, namely avoiding reciprocal tariff concessions by disguised means. Competition law should 
then be taken into consideration where anticompetitive behaviour hinders trade objectives. Often the 
competition provisions are sectorial and limited in nature. A generic obligation to regulate 
international anticompetitive behaviour is absent. Existing competition provisions in the WTO are 
therefore applied ad hoc, in a localised and inconsistent manner. There is no overall ‘policy’ to be 
detected.2363   
 
                                                          
2358 See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (accessed July 2017). 
2359 See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (accessed July 2017).  
2360 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A – Economic and Scientific 
Policy, Competition Policy in International Agreements – Study for Econ Committee, IP/A/ECON/2015-02, August 
2015, 27.  
2361 Opinion of the Committee on International Trade for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the 
proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, 12418/2012 – C7-0146/2013 – 
2012/0127(NLE), 17 December 2013.  
2362 An overview can be found in M. Taylor, International competition law – A new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, 160-162.  Competition provisions can be found in the GATT, as well as in TRIPS, the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the ‘Reference Paper’ which complements the WTO 
Telecommunications Agreement. (A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 245).  
2363 Ibid., 162-163.  
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While some claim that there is a historic precedent to include competition policy into the WTO, this 
argument can be countered. The GATT for instance, intended to be an interim measure, was less 
comprehensive in scope than the Havana Charter and did not contain any provisions addressing 
anticompetitive trade practices, nor did it mention any linkage between competition and trade law. It 
did contain modest provisions on discriminatory customs valuation procedures, government 
procurement practices, and subsidies. Subsequent efforts to incorporate competition law into the 
GATT failed, consistently due to insufficient international consensus.2364   
 
The most infamous competition dispute settlement case dealt with within the ambit of the WTO is 
the Photographic Film case.2365 It represents the furthest extent to which private anti-competitive 
activity was challenged within the context of generic WTO obligations.2366 The case highlighted the 
deficiencies of the WTO legal framework in dealing with private restraints on international trade.2367 
In this case the US Government Office of the Trade Representative, at the petition of the Eastman 
Kodak Company of the United States (Kodak), accused Japan of violating GATT rules because it 
deliberately did not correctly enforce its competition laws against Fuji Film Company. Because of 
this Fuji could maintain its exclusive distribution agreements, which caused market entry issues for 
American competitors to the Japanese distribution system for photographic film and paper and 
therefore constituted an impermissible trade barrier.2368 The claim had to be directed towards Japan, 
tolerating inefficient retail distribution networks impeding the entry of foreign products, rather than 
the companies themselves.2369 The US turned to the WTO because it had no jurisdiction to apply its 
own laws extraterritorially.2370 The case was very complex in its facts, with the final WTO Panel 
Report amounting to more than 500 pages.2371 The US made three factual allegations that the 
Japanese government had directly or indirectly introduced measures that prevented Kodak from 
entering the Japanese market, and based its claim for dispute settlement on three distinct legal 
                                                          
2364 Ibid., 153-155, 159, 183. 
2365 WTO, DS44: Japan — Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 22 April 1998. Other cases exist 
but are sectorial in nature. See M. Taylor, International competition law – A new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, 192.  One such sectorial case is the Telmex Case. This case revolved around “the 
privilege granted by Mexican legislation to the dominant telecommunications company, Telmex, to fix the rate to be paid by all foreign carriers 
terminating calls in Mexico.” (A. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, 247) The US accused Mexico of breaching its obligations under the Reference Paper 
complementing the WTO Telecommunications Agreement. The WTO panel discussed market definition, the concept of 
‘major supplier’, and expanded the definition of anti-competitive practices. (S. Singh “The Telmex Dispute at the WTO: 
Competition Makes a Backdoor Entry”, CUTS Briefing Paper, No. 1/2006.) The WTO panel concluded that Mexico 
infringed its obligations under the Reference Paper “as it failed to maintain appropriate measures to prevent anticompetitive practices 
by a firm that was a ‘major supplier’, it failed to ensure interconnection at cost-oriented rates [to foreign service suppliers], and it also 
failed to ensure reasonable and non-discriminatory access and use of telecommunications networks.” (A. Papadopoulos, The International 
Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 247. 
2366 M. Taylor, International competition law – A new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
192. 
2367 See P. Stephan, “Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of Cooperation”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 
38, 2005, 200. 
2368 B.A. Melo Araujo, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 186. M. Taylor, 
International competition law – A new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 191-192. 
2369 P. Stephan, “Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of Cooperation”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 38, 
2005, 200. 
2370 M. Taylor, International competition law – A new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
192. 
2371 P. Stephan, “Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of Cooperation”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 38, 
2005, 200. For a more detailed overview of the case, see M. Taylor, International competition law – A new dimension for the 
WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 192-201. 
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grounds.2372 Of those claims, the ones relevant to competition law included a failure by Japan to 
provide national treatment to imported (US) film, constituting a direct violation of Article III.4 of 
the GATT,2373 and that Japan had ‘nullified or impaired’ a WTO tariff concession under Article 
XXIII.1(b) of the GATT.2374 While this case relates to anticompetitive behaviour, the US did not 
expressly refer to such behaviour by Fuji, considering a negative finding of the JFTC and the fact 
that no WTO obligations existed prohibiting such behaviour. Implicitly, however, allegations of anti-
competitive exclusive dealing and vertical foreclosure can be detected.2375 The WTO Panel ruled that 
GATT rules had not been breached. The reasoning was that the actual competition laws of Japan did 
not discriminate against firms because even if there was restricted market access, such restrictions 
equally affected both domestic and foreign firms. This is where it becomes clear that existing WTO 
legislation has problems dealing with private firm behaviour. The discrimination here was being 
carried out by Fuji, a private enterprise, against which general WTO law was of no use, except in very 
particular cases, such as monopoly service suppliers that are obliged to abide with the national 
treatment obligation and should refrain from abusing their monopoly position in areas where the 
WTO Member has made specific liberalization commitments or in the context of intellectual 
property rights.2376 This form of disguised protection is therefore difficult to tackle in a WTO 
context.2377  
 
2.1.2.2 Arguments pro inclusion 
 
While it is necessary to provide an overview of the benefits and drawbacks, this section will not enter 
into detail, as the issue of including competition issues in a WTO context has been widely discussed 
already. Important proponents are GUZMAN and TAYLOR for instance, contrary to the opinions of 
FOX or TARULLO.2378  
 
As mentioned, future attempts at integrating competition law provisions in the WTO may be more 
viable due to the efforts made via FTAs (see above, Part III, 1.4.1.4), and the fact that many 
jurisdictions are more comfortable with competition law enforcement than at the time the Singapore 
issues were introduced.2379 Some claim, moreover, that export cartels and import cartels represent 
                                                          
2372 M. Taylor, International competition law – A new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
192.  
2373 “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment 
no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of 
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the 
nationality of the product.” 
2374 “If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or 
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of (b) the application by another contracting 
party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement”.  
2375 M. Taylor, International competition law – A new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
193-194.  
2376 B.A. Melo Araujo, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 186.  
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2005, 200; M. Taylor, International competition law – A new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2006, 197. 
2378 A. Guzman, “International competition law” in A. Guzman & A. Sykes (eds), Research Handbook in International 
Economic Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007, 440. For an overview of some other academics in favour of a 
WTO competition agreement, see N. Ormonov, “Exchange of Information in the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws”, 
Asper Review of International Business & Trade Law, Vol. 6, 2006, 369.  
2379 However, the drawbacks mentioned in that context are valid in the context of the WTO as well. 
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political economy problems and in this sense reflect the trade dilemma. They point to the fact that 
the non-discrimination obligations central to the WTO Agreements are in fact heavily imbued with 
competition-related concerns, as they help ensure the equality of competitive conditions between 
foreign and domestic suppliers.2380 It is therefore argued that inherently the solution for international 
competition issues remains within the WTO.2381 PIILOLA is of the opinion that the interdependence 
between antitrust and trade policy requires that the implications of one policy regime vis-à-vis the 
other should be carefully considered and that the inclusion of antitrust law and policy into the WTO 
would allow for a greater coordination in that regard.2382 TAYLOR similarly believes that synergies in 
both underlying theory and policy coordination would be realised.2383 The fact that trade and 
competition are interlinked, does not mean, however, that they should be dealt with by the same 
institution. As mentioned, while they interact and sometimes their goals overlap, they nevertheless 
pursue different objectives (see above, Part III, 1.3.2.2).  
 
The WTO setting indeed offers the possibility to negotiate several issues at once. This allows for 
issue linkages and trade-offs. Some claim that “[t]his ability to negotiate a range of topics is crucial in achieving 
an international antitrust agreement because it reduces transaction costs which, in turn, increases the likelihood that the 
parties will reach the optimal result.”2384 The setting of the WTO would also be conducive to allowing 
transfer payments.2385 As mentioned, however (see above, Part III, 1.3.2.1), these linkages are a 
liability as much as a benefit. If the WTO moreover responds to requests to increase its 
responsiveness to the concerns of citizens’ groups and to act more openly, it will inevitably be 
hindered by inconsistent political demands and difficult choices. One solution is then to exclude 
issues of ‘high’ policy, and limit WTO activities to regulatory and technical problems with regard to 
opening markets and safeguarding principles of fairness and due process.2386  
 
The broad membership and experience of the WTO in successfully managing the negotiation and 
implementation of complex international agreements are yet other benefits attributed to the WTO as 
forum for competition law issues.2387 In the same line the respect and confidence of the international 
community enjoyed by the WTO institutions are mentioned, even if the WTO is not free of 
criticism, regarding for instance its membership and legitimacy.2388  
 
2.1.2.3 Arguments contra inclusion  
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377 
 
So while there are benefits to including competition law issues in the WTO, far more compelling 
reasons exist to exclude it. A first one is that the WTO has experience with restrictions imposed by 
the state, not those resulting from private behaviour.2389 The rather adversarial character of the WTO 
renders it somewhat inappropriate for fostering cooperation among states. The WTO has experience 
in eliminating certain government activities, not coordinating them. The WTO's adversarial tradition 
could even undermine the bonds of trust already formed among national antitrust authorities and 
crucial to cooperation. It should be mentioned, however, that such argumentation should take into 
account the extent to which disputes are resolved informally in the WTO.2390 The culture of political 
bargaining present at the WTO is equally at odds with the decision-making practices common in the 
field of international competition. Rather than finding solution in WTO action, many international 
competition law enforcement issues require a cooperative solution.2391  
 
The incorporation of an international competition agreement into the WTO would require a 
consensus decision of the WTO members. This in turn has an impact on the content of such an 
agreement.2392 The most likely outcome of an international competition agreement would be in the 
form of core-principles, such as non-discrimination, transparency, procedural fairness, provisions on 
hardcore cartels, and perhaps some modalities for voluntary cooperation. Multilaterally achieving a 
binding agreement on matters with broad social and economic impact throughout all levels of 
government is deemed to be a slow and difficult process.2393 One may then wonder whether the 
effort of negotiating and monitoring such an agreement will be worth the very limited benefits.2394 It 
can be doubted whether such minimum standards would do any good. The complexity of the 
international environment will remain largely the same, and countries already complying will not be 
motivated to go any further.2395 Moreover, to get developing countries on board, investments will 
first need to be made in terms of capacity building. The competition provisions in the WTO 
agreements as they stand are insufficient in any case, and their sectorial nature, and the case-specific 
analysis based on sector-specific competition provisions in the cases that have already occurred, 
might lead to an inconsistent competition policy across sectors.2396 According to SINGH, as it stands, 
the WTO dispute settlement bodies “cannot responsibly tackle the problems of anti-competitive practices in a 
satisfactory manner”, as he believes “that the stretching of judicial creation runs the risk of undermining the 
legitimacy and integrity of the WTO.”2397 
 
At the occasion of the Telmex case mentioned above, MARSDEN pointed to some other shortcomings 
of the WTO-environment for resolving competition issues. He first underlined the lack of expertise 
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WTO panels with regard to competition matters. Second, the fact that panels should not upset the 
‘security and predictability’ of the multilateral trading system prevents them from adding to or 
diminishing the rights and obligations in the agreements. Panels according to Marsden take to what is 
perceived as ‘the safest route’. Cases also provide little precedent value, as the panel report in the 
Telmex case for instance stated clearly that its findings apply solely to the specific case of Mexico 
brought before it.2398 
 
2.1.2.4 Future: stick to trade  
 
In conclusion, it is highly unlikely that the heavy WTO law-making process will lead to the creation 
of a competition law agreement in the near or even mid-term future. If anything, the most likely 
outcome would be minimum harmonisation of certain core principles. This would not resolve any of 
the real life problems currently plaguing international competition law enforcement. The sense of 
urgency that could potentially push through agenda-setting and negotiations is moreover lacking.  
 
2.1.3 UNCTAD: development and competition  
 
2.1.3.1 Origins & membership  
 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was established by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1964 as a permanent intergovernmental body. Its headquarters are located in 
Geneva, and additional offices exist in New York and Addis Ababa. Institutionally UNCTAD is part 
of the UN Secretariat as well as the United Nations Development Group, reporting to the UN 
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. It does however has its own membership, 
leadership, and budget. The goal is to create prosperity for the citizens of the 194 member 
countries2399 Because UNCTAD is an intergovernmental institution, the EU itself is not a full 
member, but enjoys observer status.2400 All EU member states are members, however. The 
UNCTAD competition policy secretariat’s core function is to support UNCTAD’s technical 
assistance program. It is comprised of approximately ten professionals. Often they are employed on 
short-term renewable contracts, which may have the effect of impeding the recruitment and 
retention of capable staff.2401  
 
Focus is on supporting developing countries to reap the benefits of a globalized economy more fairly 
and effectively as well as helping them to properly deal with the potential drawbacks. This happens 
via research, data-collection, analysis, consultation, information-sharing, consensus-building, 
technical assistance, and capacity-building.2402 Trade, investment, finance, and technology are seen as 
vehicles for inclusive and sustainable development. Curbing regulations that stifle competition is 
explicitly mentioned among the means to reach that goal.2403 As mentioned (see above, Part I, 3.3.2), 
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in the 1970s, a ‘New International Economic Order’ was suggested by UNCTAD, aimed at creating 
an economically more fair environment for developing countries. Among the topics discussed were 
restrictive business practices, including the application of competition law.2404  
 
2.1.3.2 Accomplishments 
 
The main work of UNCTAD on competition policy is ‘the Set’ (see above, Part I, 3.3.2) However, 
this is not the only type of competition-related output of UNCTAD. It also engages in country 
reviews. The example of Ukraine can be mentioned where the UNCTAD peer review led to major 
changes to the competition law system, and whereby UNCTAD helped provide the template for the 
changes.2405 More generally the work is very similar to that of the OECD, but with a clear focus on 
development.  
 
The Competition and Consumer Policies Programme services the Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts on Competition Law and Policy as well as the Ad-hoc Expert Group meeting on Consumer 
protection policies every year. It also undertakes competition policy peer reviews, publishes the 
UNCTAD Model law on competition and the Handbook on competition legislation, and 
implements sector specific and economy-wide competition and consumer policies reforms. The 
highest intergovernmental bodies are the Review Conferences to appraise the Set on Competition 
policy every five years.2406 The most recent one, the Seventh UN Review Conference, took place in 
2015, marking the 35th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Set of Multilaterally 
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices.2407 During 
these reviews, inter alia future work programmes are endorsed and shaped, and resolutions are 
adopted.2408  
 
2.1.3.3 Future: increasing importance  
 
UNCTADs role will likely only increase in the future. Its development-perspective is unique. It has 
political clout considering its role as de facto agent for the interests of developing and least 
developed countries. In the development of multilateral rules, UNCTAD’s input will be crucial in 
assisting and resourcing developing countries.2409 The engagement of developing countries in several 
multilateral forums indeed causes resource-problems. Newer agencies will often lack the resources to 
assign multiple people to international relations issues, or support frequent travel costs. Both the 
OECD and UNCTAD have the capacity to offer supporting travel funds for less wealthy 
authorities.2410  
                                                          
2404 H. M. Hollman & W. E. Kovacic, “The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role” in P. 
Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 
2011, 68-69.  
2405 “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by Concurrences 
and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015. 
2406 See http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/Competition-Law-and-Policy.aspx (accessed July 2017).  
2407 See http://unctad.org/en/conferences/UN-Set/7th-Review/Pages/home.aspx (accessed July 2017).  
2408 Seventh United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles 
and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, Geneva, 6–10 July 2015.  
2409 M. Taylor, International Competition Law: a New Dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
132. 
2410 H. M. Hollman & W. E. Kovacic, “The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role” in P. 
Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 
2011, 71.  
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2.1.4 ICN: virtual giant 
 
2.1.4.1 Origins, membership, functioning: an inclusive, virtual network     
 
A) Origins 
 
The International Competition Network was created upon incentive of the US. As a reaction to 
developments within the WTO, the Department of Justice under the CLINTON administration 
convened the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) in 1997 to study the 
implications of globalisation on international antitrust policy and enforcement. It focused among 
other things on issues such as multi-jurisdictional merger review, the interface between trade and 
competition, and the future direction for interagency-cooperation. The Committee issued its report 
in 2000, which contained the foundations for the ICN.2411 Rather than incorporating competition 
issues in a binding WTO-framework, a more cooperative, voluntary network approach was suggested 
as alternative route. ICPAC encouraged the US to consider the creation of a ‘Global Competition 
Initiative’ that would offer a forum where government officials, private actors and non-governmental 
organisations could discuss competition matters, so that they could grow towards greater 
convergence of competition law and analysis, as well as a common understanding and a common 
competition culture. Part of the logic behind this initiative was that countries may be prepared to 
meaningfully cooperate, but not necessarily in a strict, legally binding manner.2412 Members were 
persuaded that there was an urgent need for a forum for the world’s competition agencies to meet 
and work together addressing common challenges, and that the value of articulating aspirational best 
practice standards offset concerns about not immediately meeting such standards.2413 Support of the 
EU, a proponent of the WTO-track, followed after the crisis surrounding the GE/Honeywell 
case.2414 On October 25, 2001, the leading competition officials of Australia, Canada, the EU, France, 
Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the US, and 
Zambia, founded the ICN.2415 The name change was due to the negative connotation of the word 
‘global’ at the time, as it was feared to be a red flag to anti-globalization activists. ‘International’ was a 
less charged alternative. The word ‘network’ was added to underline the interactive and non-
hierarchical nature of the initiative.2416 Currently, the ICN is comprised of around 120 competition 
                                                          
2411 E. Fox, “Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International Competition 
Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 113; D. Daniel Sokol “The ICN in the 
Context of International Antitrust Institutions” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, 
Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 156. 
2412 E. Fox, “Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network”, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 09-27, July 2009, 158. 
2413 X., “Interview: Randolph Tritell: A U.S. Government official’s perspective on international antitrust”, Concurrences, N° 
2-2011, 12.   
2414 D. Daniel Sokol “The ICN in the Context of International Antitrust Institutions” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International 
Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 157.  
2415 See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/history.aspx (accessed July 2017); A. Heimler, “EU 
Foreign policy tools/Competition policy” in F. Bindi (ed.), The foreign policy of the European Union – Assessing Europe’s role in 
the world, 1st ed., Massachusets, Brookings Institution Press, 2010, 97, footnote 22. 
2416 E. Fox, “Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network”, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 09-27, July 2009, 160. 
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agencies from over a hundred jurisdictions,2417 and is generally considered as a success. It has been 
able to create its own momentum, and appears to continue in a stable and focused manner.2418  
 
The ICN therefore is a much younger forum than the OECD or UNCTAD, but its membership is 
more extended. It distinguishes itself from the abovementioned forums in other ways as well. It had 
to differentiate itself, considering the critics that claimed during its creation that other organisations 
were already doing useful work or could expand their activities. The ICN engages in work that 
cannot properly be done by either the OECD, UNCTAD, or the WTO.2419 A first defining 
characteristic is that the Network is almost entirely virtual. There is no secretariat, but a Steering 
Group of members is in control. Most interactions happen via the internet or the phone. The annual 
conference is one of the only occasions where real-life interactions take place. Second, the ICN 
focuses on ‘all competition, all of the time’, and has a strong inclination toward the practical.2420 It is 
the only international body devoted exclusively to competition law enforcement.2421 According to the 
ICN, it “provides competition authorities with a specialized yet informal venue for maintaining regular contacts and 
addressing practical competition concerns.”2422 The dynamic dialogue created in this way can build consensus 
and convergence.2423 The original Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the ICN 
laid the pavement for work that is aimed at convergence, experience-sharing, supporting competition 
advocacy, and seeking to facilitate international cooperation. More specifically, the ICN aims to help 
its members achieve four main outcomes: to better address private anti-competitive behaviour as 
well as unwarranted public restrictions on competition, to minimise incompatible outcomes across 
jurisdictions, and to reduce unnecessary cost and burdens resulting from duplicative or inconsistent 
procedures. The ICN has in 2011 published the goals that it will pursue during the second decade of 
its existence. It will continue to encourage the dissemination of competition experience and best 
practices, formulate proposals for procedural and substantive convergence through a results-oriented 
agenda and structure, support competition advocacy, while facilitating effective international 
cooperation. Where convergence is not possible, for instance due to different domestic economic 
histories, development and priorities, the ICN aims to facilitate ‘informed divergence’, namely 
identifying the nature of and sources or rationales behind divergences so that they can be better 
understood and respected. This in turn may lead to greater clarity and transparency and can lay the 
groundwork for possible longer-term convergence.2424  
 
B) Membership  
 
The ICN also distinguishes itself from other international forums via its membership, which is very 
inclusive, consists of agencies, not governments, and includes a wide range of other non-
governmental actors (NGAs). Participation and transparency are central to the ICN. Every 
competition authority in the world is welcome. In practice, however, there is differentiation in the 
level of participation of each authority. A central core of mature agencies is more active than 
                                                          
2417 ICN, The ICN’s vision for its second decade, Presented at the 10th annual conference of the ICN, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 17-20 May 2011, 1. 
2418 E. Fox, “Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network”, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 09-27, July 2009, 165-166.  
2419 Ibid., 166. 
2420 M. Coppola, “One network’s effect: the rise and future of the ICN”, Concurrences, N° 3-2011, 227.  
2421 Taking into consideration that the ECN is limited to the European Union and not truly international in scope.  
2422 See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about.aspx (accessed July 2017). 
2423 Ibid.  
2424 ICN, The ICN’s vision for its second decade, Presented at the 10th annual conference of the ICN, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 17-20 May 2011, 4-6. 
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younger, less resourced ones (despite some funding by the ICN). A lack of time, and sometimes of 
expertise, also plays a role, as well as language constraints.2425 Not only participation is influenced in 
this manner, power dynamics can occur as well. As inclusive and democratic as the ICN wishes to 
be, “the process of negotiation is nevertheless likely to reflect imbalances in terms of resources, clout, power and 
influence.”2426 The ICN Steering Group as well is, somewhat logically, dominated by developed 
countries, as they generally have more experience and resources.2427 The fact that it are competition 
agencies, and not governments that make up the ICN, allows for less formal and bureaucratic 
contacts. It also allegedly decreases the risk of politicization, which at least creates the perception that 
negotiations will be easier and quicker.2428   
 
Far more than in the OECD, where academics are occasionally invited to give their insights on 
certain issues,2429 the ICN from the start welcomed members of the business, consumer and 
academic communities, civil society groups, private sector attorneys from in-house and law firm 
backgrounds, as well as the economic professions. They provide their unique insights when 
scrutinising ideas and discussing analytical approaches or specific language of various work products. 
Such insight might point to potential effects of work product that agencies themselves might not 
readily foresee.2430 NGA input is therefore a valuable resource for the ICN, and helps in broadening 
its support- base and in increasing its legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders, by providing a sense of 
ownership of the various outcomes.2431 NGA participation is also beneficial for ICN members with 
little resources, as NGAs share the resource burden of participating in ICN projects.2432 Criticism has 
been voiced regarding potential undue influence from NGAs, however, and bias in the ‘openness’ of 
the Network, in particular from the business community and from large Anglo-Saxon law firms, on 
the ICN’s agenda.2433 The decision-making mechanism of the ICN however (see below) offsets any 
                                                          
2425 E. Fox, “Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network”, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 09-27, July 2009, 167.  
2426 M.-L. Djelic, “International Competition Network” in T. Hale & D. Held (eds), Handbook of transnational governance – 
institutions and innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, 84.  
2427 Ibid., 85.  
2428 C. Damro, “The new trade politics and EU competition policy: shopping for convergence and co-operation”, Journal 
of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 6, September 2006, 879. 
2429 The OECD also receives input from BIAC, the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD. The 
Committee is comprised of business representatives, in-house lawyers and former officials of competition authorities 
having joined the bar. (F. Jenny, “The International Competition Network and the OECD Competition Committee: 
Differences, Similarities and Complementarities” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, 
Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 101.) 
2430 D. Daniel Sokol “The ICN in the Context of International Antitrust Institutions” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International 
Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 157. 
2431 J. Fingleton, “Competition Agencies and Global Markets: The Challenges Ahead” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International 
Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 195; F. Jenny, “The 
International Competition Network and the OECD Competition Committee: Differences, Similarities and 
Complementarities” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, 
Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 100; D. Daniel Sokol “The ICN in the Context of International Antitrust Institutions” in P. 
Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 
2011, 157. 
2432 ICN, The ICN’s vision for its second decade, Presented at the 10th annual conference of the ICN, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 17-20 May 2011, 25.  
2433 F. Jenny, “The International Competition Network and the OECD Competition Committee: Differences, Similarities 
and Complementarities” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and 
Aspirations, Intersentia, Mortsel, 2011, 101. 
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type of unjustifiable influence.2434 Concerns regarding democratic deficit are nevertheless valid (see 
below, Part III, 2.3.3). 
 
C) Functioning 
 
According to SOKOL, the success of the ICN is due to its institutional design and its originally rather 
modest agenda, focusing on issues on which success would be fairly easy to achieve.2435 The ICN is 
relatively non-hierarchical in nature.2436 It is ‘governed’ by a steering group, consisting of fifteen 
elected members – who serve renewable two-year terms – and three ex officio members. The latter 
represent ICN members designated to host an annual conference. During the annual conference, in 
odd-numbered years, Steering Group members are confirmed by consensus of ICN Members.2437 
The Steering Group sets the agenda, determines the work plans, and identifies the priorities. This is 
later approved by ICN members during the annual conference.2438  
 
The work is done in Working Groups, focused on specific aspects of competition policy, who 
operate on a consensus basis. If consensus is not possible, the different views are identified in the 
reports.2439 The working groups, comprising a high level of expertise, are flexible and project-
oriented. Currently working groups exist on advocacy, agency effectiveness, cartels, mergers, and 
unilateral conduct, but this may change according to the need. According to WHITE, this 
‘compartmentalisation’ “may allow the ICN to operate more efficiently than an entity with an operating structure 
with multiple levels of authority.”2440 As mentioned, the ICN is a virtual organisation, without a permanent 
secretariat, headquarters, or other permanent staff. It is estimated that 90% of the ICN’s work is 
conducted virtually, meaning by email, the internet, and teleconferencing.2441 Virtual contacts are then 
strengthened via face-to-face contacts at the annual conference, and sometimes workshops.2442 Much 
of the ICNs activity takes place at this conference, not in the least the official adoption of 
recommendations and other documents.2443 The virtual nature of the network facilitates participation 
and allows for speed and adaptability to address issues where a pressing demand exists for 
international action and for which practical solutions can be envisaged.2444  
 
                                                          
2434 M.-L. Djelic, “International Competition Network” in T. Hale & D. Held (eds), Handbook of transnational governance – 
institutions and innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, 82.  
2435 D. Daniel Sokol “The ICN in the Context of International Antitrust Institutions” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International 
Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 157. 
2436 P.-H. Verdier, “Regulatory networks and their limits”, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and 
Business Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 22, 9/2008, 47. 
2437 See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/steering-group.aspx (accessed July 2017).  
2438 M.-L. Djelic, “International Competition Network” in T. Hale & D. Held (eds), Handbook of transnational governance – 
institutions and innovations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, 81.  
2439 ICN Operational Framework, Adopted by ICN members, 13 February 2012.  
2440 P. White, “International judicial assistance in antitrust enforcement: the shortcomings of current practices and 
legislation, and the roles of international organizations”, Administrative Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2010, 276.  
2441 C. Damro, “The new trade politics and EU competition policy: shopping for convergence and co-operation”, Journal 
of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 6, September 2006, 879. 
2442M. Coppola, “One network’s effect: the rise and future of the ICN”, Concurrences, N° 3-2011, 223. 
2443 P.-H. Verdier, “Regulatory networks and their limits”, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and 
Business Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 22, 9/2008, 47. 
2444 B.A. Melo Araujo, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 189-190. For 
examples, see the ICN Work Products Catalog, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1109.pdf (accessed July 2017). 
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As mentioned, one of the ICN’s goals is to reach convergence. HOLLMAN and KOVACIC have 
identified three stages of convergence based on statements of agency officials intensely involved in 
the ICN’s early development and subsequent operations. In the first stage of decentralized 
experimentation, nations test substantive rules, analytical methods, procedures, and administrative 
techniques. Based on this experience, superior practices are identified, to which countries can then 
voluntarily opt-in. Satisfaction with a standard may eventually lead to its inclusion in a treaty or other 
form of international obligation. The ICN contributes to this process by first increasing the 
understanding of individual systems, by engaging its members in regular discussions about existing 
practice that may illuminate similarities and explain differences. This fuller understanding forms the 
basis for the identification of superior practices. At this stage inclusive participation is crucial, both 
by agencies from well-established market economies as well as economies in transition. As 
mentioned, resource issues may present a dilemma here. On the one hand, most resources (including 
human resources) will reside in older, more experienced agencies. Without their resource 
commitment the ICN would collapse. On the other hand, however, contributions often go hand in 
hand with a certain control, which may raise doubts among less experienced and resourced 
jurisdictions that the network truly serves their interests.2445 It has been remarked that many of the 
ICN-compliant jurisdictions share relatively more experience as well as a large GDP. This has led to 
concerns that the recommended practices are a disguised means for the leading competition 
authorities to export their regulatory regimes. Such concerns regarding regulatory export by larger 
agencies, while not entirely unfounded, can be mitigated however by the consensus-based 
functioning of the network.2446 Moreover, the larger authorities also simply have more experience 
experimenting with several aspects of competition policy, so it makes sense that they have a large 
input in the recommendations. According to COPPOLA experience suggests that dissenting voices 
have considerable power.2447 The next stage is the monitoring and assessing of the actual opt-in by 
members (see below). The informality that is characteristic of the ICN allows regulators to reduce 
the uncertainty paired with cooperation, as it allows experimentation with different approaches 
permitting the assessment of the economic impact without fully engaging.2448 Finally, interoperability 
across systems should be promoted where characteristics remain dissimilar and convergence cannot 
be achieved.2449 The ICN is also active in this field.    
 
2.1.4.2 Accomplishments/work product 
 
The ICN is not a formal rule-maker, but does create soft law in its attempts to create convergence 
(which again may create concerns regarding accountability and democratic deficit, see below, Part III, 
2.3.3). It does not constrain or coerce its members to adhere to the practices it promotes. This is also 
reflected in its consensus-oriented decision-making, rather than working with a majority rule.2450 
                                                          
2445 H. M. Hollman & W. E. Kovacic, “The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role” in P. 
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2449 H. M. Hollman & W. E. Kovacic, “The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role” in P. 
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When consensus is reached on certain ‘recommendations’ or ‘best practices’, the members can 
decide whether and how they will implement them.  
 
Focus on international enforcement cooperation has been present from the beginning, but received 
renewed momentum in June 2011, when “the ICN Steering Group decided to consider a potential project for 
the ICN in its Second Decade to assess member agencies’ needs with respect to international enforcement cooperation 
and identify appropriate work to be carried out by the ICN to address those needs.”2451 In March earlier that year, 
the US FTC and DoJ had already co-organized an ICN Roundtable to deepen the discussion on 
enforcement cooperation within the network. It was the first ICN program to specifically address 
international enforcement cooperation across competition enforcement areas.2452 As an outcome of 
its Second Decade Project, the ICN in April 2012 approved a Steering Group project on 
international enforcement cooperation.2453 Momentum was increased as the OECD Competition 
Committee as well had identified international enforcement cooperation as one of its ‘strategic 
themes’ for 2012-2014. Both organizations were in contact when scoping their respective projects 
and designed the aforementioned Joint Survey, which was of unprecedented comprehensiveness.2454 
The questions relating to the ICN were designed to acquire ICN members’ views on the usefulness 
of existing ICN cooperation-related work, and on their needs and priorities for future ICN 
cooperation-related work.2455  
 
Members have a strong influence on what output is created. Again, the ICN aims to address the 
practical needs of the agencies. Feedback offered by members during workshops for instance has led 
to the inclusion the following year of sessions specifically tailored to younger agencies – one on using 
Forensic IT during inspections and another on what makes leniency policy successful.2456 Also during 
Roundtables the floor is open for discussion of future ICN work. In this manner for instance it 
became clear that promoting international cooperation on enforcement matters was considered an 
ICN priority by many members. Examples of suggested future work included the creation of a living 
contact list of cooperation liaisons, use of the ICN blog to provide cooperation tips and experiences, 
webinars or teleseminars on case cooperation examples and techniques by substantive working 
groups, advocacy efforts on the value of cooperation, etcetera.2457 
 
As becomes clear, the output produced by the ICN is very diverse. The ICN issued a statement of 
achievements covering its first decade, listing the accomplishments per active working group, other 
active projects, and former working groups.2458 Early projects mainly focused on merger review and 
advocacy, but now the ICN tackles issues from virtually all areas of competition law and policy.2459 
VERDIER identifies a gradual shift from focus on procedural matters to more substantive issues.2460 
The ICN’s work includes recommended or best practices, case-handling and enforcement manuals 
                                                          
2451 ICN Steering Group International Enforcement Cooperation Project, March 2012, 1. 
2452 ICN Roundtable on Enforcement Cooperation, Roundtable Report & Questionnaire Response Summary, 
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(such as the Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual, which holds a pragmatic reference for agencies to 
evaluate and benchmark their own approaches2461), reports, templates on legislation and rules in 
different jurisdictions (for instance the model leniency waiver template), databases and toolkits (for 
instance for advocacy), workshops, reports, teleseminars and webinars, discussions at annual 
conferences, and so on.2462 While the virtual work cannot be underestimated, the personal bonds that 
are created during the workshops and the annual conference, that knows a very high attendance rate, 
were labelled as a key benefit of the Network.2463  
 
One particular project to be mentioned is the ICN Curriculum Project launched in 2010, which is an 
open-source virtual university for competition authority officials.2464 It relies on existing ICN work 
product for guidance, and offers training modules in the form of video lectures and accompanying 
materials from a diverse group of both academics and practitioners. Participation is free of charge.2465  
   
The instruments ranked as most highly useful in the Joint Survey were the ICN Recommended 
Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures, Recommended Practice X on Interagency 
Coordination, and the ICN Merger Working Group Model Confidentiality Waiver.2466 The ICN’s 
best practices are more specific and practical than the ones issued by the OECD, which are 
addressed to governments rather than agencies. The ICN is better placed to issue best practices that 
do not require competition authorities to change their legislation, while the OECD Competition 
Committee is, at least from an institutional perspective, better placed to address issues which require 
legislative changes or coordination between government policies.2467 The ICN best practices are 
often adopted by ICN members even if many of their own laws and practices are not conform. This 
willingness and the legitimacy often enjoyed by the practices due to close public-private cooperation 
in drafting, add to the potential of some best practices in becoming an important global baseline.2468  
 
2.1.4.3 Implementation 
 
Many ICN members indicated that the process of creating the work product is extremely valuable on 
its own. Working closely together leads to exchange, understanding, and learning.2469 The 
relationships forged during this process are highly valued, and may lead to increased case-
cooperation, which as such is not one of the focus points of the ICN.2470 However, while the ICN is 
generally applauded for the consensus it manages to achieve, the actual implementation and use of 
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2468 M. Coppola, “One network’s effect: the rise and future of the ICN”, Concurrences, N° 3-2011, 224.  
2469 Ibid., 227. 
2470 B. Sweeney, "International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress", Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 10, 2009, 67.  
387 
 
the practices and other documents adopted by the members – in other words, policy influence – is 
an important factor of success as well. 2471 It is questioned in this manner whether the ICN goes 
beyond being a mere ‘talking shop’. According to COPPOLA allegations of the ICN being a ‘talking 
shop’ are entirely refutable based on statistics about convergence and anecdotes about influence.2472  
 
Despite there being several factors to measure the success of the ICN besides implementation, the 
ICN is increasingly focusing on stimulating the implementation of its work product.2473 The ICN has 
indeed been accused of not being very good in disseminating or ‘retailing’ its output, and ‘getting it 
off the shelf’.2474 This may be explained in part by the lack of permanent staff or a secretariat, and 
therefore the absence of specific marketing and outreach specialists. The ICN could also try to 
collaborate with regional networks and centres, and get more of its output, apart from the 
recommendations, translated.2475 Relying on voluntary cooperation also means that it is somewhat 
difficult to ‘be tough’ and tell members that they are not doing a good job.2476 To this day, even 
founding members of the ICN still fail to adhere to certain aspects of Recommended Practices.2477 
 
In this context, the work of the Advocacy and Implementation Network (AIN) is of great value. This 
network within the ICN is responsible for developing and, with the approval of the Steering Group, 
implementing a work plan to promote and advocate for the (better) use of ICN work products by 
competition authorities globally, including via the facilitation of technical assistance. It does so via 
the Advocacy & Implementation Network Support Program, established in 2008. Both 
representatives from the Working Groups as well as volunteer members are engaged in the AIN. 
Through the support program, ICN members can either seek advice about specific ICN work 
products or ask for assistance on the practical implementation of ICN recommendations or other 
guidance documents.2478 The agency requesting assistance together with the AIN prepares a plan for 
assistance, identifying relevant ICN work product and supporting agencies. This assistance is 
generally provided in a virtual manner. Financial assistance is excluded.2479 Among other things, AIN 
also developed an ICN Work Product Catalogue, listing and describing all ICN work products from 
2002 to 2014.2480 It also monitors competition law and policy developments in member agencies and 
promotes ICN work product to international organisations and external bodies. ICN members 
                                                          
2471 M. Coppola & C. Lagdameo, “Taking Stock and Taking Root: A Closer Look at Implementation of the ICN 
Recommended Practices for Merger Notification & Review Procedures” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International Competition 
Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 299; E. Fox, “Linked-In: Antitrust and 
the Virtues of a Virtual Network”, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-27, July 2009, 167. 
2472 M. Coppola, “One network’s effect: the rise and future of the ICN”, Concurrences, N° 3-2011, 223, 227. 
2473 F. Jenny, “ The International Competition Network and the OECD Competition Committee: Differences, 
Similarities and Complementarities” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments 
and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 102; ICN, The ICN’s vision for its second decade, Presented at the 10th annual 
conference of the ICN, The Hague, Netherlands, 17-20 May 2011, 8. 
2474 “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by Concurrences 
and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015. 
2475 M. Coppola, “One network’s effect: the rise and future of the ICN”, Concurrences, N° 3-2011, 228.  
2476 “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by Concurrences 
and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015.  
2477 R. Stern, “An in-house perspective on global competition law developments”, Concurrences, N°2-2012, 2.  
2478 ICN, The ICN’s vision for its second decade, Presented at the 10th annual conference of the ICN, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 17-20 May 2011, 9. 
2479 See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/steering-group/advocacy-implementation/aisup.aspx 
(accessed July 2017).  
2480 See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/steering-group/advocacy-implementation.aspx 
(accessed July 2017).  
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reported that ICN support of their advocacy activities is of the main benefits of participating in the 
network.2481  
 
It is difficult to establish the causal relationship between certain reforms and ICN work product. 
Significant reforms have taken place in the areas in which Recommended Practices are in place. The 
factors leading to these reforms can however be diverse and multifaceted. A study conducted in 2005 
by the ICN for instance revealed that the principal factors driving merger reform are “1) a desire to 
bring the merger review regime into greater conformity with international best practice, including the Recommended 
Practices; 2) convergence toward the regimes of other jurisdictions, such as those with well-established merger review 
systems, a regional leader, or a close trading partner; and 3) recognition by stakeholders, in particular, the private bar, 
the business community, and the competition agency, that the merger review system was not as effective or efficient as it 
could be.”2482 Members face significant barriers to implement the practices, despite the willingness of 
most members to do so, such as legal obstacles, insufficient resources, uncertainty regarding the 
impact on resources, lack of stakeholder support, or the complexity of some of the Practices.2483 
Moreover, not all aspects of the Practices may be appropriate for every jurisdiction. As resource-
issues form one of the main obstacles for implementation, members who have made reforms should 
maintain data on the costs and benefits of the reform and of the potential savings as a result of the 
reform. So far members have generally not done so or have not made such data public.2484   
 
The most well-known ICN instruments, the recommendations, are generally used as guidance when 
drafting and revising national laws, as drivers of reform, offering additional legitimacy (see the table 
below with regard to the merger recommendations for instance).2485  
 
 
Figure 14. E. Pérez Motta, “Competition policy and the trade system: challenges and opportunities”, E15 Expert Group 
on Competition Policy and the Trade System Overview Paper, April 2016, available at http://e15initiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Competition-Motta-Final.pdf (accessed May 2017), 5. 
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They have also informed an OECD recommendation on merger notifications.2486 Since its 
establishment, over one hundred recommended practices have been issued to member agencies on a 
wide variety of topics. Most often, both competition agencies as well as the private sector use them 
as a benchmark to evaluate the appropriateness of laws and policies.2487 This causes some pressure to 
conform, “as agencies appear to view their reputational value as linked to conformity with the Recommended 
Practices.”2488 Some concrete numbers can be given with regard to the Recommendations on Merger 
Notifications and Review Procedures. A 2010 survey of ICN members revealed that over 75% of the 
54 responding agencies used or were using the Practices to identify areas for change, provide 
conforming language, and build support for change, while almost 80% intended to use the Practices 
in the near future. About 60% of the respondents claimed that the Recommended Practices had 
already caused changes in their merger review regimes. At the time, 22 of the ICN’s then 87 
members that had a merger control regime, were entirely conform with the Recommended 
Practices.2489  
 
Examples are the adoption of the Korean merger notification thresholds in 2003 and again in 2007-
2009 when they were reformed, during which South-Korea publicly indicated its desire to bring its 
legislation into line with the Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review 
Procedures,2490 or the situation in India in 2007 with regard to its new merger regime that was at odds 
with one of the most important recommended practices for mergers. India saw itself forced to bring 
the regime into greater conformity with the latter, after complaints from the Indian and foreign 
private sector, often using the ICN recommendations as a benchmark for their complaints. Equally, 
bar associations and business groups used the Recommended Practices to highlight areas of the 
merger regime of the Slovak Republic deserving reform.2491 Also in Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Ireland, 
and Portugal, for instance, the Recommended Practices have been used by competition agencies to 
advocate for legislative reforms, mostly to the merger regimes.2492 Also with regard to leniency 
programmes, a number of competition agencies have cited the relevant ICN materials as 
instrumental in the development or revision of such programmes.2493 ICN work product equally plays 
a role in the adoption of new regimes, such as the introduction of merger control in China, where 
bodies commenting on various proposals frequently cited the ICN.2494 In short, it most certainly 
seems unfair to claim that the ICN is yet another expression of the “tendency of governments to commit to 
harmonization and unification projects that produce little hard law but provide officials with high-profile venues to 
display themselves”, while distracting from desirable changes and rather inducing cosmetic changes to 
appeal to the international audience.2495 
 
                                                          
2486 E. Fox, “Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network”, Law & Economics Research Paper Series 
Working Paper No. 09-27, July 2009, 169. 
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2.1.4.4 Future: challenges ahead  
 
A) Broadening 
 
The ICN has quickly established itself as one of the most relevant forums in international antitrust. 
However, some have expressed doubts on whether the ICN can continue to exist as it currently 
does. There is some discussion as to whether the ICN should stick to ‘all antitrust, all the time’, or 
expand its work to more broad issues. TRITELL, for instance, claims that while the mantra has “served 
the organization well in focusing its activities during its early years on issues that most directly concern its member 
agencies […] there are external challenges to competition policy that can emanate from other parts of government, and 
the ICN is considering whether it can play a useful and effective role as an advocate for competition policy in these 
broader settings.”2496 MARSDEN, however, rightly claims that expanding the ICN’s focus risks to distract 
the ICN from practical and achievable projects, and would moreover result in duplication of existing 
work. At the same time the Network would be restricted by the fact that it is not an 
intergovernmental institution.2497 The ICN should therefore remain focused on competition law 
enforcement issues, while transpolicy-issues could be addressed by intergovernmental forums 
crossing several policy areas such as the OECD. 
 
B) Deepening 
 
The ICN should, and is, exploring more controversial issues, while building on the existing work, of 
which the implementation is being encouraged. During one of the ICN’s surveys a respondent 
mentioned a ‘two-speed ICN’, whereby a focus on practical work is supplemented by discussions of 
more complex substantive issues.2498 As the ICN, and its members, have evolved, it may increase its 
ambitions and expect more from its members. According to FOX, the ICN already in 2009 needed 
“continued leadership and new momentum”, of which according to her, some could be supplied “by mining 
the depths of controversial issues that it [had] thus far chosen to avoid.”2499 Almost ten years later the ICN 
indeed has pushed the boundaries of its work somewhat, and it should continue to do so. To 
anticipate potential issues that may arise when more complex questions are addressed by the ICN, it 
should continue to self-assess its apparent successes and shortcomings, by for instance closely 
following what happens after the ICN annual conferences upon return of the attending officials, and 
monitoring the functioning of the working groups and the usefulness of the issues tackled.2500 It was 
suggested as well to integrate the different ICN instruments into fewer documents to provide a more 
clear and consistent basis for cooperation, following revision of such instruments based on actual 
experiences with them.2501    
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Some more tangible suggestions regarding future work, coming from ICN members themselves, 
concern the development of an electronic information-sharing platform,2502 added work on 
transparency, for instance by publishing information about statutory confidentiality protections on 
the website of the competition agencies or on the ICN’s website,2503 or the development of a 
common terminology. Another suggestion was that the ICN should engage with the judiciary.2504  
 
C) Virtual viability 
 
While the virtual nature of the ICN certainly has its benefits, it also brings about problems. In the 
words of HOLLMAN and KOVACIC “[t]he ICN network may be virtual, but the problems of financing and 
management that it faces are unmistakably real.”2505 If the ICN’s role should expand, it can be questioned 
whether this model will continue to be viable. There may arise a need in the future to examine and 
refine the ICN’s operational framework, in order for its structure and operational forms to remain 
adequate to support its future programs.2506 In the end the ICN is nothing more than the sum of its 
members. The virtual roots of the ICN must prove to be stable enough. If the driving force of the 
more advanced jurisdictions comes to a halt, the ICN has little chance of survival. It requires 
continuous devoted leadership and engagement. This is may become more difficult when more 
controversial issues arise.2507 While the institution is already fairly transparent, further efforts should 
be made, including on accountability. While the ICN produces soft law, their effect is not to be 
underestimated, which renders concerns on accountability a valid issue.2508  
 
D) Participation 
 
Another recurring challenge mentioned when addressing the future of the ICN is how to achieve 
heightened involvement of younger or smaller agencies in small or developing economies,2509 as well 
as “ensuring broad private sector participation especially in jurisdictions with less antitrust experience.”2510 While the 
consensus-method involves give-and-take on all sides, agenda-setting and norm-creation is still 
strongly influenced by the desires of developed countries,2511 even if other younger and smaller 
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agencies have stated that the ICN’s agenda is well balanced and useful, and reflects their needs.2512 
The more influential ICN work product becomes, the more important it will be to include the needs 
and context of developing countries and small economies.2513 FINGLETON stated in 2010 already that 
ensuring that all member agencies are engaged in the work of the ICN was a central theme of 
strategic review occurring at that time.2514 This also implies that resource-issues will become more 
prominent, even more after the financial and economic crisis, which has urged to ‘do more with less’. 
The cost and timing of international calls or the coordination of international conferences so that 
they can occur back-to-back are only some of the practical issues that should be (increasingly) 
addressed, for instance via toll-free numbers or the availability of recordings or minutes of 
teleseminars and calls, or the webcasting of workshops.2515  
 
2.1.5 ECN: the ultimate success-story?  
   
While this section focuses on global forums, the European Competition Network, although regional 
in nature, nevertheless deserves to be mentioned. The respondents to the OECD/ICN Joint Survey 
identified membership of all involved agencies in a case to a regional network as a factor facilitating 
both confidential and non-confidential information exchange.2516 The European Competition 
Network is widely regarded as one of the most advanced and successful competition networks. It is 
therefore relevant to analyse more closely the cooperation mechanisms used in the Network and to 
inquire whether these mechanisms can and should be transposed to a more global level.  
 
2.1.5.1 Origins, institutional structure, and functioning  
 
A) Origins 
 
The entry into force on 1 May 2004 of Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the EU 
competition rules laid down in what are currently Articles 101 and 102 TFEU marked the start of a 
revolution in EU competition law enforcement.2517 Prior to the modernisation brought on by 
Regulation 1/2003, EU competition law enforcement took place in a centralised manner, with full 
responsibility lying in the hands of the European Commission. Competition law in this manner 
occupied a special place in the whole of EU law enforcement, and was shielded for more than four 
decades from multi-level governance. This was even more the case as the epistemic community that 
formed around EU competition law stayed in relative isolation from other policy fields and the 
debate on EU governance in general due to its particularly technical language.2518  
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The Regulation set up a system of decentralised enforcement, whereby the competition authorities of 
the Member States (National Competition Authorities - NCAs) gained increased responsibility in the 
implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In this framework, the 'European Competition 
Network’ was set up as the forum in which the NCAs and Commission could discuss and cooperate 
in view of ensuring the effective and consistent application and enforcement of the EU competition 
rules,2519 as well as an efficient division of work.2520 The ECN does not have legal personality, and 
consists of the competition agencies of the EU Member States and the European Commission. Due 
to the fact that the competition rules constituted an essential part of the European economic 
constitution, consistency in their enforcement was not to be compromised even in the era of 
decentralisation.2521 The objectives of the ECN therefore relate to uniformity, via case allocation and 
cooperation in investigations and policy making. Regulation 1/2003 did not attempt to govern the 
division of territorial jurisdiction among the Member States. The jurisdiction of national competition 
authorities remains within the competence of the Member States within the boundaries of 
international law. The Regulation contains only one ‘hard rule’ on jurisdiction, Article 11(6), 
according to which the Commission can take on a case even if an NCA was already dealing with 
it.2522 
 
Article 11(1) of Regulation 1/2003 is the legal basis for administrative cooperation in the ECN. The 
ECN’s functioning was further developed in a Commission notice (the so-called Network Notice) as 
well as a joint statement of the Council and the Commission, which serves as a common political 
understanding of the Network.2523 Similar to the global environment, enforcement of competition 
law is thereby entrusted to a panoply of proactive enforcers, namely the European Commission, the 
NCAs and the national and EU courts.2524  
 
The ECN is generally labelled as a success. In the 2009 Report on the first five years of Regulation 
1/2003, the ECN was labelled “an innovative model of governance for the implementation of Community law by 
the Commission and Member State authorities.”2525 Five years later, the Commission stated that “the ECN 
has developed into a multi-faceted forum for exchanges of experience on the application of substantive competition law as 
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well as on convergence of procedures and sanctions.”2526 It further underlined the dynamic development that 
took place within the ECN, resulting in the establishment of the NCAs as a key pillar of the 
application of the EU competition rules. However, the Commission also highlighted some areas 
where improvement is welcomed, in particular with regard to procedural convergence.2527 Regulation 
1/2003 does not contain harmonisation measures with regard to national procedural rules relevant to 
competition authorities. Already in the wake of the 2009 Report, the ECN had initiated a process 
seeking possibilities for voluntary convergence of national procedural frameworks.2528 
 
B) Institutional structure 
 
When not dealing with discussions and assistance regarding individual cases, but functioning as a 
forum for the discussion of general policy issues, the Network operates via horizontal working 
groups and sector-specific subgroups. Horizontal working groups address general questions of 
antitrust enforcement in conduct cases and meet on a regular basis to discuss topical policy 
developments and to pursue common policy projects. The sectorial subgroups deal with antitrust 
enforcement in particular sectors and meet on an ad hoc basis when important developments in a 
particular sector arise. In these subgroups case-handlers of the different agencies exchange views and 
learn from each other’s experiences. Again the promotion of the coherent application of EU 
antitrust rules is central.2529 The rather informal working groups undertake technical work and are 
created organically around topics as they arise. Both types of subgroups report to the ECN Plenary, 
which is a formal arena for the heads of NCAs to meet. It takes position on the reports  from the 
working groups, decides whether to create new sub-groups and divides the work among the groups, 
and discusses practical aspects of the ECN’s operation.2530 Interagency contacts therefore occur on 
different levels.2531  
 
The ECN does not portray many of the typical characteristics of network governance, with regard to 
origins, functions, structure, and operation.2532 First of all the membership of the ECN is much more 
homogeneous and there is more trust and less variability than in a traditional global network. EU 
members are geographically close and share a common history, and similar political and economic 
ideologies. They can moreover benefit from an overarching, treaty-based framework spelling out 
long-term political and economic commitments.2533 The ECN is characterised by a strong legal 
structure, namely a cooperation mechanism predetermined in hard law as well as soft law, as well as 
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the special ‘managerial’ position of the Commission. Networks often arise organically, voluntarily, 
and experimentally among equals, from the need for cooperation to achieve a common goal.2534 The 
ECN was designed top-down around the European Commission and in function of EU competition 
law enforcement. Other networks generally do not have such a strong network design. The ECN 
also lacks a strong dispute resolution mechanism, a feature generally present in multi-level 
governance networks.2535 The ECN indeed has a clearly defined purpose and ascribes clear 
responsibilities to its members.2536  These differences can be explained by the historic importance 
given to competition policy in the EU and the fact that it was exclusively entrusted to the 
Commission. Indeed, contrary to other networks, the ECN did not emerge in an effort to coordinate 
multiple authorities in the absence of centralized authority. On the contrary, the competence of the 
Commission was long-established and the ECN was created to govern the decentralized 
enforcement that would come to the forefront.2537  
 
Figure 15. Source: F. Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, 
European Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, 666. 
 
Originally it was therefore thought that the ECN was too strong in terms of its structure and too 
weak in terms of its membership to be successful (see table above).2538   
 
C) Functioning – information exchange  
 
The ‘close cooperation’ to which the Commission and the NCAs committed themselves is based on 
two pillars: an informal case allocation regime and extensive information exchange mechanisms.2539 
                                                          
2534 F. Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, European Law 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, 662, footnote 11, 663. Based on D. Coen and M. Thatcher , “Network Governance and 
Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 28, No. 49, 2008, 
comprising a comparison of multi-level policy networks operating in other policy fields. See F. Cengiz, “Management of 
Networks between the Competition Authorities in the EC and the US: Different Polities, Different Designs”, European 
Competition Journal , Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, 429. 
2535 F. Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, European Law 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, 663, 666. 
2536 H. Kassim & K. Wright, “Network governance and the European Union: the case of the European Competition 
Network”, paper for ARENA Workshop ‘The transformation of the executive branch of government in Europe’, 
University of Oslo, 4-6 June 2009, 4. 
2537 H. Kassim & K. Wright, “Network governance and the European Union: the case of the European Competition 
Network”, paper for ARENA Workshop ‘The transformation of the executive branch of government in Europe’, 
University of Oslo, 4-6 June 2009, 4.  
2538 F. Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, European Law 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, 666. 
2539 Ibid. 
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The Regulation deals with both horizontal cooperation among the NCAs and vertical cooperation 
between the NCAs and the Commission. The focus in this section will mainly be on the former, as 
this is more relevant in the context of agency cooperation.2540  
 
Central to the functioning of the ECN in this context are Articles 12 and 22 of Regulation 1/2003. 
Article 12 relates to the exchange of information between the Network members. It allows them to 
provide one another with and use as intelligence or as evidence any matter of fact or of law, 
including confidential information, without the consent of the parties. Cooperation may occur at the 
pre-investigatory, investigatory and post-investigatory phases. Information exchanges pursuant to 
Article 12 may take place in the context of inspections, where it may enable authorities to obtain a 
more complete picture of a suspected infringement. These exchanges generally take place at a very 
early stage of an investigation,2541 in the pre-investigation phase. Before evidence-gathering begins, 
information exchanged generally regards markets to be investigated or companies to be targeted. 
During the investigation phase, evidence may also be gathered and analysed to build up the case and 
agencies may coordinate investigatory measures. At the post-investigation phase, finally, agencies 
usually exchange evidence and other information obtained during earlier stages of the proceedings 
and engage in general discussions of the case to reach efficient and consistent prosecution, 
adjudication and sanctioning.2542 None of the cooperation forms that apply among NCAs are 
obligatory, however. The only obligations under Regulation 1/2003 exist in the relationship between 
the NCAs and the Commission. Article 12 merely provides the opportunity to exchange information. 
 
Information can be exchanged regardless of the (criminal or administrative) nature of the underlying 
proceedings. If information is exchanged not as intelligence, but as evidence, its use, however, is 
conditional. Use of exchanged information is restricted in several ways. It must be for the purpose of 
enforcing article 101 or 102 TFEU and must be used in respect of the subject-matter for which it 
was collected by the transmitting authority. Information may be exchanged for the application of 
national competition law in the event that national competition law is applied in the same case and in 
parallel to EU competition law and does not lead to a different outcome. If used as evidence, the 
information exchanged may not lead to the imposition of sanctions on natural persons unless the law 
of the transmitting authority foresees similar sanctions or if the information has been collected in a 
way which respects the same level of protection of the rights of defence of natural persons as 
provided for under the national rules of the receiving authority. In the latter case custodial sanctions 
                                                          
2540 In short, vertical cooperation entails that the NCAs inform the Commission about first formal investigative measures, 
the adoption of infringement or commitment decisions under Article 7(1) and Article 9(1) respectively, and decisions 
withdrawing the benefit of a block exemption regulation under Article 29(2). This allows the European Commission to 
intervene if there is a serious risk of inconsistency in the application of EU competition law. NCAs are moreover entitled 
to consult the Commission, and they have to provide it with the documents needed for the assessment of a case. The 
Commission is under the obligation to transmit copies of both ‘most important’ and ‘other existing’ documents to NCAs 
and to inform them about its own first investigative measures (Article 11(2)-(6) Regulation 1/2003). NCAs must inform 
each other of all cases that they investigate under EU competition law (OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on 
International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 59-60). 
2541 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009)574 accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 COM(2009)206 final, 29 April 2009, 
71. 
2542 M. Błachucki & S. Jóźwiak, “Exchange of Information and Evidence between Competition Authorities and 
Entrepreneurs’ Rights”, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2012, 154-155.  
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remain excluded.2543 This provision (see below, Part III, 4.5.1.2, B), assumes a sufficient degree of 
equivalence in procedural rights in the different jurisdictions of the Network. 
 
Leniency information as well as other information that has been obtained during or following an 
inspection or any other fact-finding measures which, in each case, could not have been carried out 
except as a result of the leniency application can be exchanged without consent of the applicant in a 
limited number of circumstances. This is the case when the receiving authority has also received a 
leniency application relating to the same infringement from the same applicant as the transmitting 
authority (provided that at the time the information is transmitted it is not open to the applicant to 
withdraw the information which it has submitted to that receiving authority), when the receiving 
authority has provided a written commitment that none of the information will be used by it or by 
any other authority to which the information is subsequently transmitted to impose sanctions on the 
leniency applicant or on any other legal or natural person covered by the favourable treatment 
offered by the transmitting authority as a result of the application made by the applicant under its 
leniency programme, or on any employee or former employee of any of these persons.2544 According 
to DEKEYSER and DE SMIJTER, these far-reaching safeguards (complemented by those mentioned 
below) may prevent extensive information exchange and therefore lead to structural under-
punishment as not only the leniency applicant, but also other participants to the competition rules 
infringing behaviour will escape from effective sanctioning.2545 The use of information gathered in 
the framework of a leniency procedure is subject to certain further restrictions. Leniency related 
information submitted pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003, dealing with Cooperation 
between the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States, cannot be used by 
other network members to start an investigation.2546  
 
As mentioned, confidential information can be exchanged as well. National guarantees have been 
replaced with an EU-wide guarantee of protection contained in Article 28(2) of Regulation 1/2003, 
stating that the ECN members may not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them in the 
framework provided by the Regulation of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. 
This concept has an EU-specific meaning and encompasses business secrets and other confidential 
information (see above, Part II, 3.4.2).2547 There is no obligation to inform the undertakings 
concerned about any exchange of information.  
 
Article 22 offers the opportunity for Member States to initiate inspections or other fact-finding 
measures on behalf and for the account of another national competition authority or the European 
Commission. It is the national law of the member state where the enforcement action takes place 
that is valid.2548 Whether or not such assistance is offered is left entirely to the discretion of the 
requested authority. While information exchange takes place regularly, this type of assistance is also 
                                                          
2543 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, recital 
28(c).  
2544 Ibid., recital 41-42. 
2545 K. Dekeyser & E. De Smijter, “The exchange of evidence within the ECN and how it contributes to the European 
co-operation and co-ordination in cartel cases”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2005, 166.  
2546 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, recital 39. 
2547 The protection only applies when information is objectively confidential, the will of an undertaking to keep 
information confidential is therefore irrelevant. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO 
Chemie UK Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, 53/85, EU:C:1986:25. 
2548 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution 
from the European Union, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)53, 9 February 2012, 4.  
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offered on a regular basis.2549 Often when information is exchanged and used as evidence, it is in the 
context of an Article 22 scenario. It should be noted, however, that national competition authorities 
did encounter some difficulties when using the documents collected by another national competition 
authority due to different legislation on the confidentiality requirements.2550 
 
Information exchanges within the ECN take place via an allegedly secure, fast, and user-friendly 
intranet.2551 How NCAs should engage with each other is not regulated in detail. No particular 
procedures for the practical operation of the exchange of information are laid down in Regulation 
1/2003, or in any other EU act. Cooperation therefore generally takes place via certain practical modi 
operandi that have emerged within the Network.2552 For instance, the information obligation to report 
new cases where EU law is applied,2553 is fulfilled by uploading a standard form on the common case-
management system (see below). The competition authorities inform each other of cases via a 
standard form containing basic information regarding the case. This includes the authority dealing 
with the case, the product, markets, and parties concerned, the alleged infringement, the suspected 
duration of the infringement and the origin of the case.2554 Information regarding all stages of 
investigations can be shared through a securely encrypted on-line database, which can be tracked by 
all network members.2555 The database is divided in two levels, ‘ECN Circa’, to which each case 
handler has an own account, and ‘ECN Interactive’, of a higher confidentiality level, where 
notifications of opened proceedings are lodged.2556 Other cooperation mechanisms have been created 
to allow that the relevant authorities can be informed before an inspection is carried out, to allow for 
coordination, for instance in the form of simultaneous searches, raids or inspections.2557 It is argued 
that this type of openness compensates the absence of hard jurisdictional rules and concrete dispute 
resolution mechanisms in the network.2558 Apart from these formal means of cooperation foreseen in 
the legislation surrounding the Network, the ECN also hosts a range of informal cooperation 
                                                          
2549 The Italian competition authority, for instance, inspected the premises of a lead producer and seller of fruit and 
vegetable packaging located in Italy on behalf and for the account of the Spanish competition authority. This resulted in 
fines by the Spanish competition authority for an anticompetitive agreement among fruit packaging producers in Spain. 
The Austrian competition authority assisted the German competition authority by carrying out an inspection in the 
sector of the production of fire fighting vehicles and super-structural parts. I. Breit, J. Capiau, D. Dalheimer, V. 
Jukneviciüté, P. Krenz, E. Rikkers, A. Sinclair, “Developments in and around the European Competition Network and 
cooperation in competition enforcement in the EU: an update”, Concurrences, N° 3-2012, 82. 
2550 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009)574 accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 COM(2009)206 final, 29 April 2009, 
71. 
2551 A. Mundt, “State of play of decentralized application of Europeran competition law: collection and exchange of 
information within the ECN”, Concurrences, N°4-2014, 2.  
2552 M. Błachucki & S. Jóźwiak, “Exchange of Information and Evidence between Competition Authorities and 
Entrepreneurs’ Rights”, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2012, 154-155 
2553 Article 11(3) Regulation 1/2003.  
2554 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, Article 
17. Also see OECD, Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 
20 November 2015, 35.  
2555 F. Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, European Law 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, 668.  
2556 H. Kassim & K. Wright, “Network governance and the European Union: the case of the European Competition 
Network”, paper for ARENA Workshop ‘The transformation of the executive branch of government in Europe’, 
University of Oslo, 4-6 June 2009, 7. 
2557 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 20.  
2558 F. Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, European Law 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, 668.  
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mechanisms. One example are so-called informal requests for information (RFI’s), often concerning 
public information such as information related to the legislation in force, case law, or economic 
data.2559  
 
D) Functioning – case-allocation 
 
The second pillar of the ECN is the case-allocation mechanism. The Network is based on a system 
of parallel competences to apply the EU competition rules, aimed at an efficient division of work 
providing coherent results. Each network member retains full discretion in deciding whether or not 
to investigate a case. Cases can then be dealt with by either a single NCA, possibly with assistance, 
several NCAs, or the Commission. Re-allocation of a case generally takes place at the outset of a 
procedure, due to the fact that either the authority originally burdened with the case considers itself 
not suited to act, or when other authorities consider themselves well placed to act. The Network 
Notice offers some guidance with regard to when an authority can consider itself to be well placed to 
deal with a case. The alleged anticompetitive behaviour under investigation must have substantial 
direct actual or foreseeable effects on competition within the territory of the authority, or must be 
implemented within or originates from that territory. The authority must moreover be able to 
effectively bring the entire infringement to an end and appropriately sanction the infringement. 
Finally, the authority must be able to gather the evidence required to prove the infringement, if 
necessary with the assistance of other authorities. A material link is therefore required between the 
infringement and the territory of a Member State. Even when more than one NCA can be regarded 
as well placed, the action of a single NCA is preferred when it is sufficient to bring the entire 
infringement to an end.2560 Cases may be re-allocated if efficient enforcement so requires. The 
Commission is well-placed to act where the infringement affects more than three Member States or 
where there is a link to other priority actions of the Union, but it is never obliged to act.2561 If the 
Commission formally initiates proceedings, national agencies lose their competence to deal with the 
same case. This system of work allocation is believed to avoid the hindrance of effective 
enforcement of the EU antitrust rules due to a lack of resources of a particular agency and allows EU 
control over cases involving important issues for the development of EU competition policy.2562 
  
The Network Notice merely states that re-allocation should be a quick and efficient process and that 
it should not hold up on-going investigations. No strict time limit has been set out, but it is 
mentioned that normally after a period of two months following notification of a case in the 
Network, re-allocation should only occur in case of a material change of facts.2563 Companies do not 
have the right to have a case dealt with by a particular authority. As mentioned, a competition 
authority intending to investigate and sanction an infringement must inform the Network by 
inserting some basic information in the ECN database. This allows for rapid detection of multiple 
                                                          
2559 M. Błachucki & S. Jóźwiak, “Exchange of Information and Evidence between Competition Authorities and 
Entrepreneurs’ Rights”, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2012, 159, footnote 72.  
2560 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, recital 5-
11.   
2561 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009)574 accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 COM(2009)206 final, 29 April 2009, 
63.  
2562 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 60.  
2563 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, recital 7, 
18-19.  
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proceedings and aids efficient work-sharing, as other authorities may signal their interest to also act 
in the case.2564 
 
E) Example 
 
Some examples can be provided on cooperation between competition authorities within the ECN, 
even if systematic data are not available. The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets 
(ACM) reports joint investigations involving the planning and executing of joint dawn raids, 
information exchange according to Articles 12 and 22 of Regulation 1/2003, using offices and staff 
of another authority for detection and to interview individuals, as well as joint discussions on issues 
such as the definition of the relevant markets or jurisdictional issues to avoid double jeopardy.2565 
Before the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 and therefore the case-allocation mechanism, the 
ACM mentions cooperation in the Shrimp Cartel case,2566 which marked the first time that the ACM 
established a violation of European competition rules alongside a violation of Dutch competition 
rules. The ACM fined 8 shrimp wholesalers and a number of Dutch, German and Danish trade 
organisations. When doing this, it only looked at the anticompetitive behaviour’s effects on the 
Dutch market, because the German Bundeskartellamt was simultaneously investigating illegal 
activities in the same sector and in this way the latter would not be faced with a possible ne bis in idem 
situation.2567 This case is referred to as an example of ECN cooperation ‘avant la lettre’, as the latter 
did not exist yet at the time.2568  
 
Another remarkable cooperation case is the Flour Mill Cartel case.2569 In this case the ACM 
coordinated inspections by several NCAs carrying out parallel investigations into similar cartels in 
their respective territories, after having received leniency applications from applicants from various 
countries.2570 Documents were transmitted according to Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003, and case 
teams visited each other to be present at interviews conducted on their behalf. Coordination 
continued further in the case as well.2571 When a German flour mill claimed inability to pay, the 
Bundeskartellamt and the ACM coordinated their fining. After a joint assessment, the ACM lowered 
its fine and the Bundeskartellamt proceeded with the imposition of a fine taking into account the 
                                                          
2564 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009)574 accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 COM(2009)206 final, 29 April 2009, 
63.  
2565 C. Fonteijn & S. O’Keeffe, “Information Exchange Between Authorities: Enhancing Enforcement”, 21st St.-Gallen 
International Competition Law Forum, 15-16 May 2014, 6. 
2566 Case n. 2269/Garnalen, NMA decision of 14 January 2003, available at 
http://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicaties/884/Garnalen--- boete/ (accessed July 2017).  
2567 C. Fonteijn & S. O’Keeffe, “Information Exchange Between Authorities: Enhancing Enforcement”, 21st St.-Gallen 
International Competition Law Forum, 15-16 May 2014, 7-8.  
2568 P. Amador Sanchez, G. Bakker, A. Kleijweg, “The art of enforcement: Cooperation with other institutions, a national 
competition authority’s perspective” in H. Don, J. de Keijzer, E. Lamboo, M. van Oers, J. van Sinderen (eds), The Art of 
Supervision, Liber Amicorum, Pieter Kalbfleisch, Rotterdam, Editor Ronald Kouwenhoven, 2011, 42-43. 
2569 Summary of Case 6306 of the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets, “Fine cartels flour producers”, 22 
December 2010, available at https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/3975/Fine-cartels-flourproducers/ 
(accessed July 2017), X., “NMa imposes fines totaling more than EUR 80 million for cartel agreements in flour industry”, 
22 December 2010, Authority for Consumers and Markets, available at 
https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/5827/NMa- imposes-finestotaling-more-than-EUR-80-million-for-
cartel-agreements-in-flour-industry/ (accessed July 2017).  
2570 More precisely the Belgian and German competition authorities.  
2571 C. Fonteijn & S. O’Keeffe, “Information Exchange Between Authorities: Enhancing Enforcement”, 21st St.-Gallen 
International Competition Law Forum, 15-16 May 2014, 9. 
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ability to pay of the undertaking. The undertaking in turn announced that it would not appeal the 
fine by the Bundeskartellamt and it withdrew its appeal against the Dutch fine.2572 The Flour Mill case 
was said to be “exemplary of […] ECN cooperation in cartel cases” at the time.2573   
 
F) ECN output  
 
As mentioned, the ECN is generally seen as a success, with a significant track record in cooperation 
activities and the resulting enforcement actions. The ECN has also produced some more tangible 
output, in the form of soft harmonization tools. Competition agencies cooperate to develop a 
common approach by way of upstream convergence.2574 The ECN regularly issues 
Recommendations on different policy topics. Examples include the ECN Recommendation on 
Investigative Powers, Enforcement Measures and Sanctions in the context of Inspections and 
Requests for Information, which sets out the minimum investigative powers that an ECN authority 
must have at its disposal in order to function effectively, the ECN Recommendation on the Power to 
Collect Digital Evidence, including by Forensic Means, or the ECN Recommendation on 
Commitment Procedures and the ECN Recommendation on the Power to Impose Structural 
Remedies. It has also produced reports that provide an overview of the different systems and 
procedures for antitrust investigations within the ECN, for instance on investigative powers or 
decision-making. The ECN moreover creates resolutions on topics such as the reform of the 
common agricultural policy, as well as sector reports.2575 An area of soft harmonisation in which the 
ECN has been particularly active is leniency. The ECN developed a common set of rules on how to 
apply leniency policy in the ECN, resulting inter alia in an EU-wide Model Leniency Programme.2576 
The ECN has finally developed a joint communication tool available to the public, in the form of the 
‘ECN Brief’. The publication compiles topical contributions from NCAs and DG COMP.2577 
 
4.5.1.2 Unique characteristics  
 
Due to the success of the ECN many turn to the Network for inspiration regarding international 
cooperation. The Network, however, is characterised by some unique features that render it difficult 
to generalise the cooperation mechanisms that exist within it.  
 
A) Common basis of substantive law 
 
                                                          
2572 X., “The German Competition Authority coordinates with the Dutch NCA its fining against a German mill involved 
in a cartel in the flour industry (Mühlen), The Netherlands and Germany: Joint Solution to cross-border Inability to Pay 
Claim in Flour Cartel Cases”, European Competition Network Brief, e-Competitions/N° 51205, 1-2; C. Fonteijn & S. 
O’Keeffe, “Information Exchange Between Authorities: Enhancing Enforcement”, 21st St.-Gallen International 
Competition Law Forum, 15-16 May 2014, 9. 
2573 P. Amador Sanchez, G. Bakker, A. Kleijweg, “The art of enforcement: Cooperation with other institutions, a national 
competition authority’s perspective” in H. Don, J. de Keijzer, E. Lamboo, M. van Oers, J. van Sinderen (eds), The Art of 
Supervision, Liber Amicorum, Pieter Kalbfleisch, Rotterdam, Editor Ronald Kouwenhoven, 2011, 43. 
2574 I. Breit, J. Capiau, D. Dalheimer, V. Jukneviciüté, P. Krenz, E. Rikkers, A. Sinclair, “Developments in and around the 
European Competition Network and cooperation in competition enforcement in the EU: an update”, Concurrences, N° 3-
2012, 83.  
2575 A list of recommendations can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.html (accessed July 
2017). 
2576 ECN Model Leniency Programme, 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mlp_revised_2012_en.pdf (accessed July 207).  
2577 See https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/multisite/ecn-brief/en/brief/editorial (accessed July 2017) and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/archive.html (accessed July 2017).  
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One important feature of the ECN is that its members in part apply the same substantive (EU) 
competition laws, in parallel with their own national laws.2578 The national competition authorities 
operate in an environment characterised by the supremacy and direct effect of EU law as well as 
national non-harmonised procedures.2579 Indeed, the Network was designed not only to ensure an 
efficient division of work and handling of cases within the Network, but mostly to ensure an 
effective and uniform application of a shared set of substantive rules, namely the EU competition 
rules.2580   
  
This implies that there are no large substantive discrepancies among the different jurisdictions 
working together. Regulation 1/2003 did not impose any form of procedural harmonisation. While 
this was not an important issue during the early years of the Network, it does seem to cause some 
difficulties today, as cooperation intensifies (see Part III, 4.5.1.3, A). The fact that this hurdle did not 
have to be overcome in the field of substantive laws, however, makes a great difference compared to 
the international environment as the identification and analysis of anticompetitive behaviour will 
generally be aligned. The fact that all Member States belong to an economically and politically deeply 
integrated area therefore has certain consequences.2581 
 
B) Assumption of equivalence  
 
Linked to the above, a second difference between cooperation in the Network and cooperation 
internationally, is that in the ECN there is a so-called ‘assumption of sufficient equivalence’ regarding 
the protection of the rights of defence enjoyed by undertakings in the various legal systems of the 
member states, despite the absence of procedural harmonization. Indeed, the institutional shape of 
national competition authorities, remedies, damages and litigation, data protection, definition of 
confidential information, enforcement powers and procedures of investigation, etcetera, all remain a 
national prerogative.2582 Nevertheless, Member States are obliged to recognise each other’s 
enforcement systems as a basis for cooperation. This is possible because Member States, and 
therefore also their NCAs, have to comply with EU law. This includes the principles of effectiveness 
and equivalence as well as the requirements revolving around due process arising from fundamental 
rights. These requirements have an impact on the set-up and functioning of national enforcement 
frameworks.2583 The Member States also have the duty to ensure the effet utile of the Treaty’s 
competition rules. They should be able to adequately bring to end and sanction an infringement, and 
                                                          
2578 Member States can, however, have national competition laws which could lead to stricter outcomes than the position 
under EU law. 
2579 P. Holmes, A. Papadopoulos, B. Özgür Kayali & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition 
Cooperation Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for 
International Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 
December 2005, 65-66.  
2580 M. Błachucki & S. Jóźwiak, “Exchange of Information and Evidence between Competition Authorities and 
Entrepreneurs’ Rights”, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2012, 153-154. 
2581 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 68.  
2582 P. Holmes, A. Papadopoulos, B. Özgür Kayali & A. Sydorak, “A Taxonomy of International Competition 
Cooperation Provisions”, paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for 
International Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 
December 2005, 65.  
2583 I. Breit, J. Capiau, D. Dalheimer, V. Jukneviciüté, P. Krenz, E. Rikkers, A. Sinclair, “Developments in and around the 
European Competition Network and cooperation in competition enforcement in the EU: an update”, Concurrences, N° 3-
2012, 79.  
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in general NCAs are obliged to comply with the mechanisms of the Regulation.2584 An effectiveness 
requirement for the procedural framework of a Member States therefore seems to be in place, setting 
a de facto minimum harmonization level for national procedures.2585 This makes it easier for the 
members of the ECN to trust one another when cooperating on a certain case, as they are subject to 
the same minimum requirements. Without this automatic mutual recognition, information exchange 
would be significantly hampered, first because the standard in the receiving jurisdiction would have 
to be assessed before exchange, and second because “this exercise of comparative law would give rise to 
perpetual challenges by the undertakings involved.”2586 It must be remarked, however, that a minimum 
harmonization does not create a level playing field, and difficulties remain (see below, Part III, 
4.5.1.3, A).2587  
 
The assumption of equivalence is somewhat formalized in paragraph 8 of the Joint Statement of the 
Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities, which 
contains the principle of ‘mutual recognition of national procedural rules’.2588 It states that while it is 
accepted that the enforcement systems of the Member States differ, they must nonetheless recognize 
each other’s standards as a basis for cooperation. This is of course made easier by the fact that a large 
majority of ECN Member States adheres to the same administrative model.2589  
 
C) Top-down steering 
 
According to FINGLETON, “the reasons for the success of the EU network are inextricably linked to the vertical 
aspects of its nature.”2590 He first pointed to the role of the legal supremacy of the EU in addressing 
substantive conflicts. Another factor that separates the ECN from the global antitrust environment is 
the European Commission acting as primus inter pares. The discussions preceding the adoption of 
Regulation 1/2003 mainly revolved around the vertical relationship between the Commission and the 
national competition authorities. Important to notice as well is that contrary to cooperation in the 
international sphere, where merger control constitutes one of the more successful areas of 
international cooperation, this has not been the case in the ECN. An explanation for this is that 
national merger control regimes were already in place before the emergence of an EU-wide system. 
The situation was reversed with regard to the fight against cartels.2591 When no existing regime is in 
place, convergence was much easier. According to the OECD “[t]he compulsory nature of EU regulations 
                                                          
2584 Article 35 Regulation 1/2003.  
2585 A. Mundt, “Ten Years of ECN – Cooperation at its best” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. 
Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – Liber Amicorum Jaques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 511.  
2586 K. Dekeyser & E. De Smijter, “The exchange of evidence within the ECN and how it contributes to the European 
co-operation and co-ordination in cartel cases”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 32, No. 2 , 2005, 170-171.  
2587 A. Mundt, “Ten Years of ECN – Cooperation at its best” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. 
Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – Liber Amicorum Jaques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 511-512.  
2588 “Member States accept that their enforcement systems differ but nonetheless mutually recognize the standards of each other’s system as a 
basis for cooperation.” 
2589 B. Lasserre, “Le réseau européen de concurrence: entre réussites et défis” dans D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. 
Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – Liber Amicorum Jaques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 476; and 
I. Breit, J. Capiau, D. Dalheimer, V. Jukneviciüté, P. Krenz, E. Rikkers, A. Sinclair, “Developments in and around the 
European Competition Network and cooperation in competition enforcement in the EU: an update”, Concurrences, N° 3-
2012, 79. 
2590 J. Fingleton, “Competition Agencies and Global Markets: The Challenges Ahead” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International 
Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 194. 
2591 B. Lasserre, “Le réseau européen de concurrence: entre réussites et défis” dans D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. 
Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – Liber Amicorum Jaques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 476-477.  
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is the main feature that distinguishes this regional network from general international co-operation.”2592 The 
introduction of the Significant Impediment to Effective Competition test via Regulation 139/2004 
for instance created the top-down incentive for NCAs to abandon the criterion of dominant 
position.2593  
 
It has been claimed that rather than a force of decentralization, the ECN functions as a centralising 
mechanism in its search for convergence in enforcement. Much power is put in the hands of the 
Commission: cases involving three or more Member States are said to be best handled by the 
Commission, as well as cases that raise new issues, making the Commission the main policy-deviser. 
The Commission may also review the envisaged decisions of NCAs and may try to either correct the 
approach informally or withdraw the case, generating a certain amount of pressure on an NCA to 
comply with the Commission’s visions. This ‘threat’ is a powerful mechanism by which the 
Commission can ‘push’ Member States towards a desired approach.2594 It is reported that informal 
discussions have led to NCAs changing their decision.2595 The EU courts as well are able to clarify 
and steer any opacities, for instance on the relationship between the leniency application made to the 
Commission and a summary application made to an NCA (paragraphs 24 to 26 of the Model 
Leniency Notice) and linked to this the legal status of the ECN Model Leniency Notice.2596 The 
CJEU has also played a role in limiting the powers of NCAs. In Tele 2 it established that only the 
Commission can declare that a practice does not infringe competition law, and not the NCAs.2597 
This is confirmation of the role of the Commission as ‘first among equals’. This type of steering is 
impossible in today’s global arena. MONTI advocated to loosen the reins of centralised control. He 
pointed out that the prevailing ECN ethos of convergence and coherence, and the accompanying 
policing-mechanisms of the CJEU and the Commission make it less easy for NCAs to experiment 
and evolve.2598   
  
4.5.1.3 Not just a success story 
 
Despite the reputation that the ECN has acquired, its story is not just one of successes. Several years 
of experience have exposed the weaknesses of the Network. The public hearing organised by the 
ECON Committee in the European Parliament on ‘Empowering the national competition 
authorities to be more effective enforcers of the EU competition rules’ on 19 April 2016 
demonstrated that much work still can and needs to be done.  
 
A) Assumption of equivalence but no real equivalence: a common procedural framework is lacking  
 
                                                          
2592 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 68. 
2593 B. Lasserre, “Le réseau européen de concurrence: entre réussites et défis” dans D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. 
Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – Liber Amicorum Jaques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 479.   
2594 J. Fingleton, “Competition Agencies and Global Markets: The Challenges Ahead” in P. Lugard (ed.), The International 
Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Mortsel, Intersentia, 2011, 194. 
2595 G. Monti, “Independence, interdependence and legitimacy: the EU Commission, National Competition Authorities, 
and the European Competition Network”, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2014/01, 2, 16. 
2596 M. Favart, “ECJ Advocate General Wathelet hands down opinion on the relationship between the EU Commission 
and NCA leniency applications for the same Cartel (DHL)”, e-Competitions National Competition Laws Bulletin, N°75916. 
2597 Judgment of 3 May 2011, Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v Tele2 Polska sp. z o.o., devenue Netia SA, Case 
C-375/09, EU:C:2011:270. 
2598 G. Monti, “Independence, interdependence and legitimacy: the EU Commission, National Competition Authorities, 
and the European Competition Network”, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2014/01, 16, 19. 
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It was mentioned before that there is an assumption of equivalence regarding the procedural rules of 
the member states. According to MUNDT, the provisions relating to procedural aspects of national 
legislation in Regulation 1/20032599 represent no more than a “punctual harmonization of isolated 
procedural issues, representing the absolute minimum of procedural harmonization that was put in place in order to get 
the ECN going”.2600 The Regulation attempted to attenuate some of the differences, for instance by 
prohibiting the use of information and evidence collected under civil procedures to impose criminal 
sanctions. Such measures do not seem to be entirely effective, however, as “the huge procedural diversity 
at the national level made it difficult even to determine when the information was actually ‘exchanged’.”2601 
Procedural minimum harmonization (at best) does not ensure a level playing field. In reality, there 
are differences among the resources and functioning of the NCAs as well as the procedural 
environment in which they operate nationally. Differences in procedural frameworks matter in view 
of the re-allocation possibilities within the ECN, even at late stages of the proceedings.2602 
Differences remain with regard to timing and timetables of national jurisdictions, investigative 
powers, the recognition of evidence, access to documents, or decision-making rules for instance.2603 
Also the interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination is an example of one of the areas of 
divergence between the procedural frameworks applicable to the various ECN authorities,2604 as are 
the differences in leniency programmes, for instance relating to the application of markers.2605 While 
according to EZRACHI “secondary provisions—often procedural in nature—tend to be less susceptible to wider 
domestic interests and as such form better candidates for wide multinational convergence”2606 this is contradicted by 
practitioners, who claim that procedural harmonisation is equally difficult as substantive 
harmonisation.  
 
During the ECON Committee and European Commission Public Hearing on empowering the 
national competition authorities to be more effective enforcers of the EU competition rules, with 
sessions on enforcement powers and independence of NCAs when applying the EU competition 
rules, and leniency and sanctions in the Member States when enforcing the competition rules, the 
wish was expressed for greater coherency within the ECN as to how competition law is applied.2607 
Competition Commissioner VESTAGER explained that the results of the public consultation, launched 
in November 2015, indicated a strong support for further action in particular with regard to guarantees 
                                                          
2599 These are limited to Article 2, which contains rules on the burden of proof that also apply in national proceedings, 
Article 13 allowing national authorities to reject complaints or close proceedings, and Article 5 which lists the decision 
types that national authorities must have at their disposal to implement the EU antitrust rules.  
2600 A. Mundt, “Ten Years of ECN – Cooperation at its best” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. 
Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – Liber Amicorum Jaques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 508.  
2601 F. Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, European Law 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, 669. 
2602 A. Mundt, “Ten Years of ECN – Cooperation at its best” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. 
Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – Liber Amicorum Jaques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 510.  
2603 M. Albers, “National Competition Laws, International Cooperation and Procedural Rights” paper for Cauffman, 
Caroline, Hao, Qian (eds), Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China, China-EU Law Series, Vol 3., Berlin, 
Heidelberg, Springer, 2016, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567001 (accessed July 
2017), 3-4; OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 314.  
2604 A. Mundt, “State of play of decentralized application of Europeran competition law: collection and exchange of 
information within the ECN”, Concurrences, N°4-2014, 3.  
2605 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 314.    
2606 A. Ezrachi, “Sponge”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2017, 74. 
2607 ECON Committee and European Commission Public Hearing on empowering the national competition authorities 
to be more effective enforcers of the EU competition rules, European Parliament, Brussels, 19 April 2016. 
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of independence, resources, enforcement tools to detect and investigate, fining powers, and leniency 
programmes. The first steps towards more empowered and effective NCAs have been taken in the 
form of ECN+. The rules proposed after the public hearing, in the form of a directive, will, once 
adopted, provide the national competition authorities with a minimum common toolkit and effective 
enforcement powers. These should ensure that NCAs can act independently and impartially when 
enforcing EU antitrust rules, have the necessary resources to do their work, both financial and 
human, have all the powers needed to gather all relevant evidence, in particular electronic evidence, 
have adequate tools to impose proportionate and deterrent sanctions for breaches of EU antitrust 
rules, for instance regarding  parental liability and succession so that companies cannot escape fines 
through corporate re-structuring. Importantly, the proposal also foresees that NCAs will be able to 
enforce the payment of fines against infringing companies that do not have a legal presence on their 
territory. Furthermore, the proposal foresees coordinated leniency programmes, increasing the 
overall incentives for companies to participate. The importance of companies' fundamental rights is 
underlined and it is required that authorities respect appropriate safeguards for the exercise of their 
powers, in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.2608 
 
B) Transparency and accountability  
 
According to MONTI, “the ECN’s legitimacy is under scrutiny because its decisions lack transparency and 
channels of accountability.”2609 The functioning of the network is not fully transparent, first, due to 
opacities in Regulation 1/2003 and the Network Notice, and second, because of the many informal 
means of communication-and cooperation that have arisen. This in turn has effect on the 
accountability of the network members.  
 
One area of confusion for instance concerns the position of leniency applicants.2610 A network 
member has the obligation to inform other ECN members about the beginning of an investigation 
pursuant to Article 11 (2)&(3) of Regulation 1/2003, even if this investigation is initiated as a result 
of a leniency application.2611 Leniency applicants are protected, however, in the sense that such 
information may not be used as the basis of an investigation by another member of the Network, 
whether under the competition rules of the Treaty or under national laws. This does not prevent the 
authority however to open an investigation on the basis of information received from other sources 
or to request, be provided with and use information with consent of the leniency applicant. This has 
caused confusion as on the one hand if an applicant cannot send an application simultaneously to all 
relevant competition authorities, it loses its privileged position if the information is circulated 
immediately and automatically within the ECN. The consent requirement does not remedy this 
situation, and it is claimed that the procedure suggested in the ECN Notice is not sufficiently 
clear.2612  
                                                          
2608 European Commission, Press release, “Antitrust: Commission proposal to make national competition authorities 
even more effective enforcers for the benefit of jobs and growth”, IP/17/685, Brussels, 22 March 2017; Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States 
to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, COM(2017) 142 final 
2017/0063 (COD), 22 March 2017.  
2609 G. Monti, “Independence, interdependence and legitimacy: the EU Commission, National Competition Authorities, 
and the European Competition Network”, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2014/01, 2. 
2610 For more examples, see D. Reichelt, “To what extent does the co-operation within the European Competition 
Network protect the rights of undertakings?”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 42, 2005.  
2611 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, recital 39.  
2612 D. Reichelt, “To what extent does the co-operation within the European Competition Network protect the rights of 
undertakings?”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 42, 2005, 768. 
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Network literature generally focused on the effectiveness of network-outcomes, before it focused its 
attention to internal procedures and accountability of members. Networks have generally been 
acclaimed for having high ‘output accountability’. However, their ‘process accountability’ sometimes 
shows significant flaws. The 2014 Report on 10 years of regulation 1/2003 indeed mainly engaged in 
an outcome assessment rather than a process- assessment.2613 What is valid for the ECN is that the 
competition authorities should remain independent from their principals with political identities. 
This independence then also allows for a certain opaqueness. The level of transparency that a 
network should allow is difficult to determine, as it requires balancing of on the one hand 
administrative efficiency and protection from outside political interference, and on the other hand 
ensuring accountability. A distinction can thereby be made between accountability to the outside 
world and transparency within the network, providing a basis for so-called ‘peer-to-peer’ 
accountability. The ECN regime is also largely out of the scope of review of the Courts due to the 
lack of transparency and reliance on informal procedures and soft law.2614  
 
C) Due process 
 
Linked to the lack of transparency are concerns regarding due process in the functioning of the 
Network. For instance, observations made by the Commission on envisaged NCA decisions are not 
open to the parties under investigation, who consequently cannot react.2615 Only legal acts can be 
challenged by the companies concerned.2616 More generally the parties subject to an investigation 
often lack the opportunity to respond. This is also the case with regard to the use of exchanged 
evidence, which cannot be challenged to the extent that it was legally gathered by the transmitting 
ECN member. Any domestic limitations to the use of transmitted evidence in the receiving ECN 
member are irrelevant because of the primacy of European law.2617 A violation of domestic 
provisions indeed does not exclude exchange information within the ECN. Compliance with the 
domestic provisions on information gathering is not expressly required. Article 12(1) of Regulation 
1/2003 allows the direct use of information exchanged regardless of provisions of national 
procedural law. According to REICHELT the rights of defence of undertakings cannot be sufficiently 
guaranteed if NCAs can use information regardless of the lack of uniform procedural law applicable 
to them and the Commission.2618  
 
REICHELT has further listed some of the opacities surrounding the ECN with regard to due process. 
For instance, it is unclear what should happen when the assessment of the legality of the gathering of 
information by the transmitting NCA was incorrect. Should the transmitting authority wait for a 
court decision? Can the receiving NCA use the information? Can one NCA refuse to carry out an 
investigation on behalf of another because it claims that the requesting NCA’s domestic legislation 
                                                          
2613 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
“Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives”, COM(2014) 
453, SWD(2014) 230}_{SWD(2014) 231, 9 July 2014.   
2614 F. Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, European Law 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, 671-675. 
2615 Ibid., 675-676. 
2616 D. Reichelt, “To what extent does the co-operation within the European Competition Network protect the rights of 
undertakings?”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 42, 2005, 759. 
2617 K. Dekeyser & E. De Smijter, “The exchange of evidence within the ECN and how it contributes to the European 
co-operation and co-ordination in cartel cases”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 32, No. 2 , 2005, 163-164. 
2618 D. Reichelt, “To what extent does the co-operation within the European Competition Network protect the rights of 
undertakings?”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 42, 2005, 751, 777, 780. 
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provides insufficient protection? Would this go against the principle of assumed equivalence? What if 
the request is based on illegally gathered information? Paragraph 27 of the Network Notice even 
leaves it to the transmitting authority to decide whether or not to inform the receiving authority of 
“whether the gathering of the information was contested or could still be contested.”2619 The fact that the ECN is 
based on mutual recognition of the member’s legal systems indeed implies that one member cannot 
evaluate the legal system of another. This does not mean, however, that issues cannot arise. This is 
not explicitly addressed by the legislation regulating the ECN.2620  
 
With regard to information exchange among the NCAs and the Commission, it is unclear what 
information ‘necessary for the assessment of the case’ implies. This will vary depending on the case. 
Undertakings can therefore not predict with certainty what information will be transmitted, even 
more so since there is no obligation for the NCA to inform the undertaking of the request made by 
the Commission or other exchanges of information. In this way, the undertaking doesn’t know 
whether all relevant documents have been exchanged, or whether exculpatory documents could be 
missing.2621   
 
D) The network design failed when put to the test: Eurotunnel SeaFrance   
 
While the ECN has indeed been successful, it has done so mostly in areas that were not its original 
focus point. Case-allocation and information-sharing are not the principal ways in which 
interdependence among the competition authorities has evolved. The ECN has primarily produced 
results as a policy-making network ensuring convergence among the NCAs. The ECN mainly 
engages in coordinating procedural issues, and in serving as a forum of discussion. Most often, 
information requested concerns how to handle a case in view of particular legal or economic 
difficulties.2622 According to MUNDT, the treatment of related cases – interconnected cases pursued 
simultaneously by different ECN authorities – was exposed over the years as an area in need of 
additional soft cooperation tools and further good practices with regard to the possible impact of 
one authority’s decision on that of another.2623  
 
Only little enforcement cooperation between NCAs in competition law cases has been reported. 
CENGIZ explained, however, that this should be seen as a success of the network, as the ECN was 
designed to minimise the number of authorities involved in a single investigation as a precaution 
against inconsistency, rather than a failure, even if the Commission does not seem to think so. There 
is evidence that suggest that informal cooperation has been developed, outside the original network 
design.2624 While relatively few cases have been re-allocated and there has not been any notable legal 
challenge against the operation of the network or disturbances in the relations among competition 
authorities, 2625 one can nevertheless wonder whether this is truly the merit of the Network, as it 
                                                          
2619 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, recital 27. 
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seems to have failed when faced with the problematic Eurotunnel SeaFrance case. This case is one of 
the first remarkable clashes between the competition regimes of two major EU member states.2626 
Indeed, up until then, “the ECN has not yet had to face a crisis situation, an actual or potential conflict with 
significant connections to the national economic and political interests.”2627 The management and resolution of 
such a crisis situation indeed is a strong indicator of the success of ECN as a network.2628   
 
The facts of this case are quite complex and unique, involving insolvency, employment, as well as 
competition law aspects. Only a compressed version of the facts will be provided here, in view of its 
relevance for cooperation under the ECN. After a period of heavy losses, ferry company SeaFrance 
went into liquidation in November 2011, putting a halt to its ferry services across the English 
Channel from Calais to Dover. In January the liquidator of SeaFrance was ordered by a French court 
to sell the assets. This triggered an obligation to make SeaFrance’s employees redundant, save those 
required to assist with the liquidation. At the same time, SeaFrance’s parent company was allowed to 
initiate a job-saving plan for former SeaFrance employees (‘Plan de Sauvegarde de l’Emploi’), facilitating 
the return to work of the latter by inter alia providing payments to businesses that took on those 
employees. Group Eurotunnel SE (GE), together with a workers’ cooperative aiming to secure 
employment for SeaFrance’s former staff via the continuation of its ferry services (SCOP – Société 
Coopérative de Production SeafFrance SA), acquired from the liquidator three of SeaFrance’s four vessels 
and certain other intangible assets. The ferry service would be operated by (a subsidiary of) GE while 
the ships would be operated and manned by SCOP.2629 The services were finally recommenced as 
MyFerryLink in August 2012.2630  
 
This acquisition by GE was cleared by the French competition authority, but prohibited by the then 
UK Competition Commission, to whom the case was referred by the Office of Fair Trade (OFT),2631 
based on an investigation of the impact of the transaction on competition on the cross-Channel 
routes. The OFT required that GE either cease its ferry service from Dover using the passenger 
ships acquired from SeaFrance for a period of ten years or divest the MyFerryLink business. The 
Competition Commission established its jurisdiction based on the fact that in its view the acquisition 
by GE of the SeaFrance assets created a ‘relevant merger situation’ under the 2002 Enterprise Act. 
This in turn depended on whether the acquisition of GE and SCOP constituted an ‘enterprise’ or 
rather the assets of an empty enterprise.2632 This is exactly what was challenged before the UK 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), which found that the UK Competition Commission had 
rightly judged that GE/SCOP had acquired an ‘enterprise’. 2633 This lead to another appeal to the 
Court of Appeal, which then clarified that “what had been acquired was not the “enterprise” formerly carried on 
                                                          
2626 J. Briggs & D. Oakes, “Eurotunnel and the short sea battle between the French and the English: A U.S. perspective”, 
Concurrences, N °1-2014, 17. 
2627 F. Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, European Law 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, 671. 
2628 Ibid., 671. 
2629 Judgment, Société Coopérative de Production SeaFrance SA (Respondent) v The Competition and Markets Authority 
and another (Appellants), Michaelmas Term, [2015] UKSC 75, 16 December 2015, 2.  
2630 A. Nourry & D. Harrison, “The Eurotunnel case continues - When is an enterprise not an enterprise?”, Clifford 
Chance LLP Competition Law Insight, 7 July 2015, 12. 
2631 Currently the Competition and Markets Authority.  
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by SeaFrance, but only the means to construct a similar but new enterprise.”2634 The UK’s competition authority 
therefore did not have the jurisdiction to impose remedies.2635 
 
In this case, the same merger, notified by the same undertakings and regarding the same relevant 
markets was investigated by two authorities within the ECN, leading to entirely opposing results, 
despite virtually identical competition regimes with respect to mergers and acquisitions. The French 
competition authority authorised the merger subject to behavioural remedies, but the UK 
Competition Commission, on the basis of a different counterfactual to which the post-merger effects 
were to be compared, required additional structural remedies. Informal and formal exchanges 
between both authorities – the French authority allegedly contributed to the market test in the UK – 
did not lead to convergence in the analysis or the result.2636 There is no official information however 
on whether and to what extent discussions between both authorities took place, for instance to 
achieve convergence regarding the appropriate counterfactual to be relied upon.2637 It is claimed that 
the UK and France did cooperate and discussed both approach and evidence.2638  
 
The ECN cooperation-mechanisms seem largely absent in this case. According to the Network 
Notice case-allocation issues may arise if several authorities consider themselves well-placed to act. 
Network members should, however, attempt to re-allocate cases to a single competition authority as 
often as possible. If issues regarding re-allocation should arise, they should be resolved swiftly, and 
competition authorities should endeavour to reach an agreement on possible re-allocation and on 
potential modalities for parallel action. If authorities do engage in parallel action on a certain case, 
they should attempt to coordinate their action to the extent possible. If despite these measures 
Network members envisage conflicting decisions in the same case, the Commission can apply Article 
11(6) of Regulation 1/2003, and take over the case.2639 It would therefore seem that in this situation 
the Member States failed to come to an optimal solution, and the Commission could have made use 
of Article 11(6) to resolve the matter, but it did not do so, nor did the Advisory Committee, the 
forum where experts from the various competition authorities discuss individual cases and general 
issues of EU competition law, come together.2640 It was merely stated that formal as well as informal 
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stake. No other document has been identified referring to specific discussions on this case in the context of other bodies composed of 
representatives of the European Commission and the National Competition Authorities in the field of merger control.” Brussels, 
COMP/F.4/IMI/(2016)/5008. The Advisory Committee of member states generally hears and comments on the 
Commission’s preliminary draft decisions as a consultative body. (H. Kassim & K. Wright, “Network governance and the 
European Union: the case of the European Competition Network”, paper for ARENA Workshop ‘The transformation 
of the executive branch of government in Europe’, University of Oslo, 4-6 June 2009, 11.) 
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contacts took place between both agencies “in accordance with the good practices established in the framework 
of the ECN”,2641 but that these did not result in convergent analyses.2642 The case caused heavy 
controversy and affected relations among competition authorities. It is regrettable that the Network-
mechanisms could not prevent this situation.   
   
4.5.1.4 Lessons that can nevertheless be drawn from this unique network 
 
Even though the ECN has unique characteristics, some lessons may nevertheless be drawn from its 
functioning that are relevant for international competition cooperation more generally.  
 
First, the fact that all EU member states must apply the EU competition rules, and must 
acknowledge each other’s competition systems, largely contributed to the ECN’s success. This was 
confirmed by the French delegation during the OECD Roundtable on International Cooperation in 
Cartel Investigations, where it attributed the success of the ECN to four elements in particular: “the 
institutional framework of the EU Member States, the economic union, the single market and a single set of rules 
enforced by the common judicial framework.”2643 A common, or at least similar legal framework therefore 
seems to be a prerequisite for effective international enforcement cooperation. 
 
Secondly, the importance of procedural convergence should not be underestimated. Often 
substantive convergence takes centre stage, but national procedures to pursue competition law 
infringements tend to diverge more than substantive law standards. It is claimed that agreement on 
substance is easier to reach than on procedure, as procedural rights and obligations are more strongly 
embedded in the national legal culture and traditions.2644 Soft law tools are often insufficient then to 
stimulate convergence.2645 This is confirmed by CAPOBIANCO from the OECD, stating that while 
indeed procedures differ greatly among jurisdictions, they are very difficult to harmonise. He 
mentioned the failed attempt to develop a merger filing form, where agreement was impossible 
because every party wanted to add their own features. For international businesses, differences in 
procedure are equally difficult to navigate as substantive differences between jurisdictions. Both 
formal and informal notification timelines for instance vary hugely.2646 The Commission 
                                                          
2641 « en accord avec les bonnes pratiques établis dans le cadre du REC » 
2642 B. Lasserre, “Le réseau européen de concurrence: entre réussites et défis” dans D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. 
Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et Europae Civis – Liber Amicorum Jaques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 480.  
2643 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 313. 
2644 M. Albers, “National Competition Laws, International Cooperation and Procedural Rights” paper for Cauffman, 
Caroline, Hao, Qian (eds), Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China, China-EU Law Series, Vol 3., Berlin, 
Heidelberg, Springer, 2016, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567001 (accessed July 
2017), 3; “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by 
Concurrences and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015. See W. E. Kovacic, P. Mavroidis, D. Neven, “Merger control 
procedures and institutions: a comparison of the EU and US practice”, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2014/20, for an 
illustration of such embeddedness. 
2645 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “Ten 
Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives”, COM(2014) 453, 
SWD(2014) 230}_{SWD(2014) 231, 9 July 2014, 10.  
2646 “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by Concurrences 
and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015. 
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acknowledged that to enhance future EU competition enforcement, ensuring further convergence of 
national procedures and sanctions applying to infringements of EU competition rules is key.2647 
 
While MARSDEN was right to claim that cooperation evolves most naturally and is most stable when 
it is not required,2648 the ECN nevertheless demonstrates that some form of hard obligations is not 
detrimental to the cooperation process and does not necessarily lead to overflowing enforcement 
agendas. The OECD confirmed that the obligatory sharing of information between the Commission 
and the Member States “often allows for the prosecution of cartel cases that would lack sufficient evidence in any 
individual jurisdiction.”2649 Hard obligations moreover do not imply that use must be made of ‘hard 
enforcement.’ The reputation of agencies concerning the delivery of good work is crucial for their 
functioning and existence.2650 The statistics of the ECN then create a basis of comparison 
encouraging Member States and national competition authorities that perform relatively less well to 
take measures to improve their behaviour.2651  
 
Finally, a lot of the communication that occurs within the ECN happens on an informal basis. While 
it is laudable that such close ties are created between European enforcers and such interaction can 
strengthen internal trust and identity within the network, informality also risks creating opacity in 
network management, which may lead to accountability and due process problems.2652 MONTI even 
wondered whether the amount of cooperation resting upon informal arrangements is compatible 
with the rule of law.2653 MARSDEN rightly pointed out that strong procedural safeguards are 
absolutely necessary.2654  
 
2.2 A distinct complementary role  
 
From what is stated above, it becomes clear that the multilateral forums dealing with competition law 
have a distinct, complementary role to fulfil, both compared to the bilateral plane, as well as 
reciprocally.  
 
2.2.1 Complementarity between the multilateral and bilateral plane 
 
2.2.1.1 A different focus 
 
                                                          
2647 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “Ten 
Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives”, COM(2014) 453, 
SWD(2014) 230}_{SWD(2014) 231, 9 July 2014, 8.  
2648 Intervention by P. Marsden, ECON Committee and European Commission Public Hearing on empowering the 
national competition authorities to be more effective enforcers of the EU competition rules, European Parliament, 
Brussels, 19 April 2016. 
2649 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 313. 
2650 G. Monti, “Independence, interdependence and legitimacy: the EU Commission, National Competition Authorities, 
and the European Competition Network”, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2014/01, 1. 
2651 W. Wils, “Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), 
Mundi et Europae Civis – Liber Amicorum Jaques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 627.  
2652 F. Cengiz, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, European Law 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, 662. 
2653 G. Monti, “Independence, interdependence and legitimacy: the EU Commission, National Competition Authorities, 
and the European Competition Network”, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2014/01, 16. 
2654 ECON Committee and European Commission Public Hearing on empowering the national competition authorities 
to be more effective enforcers of the EU competition rules, European Parliament, Brussels, 19 April 2016.  
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A) Stimulate convergence  
 
Already in 1995 the Commission acknowledged that the EU should simultaneously work towards 
deepening its bilateral efforts and towards a multilateral framework on competition principles.2655 
Such a strategy indeed seems worthwhile, as both routes have different focuses. Bilateral cooperation 
is more focused on intensive case-specific cooperation. In case-specific cooperation more defined 
rights and obligations for both parties are desirable.2656 While bilateral agreements can have the effect 
of creating convergence, this goal is much more central in the different multilateral forums analysed 
above. Multilateral forums have the resources and clout to gather substantial data and via thorough 
analysis identify superior practices. 
 
As pressures towards convergence are increasing, the role of multilateral forums will only gain in 
importance. Procedural convergence in particular will be a difficult hurdle to tackle.2657 With regard 
to mergers, for instance, strong calls for action are heard from the private sector to develop greater 
convergence. There is demand for the streamlining of the process, starting with the type of 
transactions that require review (aligning of notification thresholds) and the information needed to 
do so (the elimination of uncommon requirements). There is a divide in particular between more 
advanced and younger agencies. Whereas the large jurisdictions already require a detailed analyses of 
the predicted competitive impact of large transactions, asking to produce extensive evidence, 
younger agencies increasingly ask additional information of which the relevance is not always 
obvious.2658 Some jurisdictions require filing when there is not even a link with the country, resulting 
in the restructuring of mergers simply because of the administrative burden on companies.2659 
Increased transparency and legal certainty regarding the review process are necessary.2660 This cannot 
be done solely via bilateral contacts. Another example relates to inconsistencies across leniency 
policies. The gradual elimination of conflicting requirements and increased consistency would 
encourage leniency applicants to come forward in a wider number of jurisdictions. This in turn might 
then stimulate the granting of waivers of confidentiality.2661  
 
Convergence should moreover not only occur between regulations, but also with regard to how such 
regulations are applied and interpreted. While bilateral agreements are concluded between either 
agencies or governments, multilateral forums could more easily reach out to the judiciary, in order to 
come to an alignment of regulators, enforcers, and the judiciary. Divergence at the court level is at 
times more pronounced than disagreements among enforcement agencies, as illustrated by the 
implementation of comity-considerations (see above, Part II, 2.2.4).2662 
                                                          
2655 U. Aydin, “Promoting Competition: European Union and the Global Competition Order”, paper prepared for 
presentation at the European Union Studies Association 11th Biennial International Conference, Los Angeles California, 
23-25 April 2009, 21.  
2656 A. Schaub, “International Co-operation in Antitrust matters: making the point in the wake of the Boeing/MDD 
proceedings”, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1, February 1998. 
2657 Interview with Commission official. 
2658 Interview of Chief Legal Counsel Camilla Holtse (Maersk) by Kostis Hatzitaskos (Cornerstone Research) in view of 
their panel “international mergers: working across multiple jurisdictions”, Global Antitrust Economics Conference, 
Chicago, 7 October 2016.  
2659 “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by Concurrences 
and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015. 
2660 Result of author’s law firm survey (see Annex I). 
2661 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 39, 56.  
2662 E. Fox, “Networking the world”, Concurrences, N° 4-2011, 4.  
414 
 
 
Finally, multilateral forums are also better placed to follow-up on the evolutions in individual 
jurisdictions and the convergence or divergence that occurs. HOLTSE, Chief legal counsel and head 
of competition compliance of Maersk Line stated for instance that the rules of some 125 
jurisdictions are constantly changing, which is extremely difficult to monitor, especially for smaller 
companies. As an example she mentioned the disruption of the amnesty programme in Ukraine.2663 
 
B) Create momentum, stimulate advocacy, and ensure inclusiveness  
 
Another role more suited for multilateral forums is the creation of momentum, stimulation of 
advocacy efforts, and including a broad constituency in the process. OECD initiatives for instance 
have in the past been able to create and maintain momentum with regard to international 
cooperation, and “[have] been one of the main stimuli to greater co-operation between agencies.”2664 Multilateral 
forums can not only stimulate agency cooperation, they can also increase general support for such 
cooperation. Through their work, they can increase the confidence in and legitimacy of the process, 
by ensuring that decisions are grounded in the application of sound competition principles.2665 They 
can “improve perceptions of the overall benefits of international cooperation in competition enforcement […].”2666 This 
is more difficult via bilateral agreements due to the limited inclusiveness and general opaqueness that 
still surrounds the negotiation of such agreements. PAEMEN indeed reported growing opposition 
towards bilateral trade negotiations for instance, in particular from NGO’s, who criticize the lack of 
transparency and participation or input by stakeholders or civil society during the negotiations.2667 
Equally, bilateral enforcement agreements do not generally counter for instance the inclination 
jurisdictions may have to under-enforce their competition laws for their export-industries. 
Multilateral forums can contribute to arming the importing jurisdiction with the tools needed to be 
an effective enforcer.2668  
 
Multilateral forums offer the rather unique opportunity to engage both government policymakers as 
well as participants from non-government constituencies. As indicated above, such input often 
proves to be invaluable.2669 Inclusiveness does not only imply involvement of non-governmental 
actors, however. Bilateral agreements are generally only concluded when two parties have rather 
similar competition regimes, or are at least aware of common cases and the functioning of the other 
authority. If agencies have insufficient prior interaction, this will result in a lack of awareness of 
                                                          
2663 “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by Concurrences 
and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015. 
2664 ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the 
ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, 5. 
2665 R. Hoffinger, “Reflections on the application of multiple competition law regimes to global businesses and markets”, 
Concurrences, N° 1-2014, 2.  
2666 OECD, Discussion on International Co-operation, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)24, 12 June 2012, 10. 
2667 H. Paemen, “A new trade policy” in D. Arts, W. Devroe, R. Foqué, K. Marchand, I. Verougstraete (eds), Mundi et 
Europae Civis – Liber Amicorum Jacques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 138.  
2668 E. Elhauge & D. Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2nd ed., Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart 
Publishing, 2011, 1231.  
2669 W.E. Kovacic, “Nine next steps for transatlantic antitrust policy cooperation”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 1, October 
2011, 5.  
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other’s procedures or legal regimes which in turn will hinder cooperation.2670 Multilateral forums 
offer less acquainted agencies the opportunity to meet, and understand each other’s functioning.2671  
 
C) Capacity building and technical assistance  
 
In the future, capacity building and technical assistance will only become more important, as the 
economy becomes even more globally integrated, and jurisdictions increasingly develop competition 
law regimes.2672 Commitments and capabilities will need to be aligned. Multilateral forums can study 
past experiences and identify where issues arise and efficiency and effectiveness can be increased. 
They can help with performance reviews of competition agencies globally.2673 
 
Moreover, capacity building and technical assistance are important in the deterrence of forum 
shopping. Companies aiming to achieve profit maximization will seek to operate in countries with no 
competition regulation or weak enforcement, often due to a lack of trained personnel, resources, 
experience or due to government corruption.2674 In these instances international support is crucial. 
Institutional strengthening is a pre-condition for the enactment of effective competition laws.2675 A 
shared understanding of the need for high standards of transparency, independence, and impartiality 
must be developed, so that strong and independent regulators can be in charge.2676 Younger agencies 
and agencies from developing countries are generally welcoming of this type of support from more 
experienced jurisdictions.2677 Best practices for instance are largely institutionalizing existing practices, 
but by doing so the latter are made more transparent so that they can be used more widely.2678  
 
One particular area where synergies are not yet created is with regard to North-South cooperation. 
This element of cooperation is still relatively underdeveloped. The OECD reported little evidence of 
effective cartel enforcement cooperation between competition authorities in developed and 
developing country authorities,2679 and there are only few agreements between developed and 
developing countries or between large and small countries.2680 This is in part linked to the absence of 
a strategy with regard to bilateralism as mentioned above. The priorities of younger agencies should 
                                                          
2670 OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 February 2013, 82.  
2671 H. Dieckmann, “The Benefits of Cooperation between Competition Authorities”, presented at the Inaugural 
Symposium of the Competition Policy Research Center, Tokyo, 20 November 2003, 10.  
2672 D. D. Sokol, “International Antitrust Institutions”, in A. Guzman (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2011, 190. 
2673 “Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by Concurrences 
and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015. 
2674 N. Ormonov, “Exchange of Information in the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws”, Asper Review of International Business 
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2675 M. Taylor, International competition law – A new dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
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Conference, Cape Town, 7 March 2014.   
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Working Paper No. 09-27, July 2009, 151. 
2678 H. Dieckmann, “The Benefits of Cooperation between Competition Authorities”, presented at the Inaugural 
Symposium of the Competition Policy Research Center, Tokyo, 20 November 2003, 10.  
2679 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 45. 
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be to first build up experience and use their resources to “establish credible competition institutions and 
develop the necessary instruments and policies to become effective cartel enforcers.”2681 Only then can they “harness 
the benefits of greater co-operation in the same manner as more experienced jurisdictions”2682 Factors contributing 
to this situation are a lack of investigatory powers, a lack of functioning leniency programmes, 
limited human resource capacity, a higher risk of making mistakes, and national courts with 
insufficient knowledge. Therefore, focus should be directed towards gathering institutional capacity. 
Technical assistance and training courses can help achieve this.2683 Trust is often referred to as a 
central element in cooperation. If one assumes that smaller countries and in particular developing 
countries have younger and less experienced competition authorities, the trust can be lacking to 
engage in cooperation.2684 While bilateral agreements can spark further trust between authorities, a 
minimum should already be present. This can be created in multilateral venues, where younger 
authorities can learn from others and share their own experience, as well as meet their peers. Practice 
indicates that trust is mainly earned via personal contacts, and is less connected to the overall 
experience or reputation of a certain authority.2685 Here again multilateral forums can indeed 
cooperate and play an important role. Competition authorities in developing countries find 
themselves in somewhat of a Catch-22 situation. Indeed, before more experienced authorities will 
cooperate with these agencies, they need to acquire the necessary experience, but in order to do so, 
they need to cooperate to gain insight.2686 Because cooperation always takes place on a voluntary 
basis, case teams must see added value, which often results in difficulties for smaller countries to 
engage bigger ones to cooperate, even if cooperation could be very useful to the former.2687  
 
D) Coherence  
 
Finally, a benefit that multilateral forums can offer, in particular those encompassing more than one 
policy field, is coherence. Globally optimal solutions require more than only bilateral agreements. 
Coherence among bilateral arrangements, but also across policy fields is required, as certain 
interdependencies may exist.2688 PIILOLA rightly stated that “[a] forum with a mandate to deal with all of 
these divergent, yet interdependent, policy areas has the capacity to consider those interactions and adopt policies which 
do not counteract or frustrate the measures taken with respect to other policy areas.”2689 One particular 
complication follows from the fact that competing regulatory structures are being spread, inter alia 
via bilateral agreements. This refers to allegations of regulatory export by both the EU and the US. If 
this is done without ‘any grand scheme or blueprint’, the multilateral trading system might be 
                                                          
2681 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, 
DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 30 November 2012, 46.  
2682 Ibid.  
2683 Ibid.  
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damaged.2690 A DG Trade official stated that despite the increased use of FTAs, the WTO remains a 
priority as it is the only platform able to address systemic issues, referring to domestic regulatory 
issues, and ensure non-discrimination.2691   
 
2.2.1.2 What multilateralism and bilateralism can do for each other 
 
While the multilateral plane therefore has a distinct role to play compared to bilateralism, it can also 
promote the latter. First, convergence, in particular with regard to procedures, generally enables 
enforcement cooperation in general.2692 Formal bilateral cooperation can indeed be facilitated due to 
the degree of convergence that was created via preceding multilateral work, and the mutual trust that 
was created in that process.2693 Multilateral forums can also promote bilateral cooperation in a more 
targeted manner. One reason for instance why rather innovative initiatives such as the IAEAA, the 
UK overseas information gateway, or the EU-Switzerland Agreement have not triggered similar 
initiatives is because there is too little knowledge on their functioning outside the countries already 
engaging in such cooperation.2694 Bilateral cooperation may not have reached its full potential due to 
insufficient knowledge about its use and utility.2695 Multilateral forums offer a platform to educate 
competition agencies and governments on how bilateral cooperation can lead to increased expertise 
and how to such gains can be achieved. DABBAH rightly claims that “[b]y including bilateralism within the 
remit of a centralized platform, the focus on bilateralism can be shifted from that of a purely national affair to a 
strategy with an international component.”2696 Such efforts currently seem to be absent from the agendas of 
the main multilateral forums, while they could help younger authorities in particular to more readily 
identify appropriate and willing partners. A grand strategy, or coherent long-term vision with regard 
to the role of bilateralism in the internationalization of competition law is lacking. Multilateral 
forums could steer the international community away from the perception that bilateralism is only to 
be considered when parties realize their commonalities, and towards the contribution that it could 
make in advancing competition law and policy, and achieving convergence.2697 In the other direction, 
the more bilateral cooperation takes place, the more chances for a successful multilateral agreement 
increase, as experiences with cooperation grow.  
 
2.2.2 Complementarity among the multilateral forums  
 
While it has been established that the multilateral plane has a distinct role to play compared to 
bilateral relations, the different multilateral forums should equally ensure that there is no overlap 
among them and that synergies are created. According to HOLLMAN and KOVACIC, the ICN, the 
OECD, and UNCTAD are rivals in major respects, addressing similar issues, supplying 
complementary or even overlapping policy products, and holding largely the same principle 
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‘shareholders’. A lack of cooperation and coordination can then lead to resource losses, and lower 
quality products than could be achieved when such collaboration did take place.2698 Commonalities 
should be exploited in order to avoid duplication, create synergies, and make the best use of the 
available resources.2699 If not sufficiently diversified, an oversupply of international forums dealing 
with competition law issues could also lead to a certain amount of international network or 
relationship fatigue.2700 MARSDEN rightly claimed that more coordination should take place among 
the ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD.2701 This is particularly important in times of reduced budgets. 
According to HOLLMAN and KOVACIC, “a failure to take this step could lead to the demise of competition 
programs within one or more of the existing networks.”2702 A starting point could be to identify the 
characteristics and capabilities of all three institutions and map out the areas of existing and potential 
complementarity, in order to make better use of them and in this manner improve the collective 
effectiveness.  
 
Indeed, each network has particularities and strengths. The OECD and UNCTAD for instance are 
somewhat better equipped to serve as suppliers of input that the ICN, without a secretariat, cannot 
easily generate on its own. The OECD was also identified as most suitable forum for in-depth 
exploration and debate concerning substantive policy issues, due to its government-membership.2703 
On the other hand, the ICN has the benefit of having broad membership and their status as agencies 
rather than governments, which makes it the most suitable vehicle for convergence with regard to 
practically-oriented projects and consensus creation. The ICN’s leadership was moreover lauded for 
the development of “a more complete vision of how convergence might unfold.”2704 In a more abstract manner, 
complementarities can be found in the fact that the OECD, UNCTAD and the ICN indeed employ 
different perspectives when dealing with competition law issues, for instance with a trade or 
development component, or focusing mainly on the analytical underpinnings of competition law and 
policy or rather on implementation and consistency across jurisdictions.2705 While the ICN focuses 
on competition law and policy alone, which has its benefits, it is for instance also true that 
competition policy is strongly intertwined with other policy areas, such as industrial or trade policy. 
In this context, HOFFINGER states that competition laws “are increasingly pervaded by broad, open-ended 
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qualifications, caveats and other political considerations.”2706 In such a scenario, the OECD would be the 
more suitable venue. The table below lists some of the distinctive features of the main forums 
dealing with competition law, indicating their complementary nature. 
 
 
Figure 16. Source: C. Damro, “The new trade politics and EU competition policy: shopping for convergence and co-
operation”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 6, September 2006, 881. 
 
Some practical suggestions include first the ‘rationalisation’ of meetings, in a sense that their dates 
and topics could be coordinated so that both resources and time can be saved.2707 The same could be 
done with the number of guidelines, best practices, and recommendations. These could be merged 
together so that the creation of a uniform system for cooperation could be facilitated.2708 This could 
also happen for instance via the development of a common vocabulary creating clarity on the 
concepts used, for instance in the form of an inventory or glossary.2709 This might facilitate the 
negotiation of bilateral agreements as well.  
 
2.3 Issues of network governance 
 
It was said in the past that attempts to create a multilateral competition law agreement have failed 
because not enough nations had market-based economic systems with functioning competition 
systems.2710 A multilateral agreement is very likely to fail today as well, however, for the opposite 
reason: an abundance of jurisdictions engaging in competition law enforcement. Consensus is 
difficult to find among so many nations with functioning competition systems, and international 
competition law issues are difficult to capture in strict rules, due to diverse and complex factual 
situations that often underlie competition cases, requiring detailed understanding of specific markets 
embedded in broader national regulatory environments. Networks may then offer a feasible 
alternative solution, in response to a changing regulatory environment subject to technological 
innovation, the expansion of domestic regulation, and economic globalization. Network governance 
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is not free of flaws, however, and criticism has arisen in response to SLAUGHTER’S statement that 
transnational regulatory networks should be embraced as the architecture of a new world order.2711  
 
2.3.1 Characteristics of network governance  
 
According to COPPOLA, the international implications of many contemporary policy issues has 
fundamentally altered the separation between domestic and international policymaking, and sparked 
the creation of transnational networks of domestic officials to address these complex issues.2712 They 
form an answer to the patchwork of national regimes in a global marketplace, and ensure that the 
patches are nonetheless connected to a certain extent.2713 SLAUGTHER referred to it as the 
disaggregation of the state, by which its component institutions all reach out beyond national 
borders.2714 HALE and HELD classified a wide array of transnational governance mechanisms 
according to type and issue area.2715 Their work indicated that with regard to economic regulation, 
the exclusive form of transnational governance is transgovernmental networks. Similarly, POLLACK 
and SCHAFFER argued that transgovernmental network governance is limited to policy areas with 
similar regulatory approaches, where regulators enjoy significant independence from political 
decision makers, whereas interstate litigation will prevail if such conditions are absent.2716  
 
International regulatory networks are generally characterized by selective membership of regulatory 
agencies and non-state actors rather than states, lack of international legal personality or status 
beyond that conferred by their organization under national law, and no formal voting procedures or 
formal supervision. They therefore form loosely structured, direct peer-to-peer ties via frequent 
interaction.2717 They are self-organizing and generally include both state and non-state actors. The 
management of cross-border issues is facilitated via such direct collaboration among national 
administrators without the bureaucratic procedures of formal international institutions. An informal 
international rulemaking-process is created in this manner, which directly engages national officials. 
A platform for cross-fertilization and the fostering of common understandings is created, promoting 
voluntary convergence of domestic standards. The strength of networks is dependent on their 
internal cohesion, established via the existence of mutual trust and good faith, and their ability to 
reach consensus, and to define common goals.2718  
 
PIILOLA identified three types of global governance networks relevant for competition policy: 
intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and transnational. While the intergovernmental model 
involves states, via their heads of government, cooperating and bargaining within international 
regimes to reach an international agreement and incorporate it into an institutional framework, the 
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transgovernmental model implies the direct interaction of lower-level government officials, with a 
clear focus on the sub-state level. It departs from a horizontal and decentralised vision of global 
governance based on a technocratic, disaggregated state view, where sub-governmental experts take a 
central role. According to PIILOLA, this form of governance arose because the growing complexity of 
highly sophisticated policy areas proved too much for the existing institutional capacities, leading to a 
delegation of normative power to independent specialized agencies. The transnational model, finally, 
underlines the role of global nongovernmental organizations and other non-state actors in shaping 
regulatory agendas and preferences. While the involvement of non-governmental actors in the global 
policy making process is to be applauded, it is not yet optimal. For instance, dialogues with non-
governmental actors often take place on a sectorial basis, without any cross-cutting interaction. 
Business representatives for instance do not interact with environmental groups for instance to 
discuss common agendas.2719   
 
2.3.2 Benefits of network governance  
 
As already touched upon, network governance has several benefits compared to more traditional 
modes of governance. First, they create efficiencies as they expand a state’s capacity to confront 
transnational issues by bringing together specialised officials, advancing convergence of rules and 
regulations, and developing domestic regulatory capacity through experimentation, experience 
sharing, training, and technical assistance.2720 In this manner networks can increase the capacity of 
national governments to engage nonstate actors. Moreover, networks possess particular power due 
to their capacity to collect and disseminate information among a wide network of members.2721 
Second, it has been claimed that participation in transnational regulatory networks leads to a 
redefining of national interests. Due to the interaction that takes place and the internal dynamics of 
networks, national agencies become increasingly engaged in a common enterprise and commonly 
defined goals. This in turn may cause them to shift from their narrow purely domestic preferences 
towards advocacy of shared agendas. National agencies redefine their role to a certain extent from 
guardians of national interests to members of an international community, sharing common 
concerns.2722 In other words, “transnational networks facilitate the development of behavioral standards by 
creating shared expectations.”2723 Another claimed benefit of network governance is that it can 
depoliticize issues by integrating them into a technocratic sphere.2724 Both domestic pressures as 
those associated with formal international organisations can in this manner be decreased. In part 
because of the lack of politics and the paralysis the latter may bring with it, networks also offer speed 
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and flexibility, making them particularly suited for complex and fast-evolving issues.2725 SLAUGHTER 
summarised the benefits of networks as the creation of convergence and informed divergence, the 
improvement of compliance with international rules, and the enhancement of  the scope, nature, and 
quality of international cooperation.2726   
 
2.3.3 Reasons for caution  
 
While SLAUGHTER indeed puts forward network governance as making up the new world order, 
some caution is in place. The lack of deep knowledge with regard to regulatory networks becomes 
apparent when they are both criticised as being mere ‘talking shops’ as well as venues for unbridled 
rulemaking. It should be disclaimed, however, that the remarks made in this section are in no way 
meant to be exhaustive, but wish to illustrate that networks are not a ‘deus ex machina’ solution for 
problems of international governance.  
 
On the one hand some blame regulatory networks of being an ineffective waste of resources, unable 
to tackle substantive issues. They are considered as not having the capacity to facilitate the complex 
trade-offs that are required to reach agreement on more contentious regulatory issues and leading 
only to watered-down standards and the appearance of agreement. It is difficult to measure exactly 
what the influence of network governance is and under what circumstances networks produce 
effective regulatory cooperation rather than shallow and suboptimal results. Systematic empirical 
support seems to be lacking.2727 On the other hand, regulatory networks are accused of enabling 
unchecked technocratic rule-making and being disguised regulatory export mechanisms (lacking 
democratic accountability, see below)2728 and vehicles of special interests for those who are 
‘connected’.2729 As network governance was seen to represent a global trend towards soft law and 
informal regulatory cooperation, it was feared that the experts making up the networks would act 
outside the constraints of domestic political structures and the normal foreign affairs process. Some 
instances of networking can indeed have perverse effects, as they can be used by regulators to escape 
domestic constraints and pursue self-regarding aims. Not much attention has been given to the 
likeliness of such effects.2730 According to GRANOVETTER, “While social relations may indeed often be a 
necessary condition for trust and trustworthy behavior, they are not sufficient to guarantee these and may even provide 
occasion and means for malfeasance and conflict on a scale larger than in their absence.”2731 Social interaction can 
therefore spread malpractice as much as it can counter it, while the emergence of rival coalitions may 
promote conflict.2732 
 
One of the main criticisms towards regulatory networks is their lack of transparency and democratic 
accountability in comparison with national regulatory processes,2733 as they are seen as technocratic 
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institutions not concerned with democracy.2734 It is therefore important that networks provide 
adequate access and influence to domestic constituencies.2735 At the same time, it can be said that 
networks are more accountable than classical supranational bodies, as they are composed of national 
officials, subject to the same accountability mechanisms that control national governments.2736 
Accountability should not be seen in an abstract sense, but it should be considered to whom 
accountability is due. Domestic accountability will inevitably entail that regulators are strongly 
anchored to domestic demands, more than those of a ‘hypothetical global polity’, which has 
implications for the network in case both interests clash. Moreover, installing extensive 
accountability procedures inspired by domestic law is likely to hamper the informality, speed and 
flexibility that are said to be the main benefits of international regulatory networks. If networks are 
held accountable through domestic legal and political constraints, this will likely limit their 
contribution to global governance. If they have more domestic autonomy, the contribution to the 
enhancement of international enforcement and harmonization of standards will likely be more 
pronounced, but with the risk that this will reflect the self-interest of regulators (as a consequence of 
potential regulatory capture) rather than aggregate welfare.2737 Alternative methods are considered, 
such as deliberative participation and transparency, to reconceptualise legitimacy in transnational 
contexts.2738 PIILOLA rightly emphasises that the focus should be on whether the decisions made by 
networks are made in the context of well-informed discourse, based on transparency, inclusiveness, 
and participation, rather than attempting to ensure that administrative agencies operate under explicit 
accountability mandates.2739  
 
Finally, while it is said that network governance has the potential to depoliticize certain issues, 
politics still play a role, in particular as more distributive problems are tackled. Regulators, while 
taken out of their domestic setting, remain under the political oversight and the legal constraints 
valid in their home jurisdiction, and are therefore not entirely insulated from the domestic political 
pressures that hinder the negotiation of traditional international agreements. Domestic interests 
continue to determine the positions of individual national regulators when they engage in the 
network. Problems arise in particular when relatively easy to solve ‘coordination’ problems are 
supplemented with distributive and enforcement problems. The former conflicts involve issues 
where states share common objectives and there are multiple outcomes that all parties would favour 
over no agreement, but the parties prefer different solutions, while the latter regard situations where 
individual states can gain by defecting from the cooperative solution.2740 Networks generally avoid 
ambitious efforts “at regulatory harmonization that would require sacrifice of short-term domestic interests and 
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create enforcement problems they could not handle effectively.”2741 According to VERDIER, the tensions between 
effective global governance, subsidiarity and democratic accountability are not resolved. He finds 
regulatory networks ill-equipped to address distributive and enforcement conflicts because a mutually 
acceptable outcome requires concessions and trade-offs across issue-areas, a political task that is 
often intertwined with manifestations of relative power, which is in contrast with the very nature of 
international regulatory networks. The fact that rules adopted by networks are generally nonbinding 
and not subject to monitoring, also limit their effectiveness in circumstances where states have 
incentives to defect. The ability of courts or politicians to override regulators and their network 
standards, based on domestic considerations, detract from the credibility of the commitments made 
in the network.2742 In short, when looking at the four pillars of good regulatory governance 
developed by DAS and QUINTYN – independence, accountability, transparency, and integrity – 
networks present issues on all four accounts.2743 
 
3. Intermediate conclusion Part III 
 
The value of a ‘dedicated’ approach of bilateral agreements focusing solely on enforcement 
cooperation can only be fully determined when it is contrasted to an integrated approach. On a 
substantive level this relates to the inclusion of competition provisions in trade agreements. The 
trend towards more comprehensive competition provisions in FTAs implies that competition 
provisions in trade agreements are increasingly seen as fostering competition values and regimes per 
se and having intrinsic value, as opposed to mainly being seen as an instrument to off-set the harmful 
effects of anti-competitive practices on trade and being entirely subordinate to trade liberalization.2744  
 
The link between trade and competition has always been present, but has gained in importance 
following the general evolution towards tackling so-called ‘behind-the-border’ issues in the 
liberalisation of trade. The failed attempt to include competition in the WTO-negotiations was the 
catalyst for the move towards competition provisions in bilateral FTAs. The Global Europe 
Communication signified the start of the EU’s new approach and its review of competition 
provisions in FTAs. Trade agreements were to become both deep and comprehensive. The ‘New EU 
Trade Policy’ built on the Global Europe agenda. EU FTAs can be categorised according to their 
primary motives, which can range from considerations relating to the EU’s membership and 
neighbourhood policy, to more strategic and commercially inspired considerations. A further 
distinction can be made between the ‘traditional’ EU FTAs, the newer ‘post Global Europe’ EU 
DCFTAs, and the recent ‘mega-FTAs’. An evolution can be witnessed towards an increased 
emphasis on substantive provisions rather than cooperation provisions, in line with the Global 
Europe strategy. Diversification has taken place, but simplification as well. In general, the scope of 
the competition provisions has broadened, but the content has not. There are limits to how much 
you can include in an FTA. There are no strong obligations and the competition chapter is generally 
excluded from the dispute settlement mechanism. This exclusion can be explained by several factors. 
A first reason is that this particular type of conflict-resolution is not suited to reach what the 
provisions aim to achieve. Creating a cooperative atmosphere, or symbolically indicating a dedication 
to create a competitive environment, do not benefit from hard dispute settlement. Moreover, the 
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provisions generally are a priori unenforceable when they represent best endeavour commitments. 
Finally, it is feared that dispute settlement employing panels of trade experts would impinge on the 
competence of competition authorities. The relatively young nature of competition law may also 
explain wariness towards hard adjudication.  
 
The presence or absence of competition laws and enforcement institutions in the jurisdictions of the 
parties seems to be the main indicator of whether or not competition provisions are included in 
FTAs. The provisions may nevertheless fulfil several functions. The most straightforward reason to 
include them is to support trade enhancing objectives and to avoid the undermining of trade 
liberalisation via private restraints. Competition chapters may, however, also fulfil a symbolic role in 
promoting a pro-competitive reform and signifying adherence to a ‘competition culture’. The aim is 
then not to directly compel parties into removing private restraints on competition, but to indicate to 
both foreign investors and domestic constituents the commitment to open markets and pro-
competitive reforms.2745 This is a role distinct from that of first and second generation cooperation 
agreements. While not the main aim of competition chapters in FTAs, they may also have the effect 
of facilitating relations between the competition authorities of the parties and promote voluntary 
cooperation. In this manner FTAs can serve as a catalyst. Competition chapters in FTAs may offer 
the possibility to even the path for future cooperation. However, their main contribution to 
international competition policy is that they provide a platform to demonstrate goodwill, and can 
establish certain basic principles and foundations underpinning the competition policies of the 
parties involved. Dedicated agreements can then further elaborate on practical enforcement 
cooperation. According to the OECD FTAs “seem to stimulate a deeper level of integration and more intense 
cooperation on competition enforcement than bilateral agreements”, but an UNCTAD study attenuated this 
statement by finding that FTAs often do not reach the originally envisaged level of cooperation.2746 
Importantly, competition chapters in FTAs may circumvent deadlock in multilateral negotiations and 
set a precedent for further cooperation. It was confirmed that as the EU was not able to unblock the 
WTO-negotiations on competition from the inside, it attempts to do so from the outside via the 
inclusion of competition provisions in its bilateral FTAs. Certain oppositions seem to have 
disappeared in a bilateral context as compared to the multilateral negotiations. It is also possible that 
it is the international business community that presses for the inclusion of competition provisions in 
FTAs. As mentioned, this may have a reputational or branding effect about the importance of 
competition in a country’s economy which may provide incentives for investors. Regulatory chapters 
may also represent an export product from the dominant party. In this manner they are used as a 
vehicle for the approximation to the own domestic model and preferences. This is particularly the 
case for agreements concluded between the EU and ENP-partners, but not for commercially 
inspired agreements with more equal selected trade partners, which are often developed economies 
with established competition systems. More often than not there is no uniformity in the approach of 
the anti-competitive practices covered by the agreements and no true harmonization benefits are 
attained.2747 One of the most important roles of competition chapters in FTAs, however, is that they 
can promote and lock-in domestic reforms, by providing the international back-up to overcome 
domestic opposition. Apart from creating an international leverage to push reforms, domestic 
legitimacy of the competition policy in general may increase as well. Locking-in competition 
provisions in FTAs also ensures that successive governments may less easily depart from the policy 
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choices made in the agreement, creating a more predictable business environment. Domestic reform 
is particularly important as a 2006 paper commissioned by the OECD exposed that only 5% of 
FTAs were north-north agreements between developed countries.2748 More developing countries are 
therefore reached via FTAs rather than through bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements, 
which often exclude such countries. Finally, a genuine desire to safeguard market competition and a 
belief in the inherent value of competition law may explain the inclusion of competition provisions 
in FTAs.  
 
The hypothetical nature of the above statements points to a lack of empirical evidence regarding the 
effect of competition chapters in FTAs. It is strongly encouraged that meticulous follow-up is made 
of the implementation of such chapters, in order to gain insight in the real effect of regulatory 
chapters dealing with behind-the-border measures. Detailed obligations to report should be standard 
provisions in FTAs. BOURGEOIS, DAWAR and EVENETT rightly claimed that “[u]nless and until the 
underlying research base improves, this implies that arguments based on anecdotal evidence, qualitative claims, and 
deductions made from first principles will have to bear the most weight in convincing the EC's trading partners of the 
merits of including certain provisions in future FTAs.”2749 Such follow-up is necessary, because many reasons 
exist to exercise caution when including competition chapters in FTAs. A first factor is that 
competition chapters may be reduced to just another pawn in the game of issue-trading that occurs 
in the negotiation of comprehensive FTAs, and fall victim to considerations relating to the larger 
political economy context rather than arguments inherent to the policy area. In this manner the 
chapter merely reflects the power-dynamics in the relations between the contracting parties and 
policy-making is neglected. When competition rules are imposed on a party that is not ready simply 
because it was part of a negotiation-package, this can be detrimental to international competition 
policy and law enforcement cooperation in general. Second, trade and competition, while related, are 
not the same. Priorities of trade negotiators and competition officials may differ to a large extent and 
this impacts the content of the agreement. Trade agreements are also far more subject to 
politicisation than competition cooperation agreements, in particular since the negotiation of ‘mega-
FTAs’ led to an increase in political and social scrutiny, and more active involvement of interest 
groups. Finally, the issue of mixity renders the conclusion of comprehensive FTAs complex, and 
further increases the transactions costs. Delays or blockages may then also affect the competition 
chapters included in such agreements. The cost of including regulatory chapters in FTAs can indeed 
be high, to such an extent that ARAUJO asked whether “persisting with many of the key regulatory issues may 
ultimately cost the EU the opportunity of concluding trade deals with important economic and geopolitical 
implications.”2750 While competition provisions are generally not the most controversial element of 
such negotiations, the question can nevertheless be asked whether systemic problems attributed to 
preferential trade affect the competition provisions within trade agreements.2751 Negotiations over 
the inclusion of competition chapters in FTAs should not take up too many resources from other 
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more pressing tasks that require staff from competition agencies, so that the value of their inclusion 
remains larger than the cost.2752 
 
In sum, there are valid reasons to include competition chapters in FTAs, both for the benefit of 
competition policy and in the pursuit of trade objectives. While some have claimed that FTAs are 
‘the natural venue’ to address competition issues, considering the lack of comprehensive multilateral 
rules in the WTO,2753 their integration in the general architecture of FTAs has nevertheless been a 
delicate issue. The fact that the institutional framework was not designed for such provisions can 
cause complications with regard to interpretation and enforcement. Many of the earlier FTAs were 
negotiated in the aftermath of the ultimately ill-fated proposal for a WTO multilateral framework on 
competition policy, which may have influenced the negations on the competition chapters.2754 The 
fact that the provisions are unenforceable is not a reason to discard them. As mentioned, the most 
important role of the provisions lies in their aspirational nature and the driver they may be for 
domestic reform.2755 While competition chapters in FTAs in this sense may contribute to the global 
spread of a competition culture, they do not, however, provide strong tools for international 
enforcement cooperation. TRITELL rightly claimed that the added value of FTAs is to be found in 
the creation or strengthening of consensus on key competition principles, such as a consumer 
welfare goal, transparency, non-discrimination, or procedural fairness, rather than in providing 
detailed cooperation or substantive provisions.2756 Moreover, competition chapters in FTAs do not 
anticipate regulatory inefficiency. One aspect that is simply not addressed are the inefficiencies 
associated with the administration of multiple competition laws, even though this may present a 
significant impediment for a business's commercial viability.2757  
 
On a whole, it is unclear therefore what the grand strategy is behind the EU’s inclusion of 
competition chapters in its FTAs.2758 It does not seem to be an extension of its earlier WTO agenda. 
As mentioned, in near-all recent cases, competition chapters are entirely excluded from the DSM. 
According to ARAUJO, however, this is not because the EU faced similar resistance in the negotiation 
of its competition chapters in bilateral FTAs as it did in the WTO. There is no proof of such 
resistance, EU negotiating drafts never indicated more ambitious goals, and the EU allegedly even 
rejected “overtures from large trading partners, such as Canada, who are willing to negotiate more ambitious and 
enforceable rules on competition.”2759 There seems to be a disconnect between the EU’s narrative and its 
actual practice concerning DCFTAs. This leads ARAUJO to question the EU’s commitment to link 
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competition and trade, as it divided the Commission from the start.2760 Competition officials worried 
that if competition would be included in the working sphere of trade experts, this would change 
focus from international competition and consumer welfare to market access and trader interests.2761 
ALVAREZ, CLARKE and SILVA explained the success of agency-to-agency agreements and MLATs 
through “a lack of satisfaction among competition authority staff members about the trade focus of the provisions on 
competition included in [regional trade agreements]”.2762 While competition chapters have been more or less a 
constant in the EU’s FTAs, the EU does not seem to demonstrate great determination regarding its 
desired direction for such chapters. AHEARN moreover pointed to a lack of strategy on a larger scale, 
as he feared that the international regulatory competition caused by the EU and the US attempting to 
extend their rules and regulations via FTAs would form a threat to the multilateral trading system 
considering the lack of a grand scheme or blueprint.2763 It should be noted, however, that this threat 
is not so much present with regard to competition law as the provisions are generally too vague to 
create real conflict. If competition chapters in FTAs should become more developed, it is important 
however that this happens in a way that is consistent with multilateralism. Rather than promoting the 
domestic model and introducing new standards, enhanced compliance with existing international 
norms or standards should be pursued in order to avoid what former WTO Director-General 
MOORE described as an ‘à la carte approach’ to trade agreements in areas such as competition, leading 
to a ‘recipe for confusion’.2764 RENNIE claimed that it is the degree of generality that prevents 
incoherence between competition provisions as there is too little detail for fault lines to emerge 
between individual competition chapters.2765   
 
It is clear in any event that competition chapters in FTAs serve a different purpose than dedicated 
competition cooperation agreements. They are not suited as main vehicles to create international 
cooperation among competition authorities. Cooperation provisions, if present, are largely 
subordinate to substantive requirements. Sometimes the countries with which an FTA is concluded 
lack experience with competition law and the substantive provisions serve the purpose of fine-tuning 
the competition law system. Intense enforcement cooperation is then premature. According to 
ARAUJO the lack of emphasis on inter-agency cooperation mechanisms may also be explained by the 
focus on trade or “the absence of any real incentive for the EU to push for far-reaching cooperation commitments 
with developing countries.”2766 Including cooperation provisions in an FTA may have the effect of serving 
as an impetus to increase cooperation informally between agencies, by lowering the threshold for 
inter-agency contact, but generally the agreement is not designed to do so. Specialized cooperation 
agreements may have a greater effect in this regard than the more general FTA provisions, but the 
transaction costs of such agreements must be taken into account.2767 SOKOL uses a bureaucratic 
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politics model to explain why the formalisation of agency level cooperation at a sub-state level 
between antitrust agencies leads to more action than competition chapters in FTAs. According to 
him “[s]uch agreements will tend to operate below the political radar, both in terms of inter-agency conflict over 
negotiating priorities and in terms of eliminating the need for legislative approval afterwards.”2768 Transaction costs 
are significantly reduced in this manner as third parties such as trade ministries are avoided.2769  
 
The geographical component of the integrated approach regards the role of multilateralism. The 
impetus for this research came from the fact that the different bilateral instruments available to the 
European Commission did not seem to have equally clear diversified objectives as is the case on the 
multilateral scene. Multilateral forums gain in importance since the duopoly in competition law has 
evolved into an oligopoly. The roles of the different main forums are distinct, with the OECD 
mainly aiming at developed countries, the WTO focusing on trade, UNCTAD centring around 
developing country needs, and the ICN being a near-virtual competition-only forum. Each venue is 
faced with challenges for the future. The OECD should focus on solutions rather than merely 
mapping out the problems. The WTO is not a suitable venue for increased competition related 
activity, while UNCTAD should find a way to increase its role in a world with multiple power 
centres. Finally, the ICN, which currently is the main venue for work on international competition 
law enforcement cooperation, will have to deal with the limits of its virtual nature, and improve the 
implementation of its output. It will also need to continue to tackle more difficult problems if it 
wishes to remain relevant, and will have to encourage even more participation by smaller or 
developing economies.  
 
Often the ECN is mentioned as a successful example of international cooperation. While not all its 
traits can be transposed to the international level, as it is a regional network based on a common 
basis of substantive law, an assumption of equivalence, and a certain amount of top-down steering 
by the Commission, some lessons can nevertheless be drawn. First, the value of a common legal 
framework becomes clear, as well as the importance of procedural convergence. The ECN also 
demonstrates that some form of hard obligations does not necessarily lead to a disturbance of 
domestic enforcement agendas, and that hard obligations do not necessarily require hard 
enforcement. It also demonstrates the drawbacks of informal communication. The ECN is indeed 
not without flaws itself. The fact that a common procedural framework is lacking cannot entirely be 
addressed via an assumption of equivalence. The Network also struggles with issues of transparency 
and accountability, and due process matters cause concern as well. When put to the test the 
Network-mechanisms were not put in motion.  
 
The focus of multilateral forums is different than that of bilateral cooperation mechanisms, as they 
mainly work to stimulate convergence. The ‘tectonic plates’ of the dominant jurisdictions’ 
competition systems are slowly moving together, sometimes at an invisible pace. Multilateral forums 
also create momentum on a larger scale, and are in a better position to stimulate advocacy and ensure 
inclusiveness. Relating to the latter, they also provide for capacity building and technical assistance. 
Finally, they can ensure coherence among bilateral arrangements and across policy fields. The 
bilateral and the multilateral spheres should not exist independently, however. While the multilateral 
plane has a distinct role to play compared to bilateralism, it can also promote the latter. One way of 
doing so is that via convergence created on a multilateral level, bilateral cooperation can advance. 
What is not done to this day in the field of competition law, however, is active promotion of bilateral 
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cooperation in multilateral forums, for instance by creating more awareness about the benefits and 
achievements of such ties. A grand strategy concerning the role of bilateralism in the 
internationalisation of competition law is currently lacking. The different multilateral forums should 
also ensure that there is no overlap among themselves, and that synergies can be created. ‘Competing 
multilateralism’ should be avoided, so that scarce resources can be spent more efficiently. More 
cooperation should take place among the multilateral forums, and expertise should be exploited. This 
Part III opened with the quote “[t]he best practice in competition policy is the relentless pursuit of better 
practices.”2770 Multilateral forums offer the ideal venue to do so, but the same should be done with 
regard to their own functioning.  
 
‘Network governance’, as occurs in the multilateral forums mentioned above, is often lauded as the 
new form of international order. Compared to more traditional forms of rule-making, networks are 
said to create efficiencies by increasing a state’s capacity to address transnational issues, and national 
interests can be redefined through engagement in a common enterprise. Finally, the technocratic 
nature of most networks allegedly depoliticises sensitive issues. Caution is in place, however, as this 
type of global governance is not without flaws. The critique is double. On the one hand networks are 
blamed for being an ineffective waste of resources and being mere talking shops, while on the other 
hand they are accused of enabling unchecked technocratic rule-making and allowing regulators to 
escape domestic constraints. Hard evidence for either accusation seems to be lacking, however. The 
main criticism towards regulatory networks is their lack of transparency and democratic 
accountability. While this is a valid concern, it must be remembered that networks would lose much 
of their added value if they were subject to the same accountability mechanisms as in the domestic 
sphere. Focus should be on well-informed, transparent, inclusive, and participatory decision-making, 
rather than explicit accountability mandates.  
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Conclusion: ready, but not willing or able 
 
“The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience.”2771  
 
Globalisation has made international cooperation to enforce competition laws a necessity rather than 
a luxury. The cost of non-cooperation is high, and far higher than the cost of cooperation. There is 
not one optimal form of cooperation. However, the international community has rightly steered 
away of trying to establish a global code. While early initiatives may have been too ambitious for their 
time, such an endeavour would not be any easier today. The tremendous increase in competition 
laws and enforcers as well as differences in market economies do not simplify the task, and while the 
increase in trade levels and the interconnectedness of markets does serve as a catalyst, the will to 
cooperate has not increased significantly since the early days in which cooperation was discussed, as 
illustrated by the lukewarm commitments in bilateral agreements.2772 While agreement on the 
underpinnings of competition policy has increased among the EU-US duopoly, new, important 
players do not generally find themselves in these views. Nations turned to extraterritorial application 
of national laws, and this has remained the default solution to date. MELAMED goes too far by saying 
that it would be a mistake to codify competition principles “that may well be shown to be wrong, 
impractical, or outdated in a few years” and  “either too vague to be useful or, if precise, unsuited to the disparate 
interests involved and unlikely to pass the test of time and experience.”2773 Codification of general principles may 
help move everyone in the same direction. Nevertheless, a shift in preferences has occurred and 
case-specific cooperation has rightly come to the forefront. BRANDENBURGER was right when she 
said that getting cases right together would be the true test of how competition agencies can 
meaningfully participate in the global environment.2774 In the OECD discussion on international 
cooperation, the US rightly indicated a twofold challenge for international cooperation in 
competition matters. The first was to make more effective use of the existing mechanisms, 
recognizing the legal, cultural, political, and economic factors specific to individual jurisdictions, 
while the second was to reflect on a long-term approach of international cooperation.2775  
 
Building on this twofold approach, eight suggestions are formulated based on the above analysis to 
fulfil the potential of bilateral cooperation agreements as a worthy tool in international cooperation 
in the field of competition law.  
 
First and foremost, international cooperation instruments must evolve along the changing challenges 
posed to international law enforcement. The state of knowledge is always imperfect. Competition 
authorities must incessantly adapt to a fluid environment characterised by industrial dynamism and 
new transactional phenomena, and evolutions in relationships with peers.2776 In order to allow for this 
evolution, more follow-up is needed on the functioning of existing instruments. It is crucial that the 
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documentation of the implementation of cooperation agreements improves, in order to allow for the 
assessment of their functioning and in this manner increase the adaptability and flexibility of the 
cooperation mechanisms they contain. Detailed accounts of cooperation should be made, so that 
benchmarking reviews can take place. If cooperation does not lead to consistent remedies, the 
impact of the divergent remedies on the parties and competitive processes should be measured, and 
it should be retrospectively reviewed where cooperation could have been improved, what the 
underlying reasons for obstructions were and if and how the latter can be avoided in the future.2777 
Evaluation of the adequacy of the existing legislative framework, the effectiveness of existing 
institutions, and the quality of substantive outcomes should be routine. Agencies do not seem to 
invest in engaging in a careful, confidential ex post-examination of instances of (failed, missed, or 
successful) cooperation. A side-by-side, behind-closed-doors deconstruction of cases would be a 
valuable way to unreservedly discuss alternative interpretations. Critical self-assessment should occur. 
Gathering more information on concrete instances of cooperation represents only a minimal 
investment and can serve as a valuable lesson for both the enforcers involved and the cooperative 
process in general. KOVACIC rightly claims that such reflection on past outcomes and practices is not 
a purely optional, luxury component of policy-making, but is a natural and necessary element of 
responsible public administration. The mock cases discussed during the ICN annual conference are 
often regarded as one of the most valuable aspects of the conference. Such interactions should take 
place in a bilateral context as well. More generally, statistics of international enforcement activity 
should also be more widely available. Well-maintained, comprehensive, informative, and public 
databases on international enforcement are currently lacking in the field of competition law.2778 By 
doing so more insight can be gathered on the causal relationship between formal cooperation under 
bilateral agreements or other international tools, and informal cooperation outside any framework.2779 
A change should occur in the way in which communication on competition matters takes place. A 
study of US media coverage of cartel enforcement from 1990 to 2009 suggested that compared to 
other types of financial crimes, such as accounting fraud, successful enforcement has not created 
sufficient awareness of cartel behaviour among the public. Such apathy may in turn impact 
deterrence and detection.2780 It was rightly suggested by SOKOL that competition authorities should 
“sell the anti-cartel message to the public in terms of direct customer harm in the form of increased prices, rather than 
simply the amount of fines imposed on guilty cartel members.”2781 Rather than investing resources in new 
elaborate arrangements or rules, the first investments should go to better follow-up of existing 
mechanisms and patterns, and increased and better communication. 
 
Second, existing bilateral cooperation agreements should have flesh added to their bones. They 
should go beyond the multilateral guidelines that already exist and that are limited to guiding 
principles. While reference should be made to widely-accepted international soft law, the value of the 
latter should be increased by fleshing out such rules in a bilateral formal context. The technique of 
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‘studied ambiguity’,2782 characteristic of traditional treaty-making, is not useful in the context of 
enforcement cooperation agreements. Opaque language should be avoided, in particular with regard 
to due process issues and in cases where the rights of defence and legal systems differ.2783 Imprecise 
law can be efficient in a high-trust environment with high consensus, but generally it should be 
limited and clear definitions are needed.2784 It must be entirely obvious what information can be 
disclosed, when it can be disclosed, to whom, and what use can be made of it.  Rather than merely 
being permissive, bilateral cooperation agreements should incentivise. GRIFFIN rightly pointed out 
that “assent to intentionally vague recommendations is not equivalent to a commitment to follow those recommendations 
in specific circumstances.”2785 This is where bilateral agreements can come into play. Annexes form the 
ideal way to include positive examples of cooperation and additional practical guidance for 
competition agencies. They do not require a formal change of the agreement and therefore are 
flexible instruments. A list with examples of tangible coordination activities should be developed. 
Examples of such activities are the coordination of requests for documents so as not to impose 
different burdens on the parties, or the coordination of interviews of representatives or 
questionnaires to customers. It could be made explicit to what extent the parties can accommodate 
the fact that divergent national procedures impede the alignment of timing, time-tables and 
information exchanges as prerequisites for the close coordination of proceedings. Emphasis could be 
put on the extent to which procedural landmarks can be aligned while respecting the domestic legal 
framework, making a distinction between merger reviews and the pursuit of other anticompetitive 
practices. Also with regard to comity little more than the mere principle is currently mentioned in the 
agreement. Whether and how to apply the principle in practice remains vague.2786 In this manner the 
investigative process could be further streamlined and made more palpable without compromising 
the sovereignty of the respective regulators.2787 Barely any agreements mention specific examples of 
coordination arrangements.2788 If the exclusion of parallel procedures is not yet possible, their 
management should be so that a maximum of efficiencies can be achieved. Detailed guidance is 
required in this regard, and possible in a bilateral relationship.2789 In the 2012 OECD/ICN Joint 
Survey 36% of respondents (20 respondents) suggested structural solutions for limitations to the 
exchange of confidential information, of which 8 respondents specifically requested a more practical 
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protocol for exchange of information, for example regarding timing of procedures.2790 More fleshed 
out agreements provide additional transparency, and may give confidence to the business community 
that cooperation is conducted according to an established and clear set of protocols.2791 When there 
is confidence in the process, disagreements about the outcome are easier to digest.2792 Enforcement 
cooperation agreements are generally seen as a tool only available to experienced competition 
agencies. More detailed agreements, however, could be instrumental for younger competition 
agencies as well, as they provide insight on how advanced jurisdictions interact.   
 
Third, with regard to the form of the agreements rather than their content, the value of formality has 
been underlined. Formal, binding agreements provide stability and transparency. While MoUs suffice 
at the moment for the conclusion of first generation agreement, it is regrettable that the Court did 
not offer more guidance in case C-660/13 Council v Commission and leaves open the question to what 
extent the institutions might have recourse to the technique of legislative delegation in order to 
safeguard the effectiveness of EU external action. The rather burdensome procedure of Article 218 
TFEU is unsuited for the conclusion of predominantly technical agreements, which do not require 
heavy political investment. As cooperation evolves, the Commission might feel the need to conclude 
MoUs on behalf of the Union rather than merely itself. Allowing a certain extent of delegation would 
then be more in line with the needs of international enforcement cooperation. Inspiration can 
moreover be taken from cooperation in other policy fields to experiment with bilateralism. 
Bilateralism and multilateralism should feed off each other (see below). Very little experimentation 
has taken place with the concept of opt-ins for instance. Bilateral agreements can evolve to trilateral 
or plurilateral agreements, as happened for instance with the cooperation agreement between the 
competition authorities of Canada, New Zealand and Australia.2793 Rather than pursuing the 
unrealistic step towards a global agreement, an evolution towards several plurilateral agreements 
seems more likely.2794  
  
Once the opt-in has been made, however, stronger commitments should be made than is currently 
done in bilateral agreements. The fourth suggestion is therefore that ‘cooperation discipline’ should 
be established. This does not imply that competition authorities should be obliged to cooperate, but 
the discretion of the authorities should be restricted to a certain extent, for instance via an obligation 
to motivate a refusal to cooperate or to limit the legitimate reasons to do so. If resources are spent 
negotiating bilateral agreements, the added value should be more than just a symbolic commitment 
to closer cooperation. Cooperation should not be forced, but best endeavour commitments should 
be worded more strongly. The 1999 EU-Canada Agreement is exemplary in this regard to a certain 
extent, as for instance it requires that the parties “seek to maximise the likelihood that the other party’s 
enforcement objectives will also be achieved” and requires that the requested party inform the requesting 
party not only of its decision but also of the reasons for that decision.2795 If the effort is made to 
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negotiate a second generation agreement, investigatory assistance should be included, and 
information exchange should be made as broad as possible without impinging on the fundamental 
rights of the parties involved. In this regard a reconsideration of the balancing act reflected in the 
current safeguards is in order.   
 
In the fifth place, and in line with the fourth suggestion, more ambition is needed when cooperating 
internationally. Intense advocacy on the benefits of cooperation, not only towards the public, but 
also towards governments, is required to elicit such ambition. Willingness should be developed at the 
multilateral level, where nations should be made aware not only of the benefits of cooperation, but 
also the cost of non-cooperation. Political barriers can be broken down with the aid of technical 
cooperation instruments. The current lack of discipline in cooperation agreements is linked to a lack 
of ambition. Not only is a stronger commitment needed, but the scope of the agreements should be 
broadened as well. Enforcement cooperation mainly occurs amongst a select group of developed 
competition authorities, those authorities should be the fore-runners in exploring novel ways of 
cooperation.2796 Rather than being limited to tentative provisions on information exchange, 
cooperation agreements should dare to incorporate new cooperation techniques, and as mentioned, 
serve as an incentive to cooperate rather than a mere permissive vehicle. Interaction with other 
mechanisms should be increased. For instance, a commitment to the promotion of waivers could be 
included. Commitments to personnel-exchanges could be included in the agreement. Experience 
with cross-appointments in the ACCC and the New Zealand Commerce Commission (NZCC) 
demonstrated that such exchanges help strengthen co-operation, help align the respective analysis on 
cases, and increase the sharing of knowledge, experience and expertise.2797 Even if choice of law-rules 
and substantive harmonization are unattainable, the alternative is not merely the status quo of 
information sharing.2798 Even transfer payments could be considered, to entice nations to undertake 
enforcement action contrary to their national self-interest.2799 GERBER pitched the concept of a 
‘commitment pathway’, in which states commit to a process, a shared pathway, a set of short-term 
and long-term goals together with a set of implementing  strategies and plans, rather than to accept a 
particular set of rules.2800 Long-term strategic considerations have to be taken into account.2801  
 
Sixth, cooperation among enforcers and regulators is restricted in its potential if those efforts are not 
taken into consideration in court. More attention should therefore go to the training of the judiciary 
and the creation of awareness among lawyers, who should get acquainted with cooperation 
agreements so that they can rely upon them. The discussion surrounding comity considerations 
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illustrated that while competition authorities may be more and more receptive towards each other’s 
reasoning, courts do not consistently do so. The complete absence of the cooperation agreements in 
the amicus curiae letters of intervening parties or in the reasoning of the court is testimony of the 
separation between the two spheres. More efforts should be made to complement enforcer 
cooperation by engaging the judiciary, for instance via trainings, the recognition of foreign 
judgments, and a mutual commitment for instance to collect fines and implement remedies on behalf 
of partner countries.2802 Even though confidentiality disputes are rarely appealed to courts and 
therefore judicial review of confidentiality disputes during an investigation does not occur 
frequently,2803 courts can nevertheless play a large role in international competition law enforcement. 
Their involvement is crucial. More attention should go to communication between regulators, the 
executive, and the judiciary with regard to international cooperation.  
 
A cautious approach is advised with regard to competition chapters in FTAs. Such chapters are 
valuable, and can fulfil many roles that are complementary to that of bilateral cooperation 
agreements. Again, more empirical follow-up is required of the actual effects, however. The most 
important benefits of competition chapters in FTAs relate to their reach, with FTAs being concluded 
with a broader range of countries, including developing countries, than those involved in bilateral 
cooperation agreements, and in the fact that despite the unenforceability of the provisions they can 
promote and lock-in domestic reforms. Developing countries often do not have the resources, 
information, or power to negotiate bilateral cooperation agreements, or are simply not a suited 
partner, because the substantive rules most suitable for them are often different from the rules most 
suitable for developed economies with. Including competition chapters in free trade agreements is 
therefore a first step in the development of the domestic competition regimes via a transfer of 
knowledge and knowhow useful to their own contexts.2804 There are nevertheless many drawbacks to 
including competition chapters in FTAs. Competition and trade are different policy areas with 
different goals. When negotiating a trade agreement, trade officials may therefore have different 
strategies in mind than competition officials, and competition chapters may be instrumentalised to 
attain non-competition related objectives. The difficulties associated with the negotiation of 
comprehensive trade agreements such as issues of mixity and politicisation moreover also affect the 
competition provisions within. The seventh suggestion is therefore that the EU should reflect on the 
direction it wishes to go in with regard to competition chapters in FTAs. They can be instrumental in 
a manner that bilateral cooperation agreements are not, but the inherent risks should not be ignored. 
This study puts forward that competition chapters should be included, but competition officials 
should ensure that their interpretation and application happens in a manner consistent with 
competition objectives and not just trade objectives.  
 
Finally, international cooperation in the field of competition law and policy is in need of a 
comprehensive strategy. More interplay is needed, first, at the multilateral level. Each forum has its 
own strengths and specificities, but is also faced with its own challenges. Cooperation among the 
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multilateral forums is therefore required. Second, the interplay between the multilateral and bilateral 
level should improve. Examples of a more aware handling of those two spheres can be found in the 
area of international tax cooperation. Different goals can be achieved via the multilateral and bilateral 
track, and they rightly have a different focus. Bilateralism should not, however, be treated 
stepmotherly, but should be actively engaged. A first step in this process is education about the 
benefits of effective international cooperation. The multilateral forums will have to address the 
challenges inherent to forms of network governance, but in particular the issue of inclusion and 
participation in a world that is no longer governed by only a few powerful players. A multitude of 
active enforcers needs to be taken into account, with increasing attention for developing countries. 
The new forces of globalization must be considered and the diversity of economic and political 
needs must be recognized. In this manner goals, methods, expectations and obstacles different from 
those encountered in the US and the EU would be revealed.2805 In developing international (soft) 
standards, developing country needs must be taken into account, in particular if developing countries 
do not have the expert staffs and advisors to successfully develop and advocate the standards that 
are best for them at an international level. A dual-track alternative could be a way to accommodate 
their needs.2806   
 
According to SANCHEZ, BAKKER and KLEIJWEG, “[i]nter-institutional cooperation has developed from being a 
byproduct of agency diplomacy to a central enforcement strategy.”2807 Cooperation, despite its advances, has 
nevertheless remained superficial. Nations are ready to cooperate, in the sense that they own the right 
capabilities as a state and as a competition agency to engage in effective international competition law 
enforcement, and have the tools available to them to do so.2808 However, they are not entirely able to 
do so yet, because of the flaws in the existing instruments available to them. These flaws exist, in 
essence, because of a lack of willingness. The fact that the protection of competition is in the universal 
interest of the international community and not merely in the interest of the state has not penetrated 
the rationale of international negotiations.2809 Competition law has its specificities compared to other 
policy areas, but it is not inherently immune to an international approach. This study has proven that 
while the EU’s bilateral instruments are in need of an update, they are worthy instruments to tackle 
some of the main problems that plague international competition law enforcement and are more 
than an interim-solution. Their potential can be realised following the reforms suggested in this 
study, and increased attention and strategy-making at a global level. Bilateral cooperation agreements 
can serve as adaptable testing grounds, and filter out successful approaches. Better practices will not 
develop when simply waiting for a global regime to emerge. If the life of the law is experience rather 
than logic,2810 ambitious bilateral competition cooperation agreements can cultivate that experience 
and advance the global competition law enforcement system as a whole.   
  
                                                          
2805 D. Gerber, “The age of antitrust law globalisation”, Concurrences, N° 4-2010, 10-11.  
2806 E. Fox, “Antitrust without borders: from roots to codes to networks”, E15 Expert Group on Competition Policy and 
the Trade System Think Piece, November 2015, 7-8.  
2807 P. Amador Sanchez, G. Bakker, A. Kleijweg, “The art of enforcement: Cooperation with other institutions, a national 
competition authority’s perspective” in H. Don, J. de Keijzer, E. Lamboo, M. van Oers, J. van Sinderen (eds), The Art of 
Supervision, Liber Amicorum, Pieter Kalbfleisch, Rotterdam, Editor Ronald Kouwenhoven, 2011, 39.  
2808 In this study the terms ‘competition authority’, ‘competition agency’, ‘antitrust authority’, and ‘antitrust agency’ will be 
used interchangeably.  
2809 J. Basedow, “Competition Policy in a Globalized Economy: from Extraterritorial Application to Harmonization” in 
M. Neumann & J. Weigand (eds), The International Handbook of Competition, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004, 
331. 
2810 O. Holmes Jr., The Common Law , Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1881.  
438 
 
 
 
  
439 
 
Main bibliography 
 
 
International agreements 
 
Charter for an International Trade Organization (Havana Charter), Havana, 24 March 1948.  
 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950. 
 
UN, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries 1966, Text adopted by the International Law Commission 
at its eighteenth session.  
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969.   
 
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, The Hague, 18 March 1970. 
  
Treaty between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 
Bern, 25 May 1973.  
 
The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition 1980 (The UN Set), The Set of Multilaterally Agreed 
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.2.   
 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Strasbourg, 28 
January 1981.    
 
Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Québec, 18 March 1985. 
  
Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Washington, 6 January 1994. 
 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Marrakesh, 15 April 1994.   
 
Cooperation and Coordination Agreement between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the 
New Zealand Commerce Commission, Wellington, 31 July 1994, updated in 2007 and 2013.  
 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European 
Communities regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, Washington, 23 September 1991.  
 
Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other Part (EU-Mexico Global Agreement), 
Brussels, 8 December1997.  
 
Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the 
Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, Brussels & Washington, 4 June 
1998.  
 
Administrative Arrangement on Attendance, EU Bulletin 3-1999, Competition (18/43).  
 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia on Mutual 
Enforcement Assistance, Washington, 27 April 1999.  
 
Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the Application of their 
Competition Laws, Bonn, 17 June 1999.  
 
440 
 
Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part (EU-South Africa Trade, Development, & Co-operation 
Agreement), Pretoria, 11 October 1999.   
 
Agreement between Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden concerning Cooperation in Matters of Competition, 
Copenhagen, 16 March 2001. 
 
Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and 
the Republic of Chile, of the other part (EU-Chile association agreement), Brussels, 18 November 2002.  
 
US-EU Merger Working Group, Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, 2002.  
 
Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Japan concerning Cooperation on Anti-
competitive Activities, Brussels, 10 July 2003.  
 
EU-China Competition Policy Dialogue, Brussels, 6 May 2004.  
 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on the 
Application of Positive Comity Principles to the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, Washington, 5 October 2004.  
 
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Fair Trade Commission of the Republic of Korea and the 
Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission, Brussels, 28 October 2004.  
 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - Protocols - Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 - Tables of 
equivalences, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012.  
 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - Protocols - Annexes - Declarations 
annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 
December 2007 - Tables of equivalences, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012. 
 
Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning Cooperation 
on Anti-competitive Activities, Seoul, 23 May 2009.  
 
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Directorate-General for Competition of the European 
Commission and the Council for Economic Defense, the Secretariat of Economic Law of the Ministry of Justice, and the 
Secretariat for Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance of the government of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 
Brasília, 8 October 2009. 
 
Free trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, 
of the other part, Brussels, 6 October 2010. 
 
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Directorate-General for Competition of the European 
Commission and the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia, Brussels, 10 March 2011.   
 
US-EU Merger Working Group, Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, 2011.  
 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one Part, and Colombia and Peru, of the 
other Part, Brussels, 26 June 2012.  
 
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Anti-Monopoly Law between on the one side the 
European Commission (Directorate-General for Competition) and on the other side the National Development and 
Reform Commission and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 
Brussels, 20 September 2012.  
 
441 
 
Cooperation Arrangement between the New Zealand Commerce Commission and the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission in relation to the Provision of Compulsory-acquired Information and Investigative Assistance, 
Sidney, 19 April 2013.  
 
Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning Cooperation on the Application of 
their Competition Laws, Brussels, 17 May 2013.  
 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission and 
the Competition Commission of India on Cooperation in the Field of Competition Laws, New Delhi, 21 November 
2013. 
 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between EU and Ukraine, Brussels, 7 June 2014. 
 
Cooperation Arrangement between the Fair Trade Commission of Japan and the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, Sydney, 29 April 2015.  
 
ALECA entre l’UE et la Tunisie, Chapitre XX Concurrence et Autres Dispositions Economiques, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154481.pdf.  
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2016/C 202/02.  
 
 
EU legislation and official documents 
 
Regulations, Directives, Council Decisions, Notices, Statements 
 
Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of the Council of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff Regulations of 
Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities and instituting special 
measures temporarily applicable to officials of the Commission, OJ L 56, 4.3.1968. 
 
Decision of the Council and of the Commission of 10 April 1995 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between 
the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their 
competition laws, 95/145/EC, ECSC, OJ L 95, 27.4.1995.  
 
Decision of the Council and of the Commission of 29 May 1998 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between 
the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the application of positive comity 
principles in the enforcement of their competition laws, 98/386/EC, ECSC, OJ L 173, 18.6.1998. 
 
Council Decision 1999/97/EC of 31 December 1998 on the position to be taken by the Community regarding an 
agreement concerning the monetary relations with the Republic of San Marino, OJ L 30, 4.2.1999.  
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of 
the EC Treaty, OJ L 83, 27.3.1999. 
 
Council and Commission Decision of 29 April 1999 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European 
Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the application of their competition laws, 1999/445/EC, ECSC, 
OJ L 175, 10.7.1999. 
 
Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ L 8/1, 12.1.2001.  
 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access 
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145, 31.5.2001. 
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down 
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003.  
442 
 
 
Council Decision of 16 June 2003 concluding the Agreement between the European Community and the Government of 
Japan concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities, 2003/520/EC, OJ L 183, 22.7.2003. 
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the 
EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24, 29.1.2004.  
 
Council Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No 723/2004 of 22 March 2004 amending the Staff Regulations of officials of the 
European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European Communities, OJ L 124, 
27.4.2004. 
 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission 
pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 123, 27.4.2004.  
 
Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004.  
 
Commission Notice on cooperation between the Commission and the Courts of the Member States, OJ C 101, 
27.04.2004.  
 
Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, OJ C 325, 22.12.2005.   
 
Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 298, 08.12.2006. 
 
Council Decision of 16 February 2009 relating to the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community 
and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities, 2009/586/EC, OJ 
L 202, 4.8.2009. 
 
Council Decision 2009/904/EC of 26 November 2009 on the position to be taken by the European Community 
regarding the renegotiation of the Monetary Agreement with the Republic of San Marino, OJ L 322, 9.12.2009. 
 
Commission Notice on Best Practices for the Conduct of Proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, OJ C 308, 
20.10.2011.  
 
Council Decision of 22 April 2013 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement between the 
European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws 
(2013/203/EU), OJ L 117, 27.4.2013. 
 
Council Decision of 21 October 2014 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws (2014/866/EU), OJ L 347, 
3.12.2014. 
  
Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014. 
 
Rules of procedure of the General Court, OJ L 105, 23.4.2015.  
 
Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 248, 24.9.2015. 
 
Commission Regulation 2015/1348 of 3 August 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 relating to the conduct of 
proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 208, 5.8.2015. 
 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016.  
443 
 
 
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016. 
   
Joint statement of the Council and the Commission on the functioning of the network of competition authorities.  
 
European Commission Decisions and other Commission Documents 
 
Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, IV/26.870 - Aluminium imports 
from eastern Europe, 85/206/EEC, 19 December 1984. 
 
European Commission, XXIInd Report on Competition Policy 1992, 27 October 1993. 
 
European Commission, Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules 
– Report of the Group of Experts, COM(95)359 final, 12 July 1995.  
 
European Commission, Towards an international framework of competition rules, Communication to the Council, 
COM(96)284 final, 18 June 1996. 
 
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement between 
the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their 
competition laws, 10 April 1995 to 30 June 1996, COM(96) 479 final, 8 October 1996.  
 
Communication from the Commission to the Council concerning the Agreement between the European Communities 
and the Government of the United States on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their 
competition laws, COM(97) 233 final, 97/0178(CNS), 18 June 1997.  
 
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement between 
the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their 
competition laws, 1 July 1996 to 31 December 1996, COM(97) 346 final, 4 July 1997.  
 
Commission Decisions declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA 
Agreement, Case No IV/M.877 - Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, 30 July 1997. 
 
Commission report to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of the agreement between the 
European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their 
competition laws, 1 January 1997 to 31 December 1997, COM/98/0510 final, 3 September 1998.    
 
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of the Agreement between 
the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their 
competition laws, 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1998, COM/99/0439 final, 13 September 1999.   
 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement, 
Case No COMP/M.1630 - Air Liquide / BOC, 18 January 2000. 
 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration incompatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement, Case 
No COMP/M.1741 - MCI WorldCom / Sprint, 28 June 2000. 
 
Commission Report to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement between the 
European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their 
competition laws, 1 January 1999 to 31 December 1999, COM(2000) 618 final, 4 October 2000.  
 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement, 
Case No COMP/M.2220 - General Electric/Honeywell, 3 July 2001.  
 
444 
 
Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty, Case COMP/36.571/D-1: Austrian 
banks — ‘Lombard Club’, 11 June 2002. 
 
Commission Communication C(2003) 4582 of 1 December 2003 on professional secrecy in State aid decisions, OJ C 297, 
09.12.2003. 
 
Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, 
C(2004)900 final, 24 March 2004. 
 
Communication from the Commission, “Global Europe: Competing in the world – A contribution to the EU’s Growth 
and Jobs Strategy”, COM (2006) 567 final, 4 October 2006. 
 
Commission Staff Working Document, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Global 
Europe: Competing in the World”, SEC(2006) 1230, 4 October 2006. 
 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European 
neighbourhood policy, COM/2006/0726 final, 4 December 2006.   
 
Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2009)574 accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 COM(2009)206 final, 29 April 2009.    
 
Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, 
COMP/C-3 /37.990 – Intel, 13 May 2009.  
 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Report on the functioning of 
Regulation 1/2003, COM/2009/0206 final, SEC(2009)574. 
 
Commission of the European Communities, Report on Competition Policy 2008, COM(2009) 374 final, SEC(2009) 
10004, 23 July 2009.  
 
Commission staff working document SEC/2009/1004 final accompanying the Report from the Commission on 
Competition Policy 2008, COM(2009)374 final, 23 July 2009. 
 
European Commission, Report on competition policy (including Commission Staff Working Document) 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2009/part_2_en.pdf. 
 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the 
EEA Agreement, Case No COMP/M.5529 - Oracle/ Sun Microsystems, C(2010) 142 final, 21 January 2010.  
 
Case No COMP/M.5669 - CISCO/ Tandberg, Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 Merger Procedure, 29 March 2010.  
 
Commission staff working document accompanying the Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2009, 
COM(2010)282 final, SEC/2010/0666 final, 3 June 2010. 
 
Case No COMP/M.5778 - Novartis / Alcon, Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 Merger Procedure, 9 August 2010. 
 
European Commission, Trade, Growth and World Affairs – Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 
Strategy, COM(2010)612, November 2010.   
 
Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and the 
Swiss Confederation on Air Transport, Case COMP/39258 - Airfreight Brussels, 9 November 2010. 
 
Annex to the Commission staff working paper accompanying the Commission Report on Competition Policy 2010, 
SEC/2011/0609 final, February 2011.  
 
445 
 
European Commission, Report on Competition Policy 2010, COM(2011) 328 final, SEC(2011) 690 final, 10 June 2011. 
  
Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2011) 690 final accompanying the Report from the Commission on Competition 
Policy 2010 COM(2011) 328 final, 10 June 2011.   
 
DG Competition informal guidance paper on confidentiality claims, March 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/guidance_en.pdf. 
 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, COM/2012/0244 final - 2012/0126 
(NLE), Explanatory Memorandum, June 2012. 
 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, COM/2012/0245 final - 2012/0127 
(NLE), 1 June 2012. 
 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the internal market and the EEA agreement 
according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, Case No COMP/M.6410 - UTC/ Goodrich, 26 July 2012. 
 
DG Competition Management Plan 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/comp_mp.pdf. 
 
Antitrust Manual of Procedures, Internal DG Competition working documents on procedures for the application of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, March 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/antitrust_manproc_3_2012_en.pdf.  
 
European Commission, Report on Competition Policy 2012, COM(2013) 257 final, SWD(2013) 159 final, 7 May 2013.  
 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market according to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, Case No COMP/M.6844 - GE /AVIO, 1 July 2013. 
 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market according to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, Case No COMP/M.6857 – Crane Co/ Mei Group, 19 July 2013. 
 
Commission Decision on the signature of the Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding on a Swiss financial 
contribution, C(2013) 6355 final, 3 October 2013.  
 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market according to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, Case No COMP/M.6944 – Thermo Fisher Scientific/ Life Technologies, 26 November 
2013. 
 
DG Competition Management Plan 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_management_plan/amp_2013_en.pdf.  
 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – The Regulatory Part, September 2013, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151605.pdf.  
 
Commission Staff Working Document “Ten years of antitrust enforcement under regulation 1/2003” accompanying the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “Ten Years of Antitrust 
Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives”, SWD/2014/0230 final, 9 July 2014. 
 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “Ten Years 
of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives”, COM(2014) 453, 
SWD(2014) 230}_{SWD(2014) 231, 9 July 2014.   
 
DG Competition Management Plan 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_management_plan/amp_2014_en.pdf. 
 
446 
 
 
Commission Decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) in conjunction with Article 6(2) of Council Regulation No 139/2004, 
Case No COMP/M.7276 – Glaxosmithkline/Novartis Vaccines Business (Excl. Influenza/Novartis Consumer Health 
Business), 28 January 2015.  
 
European Commission, “The Damages Directive – Towards more effective enforcement of the EU competition rules”, 
Competition policy brief, Issue 2015-1, January 2015.  
 
Competition policy in TTIP, Factsheet competition: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153019.6%20Competition%20SoE%20Subsidies%20merg
ed.pdf. 
 
Textual Proposal, the European Union's initial proposal for legal text on ‘Competition’ in TTIP, tabled for discussion 
with the US in the negotiating round of 10-14 March 2014 and made public on 7 January 2015, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153029.pdf.  
 
Textual Proposal, the European Union's initial proposal for legal text on ‘State-owned Enterprises’ in TTIP, tabled for 
discussion with the US in the negotiating round of 14-18 July 2014 and made public on 7 January 2015, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153030.pdf.  
 
Textual Proposal, the European Union's initial proposal for legal text on ‘Subsidies’ in TTIP, tabled for discussion with 
the US in the negotiating round of 10-14 March 2014 and made public on 7 January 2015, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153031.pdf.  
 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the internal market and the EEA agreement, Case 
M.7278 – General Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power – Renewable Power & Grid Business, C(2015) 6179 final, 8 
September 2015. 
 
DG Competition Management Plan 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/comp_mp_2015_en.pdf.  
 
European Commission, The Twelfth Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), 22-26 February 2016, Public Report–March 2016.  
 
Negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Tunisia, The EU 
Proposal on Competition and State Aid, Factsheet, April 2016.     
 
Rapport conjoint du premier round de négociation sur un accord de libre-échange complet et approfondi (ALECA) entre 
la Tunisie et l’Union européenne, Tunis, 18-21 avril 2016, 22 avril 2016.  
 
Delegation of the European Union to Vietnam, Guide to the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, June 2016, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/june/tradoc_154622.pdf.  
 
DG Competition Management Plan 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/comp_mp_2016_en.pdf. 
 
DG Competition Management Plan 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/management-plan-
comp-2017_en_0.pdf.    
 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities of the 
Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, COM(2017) 
142 final 2017/0063 (COD), 22 March 2017.  
 
European Commission, Confidentiality Waiver, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/npwaivers.pdf.  
 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/  
 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/chile/  
 
447 
 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/mexico/  
 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/morocco/  
 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/  
 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/tunisia/  
 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/ukraine/    
 
European Parliament Documents 
 
European Parliament Resolution on Institutional and Legal Implications of the Use of ‘Soft Law’ Instruments, 
2007/2028(INI), 4 September 2007.  
 
De Gucht, Karel, Testimony before the Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament, Brussels , 21 
February 2013. 
 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C - Citizen’s rights and constitutional 
affairs, Justice, Freedom and Security, Openness, transparency and access to documents and information in the EU, PE 
493.035, November 2013.  
 
Opinion of the Committee on International Trade for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the 
proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their competition laws, 12418/2012 – C7-0146/2013 – 
2012/0127(NLE), 17 December 2013.  
 
European Parliament Resolution on EU Cooperation Agreements on Competition Policy Enforcement – The Way 
Forward, 2013/2921(RSP), 5 February 2014. 
 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A – Economic and Scientific Policy, 
Competition Policy in International Agreements – Study for Econ Committee, IP/A/ECON/2015-02, August 2015.  
 
ECON Committee and European Commission Public Hearing on empowering the national competition authorities to be 
more effective enforcers of the EU competition rules, European Parliament, Brussels, 19 April 2016. 
 
EU press releases and speeches  
 
European Commission, Press Release, “Following an undertaking by Microsoft to change its licensing practices, the 
European Commission suspends its action for breach of the competition rules”, IP/94/653, Brussels, 17 July 1994.  
 
Spratling, Gary R., “Negotiating the waters of international cartel prosecutions – Antitrust Division Policies Relating to 
Plea Agreements in International Cases”, Speech before the ABA Criminal Justice Section’s Thirteenth Annual National 
Institute on White Collar Crime, 4 March 1999.  
 
European Commission, Press Release, “Commission opens proceedings against Microsoft’s Alleged Discriminatory 
licensing and refusal to supply software information”, IP/00/906, Brussels, 3 August 2000.  
 
European Commission, Press Release, “Commission fines eight companies in graphite electrode cartel”, IP/01/1010, 
Brussels, 18 July 2001.  
 
European Commission, Press Release, “Commission initiates additional proceedings against Microsoft”, IP/01/1232, 
Brussels, 30 August 2001.  
 
European Commission, Press Release, “Commission Imposes Fines on Vitamin Cartels”, IP/01/1625, Brussels, 21 
November 2001.   
 
448 
 
European Commission, “Statement on inspections at producers of heat stabilisers as well as impact modifiers and 
processing aids - International cooperation on inspections”, MEMO/03/33, Brussels, 13 February 2003.  
 
European Commission, “Microsoft - Questions and Answers on Commission Decision”, MEMO/04/70, Brussels, 24 
March 2004.   
 
European Commission, Press Release, “Commission clears Oracle’s takeover bid for PeopleSoft”, IP/04/1312, Brussels, 
26 October 2004. 
 
European Commission, Press Release, “Mergers: Commission clears Cisco's proposed acquisition of Tandberg subject to 
conditions”, IP/10/377, Brussels, 29 March 2010.   
 
European Commission, Press Release, “Mergers: Commission clears planned acquisition of Alcon by Novartis, subject to 
conditions”, IP/10/1042, Brussels, 9 August 2010.  
 
European Commission, Press Release, “Vice President Almunia signs cooperation agreement with Russian competition 
authority”, IP/11/278, Brussels, 10 March 2011.  
 
Almunia, Joaquin, “Cartels: the Priority in Competition Enforcement”, Speech at the 15th International Conference on 
Competition: a Spotlight on Cartel Prosecution, Berlin, 2011.  
 
Italianer, Alexander, “Zero Tolerance for International Cartels”, Speech at the ICN Cartel Workshop, Bruges, 2011. 
 
Van der Wee, Miek, “Competition Policy in a Globalised Economy: Challenges and Responses”, presentation for 
International Relations Unit DG Competition, 27 September 2012.   
 
European Commission, Press Release, “Commission accepts legally binding commitments from Simon & Schuster, 
Harper Collins, Hachette, Holtzbrinck and Apple for sale of e-books”, IP/12/1367, Brussels, 13 December 2012.  
 
Almunia, Joaquin, “Competition policy and the global economy”, Speech at the IBA 10th Competition Mid-Year 
Conference, Cape Town, 7 March 2014.   
 
European Commission, “The EU’s Association Agreements with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine”, 
MEMO/14/430, Brussels, 23 June 2014. 
 
European Commission, Press Release, “EU and Ecuador Conclude Negotiations for Trade and Development 
Agreement”, IP/14/845, Brussels, 17 July 2014. 
 
European Commission, Press release, “Antitrust: Commission proposal to make national competition authorities even 
more effective enforcers for the benefit of jobs and growth”, IP/17/685, Brussels, 22 March 2017. 
 
Other 
 
Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council on a financial contribution by the Swiss Confederation, Doc. 6283/06, 14 February 
2006. 
 
EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, June 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf.  
 
Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council on an Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding between the President of the 
Council of the European Union and the Swiss Federal Council of 27 February 2006, Doc. 8681/08, 5 May 2008. 
 
Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ L 304/47, 20 
November 2010.  
 
449 
 
ECN, Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of the European Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012, Protection of 
leniency material in the context of civil damages actions, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf.  
 
ECN Model Leniency Programme, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mlp_revised_2012_en.pdf.  
 
Council of the European Union, Contribution of the legal service Subject: Procedure to be followed for the conclusion 
by the EU of Memoranda of Understanding, Joint Statements and other texts containing policy commitments, with third 
countries and international organisation, 5707/13, 1 February 2013.  
 
Council of the European Union, Amending Protocol to the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation providing for measures equivalent to those laid down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payments, , 8297/15, 21 May 2015. 
 
Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release, “Opinion 2/15: The free trade agreement with Singapore cannot, 
in its current form, be concluded by the EU alone”, No 52/17, Luxembourg, 16 May 2017. 
 
ECN Brief, “European Commission: Recent Developments on Discovery following Amicus Curiae”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/04_2010/com_discovery.pdf.  
 
EEAS, “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area - What’s it all about?”, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ukraine/documents/virtual_library/vademecum_en.pdf  
 
 
OECD documents 
 
OECD, Recommendation Concerning Co-operation between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices 
Affecting International Trade, C(67)53, 5 October 1967. 
 
OECD, Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Co-operation between Member Countries on Restrictive 
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, C(79)154, 25 October 1979.  
 
OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 23 September 1980, 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.ht
m#part1.  
 
OECD, Mutual Assistance Agreements, Secretariat Note, DAFFE/CLP/WP3(93)3, 1993. 
 
OECD, Whish-Wood Report, DAFFE/CLP/WP3(93)6/PART1, 1994. 
 
OECD, Issues Paper Effective Co-operation in International Antitrust Enforcement: Confidential Information Sharing 
and other Essential Mutual Assistance, DAFFE/CLP/WP3(94)1, 1994.  
 
OECD, Revised recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation between Member countries on 
Anticompetitive Practices affecting International Trade 1995, C(95)130/FINAL. 
 
OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 1998, 
C(98)35/FINAL. 
 
OECD, Report of the Committee on Competition Law and Policy – Making International Markets More Efficient 
through ‘Positive Comity’ in Competition Law Enforcement, DAFFE/CLP(99)19, 14 June 1999.  
 
BIAC/ICC Questions from business regarding the protection of confidential information in the context of international 
antitrust cooperation, Prepared by the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) jointly with the 
ICC Commission on Law and Practices relating to competition, 23 October 2000.  
 
OECD, Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters, April 2002.  
450 
 
 
OECD, The Relationship Between Regional Trade Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System: Competition, 
TD/TC/WP(2002)19/FINAL, 7 May 2002.  
 
OECD, BIAC Working Group on Information Exchange in International Cartel Investigations Update, Presented to the 
OECD Competition Committee Working Party 3 on International Co-operation by Goldman, Calvin S. and Rill, James 
F., Vice Chairs, BIAC Competition Committee, 14 October 2003.  
 
OECD Reports, Global Forum on Competition, ‘ Preventing Market abuses and promoting economic efficiency, growth 
and opportunity’, 2004, http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/27892500.pdf.   
 
OECD, Best Practices for the formal exchange of information between competition authorities in hard core cartel 
investigations, 2005.  
 
Solano, Oliver & Sennekamp, Andreas, “Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements”, OECD Trade Policy 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 31, 2006, COM/DAF/TD(2005)3/FINAL. 
 
OECD, Access for tax authorities to information gathered by anti-money laundering authorities, September 2007. 
 
OECD, Sixth Meeting of the OECD Forum on Tax Administration, Istanbul, 15-16 September 2010, Joint Audit 
Report. 
 
OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Contribution 
from New Zealand, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)14, 19 December 2011.  
 
OECD, Global Forum on Competition, “Improving International co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution 
from the United Kingdom, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)19, 23 December 2011.      
 
OECD and Council of Europe, The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 
Amended by the 2010 Protocol, 2011. 
 
OECD, Text of the revised explanatory report to the convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters as 
amended by protocol. 
 
OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution from 
Australia, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)36, 24 January 2012.  
 
OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Contribution 
from the United States (DoJ), DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)46, 31 January 2012.  
 
OECD, Global Forum on Competition Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution from 
Switzerland, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)15, 7 February 2012.  
 
OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution from 
the European Union, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)53, 9 February 2012.  
 
OECD, Global Forum on Competition, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, Background 
Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)6, 13 February 2012.  
 
OECD, Global forum on Competition, Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations, Contribution from 
BIAC, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2012)57, 13 February 2012.  
 
OECD, The Competition Committee’s two strategic themes for 2012-2014: international co-operation and evaluation of 
competition interventions – Workplans, DAF/COMP(2012)1, 15 February 2012.  
 
OECD, Discussion on International Co-operation, Contribution of the United States, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)24, 
12 June 2012. 
451 
 
 
OECD, International Co-operation – Stocktaking Exercise of the Competition Committee’s Past Work, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)5, 12 June 2012.  
 
OECD, Discussion on Limitations and Constraints to International Co-operation, Contribution of the European Union, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2012)41, 23 October 2012. 
 
OECD, Issues paper by the secretariat, Limitations and constraints to international co-operation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2012)8, 23 October 2012. 
 
OECD, Policy Roundtables, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel investigations, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16, 
30 November 2012. 
 
OECD, Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)2, 26 
February 2013.  
 
OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the European Union, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)57, 29 October 2013.  
 
OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution from Japan, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)40, 29 October 2013. 
 
OECD, Discussion on how to define confidential information, Contribution of the United States, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2013)55, 29 October 2013.  
 
OECD, The OECD privacy framework, 2013, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf.   
 
OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by Chief Judge Diane P. Wood, “Enhanced 
international cooperation in competition cases: the role of the courts”, DAF/COMP/WP3(2014)5, 26 May 2014. 
 
OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by John Temple Lang, “Aims of enhanced international 
cooperation in competition cases”, DAF/COMP/WP3(2014)7, 28 May 2014. 
 
OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by Prof. Olivier Budzinski, “Towards rationalizing 
multiple competition policy enforcement procedures: the role of lead jurisdiction concepts”, DAF/COMP/WP3(2014)6, 
23 June 2014.  
 
OECD, Hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation, Paper by Prof. Michal S. Gal, “Increasing deterrence of 
international cartels through reliance on foreign decisions”, DAF/COMP/WP3/(2014)4, 24 June 2014.  
 
OECD, Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations 
and Proceedings, C(2014)108, 16 September 2014. 
 
OECD, National and International Provisions for the exchange of confidential information between competition 
agencies without waivers, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)4, 2 October 2014.  
 
OECD, Summary of discussion of the hearing on enhanced enforcement cooperation, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/M(2014)2/ANN2/FINAL, 7 November 2014. 
 
OECD, Report/Inventory on provisions contained in existing international co-operation agreements, Note by the 
Secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2014)10, 16 December 2014. 
 
OECD, Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition Law Enforcement, 2014, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Challenges-Competition-Internat-Coop-2014.pdf. 
 
OECD, Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and enforcement, Relationship between public and private antitrust 
enforcement, Contribution of the United States, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2015)11, 15 June 2015. 
452 
 
 
OECD, Inventory of co-operation agreements, Note by the secretariat, DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)12/REV1, 20 
November 2015.  
 
OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=222.  
  
http://www.oecd.org/about/ 
  
 
ICN documents 
 
ICN, Cartels Working Group, Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations, Report to the ICN 
Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007.  
 
ICN Cartels Working Group, Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement in Cartel Cases, Report to the ICN Annual 
Conference, Moscow, May 2007.  
 
ICN Factsheet and Key Messages, April 2009. 
 
ICN, Merger Working Group Comprehensive Assessment 2010-2011.    
 
ICN, The ICN’s vision for its second decade, Presented at the 10th annual conference of the ICN, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 17-20 May 2011. 
 
ICN Operational Framework, Adopted by ICN members, 13 February 2012.  
 
ICN Steering Group International Enforcement Cooperation Project, March 2012.  
 
ICN Roundtable on Enforcement Cooperation, Roundtable Report & Questionnaire Response Summary, Washington, 
DC, 29 March 2011.  
 
ICN Statement of Achievements 2001-2011. 
 
ICN, ICN Report on OECD/ICN questionnaire on international enforcement cooperation, 2012.   
 
ICN, Waivers of Confidentiality in Cartel Investigations – Explanatory Note, 2014. 
 
ICN, Agency Effectiveness Project on Investigative Process – Competition Agency Confidentiality Practices, April 2014.   
 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ 
 
 
WTO documents 
 
WTO, Ministerial Conference, Singapore - Singapore Ministerial Declaration - Adopted on 13 December 1996, 
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 18 December 1996.  
 
WTO, DS44: Japan — Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 22 April 1998.  
 
EC submission to the WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/129, 12 July 1999. 
 
WTO, Ministerial Conference - Fifth Session - Cancun, 10 - 14 September 2003 - ACP Declaration on the Fifth 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO, Communication from Botswana, WT/MIN(03)/W/4, 1 August 2003.  
 
453 
 
WTO, General Council – Proposals for Inclusion in the Draft Text for Cancun, Communication from Benin, Botswana, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, WT/GC/W/510, 14 
August 2003. 
 
WTO, World Trade Report 2004: Exploring the Linkages Between the Domestic Policy Environment and International 
Trade, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report04_e.pdf.  
 
http://www.wto.org/   
 
 
UN Documents 
 
Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion No. 10 on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices of 
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, 23 September 1954.  
 
UNCTAD, A Presentation of Types of Common Provisions to be Found in International, Particularly Bilateral and 
Regional, Cooperation Agreements on Competition Policy and their Application, TD/RBP/CONF.6/3, 6 September 
2005.  
 
UNCTAD, Experiences gained so far on international cooperation on competition policy issues and the mechanisms 
used, TD/B/COM.2/CLP/21/Rev.5, 17-19 July 2007. 
 
Sixth United Nations Conference to Review all Aspect of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules 
for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, 8-12 November 2010. 
 
Contribution by the United States, Roundtable on Modalities and Procedures for International Cooperation in 
Competition Cases Involving more than one Country, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and 
Policy, Geneva, 8-10 July 2013. 
 
Seventh United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and 
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, Geneva, 6–10 July 2015.  
 
http://unctad.org/  
 
 
National legislation 
 
16 Code of Federal Regulations Part 3, FTC Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings.  
 
28 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 16, Production or Disclosure of Material or Information.   
 
Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Act No. 54 of April 14, 1947), Japan.  
 
Annex to the Federal Decree of 20 June 2014 on the Approval of the Agreement between Switzerland and the EU 
concerning Cooperation on the Application and Implementation of their Competition Laws, in force since 1 Dec. 2014 
(AS 2014 3711; BBl 2013 3959).  
 
Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962, 15 USC Sec. 1311-1314. 
 
Competition and Consumer Act 2012, Australia, https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00062.  
 
Dutch Competition Act, Act of 22 May 1997, Providing New Rules for Economic Competition, 
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/competitionact.htm.  
 
Enterprise Act of 2002, UK, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents.  
 
454 
 
Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition of 6 October 1995 (Status as of 1 December 2014), 
Switzerland.  
 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  
 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 USC Sec. 41-58.   
 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC Sec. 552. 
 
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 USC Sec. 6202-6212.   
 
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 USC Sec. 552a. 
 
US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International 
Operations”, April 1995, https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-enforcement-guidelines-international-operations.     
 
US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and 
Cooperation”, January 2017, https://www.justice.gov/atr/internationalguidelines/download. 
 
 
Case-law  
 
US 
 
American Banana Co. v United Fruit Co., 213 US 347, (1909). 
 
United States v Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir./CA2 1945). 
 
United States v Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (ND Ohio 1949)  
 
United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Inf. Ctr., 168 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of America, 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).    
 
National Bank of Canada v Interbank Card Association and Bank of Montreal, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).  
 
Laker Airways Ltd. v Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 235 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
 
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. (1987). 
 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v California, 509 US 764, (1993).  
 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (DCC 1995). 
 
United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (DCC, 2001).  
 
Re: Methionine Antitrust Litigation, No. C-99-3491, MDL no. 1311 (ND Cal. 2002). 
  
Re: Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, Misc. No. 99-197 (DDC, 2002).  
 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359 (2004).  
 
United States v LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). 
455 
 
 
Re: Vitamins Antitrust Litigation 398 F. Supp. 2d 209, 226 (DDC, 2005).  
 
Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (ND Cal. 2007).  
 
Re: Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation No 06 –MD-1775, 2009 WL 3077396 (EDNY, 2009).  
 
Re: Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation No 06-MD-1775, 2011 WL 2909163 (EDNY, 2011). 
 
Re: TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation No M 07-1827 SI, 2011 WL 723571 (ND Cal, 2011).  
 
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 
Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., F.3d 14-8003, 2014 WL 1243797 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 
 
EU 
 
Joined opinion of Advocate General Mayras in Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission of the European Communities, 
Badische Anilin- & Soda-Fabrik AG v Commission of the European Communities, Farbenfabriken Bayer AG v Commission of the 
European Communities, J. R. Geigy AG v Commission of the European Communities, Sandoz AG v Commission of the European 
Communities, SA française des matières colorantes (Francolor) v Commission of the European Communities, Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur 
AG v Commission of the European Communities, Farbwerke Hoechst AG v Commission of the European Communities, Azienda Colori 
Nazionali - ACNA S.p.A. v Commission of the European Communities, 57-69, EU:C:1972:32.  
 
Judgment of 14 July 1972, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission of the European Communities, 48-69, EU:C:1972:70.   
 
Opinion 1/75 of the Court of 11 November 1975, EU:C:1975:145.  
 
Judgment of 26 June 1980, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities, 136/79, 
EU:C:1980:169. 
 
Judgment of 11 November 1981, International Business Machines Corporation v Commission of the European Communities, C- 
60/81, EU:C:1981:264.  
 
Judgment of 7 November 1985, Stanley George Adams v Commission of the European Communities, 145/83, EU:C:1985:448. 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in  
AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, 53/85, EU:C:1986:25. 
 
Judgment of 24 June 1986, AKZO Chemie BV and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, C-53/85, 
EU:C:1986:256. 
 
Judgment of 27 September 1988, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases 
89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, EU:C:1988:447. 
 
Judgment of 17 October 1989, Dow Benelux NV v Commission of the European Communities, 85/87, EU:C:1989:379. 
 
Judgment of 18 October 1989, Orkem v Commission of the European Communities, 374/87, EU:C:1989:387. 
 
Judgment of 17 December 1991, SA Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission of the European Communities, T-7/89, 
EU:T:1991:75. 
 
Judgment of 16 July 1992, Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia v Asociación Española de Banca Privada and others, C-
67/91, EU:C:1992:330. 
 
456 
 
Judgment of 19 May 1994, Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-Produktiebedrijven (SEP) NV v Commission of the European Communities, 
C-36/92 P, EU:C:1994:205. 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-327/91, 
EU:C:1993:941.    
 
Judgment of 9 August 1994, French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-327/91, EU:C:1994:305.  
 
Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Kingdom of the Netherlands v Council of the European Union, C-58/94, 
EU:C:1995:409. 
 
Judgment of 18 September 1996, Postbank NV v Commission of the European Communities, T-353/94, EU:T:1996:119.  
 
Judgment of 8 October 1996, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Compagnie Maritime Belge SA, Dafra-Lines A/S, 
Deutsche Afrika-Linien GmbH & Co. and Nedlloyd Lijnen BV v Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases T-24/93, 
T-25/93, T-26/93 and T-28/93, EU:T:1996:139.  
 
Judgment of 17 December 1998, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, C-185/95 P, 
EU:C:1998:608. 
 
Judgment of 25 March 1999, Gencor Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, T-102/96, EU:T:1999:65.  
 
Judgment of 8 July 1999, Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission of the European Communities, C-51/92 P, EU:C:1999:357. 
 
Judgment of 8 July 1999, Montecatini SpA v Commission of the European Communities, C-235/92 P, EU:C:1999:362. 
 
Judgment of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others, C-453/99, 
EU:C:2001:465. 
 
Judgment of 15 October 2002, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM), DSM NV and DSM Kunststoffen BV, Montedison 
SpA, Elf Atochem SA, Degussa AG, Enichem SpA, Wacker-Chemie GmbH and Hoechst AG and Imperial Chemical Industries plc 
(ICI) v Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 
P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, EU:C:2002:582. 
 
Judgment of 30 September 2003, Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v Commission of the European Communities, Joined 
Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, EU:T:2003:245. 
 
Judgment of 7 January 2004, Aalborg Portland A/S, Irish Cement Ltd, Ciments français SA, Italcementi - Fabbriche Riunite 
Cemento SpA, Buzzi Unicem SpA and Cementir - Cementerie del Tirreno SpA v Commission of the European Communities, Joined 
cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6. 
 
Judgment of 23 March 2004, French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, C-233/02, EU:C:2004:173.  
 
Judgment of 8 July 2004, Dalmine SpA v Commission of the European Communities, T-50/00, EU:T:2004:220.  
 
Judgment of 15 June 2005, Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd, Intech EDM BV, Intech EDM AG and SGL Carbon AG v Commission of the 
European Communities, Joined cases T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03, EU:T:2005:220.  
 
Judgment of 14 December 2005, General Electric Company v Commission of the European Communities, T-210/01, 
EU:T:2005:456. 
 
Judgment of 30 May 2006, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission of the European Communities, T-198/03, 
EU:T:2006:136.   
 
Judgment of 29 June 2006, Commission of the European Communities v SGL Carbon AG, C-301/04 P, EU:C:2006:432. 
 
Judgment of 29 June 2006, SGL Carbon AG v Commission of the European Communities, C-308/04 P, EU:C:2006:433. 
457 
 
 
Judgment of 29 June 2006, Showa Denko KK v Commission of the European Communities, C-289/04 P, EU:C:2006:431. 
 
Judgment of 13 July 2006, Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio Cannito v Fondiaria Sai SpA and 
Nicolò Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v Assitalia SpA, Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, EU:C:2006:461. 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission, C-64/05, EU:C:2007:433.  
 
Judgment of 12 October 2007, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission, T-474/04, EU:T:2007:306.  
 
Judgement of 14 February 2008, Varec SA v Belgian State, C-450/06, EU:C:2008:91.  
 
Judgment of 1 July 2008, Kingdom of Sweden and Maurizio Turco v Council of the European Union, Joined cases C-39/05 P and 
C-52/05 P, EU:C:2008:374.  
 
Judgment of 25 January 2007, Dalmine SpA v Commission of the European Communities, C-407/04 P, EU:C:2007:53.  
 
Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of the European Communities, C-511/06 
P, EU:C:2008:604.  
 
Judgment of 9 July 2009, Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of the European Communities, C-511/06 P, EU:C:2009:433. 
 
Judgment of 20 April 2010, European Commission v Kingdom of Sweden, C-246/07, EU:C:2010:203.  
 
Judgment of 29 June 2010, European Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH, C-139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376. 
 
Judgment of 21 September 2010, Kingdom of Sweden v Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) and European 
Commission, Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) v European Commission and European Commission v Association de la 
presse internationale ASBL (API), Joined cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541.  
 
Judgment of 3 May 2011, Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v Tele2 Polska sp. z o.o., devenue Netia SA, Case C-
375/09, EU:C:2011:270. 
 
Judgment of 14 June 2011, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, C-360/09, EU:C:2011:389. 
 
Judgment of 25 October 2011, Solvay SA v European Commission, C-110/10P, EU:C:2011:687.  
 
Judgment of 15 December 2011, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims (CDC Hydrogene Peroxide) v European 
Commission, T-437/08, EU:T:2011:752.  
 
Judgment of 2 February 2012, The Dow Chemical Company v European Commission, T-77/08, EU:T:2012:47.  
 
Judgment of 28 June 2012, European Commission v Agrofert Holding a.s., C-477/10 P, EU:C:2012:394.   
 
Judgment of 28 June 2012, European Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS, C-404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393.  
 
Judgment of 14 November 2012, Nexans v European Commission, T- 135/09, EU:T:2012:596. 
 
Order of the President in Akzo Nobel NV and Others v European Commission, T-345/12 R, EU:T:2012:605. 
 
Order of the President in Pilkington Group Ltd v European Commission, T-462/12 R, EU:T:2013:119.   
 
Judgment of 6 June 2013, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and Others, C-536/11, EU:C:2013:366. 
 
Judgment of 18 June 2013, Industries Chimiques du Fluor (ICF) v European Commission, T-406/08, EU:T:2013:322.  
 
Judgment of 13 September 2013, Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Commission, T-380/08, EU:T:2013:480.  
458 
 
 
Judgment of 14 November 2013, Liga para a Protecção da Natureza (LPN) and Republic of Finland v European Commission, 
Joined Cases C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738. 
 
Judgment of 27 February 2014, European Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG, C-365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112.  
 
Judgment of 14 March 2014, Buzzi Unicem SpA v European Commission, T-297/11, EU:T:2014:122.  
 
Judgment of 25 June 2014, Nexans v European Commission, C-37/13, EU:C:2014:2030. 
 
Order of the President in AbbVie v Ema, T-44/13 R, EU:T:2014:694. 
 
Opinion of the Court of 14 October 2014, Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, Opinion 1/13, 
EU:C:2014:2303.  
 
Judgment of 28 January 2015, Akzo Nobel NV and Others v European Commission, T-345/12, EU:T:2015:50. 
 
Judgment of 28 January 2015, Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission, T-341/12, EU:T:2015:51.  
 
Judgment of 6 October 2015, Council of the European Union v European Commission, C-73/14, EU:C:2015:663. 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2015:787.  
 
Judgment of the Court of 19 July 2016, Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenije, C-526/14, EU:C:2016:570. 
 
Judgment of 28 July 2016, Council v Commission, C-660/13, EU:C:2016:616.  
 
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of 21 December 2016, Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, Opinion 
procedure 2/15, EU:C:2016:992. 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission, C-162/15, EU:C:2016:587.  
 
Judgment of 14 March 2017, Evonik Degussa GmbH v European Commission, C-162/15 P, EU:C:2017:205. 
 
Opinion 2/15 of the Court of 16 May 2017, EU:C:2017:376. 
 
Other 
 
S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey), 7 September 1927, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10.   
 
Ozturk v Germany, App. No. 8544/79, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 409, (1984).  
 
Lithgow v United Kingdom, App. No. 9006/80, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, (1985).  
 
Niemietz v. Federal Republic of Germany , App. No. 13710/88, 251-B Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1992).  
 
Funke v France, App. No. 10828/84, 256 Eur. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Quatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 1994, 112.  
 
John Murray v United Kingdom, App. No. 18731/91, 1996-I Eur. H.R. 30 (1996). 
  
Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (1996). 
 
Beyeler v Italy, App. No. 33202/96, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep 52 (2001).  
 
459 
 
Colas Est and others v France, App. No. 37971/97, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep 17 (2002).  
 
Jalloh v. Germany, App. No. 54810/00, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (2007).   
 
O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, App. No. 15809/02, 25624/02, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407 (2008). 
 
Axel Springer AG v Germany, App. No. 39954/08, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 183 (2012).  
 
 
Literature (books, journal articles, working papers) 
 
Abbott, Kenneth W. & Snidal, Duncan, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance”, International Organization, Vol. 
54, No. 3, 2000, pp. 421-456.  
 
Abbott, Kenneth W., Keohane, Robert, Moravcsik, Andrew, Slaughter, Anne-Marie & Snidal, Duncan, “The Concept of 
Legalization”, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2000, pp. 401-419.  
 
Albers Michael, “National Competition Laws, International Cooperation and Procedural Rights” paper for Cauffman, 
Caroline, Hao, Qian (eds), Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China, China-EU Law Series, Vol 3., Berlin, 
Heidelberg, Springer, 2016, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567001.  
 
Alfaro, Jesús & T. Reher, Tim, “Towards the Directive on Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law: is the time 
ripe?”, The European Antitrust Review, 2010, pp. 43-47.  
 
Amador Sanchez, Pablo, Bakker, Gerard & Kleijweg, Aad, “The art of enforcement: Cooperation with other institutions, 
a national competition authority’s perspective” in Don, Henk,  de Keijzer, Jaap, Lamboo, Esther, van Oers, Monique & 
van Sinderen, Jarig (eds), The Art of Supervision, Liber Amicorum, Pieter Kalbfleisch, Rotterdam, Editor Ronald Kouwenhoven, 
2011, pp. 39-48. 
 
Anderson, Kenneth, “Squaring the circle? Reconciling sovereignty and global governance through global government 
networks”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118, 2005, pp. 1255-1312. 
 
Andova, Katarina, Barennes, Marc, Terrien, Vivien, “New rules of procedure of the EU General Court: what are the new 
provisions that may specifically matter to competition lawyers?”, Concurrences N°3-2015 (in Concurrences, Competition 
Law Review, English Edition 2016). 
 
Andreangeli, Arianna, “Competition Law and Human Rights: Striking a Balance Between Business Freedom and 
Regulatory Intervention”, Edinburgh Research Explorer, 2009, 
http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/14818433/Competition_Law_Human_Rights_Striking_a_Balance_Between_
Business_Freedom_and_Regulatory_Intervention.pdf.  
 
Anselin, Yann, Damaj, Dylan, “The General Court of the European Union authorizes the Commission to communicate 
information submitted in support of its leniency program, through the publication of an new and more detailed version 
of its penalty decision in the hydrogen peroxide cartel (Akzo Nobel, Eka Chemicals)”, e-Competitions National Competition 
Laws Bulletin, N° 72350. 
 
Arnold, Julie E., “Executive Agreements in the Aftermath of Weinberger v. Rossi: Undermining the Constitutional 
Treaty-Making Power”, Fordham International Law Journal, 1982, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 636-657. 
 
Arts, Dirk, Devroe, Wouter, Foqué, René, Marchand, Karel, Verougstraete Ivan, (eds), Mundi et Europae Civic – Liber 
Amicorum Jacques Steenbergen, Gent, Larcier, 2014, 664 p. 
 
Ashworth, Andrew, “Self-incrimination in European Human Rights law – a pregnant pragmatism?”, Cardozo Law Review, 
Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008, pp. 751-774. 
 
460 
 
Atwood, James R., “Positive Comity: is it a positive step?” in Hawk, Barry, (ed.), 1992 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference, Fordham Corporate Law institute, New York, Juris 
Publishing, 1993, pp. 79-90. 
 
Aust, Anthony, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd ed., New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 516 p. 
 
Baks, Thomas J., “Case 327/91, France v. Commission: establishing a balance between Community institutions”, Boston 
University International Law Journal, Vol. 15, 1997, pp. 235-260.  
 
Baroncini, Elisa, “La Cour de justice et le treaty making power de la Commission européenne depuis l’Accord de 
coopération dans l’application des régimes antitrust jusqu’à l’Accord sur les orientations en matière de coopération 
normative et de transparence”, Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne, No. 2, 2006, pp. 369 - 430.  
 
Basedow, Jürgen, “Competition Policy in a Globalized Economy: from Extraterritorial Application to Harmonization” in 
M. Neumann & J. Weigand (eds), The International Handbook of Competition, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004, 
pp. 321-338. 
 
Beaton-Wells, Caron, “Leniency policies in anti-cartel enforcement: critical review is well overdue”, Concurrences, N°3 – 
2015 (in Concurrences Competition Law Review English Edition 2016).  
 
Behre, Kirby D., Briggerman, Lauren E. & Dowd, Sarah “International cartel investigations in the United States”, 8 
August 2016, Global Investigations Review, http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/benchmarking/the-investigations-review-
of-the-americas-2017/1067471/international-cartel-investigations-in-the-united-states. 
 
Benson, Stuart E., “The U.N. Code on Restrictive Business Practices: an International Antitrust Code is Born”, The 
American University Law Review, Vol. 30, 1981, pp. 1031-1048.  
 
Billiet, Jaak & H. Waege, Hans, (eds) Een Samenleving Onderzocht – Methoden van Sociaal-Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, 
Antwerpen, Uitgeverij De Boeck nv, 2003, 390 p. 
 
Błachucki, Mateusz & Jóźwiak, Sonia, “Exchange of Information and Evidence between Competition Authorities and 
Entrepreneurs’ Rights”, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2012, pp. 137-167. 
 
Blauberger, Michael, “The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions. How International Cooperation Enhances the 
Autonomy of Competition Authorities”, Transtate Working Papers, No. 102, Bremen, 2009. 
 
Botteman, Yves & Hughes, Paul, “Access to file: striking the balance between leniency and private enforcement tools”, 
The European Antitrust Review, 2013.   
 
Bourgeois, Jacques, “Competition Policy: the Poor Relation in the European Union Free Trade Agreements” in Govaere, 
Inge, Lannon, Erwoan, Van Elsuwege, Peter & Adam, Stanislas (eds), The European Union in the World – Essays in honour of 
Marc Maresceau, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014, pp. 381–397. 
 
Bourgeois, Jacques, Dawar, Kamala & Evenett, Simon J., “A comparative analysis of selected provisions in free trade 
agreements”, Commissioned by DG TRADE, October 2007, 
http://www.kamaladawar.com/userfiles/file/downloads/A%20Comparative%20Analysis%20of%20Selected%20FTAs.
pdf. 
 
Bouris, Dimitris & Schumacher, Tobias (eds.), The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign 
Policy, Springer, London, Palgrave Mcmillan, 2017, 306 p. 
 
Boyle, Alan E., “Some reflections on the relationship of treaties and soft law”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 48, No. 4, 2001, pp. 901-913. 
 
Bradford, Anu & Büthe, Tim, “Competition policy and free trade – Antitrust provisions in PTAs” in Dür, Andreas & 
Elsig, Manfred (eds), Trade cooperation – the purpose, design and effects of preferential trade agreements, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2015, pp. 246-274.  
461 
 
 
Breit, Ingrid, Capiau, Jeroen, Dalheimer, Dorothe, Jukneviciüté, Vita, E. Rikkers, Evelyne, & A. Sinclair, Ailsa, 
“Developments in and around the European Competition Network and cooperation in competition enforcement in the 
EU: an update”, Concurrences, N° 3-2012. 
 
Bretherton, Charlotte & Vogler, John, The European Union as a Global Actor, 2nd ed., New York, Routledge, 2006, 273 p.  
 
Briggs, John & Oakes, Daniel, “Eurotunnel and the short sea battle between the French and the English: A U.S. 
perspective”, Concurrences N °1-2014. 
 
Brockhoff, Julia, Jehanno, Bertrand, Pozzato, Vera, Buhr, Carl-Christian, Eberl, Peter & Papandropoulos, Penelope, 
“Google/DoubleClick: The first test for the Commission’s non-horizontal merger guidelines”, Competition Policy Newsletter, 
No. 2, 2008, pp. 53-60. 
 
Brusick, Philippe, Alvarez, Ana Maria, & Cernat, Lucian (eds), Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to 
Assure Development Gains, United Nations Publication, 2005, 486 p. 
 
Budzinski, Oliver, “Lead jurisdiction concepts – towards rationalizing multiple competition policy enforcement 
procedures”, Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers, Vol. 19, No. 87, June 2014.  
 
Büthe, Tim, “The politics of market competition: trade and antitrust in a global economy”, paper for Martin, Lisa L. 
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, available at 
http://leitner.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/resources/papers/Buthe_chapter_all_2014-03-20.pdf.  
 
C. Noonan, Chris, The Emerging Principles of International Competition Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 639 p.  
 
Calisti, Daniele & Haasbeek, Luke, “The proposal for a Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: the European 
Commission sets the stage for private enforcement in the European Union”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 8, August 2013.  
 
Canenbley, Cornelis & Steinvorth, Till, “Effective enforcement of competition law: is there a solution to the conflict 
between leniency programmes and private damages actions?”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 
2011, pp. 315- 326. 
 
Caruso, Antonio, “Leniency programmes and protection of confidentiality: the experience of the European 
Commission”, Journal of Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 1, No. 6, 2010, pp. 453-477.  
 
Cengiz, Firat, “Management of Networks between the Competition Authorities in the EC and the US: Different Polities, 
Different Designs”, European Competition Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, pp. 413-436.  
 
Cengiz, Firat, “Multi-level governance in competition policy: The European Competition Network”, European Law Review, 
Vol. 35, No. 5, 2010, pp. 660-677.  
 
Charbit, Nicolas, Ramundo, Elisa, Chehtova, Anna, & Slater, Abigail (eds), William E. Kovacic An Antitrust Tribute, Liber 
Amicorum – Volume I, New York, Institute of Competition Law, 2012, 432 p. 
  
Choi, Jay P. & H. Gerlach, Heiko, “Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation”, 
International journal of industrial organization, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2012, pp. 528-540.  
 
Chowdhury, Michelle, “From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling the Obstacles to Transatlantic 
Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement”, American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 11-09, 28 November 2011.  
 
Coen, David & Thatcher, Mark, “Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory 
Agencies”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2008, pp. 49-71.  
 
Coman-Kund, Florin, European Union Agencies as global actors – a legal study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex, and 
Europol, Maastricht, Production print Datawyse/Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2015, 533 p.  
 
462 
 
Connolly, William P., “Lessons to be Learned: the Conflict in International Antitrust Law Contrasted with Progress in 
International Financial Law”, Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. 6, No.1, 2001, pp. 207-248.   
 
Coppola, Maria, “ICN Best Practice: Soft Law, Concrete Results”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, July 2011.  
 
Coppola, Maria, “One network’s effect: the rise and future of the ICN”, Concurrences, N° 3-2011.  
 
Craig, Paul & de Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law - Text, Cases and Materials, 5th ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 1155 
p.  
 
Damro, Chad, “Destructive Issue linkages: the failure of multilateral trade-competition negotiations”, The Antitrust 
Bulletin, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2012, pp. 563-589.  
 
Damro, Chad, “The new trade politics and EU competition policy: shopping for convergence and co-operation”, Journal 
of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 6, September 2006, pp. 867-886. 
 
Damro, Chad, Cooperating on Competition in Transatlantic Economic Relations: the Politics of Dispute Prevention, New York, 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, 214 p.  
 
Davidow, Joel & Chiles, Lisa, “The United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary Nature of International 
Codes of Conduct regarding Restrictive Business Practices”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 72, No. 2, 1978, 
pp. 247-271.  
 
de Visser, Maartje, Network-Based Governance in EC law, the Example of EC Competition Law and EC Communications Law, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2009, 420 p.  
 
Dekeyser, Kris, & E. De Smijter, Eddy, “The exchange of evidence within the ECN and how it contributes to the 
European co-operation and co-ordination in cartel cases”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 32 No. 2 , 2005, pp. 161-
174.   
 
Demedts, Valerie & Chamon, Merijn, “The Commission back on the leash: no autonomy to sign non-binding agreements 
on behalf of the EU: Council v Commission”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 54, No.1, 2017, pp. 245-262.   
 
Demedts, Valerie, “International Competition law enforcement: different means, one goal?”, Competition Law Review, Vol. 
8, No. 3, 2012, pp. 223-253.   
 
Demedts, Valerie, “La coopération internationale entre les autorités de concurrence: ‘Entre le marteau et l’enclume’?,” 
Revue de l’Union européenne, Vol. 575, No. 2, 2014, pp. 101-109. 
 
Domke, Martin, “Notes: The United Nations Draft Convention on Restrictive Business Practices”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1955, pp. 129-140.   
 
Downs, George W. & Jones, Michael A., “Reputation, Compliance, and International Law”, The Journal of Legal Studies, 
Vol. 31, No. 1, 2002, pp. S95-S114.  
 
Drexl, Josef, Grimes, Warren S., Jones, Clifford A., Peritz, Rudolph J.R. & Swaine, Edward T. (eds), More Common Ground 
for International Competition Law?, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, 328 p.  
 
Ducrey, Patrik, “The Agreement between Switzerland and the EU concerning cooperation in the application of their 
competition laws”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2013, pp. 437-444. 
 
Economides, Nicholas & Lianos, Ioannis, “A critical appraisal of remedies in the E.U. Microsoft cases”, Columbia Business 
Law Review, No. 2, 2010, pp. 346-420. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry & Uzan, Marc, “The 1933 World Economic Conference as an Instance of Failed International 
Cooperation”, Working Paper No. 90-149, October 1990, University of California at Berkeley, Department of 
Economics.  
463 
 
 
Elhauge, Einer & Geradin, Damien, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2nd ed., Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart 
Publishing, 2011, 1324 p. 
 
Emberland, Marius, The human rights of companies – exploring the structure of ECHR protection, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2006, 272 p. 
 
Evans, Jeremy P. & Booth, Andrew R., “What Price Cooperation? The Ever Increasing Cost of Global Antitrust Cases”, 
Bloomberg Law Reports, 2010, https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/1772.pdf. 
 
Evers, Jeanine & de Boer, Fijge, The Qualitative Interview: Art and Skill, The Hague, Eleven International Publishing, 2012, 
172 p. 
 
Ezrachi, Ariel, “Sponge”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2017, pp. 49-75. 
 
Favart, Martin, “ECJ Advocate General Wathelet hands down opinion on the relationship between the EU Commission 
and NCA leniency applications for the same Cartel (DHL)”, e-Competitions National Competition Laws Bulletin, N°75916. 
 
Fikentscher, Wolfgang, “The Draft International Antitrust Code (‘DIAC’) in the Context of International Technological 
Integration”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 72, No. 2, 1996-1997, pp. 533-543. 
 
Fingleton, John, “An international perspective”, Concurrences, N° 3-2010.  
 
First, Harry, “The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law”, Antitrust Law 
Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2001, pp. 711-734.  
 
Fox, Eleanor & Crane, Daniel (eds), Antitrust stories, New York, Foundation Press, 2007, 405 p. 
 
Fox, Eleanor & Crane, Daniel, Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law, St. Paul, Thomson Reuters, 2010, 659 p.  
 
Fox, Eleanor M., “Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network”, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 09-27, July 2009. 
 
Fox, Eleanor, “Antitrust without borders: from roots to codes to networks”, E15 Expert Group on Competition Policy 
and the Trade System Think Piece, November 2015. 
 
Fox, Eleanor, “International Antitrust and the Doha Dome”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, 2002-2003, pp. 
911-932.  
 
Fox, Eleanor, “Networking the world”, Concurrences, N° 4-2011.  
 
Gal, Michal S., “Review Essay: New Perspectives on International Antitrust”, The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 106, 2012, pp. 401-410.  
 
Gal, Michal, “Antitrust in a globalized economy: the unique enforcement challenges faced by small and developing 
jurisdictions”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2009, pp. 1-56. 
 
Gallagher, Peter, The First Ten Years of the WTO 1995-2005, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 254 p. 
 
Gatto, Alexandra, Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights – Obligations under EU Law and International Law, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, 352 p. 
 
Gerber, David, “The age of antitrust law globalisation”, Concurrences, N° 4-2010.  
 
Gerber, David, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 394 p.  
 
464 
 
Gereffi, Gary & Fernandez-Stark, Karina, “Global value chain analysis: a primer”, 2nd ed., July 2016, 
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/12488/2016-07-
28_GVC%20Primer%202016_2nd%20edition.pdf?sequence=1.   
 
Gereffi, Gary, Humphrey, John & Sturgeon, Timothy, “The governance of global value chains”, Review of International 
Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005, pp. 78-104.  
 
Giannakopoulos, Themistoklis K., Safeguarding companies’ rights in competition and anti-dumping/anti-subsidies proceedings, 2nd ed., 
Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 664 p.  
 
Gifford, Daniel J., “The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at Munich: Good Intentions Gone Awry”, 
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1997, pp. 1-66. 
 
Gill, David G., “The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code: a Code for Competition?”, International Lawyer, Vol. 
13, 1979, pp. 607-617.  
 
Ginsberg, Melissa R., “Expert Testimony: Additional Insights from AU Optronics”, Antitrust Update Blog Patterson 
Belknap, 4 August 2014, https://www.antitrustupdateblog.com/expert-testimony-additional-insights-au-optronics.   
 
Govaere, Inge, “Setting the international scene: EU external competence and procedures post-Lisbon revisited in the 
limelight of CJEU Opinion 1/13”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 5, 2015, pp. 1277-1308. 
 
Grabenwarter, Christoph, European Convention on Human Rights – Commentary, Munich, Beck (in Gemeinschaft mit Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden und Helbing & Lichtenhahn/Basel), 2014, 660 p. 
 
Griffin, Joseph P., “EC/U.S. antitrust cooperation agreement: impact on transnational business”, Law & Policy in 
International Business, Vol. 24, 1992-1993, pp. 1051- 1066.  
 
Grosse Ruse-Khan, Henning, Jaeger, Thomas & Kordic, Robert, “The role of atypical acts in EU external trade and 
intellectual property policy”, The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2011, pp. 901-939. 
 
Guldborg Hansen, Pelle, “What is Nudging?”, Behavioral Science & Policy Association, 16 August 2016, 
https://behavioralpolicy.org/what-is-nudging/. 
 
Guzman, Andrew T. (ed.), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 374 p.  
 
Guzman, Andrew T., & Sykes, Alan O. (eds), Research handbook in international economic law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2007, 640 p. 
 
Guzman, Andrew T., “A Compliance-based Theory of International Law”, California Law Review, Vol. 90, 2002, pp. 1823-
1888. 
 
Guzman, Andrew T., “The Case for International Antitrust”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, 2004, pp. 355-
374. 
 
Hammond, Scott D., Wood, Diane, Healy, Madeleine, “New Swiss/EU Cooperation Agreement creates enhanced 
enforcement opportunities for antitrust regulators, but leaves uncertainty for companies”, Gibson Dunn Publications, 10 
December 2014, http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/New-Swiss-EU-Cooperation-Agreement-
Creates-Enhanced-Enforcement-Opportunities-for-Antitrust-Regulators.pdf.  
 
Harding, Christopher & Joshua, Julian, Regulating Cartels in Europe, 2nd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 440 
p.   
 
Hataway, Scott, “Interview of Antonio Capobianco in the framework of the conference ‘Crossing merger control 
frontiers: what are the new borders?’”, Concurrences Review, 28 September 2015, http://us7.campaign-
archive2.com/?u=f48c739bee8a60152edc27c50&id=7c1280b87d&e=5adbabdbc5.  
 
465 
 
Hausfeld, Michael D., Landau, Brent W., Scherrer, Hilary K., Coolidge, Melinda R., “Multi-Billion Dollar Air Cargo 
Price-Fixing Litigation Headed to Trial in Brooklyn”, Hausfeld, 31 August 2015, 
http://www.hausfeld.com/news/us/multi-billion-dollar-air-cargo-price-fixing-litigation-headed-to-trial-in-b. 
 
Hawk, Barry, 2008 Competition Law Institute International Antitrust Law & Policy, Fordham University School of Law, New 
York, Juris Publishing, 2009, 746 p.  
 
Hawk, Barry, 2010 International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law, Fordham University School of Law, New 
York, Juris Publishing, 2011, 486 p. 
 
Heather, Sean & Lobrano, Guido, “‘I’d Like to Propose a Toast’: Marking the 20th Anniversary of US-EU Antitrust 
Cooperation”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 1, 2011.  
 
Heckenberger, Wolfgang, “The internationalisation of antitrust – challenges and opportunities”, Concurrences , N° 3-2014.  
 
Heimler, Alberto, “EU Foreign policy tools/Competition policy” in Bindi, Federiga (ed.), The foreign policy of the European 
Union – Assessing Europe’s role in the world, 1st ed., Massachusetts, Brookings Institution Press, 2010, pp. 82-98.  
 
Held, David & Hale, Thomas (eds), Handbook of Transnational Governance– New institutions and innovations, Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 2011, 296 p.  
 
Hillgenberg, Hartmut, “A Fresh Look at Soft Law”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1999, pp. 499-
515. 
 
Hillion, Christophe & Koutrakos, Panos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, 418 p. 
 
Hilpold, Peter, “Regulating International Competition Issues by Regional Trade Agreements: A Stepping Stone Towards 
a Plurilateral Trade Agreement?”, European Yearbook of International Economic Law, Vol. 4, 2013, pp. 71-86. 
 
Hoffet, Franz, Dietrich, Marcel & Brei, Gerald, “Cooperation Agreement Switzerland – EU on Competition Law 
becomes effective on 1 December 2014, Facilitation of the Transmission of Confidential Information and Documents 
between Swiss and European Competition Authorities”, Homburger Bulletin, 6 November 2014, 
http://www.homburger.ch/fileadmin/publications/Homburger_Bulletin_20141106_EN.PDF. 
 
Hoffinger, Roy E., “Ending the ‘confidentiality exception’ to due process”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 2, November 
2013. 
 
Hoffinger, Roy E., “Reflections on the application of multiple competition law regimes to global businesses and 
markets”, Concurrences, N° 1-2014.  
 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell Jr., The Common Law , Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1881, 289 p.  
 
Horn, Henrik, Mavroidis, Petros C. & Sapir, André, “Beyond the WTO? An anatomy of EU and US preferential trade 
agreements”, Bruegel Blueprint Series, Vol. VII, 2009.  
 
Jarosz-Friis, Anna, Pesaresi, Nicola & Kerle, Clemens, “EU-Korea FTA: A Stepping Stone towards Better Subsidies’ 
Control at the International Level”, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1, 2010.  
 
Jenny, Frédéric “International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and Perspective”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 
48, Winter 2003, pp. 973-1004.  
 
Joelson, Mark R., An International Antitrust Primer: A Guide to the Operation of United States, European Union and Other Key 
Competition Laws in the Global Economy, 3rd ed., Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2006, 720 p.  
 
Jones, Alison & Sufrin, Brenda, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., New York, Oxford  
University Press, 2008, 1418 p.  
 
466 
 
Karamanian, Susan, “Book Review: An International Antitrust Primer: a Guide to the Operation of the United States, 
European Union, and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global Economy”, The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 96, 2002, pp. 1012-1015.   
 
Keegan, Laura E., “The 1991 U.S./EC Competition Agreement: a glimpse of the future through the United States v. 
Microsoft Corp. window”, Journal of International Legal Studies, Vol. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 149-179.   
 
Kellerbauer, Manuel & Repa, Lucas, “The Court of First Instance upholds two decisions of the Hearing Officer clarifying 
important procedural questions in antitrust investigations”, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 5, 2007, pp. 297-
305. 
 
Kerr, Clark, The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity?, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1983, 192 p. 
 
Klabbers, Jan, “The undesirability of soft law”, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 67, 1998, pp. 381-392.  
 
Klawiter, Donald C. & Laciak, Christine A., “International Competition Cooperation: No Longer Just the Formal 
Agreements”, The Antitrust Review of the Americas, A Global Competition Review Special Report, 2003.  
 
Kleimann, David & Kübek, Gesa, “The Future of EU External Trade Policy - Opinion 2/15: Report from the Hearing”, 
4 October 2016, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2016/10/the-future-of-eu-external-trade-policy.html.  
 
Klodt, Henning, Towards a Global Competition Order, Berlin, Liberal Verlag GmbH, 2005, 120 p.  
 
Kobel, Pierre, & Viros, David, “Cooperation Agreement – Investigations – Confidentiality obligations: The European 
Union and Switzerland reach the agreement concerning the application of their competition law entering in force on 1st 
December 2014”, Concurrences, N° 2- 2015.  
 
Korkea-Aho, Emilia, “EU Soft Law in Domestic Legal Systems: Flexibility and Diversity Guaranteed?”, Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 16, 2009, pp. 271-290.  
 
Kovacic, William E., Mavroidis, Petros C., Neven, Damien J., “Merger control procedures and institutions: a comparison 
of the EU and US practice”, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2014/20. 
 
Kovacic, William, “Nine next steps for transatlantic antitrust policy cooperation”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 1, October 
2011.  
 
Krauss, Joseph G., Baldwin, Robert F. III & Shulak, Daniel E. “FTC & DOJ release updated model confidentiality 
waiver for use in cross-border investigations”, Hogan Lovells Antitrust, Competition and Economic Regulation Quarterly 
Newsletter, Autumn 2013.  
 
Kuijper, Pieter-Jan, Wouters, Jan, Hoffmeister, Frank, De Baere, Geert, Ramopoulos, Thomas, The law of EU external 
relations – cases, materials, and commentary on the EU as an international legal actor, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, 1160 
p. 
 
Laciak, Christine A., International Antitrust Cooperation Handbook, Chichago Ill., ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2004, 795 p. 
 
Laprévote, François-Charles, “Antitrust in wonderland: trade defense through the competition looking glass”, Concurrences 
N 2° - 2015 (in Concurrences, Competition Law Review, English Edition 2016). 
 
Laserre, Bruno, “The future of the European Competition Network”, Italian Antitrust Review, No. 0, 2013. 
 
Laudati, Laraine L., Study of exchange of confidential information agreements and treaties between the US and Member States of the EU 
in areas of securities, criminal, tax and customs, Luxemburg, Office for Offiical Publications of the European Communities, 
1996, 76p.    
 
467 
 
Lavranos, Nikolaos & van Ooik, Ronald H. “Noot: Zaak C-233/02, Franse Republiek t. Commissie van de Europese 
Gemeenschappen (‘EG-VS Richtsnoeren’)”, SEW Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht, No. 12, December 2004, pp. 
543-547.  
 
Lee, Jane, “Vitamin ‘C’ is for Compulsion: Delimiting the Foreign Sovereign Compulsion Defense”, Virginia Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2010, pp. 758-791.  
 
Leskinen, Charlotte, “The EU/US cooperation in the field of antitrust law enforcement – some challenges for future 
cooperation”, Working Paper IE Law School, 5 May 2010. 
 
Lianos, Ioannis, & Sokol, D. Daniel (eds), The Global Limits of Competition Law, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2012, 
312 p. 
 
Lohse, Eva, “The Meaning of Harmonisation in the Context of European Union Law – a Process in Need of Definition” 
in Andenas, Mads & Andersen, Camilla B. (eds), Theory and Practice of Harmonisation, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011, pp. 282- 313. 
 
Lugard, Paul, (ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten – Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations, Intersentia, 
Mortsel, 2011, 424 p. 
 
Luttwak, Edward N. “From geopolitics to geo-economics: logic of conflict, grammar of commerce”, National Interest, No. 
20, Summer 1990, pp. 17-23. 
 
Maher, Imelda, “Competition Law in the International Domain: Networks as a New Form of Governance”, Journal of 
Law and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2002, pp. 111-136.  
 
Maresceau, Marc, “EU-Switzerland: Quo Vadis?”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2011, 
pp. 729-737. 
 
Markert, Kurt E., “Recent Developments in International Antitrust Cooperation”, Antitrust Bulletin, No. 13, 1968, pp. 
355-372.  
 
Marsden, Philip, “‘Jaw-jaw’ not ‘law-law’ – from treaties to meetings: the increasing informality and effectiveness of 
international cooperation” in Ezrachi, Ariel (ed.), Research Handbook on International Competition, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2012, pp. 110-135.  
 
Marteau Theresa M., “Judging nudging: can nudging improve population health?”, The BMJ, Vol. 342, 29 January 2011.  
 
Martyniszyn, Marek, “Discovery and evidence in transnational antitrust cases: current framework and the way forward”, 
Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, University College Dublin - School 
of Law, September 2012, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142978.  
 
Mateus, Abel M., “Ensuring a More Level Playing Field in Competition Enforcement Throughout the European Union”, 
Competition Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 12, 2010, pp. 514-529.  
 
Meisner, Stefan M., “FTAIA and Foreign Sales: Seventh Circuit Limits Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law in 
Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics”, McDermott, Will & Emery, 8 April 2014.  
 
Melamed, Douglas A., “Antitrust enforcement in a global economy” in Hawk, Barry (ed.), 1998 Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference, New York, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1999, pp. 1-17.  
 
Melamed, Douglas A., “International Cooperation in Competition Law and Policy: What can be Achieved at the Bilateral, 
Regional, and Multilateral levels”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1999, pp. 423-434.  
 
Melo Araujo, Billy, The EU deep trade agenda – law and policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, 304 p. 
 
468 
 
Miller, Samuel R., Nordlander, Kristina, Owens, James C., “U.S. discovery of European Union and U.S. leniency 
applications and other confidential investigatory materials”, CPI Antitrust Journal, March 2010.  
 
Molan Gaban, Eduardo, de Vicente Santos, Natali & Duarte Calmon Carvalho, Fernanda, “Brazil: STJ Restricts the 
Confidentiality Extension Granted to Leniency Agreement Provisions Entered into by CADE”, Tauil & Chequer Legal 
Update, 16 May 2016.  
 
Montag, Frank & Colgan, Daniel, “The complexity of cartel enforcement in times of globalization of competition law”, 
CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 1, October 2011.  
 
Monti, Giorgio, “Independence, interdependence and legitimacy: the EU Commission, National Competition 
Authorities, and the European Competition Network”, EUI Working Papers, LAW 2014/01. 
 
Moodaliyar, Kasturi, Reardon, James F., Theuerkauf, Sarah, “The Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement 
in Competition Law - A Comparative Analysis of South African, the European Union, and Swiss Law”, 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/10-year-review/parallel-3b/The-Relationship-between-Public-and-
Private-Enforcement-of-Competition-Law-SA-EU-CH.pdf.  
 
Morrison, Fred.L., “Executive Agreements”, in Max Planck Encylopaedia of Public International Law, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1403. 
 
Mundt, Andreas, “State of play of decentralized application of European competition law: collection and exchange of 
information within the ECN”, Concurrences, N°4-2014.  
 
Murphy, Dale D., The structure of regulatory competition – Corporations and public policies in a global economy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, 336 p.   
 
Nazzini, Renato, “Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A 
Comparative Contextual-Functionalist Perspective”, King’s College London Dickson Poon School of Law, Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series: Paper No. 2016-31.  
 
Nicolosi, Constanza, “No Good Whistle Goes Unpunished: Can We Protect European Antitrust Leniency Applications 
from Discovery?”, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2011, pp. 225-260. 
 
Nihoul, Paul & Lübbig, Thomas, “Competition Policy: Going International?”, Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2010, pp. 265-266.  
 
Nihoul, Paul & Scoczny, Tadeusz (eds) Procedural fairness in competition proceedings, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2015, 392 p.  
 
Nourry Alex & Harrison, Dan, “The Eurotunnel case continues - When is an enterprise not an enterprise?”, Clifford 
Chance LLP Competition Law Insight, 7 July 2015.  
 
Oliver, Adam, “From Nudging to Budging: Using Behavioural Economics to Inform Public Sector Policy”, Journal of 
Social Policy, July 2013, pp. 1- 16.  
 
Ormonov, Nodirbek, “Exchange of Information in the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws”, Asper Review of International 
Business & Trade Law, Vol. 6, 2006, pp. 343-378. 
 
Ott, Andrea, Vos, Ellen & Coman-Kund, Florin, “EU agencies and their international mandate: A new category of global 
actors?”, CLEER Working Papers 2013/7. 
 
Papadopoulos, Anestis S., The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, 331 p. 
 
Pate, R. Hewitt, “Antitrust enforcement at the United States Department of Justice: issues in merger investigations and 
litigation”, Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review, 2002, pp. 411-429.  
469 
 
 
Peck, Brian, “Extraterritorial application of antitrust laws and the U.S.-EU dispute over the Boeing and McDonnell 
Douglas merger: from comity to conflict? An argument for a binding international agreement on antitrust enforcement 
and dispute resolution”, San Diego Law Review, No. 35, 1998, pp. 1163-1213. 
 
Pérez Motta, Eduardo, “Competition policy and the trade system: challenges and opportunities”, E15 Expert Group on 
Competition Policy and the Trade System Overview Paper, April 2016. 
 
Petrasincu, Alex, “Discovery revisited- the impact of the US discovery rules on the European Commission’s leniency 
programme”, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 7, 2011, pp. 356-368.  
 
Peyer, Sebastian, “Access to competition authorities’ files in private antitrust litigation”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, 2015, pp. 58-86.   
 
Piilola, Anu “Assessing theories of global governance: a case study of international antitrust regulation”, Stanford Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 39, 2003, pp. 207-251.  
 
Putnam, Robert D., “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, International Organization, Vol. 42, 
No. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 427-460. 
 
Ramopoulos, Thomas & Wouters, Jan, “Charting the legal landscape of EU external relations post-Lisbon”, Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 156, March 2015. 
 
Raustalia, Kal & Slaughter, Anne-Marie, “International law, international relations and compliance” in Carlsnaes, Walter, 
Risse, Thomas & Simmons, Beth A. (eds), The Handbook of International Relations, London, Sage Publications, 2002, pp. 
538-558.  
 
Reichelt, Daniel, “To what extent does the co-operation within the European Competition Network protect the rights of 
undertakings?”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 42, 2005, pp. 745–782.  
 
Rennie, Jane, “Competition provisions in free trade agreements: unique responses to bilateral needs or derivative 
developments in international competition policy?”, International Trade Law & Regulation, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2009, pp. 57-71.  
 
Rennie, Jane, “Competition regulation in SAFTA, AUSFTA and TAFTA: a spaghetti bowl of competition provisions?”, 
International Trade Law & Regulation, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2007, pp. 30-38. 
 
Ribeiro, Amadeu, Dias Soares, Marcio, Carrilho Donas, Frederico, “The Brazilian Superior Court of Justice limits the 
confidentiality of the Competition Authority’s leniency agreements (Electrolux)”, e-Competition Bulletin, May 2016-II, Art. 
N° 79729, 8 March 2016.  
 
Richards, David, “Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls”, Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1996, pp. 199-204. 
 
Runciman, Walter L., “The World Economic Conference at Geneva”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 37, No. 147, September 
1927, pp. 465-472.  
 
Ryngaert, Cedric, “Assessing internatonal discovery after Intel v AMD (US Supreme Court, 2004): expanded US 
discovery opportunities for foreign litigants?”, European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2006, pp. 675-695. 
 
Saehoon Chung, Cecil, Yeon Kim, Kyoung & Hyun Kim, Kyu, “Early Signs of Protectionist Merger Control in Korea? 
Probably No, At Least Not Yet”, Competititon Policy International, 29 October 2015.  
 
Schachter, Oscar, “The twilight existence of non-binding international agreements”, The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 71, No. 2, 1977, pp. 296-304.  
 
Schäfer, Armin, “Resolving Deadlock: Why International Organisations Introduce Soft Law”, European Law Journal, Vol. 
12, No. 2, March 2006, pp. 194-208. 
 
470 
 
Schaub, Alexander, “International Co-operation in Antitrust matters: making the point in the wake of the Boeing/MDD 
proceedings”, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1, February 1998. 
 
Schnell, Gordon & Dumas-Emard, Rick, “How to catch a thief – Corporate leniency and the irrepressible challenge of 
cartel detection; Finding a better way”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, September 2011, Vol. 2. 
 
Scholte, Jan Aart, Globalization: a critical introduction, 2nd ed., New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, 492 p.  
 
Scott, Sheridan, “A Canadian Perspective on the Role of Comity in Competition Law Enforcement in a Globalised 
World”, Competition Law International, April 2011, pp. 69-75.  
 
Sebenius, James K., “Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties”, International Organization, Vol. 
37, No. 2, April 1983, pp. 281-316. 
 
Sekine, Takemasa, “Competition Related Provisions in East Asian FTAs: Their Trends and the Possible Impact of Mega 
FTAs”, Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 86, 2014, pp. 86-122. 
 
Senden, Linda, Soft Law in European Community Law, Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2004, 592 p. 
 
Simmons, Beth A., “Compliance with International Agreements”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1, 1998, pp. 75-93. 
 
Singh, Singali, “The Telmex Dispute at the WTO: Competition Makes a Backdoor Entry”, CUTS Briefing Paper, No. 
1/2006 
 
Slater, Donald, Thomas, Sébastien & Waelbroeck, Denis, “Competition Law Proceedings Before the European 
Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?”, European Competition Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009, pp. 
97-143.  
 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, A New World Order, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004, 368 p. 
 
Sokol, D. Daniel, “Cartels, corporate compliance, and what practitioners really think about enforcement”, Antitrust Law 
Journal, Vol. 78, No. 1, 2012, pp. 202-239. 
 
Sokol, D. Daniel, “Order without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy 
Chapters in Free Trade Agreements”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2008, pp. 231-292. 
 
Steenbergen, Jacques, “Competition and Trade Policy and the Challenge of Globalization” in Govaere, Inge, Quick, 
Reinhard & Bronckers, Marco (eds), Trade and Competition Law in the EU and Beyond, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011, pp. 3-17.  
 
Stefan, Oana A., “Hybridity Before the Court: a Hard Look at Soft Law in the EU Competition and State Aid Case 
Law”, European Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2012, pp. 49-69.  
 
Steger, Manfred B., Globalization, a very short introduction, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, 176 p.  
 
Stephan, Paul B., “Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents, and Legitimacy”, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business, Vol. 17, 1996-1997, pp. 681-735.  
 
Stephan, Paul B., “Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of Cooperation”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 
38, 2005, pp. 173-218.  
 
Stephan, Paul B., “Institutions and Elites: Property, Contract, the State, and Rights in Information in the Global 
Economy”, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 10 2002, pp. 305-317.  
 
Stephan, Paul B., “International Governance and American Democracy”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, 2000, 
pp. 237-256.  
 
471 
 
Stephan, Paul B., “Regulatory Cooperation and Competition –The Search for Virtue in Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation” in G. Bermann, M. Herdegen & P. Lindseth (eds.), Transatlantic Regulatory Co-operation – Legal Problems and 
Political Prospects, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 167-202.  
 
Stephan, Paul B., “Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organization”, Chicago Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 1, 2000, pp. 49-74.  
 
Stephan, Paul B., “The New International Law – Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global 
Order”, University of Colorado Law Review , Vol. 70, 1999, pp. 1555-1588. 
 
Stephan, Paul B., “The Political Economy of Choice of Law”, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 90, 2002, pp. 957-970.  
 
Stephan, Paul. B., “Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification – The Agency Problem”, Chicago Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 3, 2002, pp. 333-352.  
 
Stern, Ron, “An in-house perspective on global competition law developments”, Concurrences, N°2-2012.  
 
Sweeney, Brendan, "International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress", Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 10, 2009, pp. 58-69.  
 
Szepesi, Stefan “Comparing EU free trade agreements – Competition policy and state aid”, InBrief, European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, No. 6E, July 2004.   
 
Taylor, Martyn, International Competition Law: a New Dimension for the WTO?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
520 p.  
 
Terhechte, Jörg Philipp, International Competition Enforcement Law Between Cooperation and Convergence, Heidelberg, Springer-
Verlag, 2011, 96 p. 
 
Timberg, Sigmund, “Restrictive Business Practices as an Appropriate Subject for United Nations Action”, Antitrust 
Bulletin, Vol. 1, 1955-1956, pp. 409-440.  
 
Torremans, Paul, “Extraterritorial application of E.C. and U.S. competition law”, European Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, 
1996, pp. 280-292. 
 
Trachtman, Joel P., “International regulatory competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction”, Harvard International Law 
Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1993, pp. 47-104. 
 
Trujillo, Geralyn, “Mutual Assistance under the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act: Obstacles to a 
United States-Japanese Agreement”, Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 33, Summer 1998, pp. 613-630.  
 
Tschaeni, Hanspeter & Engammare, Valerie, “The Relationship between Trade and Competition in Free Trade 
Agreements: Developments since the 1990s and Challenges”, European Yearbook of International Economic Law , Vol. 4, 
2013, pp. 39-69. 
 
Utton, Michael A., International Competition Policy: Maintaining Open Markets in the Global Economy, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2006, 160 p. 
 
Valle Lagares, Eva, “International Agreements Regarding Cooperation in the Field of Competition: The New Strategy of 
the European Commission”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2010, pp. 1-3. 
 
Van Bael, Ivo, Due Process in Competition Proceedings, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2011, 546 p. 
 
Van der Loo, Guillaume, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area - A New Legal 
Instrument for EU Integration without Membership, Leiden/Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 2016, 416 p. 
 
472 
 
Van der Loo, Guillaume, “Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the DCFTAs with Tunisia and Morocco”, 
EuroMeSCo Series, March 2016. 
 
van Gerven, Walter, “EC jurisdiction in antitrust matters: the Wood Pulp judgment”, in Hawk, Barry (ed.), Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute, 1989, pp. 451-483.  
 
van Gestel, Rob, Micklitz, Hans-W. & Poiares Maduro, Miguel, “Methodology in the New Legal World”, EUI Working 
Papers LAW, 2012/13.  
 
van Miert, Karel, “International Cooperation in the Field of Competition: a view from the EC”, in Hawk, Barry (ed.), 
1997 Fordham Corporate Law Institute International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference, New York, Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute, 1998, pp. 13-25.   
 
Vandenborre, Ingrid, “The confidentiality of EU Commission cartel records in civil litigation: the ball is in the EU 
Court”, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No., 3, 2011, pp. 116-125.  
 
Vandenborre, Ingrid, Goetz, Thorsten & Kafetzopoulos, Andreas, “Access to file under European competition law”, 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 6 No. 10, pp. 747-756.   
 
Verdier, Pierre-Hugues, “Regulatory networks and their limits”, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business 
Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 22, 9/2008, (Later published as “Transnational Regulatory Networks 
and Their Limits”, The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, 2009, pp. 113-172. 
 
Wagner-von Papp, Florian, “Should Google’s Secret Sauce be Organic?”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, 
2015, pp. 1-39.  
 
Wallace, Cynthia Day, “‘Extraterritorial’ Discovery: Ongoing Challenges for Antitrust Litigation in an Environment of 
Global Investment”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2002, pp. 353-392.  
 
Waller, Spencer Weber, “The Internalization of Antitrust Enforcement", Boston University Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 2, 
1997, pp. 343-404. 
 
White, Peter J., “International judicial assistance in antitrust enforcement: the shortcomings of current practices and 
legislation, and the roles of international organizations”, Administrative Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2010, pp. 263-278. 
 
Wils, Wouter P.J., “The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in 
EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis”, World Competition: Law & Economic Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, 
2004, pp. 202-224.  
 
Wood, Diane,“Is cooperation possible?”, Luncheon Speech, New England Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 103-112.  
 
Woolcock, Stephen “European Union policy towards Free Trade Agreements”, ECIPE Working paper no. 03/2007. 
 
X. “Antitrust Merger Enforcement Update and Outlook”, Gibson Dunn, 21 March 2013. 
 
X., “Interview: Randolph Tritell: A U.S. Government official’s perspective on international antitrust”, Concurrences N° 2-
2011.   
 
X., “The German Competition Authority coordinates with the Dutch NCA its fining against a German mill involved in a 
cartel in the flour industry (Mühlen), The Netherlands and Germany: Joint Solution to cross-border Inability to Pay 
Claim in Flour Cartel Cases”, European Competition Network Brief, e-Competitions/N° 51205.  
 
X., “Global merger enforcement workshop at the International Competition Network (ICN)”, EU Competition and 
Regulatory Newsletter Slaughter and May, 25 September – 1 October 2015, Issue 38. 
 
X.,“US Court Rules That Confidential European Commission Documents Are Not Discoverable in US Antitrust 
Litigation”, Cleary Gottlieb Alert Memo, 14 September 2010.  
473 
 
 
Zalta, Mousa, “Recent interpretation of 28 USC§ 1782(A) by the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc.: the effects on federal district courts, domestic litigants, and foreign tribunals and litigants”, Pace International 
Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, September 2005, pp. 413-443. 
 
Zambrano, Diego, “A Comity of Errors: The Rise, Fall, and Return of International Comity in Transnational Discovery”, 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 2016, pp. 157-215. 
 
Zanettin, Bruno, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2002, 307p.  
 
 
Newspaper articles and blog posts 
 
Abbeloos, Jan-Frederik, “Nee, de Wereld is Geen Dorp”, De Standaard, 30 november 2012. 
 
Behre, Kirby D., Briggerman, Lauren E. & Dowd, Sarah, “International cartel investigations in the United States”, Global 
Investigations Review, 8 August 2016.  
 
Bradshaw, Julia, “What's the difference between TTIP and TPP and why does Donald Trump want them scrapped?”, The 
Telegraph, 22 November 2016. 
 
Connolly, Robert, “My Two Cents on the Motorola Mobility/AU Optronics Cert Petitions”, CartelCapers Blog, 9 April 
2015.  
 
Crofts, Lewis, “EU, Swiss antitrust accord hits snag as data-sharing comes under review”, Mlex, 2 December 2013.  
 
Gotev Georgi, “Romania, Bulgaria, Canada seek to unlock CETA by solving visa dispute”, EurActiv, 14 July 2016.  
 
Ince, Sarah & Christian, Gordon, “UK: The Marine Hose Cartel: A New Era In International Co-Operation”, Mondaq, 25 
February 2008.  
 
Kanter, James & Scott, Mark, “Europe Challenges Google, Seeing Violations of Its Antitrust Law”, The New York Times, 
15 April 2015.  
 
Kirklin, Taylor, “Supreme Court surprises the antitrust world with denial of cert in Motorola and AU Optronics”, 
Lexology, June 15, 2015.  
 
Kurgonaite, Evelina,“Apple and four publishers in settlement talks with European Commission”, Financial Times, 13 April 
2012.  
 
Mamane, David, “Competition law cooperation agreement EU/Switzerland”, Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 31 July 2012. 
 
Massmann, Oliver, “EU- Vietnam Free Trade Agreement - market access opportunities”, Lexology, 7 October 2016.  
 
Meinhardt, Marcel & Merkt, Benoît, “Cooperation Agreement between Switzerland and the EU on competition law 
enters into force”, Lexology, 14 November 2014.  
 
Mitchell, Alison, “Clinton Warns Europeans of Trade Complaint on Boeing Deal” , The New York Times, 18 July 1997. 
 
Murad, Ahmed, “Obama attacks Europe over technology protectionism”, Financial Times, 16 February 2015.  
 
Newman, Matthew, “Swiss parliament aims to approve EU, Swiss data-sharing accord in June”, Mlex, 22 May 2014.  
 
Nigro, Bernard A. Jr., Caspary, Tobias & Vere-Hodge, Till, “Antitrust cooperation agreement would permit EU and 
Swiss competition authorities to share evidence and confidential documents without the consent of the investigated 
party”, Lexology, 17 May 2013. 
 
474 
 
O’Grady, Sean, “By scrapping TPP and TTIP, Trump has boosted American jobs in the short term – and destroyed 
them in the long term”, Independent, 24 January 2017.   
 
Peyer, Sebastian, “The European Damages Directive fails to deliver, but can it be fixed?”, ESRC Centre for Competition 
Policy Competition Law and Policy Blog, 3 March 2015.  
 
Pincus, Walter & Lardner, George Jr., “Nixon Hoped Antitrust Threat Would Sway Network Coverage”, Washington Post 
Staff Writers, 1 December 1997.  
 
Robinson, Duncan, & Spiegel, Peter, “Concerns grow over EU rules targeting American Companies”, Financial Times, 26 
July 2015. 
 
Robinson, Duncan, “Dutch reject EU-Ukraine trade deal”, Financial Times, 7 April 2016.  
 
Steptoe & Johnson LLP, “EU and Switzerland sign antitrust cooperation agreement of unprecedented depth”, Lexology, 
29 May 2013. 
 
Van der Loo, Guillaume, “Wat nu met onze vrijhandel?”, De Redactie, 18 October 2016.  
 
Wong, Stephanie & Cheng, Wing-gar “China Blocks Coca-Cola’s $2.3 Billion Huiyuan Bid”, Bloomberg, 18 March 2009.  
 
X., Belgian region of Wallonia blocks EU-Canada trade deal, EurActiv, 14 October 2016.  
 
 
Conferences 
 
Klein, Joel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition Committee on the 
Judiciary United States Senate concerning International Antitrust Enforcement, Washington D.C., 4 May 1999.   
 
Tavares de Araujo, José Jr., “Competition policy and the EU-Mercosur trade negotiations”, paper prepared for the 
Working Group on EU-Mercosur Trade Negotiations, Paris, 12-13 May 2000. 
 
Pitofsky, Robert, “EU and US Approaches to International Mergers – Views from the US Federal Trade Commission”, 
remarks before the EC Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference, Brussels, 14 September 2000.  
 
Trittel, Randolph W., “Is a multilateral Framework Necessary?”, WTO Regional Workshop on Competition Policy, Cape 
Town, 22-24 February 2001.   
 
James, Charles A., “International Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence”, address before the 
OECD Global Forum on Competition, Paris, 17 October 2001.  
 
Dieckmann, Holger, “The Benefits of Cooperation between Competition Authorities”, presented at the Inaugural 
Symposium of the Competition Policy Research Center, Tokyo, 20 November 2003.  
 
Hammond, Scott D., “Beating cartels at their own game – sharing information in the fight against cartels”, presented at 
the Inaugural Symposium of the Competition Policy Research Center - Fair Trade Commission of Japan, Tokyo, 20 
November 2003. 
 
Kovacic, William E., “Achieving Better Practices in the Design of Competition Policy Institutions”, remarks before the 
Seoul Competition Forum, 20 April 2004. 
 
Goldman, Calvin, Hersh, Chris, & Witterick, Crystal, “International Antitrust: Developments after Empagran and Intel – 
Comity Considerations”, American Bar Association Spring Meeting, 31 March 2005. 
 
Hochschild, Jennifer, “Conducting Intensive Interviews and Elite Interviews”, Contribution to the Workshop on 
Interdisciplinary Standards for Systematic Qualitative Research, National Science Foundation, Arlington Virginia, 2005, 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/ISSQR_workshop_rpt.pdf. 
475 
 
 
Holmes, Peter, Müller, Henrike, Papadopoulos, Anestis, & Sydorak, Anna “A Taxonomy of International Competition 
Cooperation Provisions”, Paper for the International Research and Policy Symposium on Competition Policy for 
International Development, Growth and Trade organized by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brussels, 9-10 
December 2005.  
 
Lowe, Philip, “International Cooperation between Competition Agencies: Achievements and Challenges”, 4th Seoul 
International Competition Forum, 5 September 2006. 
 
Aydin, Umut, “Promoting Competition: European Union and the Global Competition Order”, paper prepared for 
presentation at the European Union Studies Association 11th Biennial International Conference, Los Angeles California, 
23-25 April 2009. 
 
Damro, Chad, “Comparing International EU Competition Cases: What Can Business and Politics Learn?”, paper 
prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies Association 11th Biennial International Conference, Los 
Angeles California, 23-25 April 2009.  
 
Kassim, Hussein & Wright, Kathryn, “Network governance and the European Union: the case of the European 
Competition Network”, paper for ARENA Workshop ‘The transformation of the executive branch of government in 
Europe’, University of Oslo, 4-6 June 2009.  
 
Brandenburger, Rachel, “International competition policy and practice: new perspectives?”, remarks as prepared for The 
Centre of European Law, King’s College, London, 29 October 2010. 
 
Almunia, Joaquin, “Taking Stock and Looking Forward: a Year at the Helm of EU Competition”, Revue Concurrences 
Conference: New Frontiers of Antitrust 2011, Paris, 11 February 2011. 
 
Almunia, Joaquin, “Recent Developments and Future Priorities in EU Competition Policy”, International Competition 
Forum St. Gallen, 8 April 2011.  
 
Pozen, Sharis A., remarks as prepared for delivery at the E-books Press Conference, 11 April 2012.  
 
Wayland, Joseph, “International cooperation at the antitrust division”, remarks as prepared for the International Bar 
Association’s 16th Annual Competition Conference, Florence, 14 September 2012. 
 
Brink, Patricia A., “International Cooperation at the Antitrust Division: A View from the Trenches”, remarks as prepared 
for the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Chicago Illinois, 19 April 
2013.  
 
Rodger, Barry, “State of Play of Antitrust damages at Member State level – competition litigation and collective redress: a 
comparative EU analysis”, presented at 9th Annual Conference of the GCLC, Antitrust Damages in EU law and policy, 
Brussels, 7-8 November 2013.  
 
Fonteijn, Chris & O’Keeffe, Siún, “Information Exchange Between Authorities: Enhancing Enforcement”, 21st St.-
Gallen International Competition Law Forum, 15-16 May 2014. 
 
Beumer, Elsbeth, “The colorful spectrum of fundamental rights in EU competition law procedures: overcompensation 
or undercompensation of fundamental rights protection? A case study on the right to be heard”, paper prepared for the 
9th ASCOLA Conference on procedural fairness in competition proceedings, Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014. 
 
Jones, Clifford A., “Into the parallel universe: procedural fairness in private litigation after the Damages Directive”, paper 
prepared for the 9th ASCOLA Conference Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, Warsaw, 26-28 June 2014.  
 
GREEN-GEM Summer School "Competing for growth, trade & influence - The externalisation of the EU's policies 
trough: multilateral governance, interregionalism, & global networks", 31 August-5 September 2014. 
  
476 
 
“EU Common Commercial Policy in the Lisbon Era – Achievements and Prospects”, Policy seminar Global 
Governance Programme EUI, Fiesole, 16 October 2014.  
 
“Crossing Merger Control Frontiers: What are the new borders?”, 3rd Annual conference organized by Concurrences 
and Paul Hastings, Paris, 30 October 2015. 
 
“Strategic Considerations in cartel follow-on litigation”, Concurrences Law & Economics Workshop, Brussels, 2 June 
2016.  
 
“Competition policy at the intersection of equity and efficiency – honouring the scholarship of Eleanor M. Fox”, Global 
Competition Law Center at the College of Europe and UCL Centre for Law, Economics and Society Conference, 
Brussels, 8 June 2016.   
 
“The European antitrust leniency calculus c.2016: still worth it?”, Brussels Matters Panel Discussion, Brussels, 16 June 
2016. 
 
Interview of Johannes Laitenberger by François-Charles Laprévote, Concurrences Review, mailing 12 April 2016. 
 
College of Europe high-level conference, “The division of competences in the EU legal order – a post-lisbon 
assessment”, 20-21 April 2016, Verversdijk, Brugge. 
 
Interview d’Ignacio Garcia Bercero par Frédéric Jenny, Demain la Concurrence, 2016, mailing 30 Mai 2016.  
 
Concurrences and George Washington University Law School Conference, “120 Merger Regimes: Multinational deals in 
a world of non-convergence: US, EU, Brazil, China,… - A call for Harmonization: towards regional regulators or 
comity?”, Washington DC, 19 September 2016, Interview of Michael Ray (Chief Legal Officer, Western Digital) by 
David Gelfand (partner, Cleary Gottlieb). 
 
Interview of Chief Legal Counsel Camilla Holtse (Maersk) by Kostis Hatzitaskos (Cornerstone Research) in view of their 
panel “international mergers: working across multiple jurisdictions”, Global Antitrust Economics Conference, Chicago, 7 
October 2016.  
 
Interview with Randy Tritell (Director, Office of International Affairs, US FTC) by Gönenç Gürkaynak (Managing 
Partner, ELIG, Attorneys-at-Law) in view of their panel "Globalization and the Rise of Regionalism: TPP, ASEAN, 
COMESA, MINT and Coherence in the World", Competition and Globalization in Developing Economies Conference, 
New York City, 28 October 2016. 
 
 
Miscellaneous  
 
Ahearn, Raymond J., “Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications”, CRS Report for 
Congress, 3 March 2011. 
 
Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report (BNA), Vol. 61, 26 September 1991. 
 
Asian Development Bank, Competition Law Toolkit, “Countries that have Adopted Systems of Competition Law”, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/OGC-Toolkits/Competition-Law/complaw030000.asp.   
 
Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae, re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig. (Flat Glass I), MDL No. 1200, Misc. No. 97-550, 
26 March 1998.  
 
Brief of Commission of European Communities as Amicus Curiae, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 
U.S. 241 (2004). 
 
Case n. 2269/Garnalen, NMA decision of 14 January 2003, 
http://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicaties/884/Garnalen--- boete/.  
 
477 
 
Competition Bureau, “Canadian perspectives on international competition cooperation”, 
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01087.html.   
 
Conseil des Etats Session d'été 2014, Quatrième séance 05.06.14, 13.044, Zweitrat - Deuxième Conseil, 
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=27047. 
 
DoJ Press Release, “Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, R Hewitt Pate, issues Statement on the EC’s Decision in 
Its Microsoft Investigation”, 04-184, 24 March 2004.  
 
DoJ Press Release, “Antitrust Division Issues Statement on the European Commission’s Decision Regarding the 
Proposed Transaction Between Oracle and Sun”, 09-1210, 9 November 2009.  
 
DoJ Press Release, “Department of Justice and Microsoft Corporation Reach Effective Settlement on Antitrust Lawsuit”, 
01-5692, November 2001. 
 
DoJ Press Release, “Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Three of the Largest Book Publishers and Continues to 
Litigate Against Apple Inc. and Two Other Publishers to Restore Price Competition and Reduce E-book Prices”, 12-457, 
11 April 2012.  
 
EC-Mexico Joint Council, Decision No. 2/200 of 23 Mar. 2000, Annex XV [2000], OJ L157/10. 
 
Evenett, Simon J., “What can we really learn from the competition provisions of regional trade agreements?”, 23 August 
2005, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.583.9612&rep=rep1&type=pdf.  
 
FTC Press Release, “First International Antitrust Assistance Agreement Under New Law Announced by FTC and DOJ”, 
P829612, 17 April 1997. 
 
Garza, Deborah A., Yarowsky, Jonathan R., Burchfield, Bobby R., Cannon, W. Stephen, Carlton, Dennis W., Delrahim, 
Makan, Jacobson, Jonathan M., Kempf, Donald G., Litvack, Sanford M., Shenefield, John H., Valentine, Debra A., 
Warden, John L., Antitrust Modernization Commission - Report and Recommendations, April 2007. 
 
Hamilton, Martha M., “Global joint investigation to be proposed at special tax meeting”, 12 April 2016, 
https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160412-global-tax-officials-meeting.html.   
 
Horney, Nick, Pasmore, Bill & O’Shea, Tom, “Leadership Agility: A Business Imperative for a VUCA World”, 
http://www.ibicity.fr/blog/public/Leadership_Agility_--_HRPS_Reprint_Permission__revised_.pdf.  
 
International Chamber of Commerce Policy Statement: “ICC Comments on EU-US Positive Comity Agreement, Law 
and Practices Relating to Competition”, 12 March 1997. 
 
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Antitrust Division, ICPAC Final Report, 2000, 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ICPAC/finalreport.htm.  
 
Judgment, Société Coopérative de Production SeaFrance SA (Respondent) v The Competition and Markets Authority 
and another (Appellants), Michaelmas Term, [2015] UKSC 75, 16 December 2015. 
 
Kinsinger, Paul & Walch, Karen, “Living and Leading in a VUCA World”, 
http://www.powerofunderstanding.net/pdfs/living_leading_small.pdf.   
 
Letter of S. Hammond, Deputy Assist. Att’y Gen. For Crim. Enf., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, In re Flat Glass 
Antitrust Litig., No. 08-180 (Doc. No. 200-6), 6 October 2009.  
 
Message relatif à l’approbation de l’accord entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne concernant la coopération en matière 
d’application de leurs droits de la concurrence, 13.044, 22 mai 2013, https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-
gazette/2013/3477.pdf.  
 
478 
 
Neven, Damien, Chief Economist DG COMP, European Commission, “Ownership, performance and national 
champions”, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/opnc.pdf.  
 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, “U.S.-EU Joint Report on T-TIP Progress to Date”, 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/january/us-eu-joint-report-t-tip-progress-0.  
 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), http://asean.org/?static_post=rcep-regional-comprehensive-
economic-partnership. 
 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the IAEAA of 1994, N° 103-388, 103rd Cong. 2d Sess, 30 September 
1994. 
 
Statement of Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the Committee on the Judiciary 
U.S. Senate concerning the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, S. 2297, 4 August 1994. 
 
Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek III and Christine A. 
Varney in the Matter of The Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 9710051, 1 July 1997. 
 
Summary of Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing - International Antitrust Issues, 15 February 2006, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/antitrust/at-links/pdf/at-mod/02_15_06.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 
Summary of Case 6306 of the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets, “Fine cartels flour producers”, 22 
December 2010, https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/3975/Fine-cartels-flourproducers/. 
 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-
text. 
 
United States Council for International Business, “Summary of U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Empagran Case”, 
http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=2941. 
 
US Model Waiver of Confidentiality, For use in civil matters involving non-U.S. competition authorities, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/705856/download. 
 
X., Contribution of James R. Atwood in Summary of Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing - International 
Antitrust Issues, 15 February 2006, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/antitrust/at-links/pdf/at-
mod/02_15_06.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 
X., Contribution of Prof. Eleanor M. Fox in Summary of Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing - International 
Antitrust Issues, 15 February 2006, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/antitrust/at-links/pdf/at-
mod/02_15_06.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 
X., Contribution of Randolph W. Trittel in Summary of Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing - International 
Antitrust Issues, 15 February 2006, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/antitrust/at-links/pdf/at-
mod/02_15_06.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 
X., “Joint investigation by Dutch FIOD and British HMRC into hiding money in a different country”, 5 April 2017, 
https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten/@98616/joint-investigation/.  
 
X., “NMa imposes fines totaling more than EUR 80 million for cartel agreements in flour industry”, 22 December 2010, 
Authority for Consumers and Markets, https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/5827/NMa- imposes-
finestotaling-more-than-EUR-80-million-for-cartel-agreements-in-flour-industry/. 
 
http://www.aeclj.com/. 
  
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/international/international-competition/international-waivers-confidentiality-ftc-antitrust.  
 
http://www.legal500.com/.   
479 
 
 
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ 
 
http://www.statpac.com/surveys. 
 
http://www.surveysystem.com/sdesign.htm. 
 
http://www.transatlantictrade.org/issues/competition-policy/.  
  
480 
 
 
 
  
481 
 
ANNEX I SURVEY 
 
Cover letter: Law Firm Experience with International Competition Law Enforcement 
 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
 
May I kindly ask for your crucial collaboration in the framework of my PhD-research on 
international competition law enforcement. It should take up only very little of your time. 
Confidentiality is guaranteed. A copy of the results can be provided. 
 
Companies and the law firms that represent them (such as your own) are among the ones affected 
most by international competition cooperation agreements (think e.g. of the procedural burden in 
multijurisdictional merger filings), but little information is available in literature or official documents 
on how you experience such cooperation efforts. It is therefore essential to get your input, as past 
attempts (for instance by the ICN) have been unsuccessful. May I kindly ask you to take part in this 
survey or spread it in your law firm to those who you consider suitable to take part. The questions 
relate to your daily practice with regard to international mergers, international cartels, and 
international unilateral conduct cases. Some of the questions are more general in nature and would 
require a clear overview of the cases dealt with by the law firm. Please note that I do not require case 
details or any form of confidential information.  
 
The selection of contacted law firms is based on their qualification in the Legal 500, and within each 
firm the partners with expertise in competition law that are (partially) based in the Brussels office are 
contacted.  
 
May I kindly ask you to return the completed surveys at the latest by April 30th 2014. If you have any 
further questions or remarks, please feel free to contact me via e-mail on valerie.demedts@ugent.be 
or by telephone on xxxxxxxxx. In case you are interested, you can also find me on LinkedIn.  
 
For your information, I am a University of Ghent and College of Europe alumna currently pursuing 
a PhD on international competition law enforcement at the Ghent European Law Institute (Jean 
Monnet Centre of Excellence) of Ghent University, Belgium, under the supervision of professor 
Inge Govaere. For more information on my research I refer to the 1 page fact sheet that is attached 
to the survey.  
 
Appreciatively looking forward to hearing from you, 
 
 
Valerie Demedts 
PhD researcher University of Ghent 
  11 March 2014 
 
FACT SHEET PHD VALERIE DEMEDTS - GHENT UNIVERSITY 
 
Author: Valerie Demedts (Ghent University, College of Europe Bruges) 
 
Institution: Ghent University – Independent academic research 
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Guidance committee: Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Inge Govaere (Head of Ghent European Law Institute 
at Ghent University, Director of the European Legal Studies Department at the College of Europe, 
Bruges). Other members: Prof. Dr. Jacques Bourgeois and Prof. Dr. Philip Marsden.  
 
Title of PhD thesis: The EU’s dedication to its dedicated competition agreements – A qualitative 
legal and practical assessment of the EU’s first and second generation competition cooperation 
agreements 
 
Main research questions:  
Should the EU continue to use dedicated competition agreements of the 1st and 2nd generation? 
Why? In other words, how effective are they and what is their potential? 
In order to answer this question I will analyse:  
PART 1: the background, context and evolution of international competition cooperation. 
PART 2: the main benefits and flaws of first and second generation agreements: 
In theory  the legal instrument / In practice  the implementation 
PART 3: relation with free trade agreements / multilateral agreements 
Main Research Subjects: 
the EU-US first generation agreement of 95 (first 1st generation agreement of the EU)  
The US-Australia second generation agreement of 98 (first 2nd generation agreement – US model) 
The EU-Switzerland agreement of 2013 (first 2nd generation agreement – EU model)  
EU-Ukraine DCFTA (first deep and comprehensive free trade agreement of the EU) 
 
Aim: the aim is to inform rule-makers on how competition authorities can further improve their 
cooperation processes and remain at the forefront of international competition law enforcement by 
combining a theoretical academic approach with insights ‘from the field’ (via the use of interviews 
and surveys) of both enforcers and law firms defending international clients.  
 
Reasons for qualitative research (interviews & surveys): The reason I wish to engage in 
qualitative research is that I want to analyse how different types of professionals experience the 
usefulness of competition cooperation agreements. I wish to investigate how the text of the law 
translates in practice. I want to learn how the officials of competition agencies interact with their 
international counterparts on a day-to-day basis and how particular legal instruments facilitate or 
obstruct this. I want to see how the companies subject to competition law enforcement and more 
specifically the law firms defending their interests benefit or suffer from such cooperation. Based on 
this data-set it is my aim to suggest improvements to the current legal system. 
 
YOUR BENEFIT: A free summary report if interested. The chance to get your view across. My 
endless gratitude. 
 
 
PhD survey V. Demedts: Law Firm Experience with International Competition Law 
Enforcement  
 
 
Some questions are factual, others ask for an appreciation. Each respondent can decide for himself/herself the level of 
detail given in the reply, taking into account any issues of confidentiality. Nevertheless, I would ask for as complete an 
input as possible to maximise the relevance of the research. Feel free to add own remarks. In order to make this survey 
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as accessible as possible, it suffices to just complete in typing or writing this Word-document and return it to 
valerie.demedts@ugent.be 
 
1. Mergers (if this is not your field of expertise, skip to section 2, starting at question 16) 
 
Numerical data 
 
1. What percentage of the total of merger cases that your law firm has dealt with were international in 
nature (i.e. covered more than one jurisdiction)?  
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate:  
 I don’t know 
 
2. What percentage of the total of merger cases that you personally have dealt with were international 
in nature (i.e. covered more than one jurisdiction)?  
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate:  
 
3. What percentage of the international merger cases dealt with by your law firm concerned a merger 
between an EU member state and a third country/ third countries (i.e. non-member state)?   
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate: 
 I don’t know 
 
4. What percentage of the international merger cases you personally have dealt with concerned a 
merger between an EU member state and a third country/ third countries (i.e. non-member state)?   
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 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate: 
 
5. On average, in the international merger cases you have dealt with, how many jurisdictions are 
involved?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Do you cooperate with law firms from other jurisdictions hired by your client in a particular case?  
 
 (almost) Never 
 Rarely 
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 (almost) Always 
 
 
Obstacles 
 
7. On average, would you consider the procedural burden – e.g. differing filing forms, differing 
deadlines, different information required - in the latter type of cases (EU-member(s) merge with 
non-member(s)): 
 
 Very high 
 High 
 Reasonable 
 Low  
 Very low  
 
8. What would you consider the biggest impediment to efficiently dealing with multi-jurisdictional 
mergers? 
 
Answer: 
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9. Did the procedural burden of multijurisdictional mergers decrease over the years or did it increase? 
Why is that in your opinion?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. In your daily practice, do you notice the efforts that are being made by the European 
Commission in cooperating with third countries through for instance the development of joint filing 
forms or coordinated deadlines? Could you elaborate on this? 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confidential information - Waivers 
 
11. In what percentage of cases are (partial or complete) waivers of confidentiality provided by the 
parties?  
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate: 
 
12. Do you think the waiver-system is working well? How do you think it could be improved in 
merger cases?  
 
Answer: 
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13. To what extent do your clients worry that sensitive or confidential information will be disclosed?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. How would you define confidential information?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future 
 
15. On what should the European Commission focus its future efforts with regard to international 
mergers (in particular mergers involving non-EU member states)? 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Cartel Cases (if this is not your field of expertise, skip to section 3, starting at question 36) 
 
Numerical data 
 
16. What percentage of the total of cartel cases that your law firm has dealt with were international in 
nature (i.e. covered more than one jurisdiction)?  
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate:  
 I don’t know 
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17. Which percentage of the total of cartel cases that you personally have dealt with were international 
in nature (i.e. covered more than one jurisdiction)? 
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate: 
 
18. What percentage of the international cartel cases dealt with by your law firm concerned a cartel 
between an EU member state and a third country/ third countries (i.e. non-member state)?   
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate: 
 I don’t know 
 
19. What percentage of the international cartel cases you personally dealt with concerned a cartel 
between an EU member state and a third country/ third countries (i.e. non-member state)?   
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate:  
 
20. Do you cooperate with law firms from other jurisdictions hired by your client in a particular case?  
 
 (almost) Never 
 Rarely 
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 (almost) Always 
 
Obstacles 
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21. What would you consider the biggest impediment to efficiently dealing with multi-jurisdictional 
cartel cases? 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22. Did the procedural burden of multijurisdictional cartel cases decrease over the years or did it 
increase? Why is that in your opinion?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Do you notice international cooperation taking place between the European Commission and 
third country competition authorities? E.g. coordinated dawn raids, exchange of information,…  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private enforcement 
 
24. How much does private enforcement of cartel cases occur in your experience? 
 
 Almost never 
 Occasionally 
 Sometimes 
 Often  
 I don’t know 
 
25. Can you notice an increase in private enforcement of cartel cases over the last few years?  
 
Answer: 
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26. What would you consider the biggest obstacles to successful private enforcement of cartel cases?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confidential information – waivers 
 
27. To what extent do clients worry that sensitive or confidential information will be disclosed?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
28. In what percentage of cases are (partial or complete) waivers of confidentiality provided by the 
parties?  
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate: 
 
29. Do you think the waiver-system is working well? How do you think it could be improved in 
cartel cases?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30. How would you define confidential information? 
 
Answer: 
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Leniency 
 
31. What factors do you take into account when applying for leniency, especially when multiple 
jurisdictions are at stake?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32. How do you think the leniency system could be improved?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33. Should international coordination between leniency programmes be a priority on the 
international agenda?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34. Do you agree with the following statement? Why? “There are some hurdles [to filing multiple 
leniency applications], but the hurdles are the price to pay to be granted immunity both on 
administrative sanctions and criminal sanctions and maybe jail time.” 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future 
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35. On what should the European Commission focus its future efforts with regard to the fight 
against international cartels (in particular cartels involving non-EU member states)? 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Unilateral Conduct (dominance) (if this is not your field of expertise, skip to section 4, starting at 
question 51) 
 
Numerical data 
 
36. What percentage of the total of unilateral conduct cases that your law firm has dealt with were 
international in nature (i.e. covered more than one jurisdiction)?  
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate:  
 I don’t know 
 
37. Which percentage of the total of unilateral conduct cases that you personally have dealt with were 
international in nature (i.e. covered more than one jurisdiction)? 
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate: 
 
38. What percentage of the international unilateral conduct cases dealt with by your law firm 
concerned unilateral conduct between an EU member state and a third country/ third countries (i.e. 
non-member state)?   
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
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 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate: 
 I don’t know 
 
39. What percentage of the international unilateral conduct cases dealt with by you personally 
concerned unilateral conduct affecting an EU member state and a third country/ third countries (i.e. 
non-member state)?   
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 
40. Do you cooperate with law firms from other jurisdictions hired by your client in a particular case?  
 
 (almost) Never 
 Rarely 
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 (almost) Always 
 
Obstacles 
 
41. What would you consider the biggest impediment to efficiently dealing with multi-jurisdictional 
unilateral conduct cases? 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42. Did the procedural burden of multijurisdictional unilateral conduct cases decrease over the years 
or did it increase? Why is that in your opinion?  
 
Answer: 
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43. Do you notice international cooperation taking place between the European Commission and 
third country competition authorities? E.g. coordinated dawn raids, exchange of information,…  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private enforcement 
 
44. How much does private enforcement of unilateral conduct cases occur in your experience? 
 
 Almost never 
 Occasionally 
 Sometimes 
 Often  
 No idea 
 
45. Can you notice an increase in private enforcement of unilateral conduct cases in recent years?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46. What would you consider the biggest obstacles to successful private enforcement of unilateral 
conduct cases?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
Confidential information – waivers 
 
47. In what percentage of cases are (partial or complete) waivers of confidentiality provided by the 
parties?  
 
 0% 
 1 – 20% 
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 21 – 40%  
 41 – 60%   
 61 – 80% 
 81 – 100% 
 I can give a more exact estimate: 
 
48. To what extent do your clients worry that sensitive or confidential information will be disclosed?  
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49. How would you define confidential information? 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
Future 
 
50. On what should the European Commission focus its future efforts with regard to the fight 
against international unilateral conduct cases? 
 
Answer: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Other comments 
 
51. Do you have any remarks or would you like to draw attention to other issues?  
 
Answer: 
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5. Optional: personal information – this information will be treated confidentially by the researcher 
and only for the purpose of organising the surveys. This does not constitute a waiver of 
confidentiality/anonymity.  
 
52. Function:  
 
53. I have           years of relevant experience.  
 
 
 
 I would like to receive a free summary report. 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
 
 
Valerie Demedts  
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ANNEX II INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
INTERVIEW EUROPEAN COMMISSION OFFICIALS 
 
Introduction/cover letter 
 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
 
I am a University of Ghent and College of Europe alumna currently pursuing a PhD at the European 
Institute (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence) of Ghent University, Belgium, under the supervision of 
professor Inge Govaere. My research pertains to international competition law enforcement. The aim 
is to investigate how the EU’s dedicated competition cooperation agreements (with the US, Canada, 
South-Korea, Japan, and very recently the second generation agreement with Switzerland, the latter 
allowing the exchange of confidential information) function in practice. It is my aim to inform rule-
makers on how competition authorities can further improve their cooperation processes and remain 
at the forefront of international competition law enforcement by combining a theoretical academic 
approach with insights ‘from the field’, via the use of interviews.  
 
The reason I wish to engage in qualitative research is that I want to learn how different types of 
professionals experience the usefulness of the dedicated competition agreements in their 
international relations. I wish to observe how the text of the law translates in practice. I want to learn 
how the officials of competition agencies interact with their international counterparts on a day-to-
day basis and how particular legal instruments facilitate or obstruct this.  
 
As DG COMP negotiates the agreements studied and is one of the main implementers of such 
agreements, I would be very grateful if you would be willing to answer some questions regarding 
your daily practice or to distribute it to people that you consider suitable to provide certain insights (I 
am interested in the viewpoints of both case-handlers, members of Unit A5, as well as higher-level 
officers; they may be working on cartels, mergers, unilateral conduct, etc.). It would allow me to 
incorporate your very valuable opinions in my research. Feel free to choose the form of interview 
that would suit you best, be it by phone/Skype/in person. My contact details are provided below. 
 
Your contribution would be a great added value to my research, as very little information is available 
in literature or official documents. Of course unanimity is guaranteed. No names, nor specific 
function-descriptions will be mentioned in the PhD, unless your explicit consent is given. I do not 
require case details or any form of confidential information (although suggestions of relevant case-
law are welcome of course). I just wish to understand what the impact of the EU’s competition 
cooperation agreements is in practice, and what benefits or drawbacks they offer to practitioners.  
 
If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me via e-mail on 
Valerie.Demedts@Ugent.be or by telephone on xxxxxxxxx. In case you are interested, my CV is 
attached to this e-mail as well to provide you some background information.  
 
Looking forward to hearing from you, 
 
Valerie Demedts 
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Interview questions: 8 main themes 
 
Variety of legal instruments - rationale 
 
Main Q: What do you believe is the cause of the diversification of legal instruments used for 
international competition law cooperation. In other words, why are political dialogues, MoUs, 
dedicated competition agreements, FTAs with competition provisions, etc. all used simultaneously to 
reach more or less the same goal?  
 
Follow-through Q’s: 
 
- For instance, what is it exactly that makes one choose a first generation agreement over a 
memorandum of understanding? What are the factors at play? If the obligations 
contained in the first generation agreements are voluntary and dependent on the will of 
the parties, why then choose the form of a binding international agreement? 
- Is it based on a tailoring depending on the partner country? A quote from a recent (2010) 
article by a commission official reads "DG Competition is now adopting a more strategic 
approach towards international agreements tailoring the instrument to the real needs of 
the relationship and to facts such as the size and importance of the country's economy, 
the intensity of the trade and investment relationship with the country concerned and the 
degree of maturity of its competition regime.” What does this more strategic approach 
imply?  
- What are the factors determining whether or not to start negotiating an agreement with a 
certain country? 
- In theory the OECD Recommendations could serve as a sufficient legal basis for states 
to cooperate internationally within their national legal limits. In practice, however, the 
majority of OECD member states(endorsing the principles of the recommendations), 
that engage in international cooperation prefer to conclude bilateral agreements on the 
application of their respective competition laws even though the content of such 
agreements eventually is very similar to the recommendations. Why do you think is this 
the case? Why did the Commission deem it necessary to conclude bilateral agreements 
even after the guidelines, recommendations and best practices were in place? In other 
words, what is the added value? 
- In the same vein: did dedicated agreements contribute to ‘an atmosphere of 
cooperation’? The framework they create is often only a formalization of what already 
existed in practice. What is the added value of such formalization? Has actual change 
taken place during the evolution from informal cooperation to cooperation under first 
generation agreements, did cooperation in practice followed cooperation in theory, or did 
the status quo remain valid? 
 
Main Q’s on first generation dedicated agreements in particular: 
Why are first generation agreements state-to-state agreements and not agency-to-agency agreements 
(as is the case with MoUs)?  
With regard to US-EU cooperation Philip Lowe said at Fordham in 2007: “But I do not think, […] 
that we would go near the idea of deference of one authority to another” Why is this?  
What happens if a country does not comply with one of the binding cooperation agreements?  
- What is the procedure/sanction?  
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- Has this ever happened before?  
- can pressure be put on the parties to cooperate where they would not have done so in the 
absence of an agreement? i.o.w. does the added value of having a binding agreement 
appear from case law? 
 
Importance/relevance of international cooperation 
 
Concrete numbers on international competition cooperation could be found in the Commission’s 
Annual Reports to the Council and the European Parliament on Bilateral Cooperation in 
Competition Policy, and in the Annual Reports on Competition Policy. However, from 2006 
onwards, these reports do not longer mention any such data and according to certain scholars the 
Commission could not provide the information upon request. No (self)-evaluation is made possible 
this way. Why did the reports on the application of the agreements stop at one point? Why was it no 
longer considered useful to keep track of these data?  
 
A number of quotes with regard to the relevance of international cooperation on which I would like 
your opinion: 
- The US ICPAC report (2000) stated that “[b]ased on the evidence, recent U.S. 
achievements in prosecuting international cartels suggest that while foreign assistance has 
and can facilitate antitrust enforcement efforts, only periodically does it prove crucial to 
their outcome.” Would you agree with this quote today? Why?  
- Similarly, in the report following the joint OECD/ICN survey on international 
competition cooperation of 2012 the following statement appears “It must be noted at 
the outset of this discussion that a large majority of respondents reported that the 
absence of co-operation has not hindered a case or an investigation, or that, although 
they could foresee difficulties, they have not encountered those difficulties in practice. 
Even among those respondents who reported instances where lack of co-operation 
hindered an investigation, one (among others) noted that “[a]lthough there have been 
cases in which a lack of international co-operation between agencies has hindered an 
investigation or prosecution, in our experience, this has rarely occurred over the past five 
years.”” If you agree, do you believe this justifies that cooperation should not be a 
priority? Why (not)? 
- Or would you rather agree with the statement that “Today, more often than not, effective 
enforcement of national rules depends upon assistance granted by foreign agencies or 
states.” 
- Diane Wood stated in 1999 that agencies did not need to coordinate the majority of their 
cases with counterparts elsewhere, but that well less than a third and maybe even less 
than a quarter of the cases handled by national authorities “raised even a hint of a need 
for international cooperation.” Would you have agreed with this statement in 1999? And 
today? Could you give an estimation of the percentage of total cases handled requires 
some form of international cooperation or coordination? It is estimated that in recent 
years between 30 and 50 % of DG COMP’s major cases involved some form of 
international cooperation. Would you say that this is a correct estimation? Could you 
make a distinction between Merger cases, Cartel cases and Unilateral conduct cases? 
 
Does the Commission keep statistics or data on cases with conflicting outcomes and are those being 
analysed?  
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Daily practice 
 
How do unit A5 (International Relations) and the case handlers within DG COMP interact? What is 
the exact role of unit A5?  
 
To what extent do you actively use guidelines, recommendations, best practices etcetera of the 
ICN/OECD/UNCTAD within DG COMP?  
- Are they used more specifically when negotiation new bilateral cooperation agreements? 
Or would you say they rather ‘lag behind’? 
- Which role did/do such documents play in your opinion? 
 
Is enhanced comity (understood here as “jurisdiction is allocated to the state whose competition 
regime is best equipped to establish an infringement and enforce any sanctions or remedies”) used in 
practice (outside of the ECN of course)?  
- What is your opinion about the usefulness in practice of the concept of comity in general 
(negative and positive) and on the concept of enhanced comity?  
 
Do benchmarking reviews take place? Or some form of periodical self-evaluation with regard to 
international cooperation?  
 
Cooperation between DG COMP and the US DOJ throughout the course of the e-books 
investigation, with frequent contact between investigative staffs and the senior officials, was labeled 
as “the first case in which the DOJ has cooperated so closely with a non-U.S. agency in a conduct 
investigation” (WP3 Discussion on International co-operation, United States, 8 June 2012, 7) Could 
you elaborate on this? 
- What was in your experience the best example of international cooperation involving the 
EU, and why?  
- If I were to choose one case-study of EU international competition cooperation, which 
example would you suggest? Why?  
- Apart from the Boeing/McDonnell and GE/Honeywell cases, no more famous 
examples of conflicting cases are available. Or am I wrong?   
 
It is often said that multilateral venues promote trust between agencies because they allow for 
frequent interpersonal contact. But is this trust indeed not based on personal relations, rather than 
agency-relations? 
 
Strategy 
 
What is the strategy of the Commission in establishing an external competition policy or in pursuing 
international cooperation? In the past it was clear that the EU pursued WTO inclusion. The current 
set of international instruments does not indicate a clear direction.  
 
If the EU insisted in the past on negotiations on competition rules to which the DSM would apply 
(in the context of the WTO), why would it give up its position in the context of its bilateral FTAs? In 
other words, why are competition chapters in the EU’s FTA’s always excluded from the DSM?  
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What type (if any) of competition provisions occurs in the trade agreement that is currently 
negotiated with the US?  
 
The way forward 
 
Main Q: Where do you think the future lies for international competition cooperation (what you 
hope)? How do you see international cooperation on competition law matters evolve (what you think 
reality will be like)? 
 
Follow-through Qs: 
- Is it rather the multilateral or bilateral? Or both? Why? If both, what would the division 
of labour look like? How do you experience the relationship between bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation? 
- Do you believe that there should be an increase of dedicated competition agreements (in 
the sense of agreements dealing only with competition matters) or should competition 
provisions be more integrated in broader frameworks, such as FTA’s? Why?  
- US officials expressed their preference for increased cooperation rather than a substantial 
code when responding to the Draft International Antitrust Code of the Munich Group. 
What is the EU’s stance today?  
 
Main Q: how will the development of private antitrust litigation in Europe affect international 
cooperation between antitrust agencies in your opinion? 
 
Follow-through Q: On Intel v. AMD: allows to sometimes obtain discovery using U.S. civil 
procedure in order to support complaints before the European Commission. This summons certain 
questions (author: Fox).  
1. Why should litigants ever be able to obtain discovery in the United States for use in a foreign 
proceeding when: a. such discovery could not be obtained in a similar U.S. litigation? b. such 
discovery would not be permitted under the discovery rules of the foreign nation? Doesn’t this 
undermine the discovery limits imposed by that nation? Doesn’t this result in U.S. litigants being 
treated worse than other litigants in that nation? c. the foreign tribunal states it does not want the 
assistance of U.S. discovery? Are parties likely to be able to get the Commission to weigh in on every 
U.S. discovery request made to support an EU complainant? If the EU itself invokes its right to 
§1782 assistance, should it categorically be given the discovery? d. the party from whom the 
information is sought is a defendant before the foreign proceeding and thus could be ordered to 
produce the relevant discovery by the foreign tribunal if it wanted it?  
2. Is the Court right to treat each of the above as discretionary factors cutting against discovery 
rather than as a categorical bar?  
3. Should the U.S. courts compel the discovery of documents to aid foreign antitrust proceedings 
even when those foreign nations refuse to reciprocate by compelling discovery to aid U.S. antitrust 
proceedings?” 
 
Assessment 
 
Do you think the standards for cooperation are set too low? Many problems identified 10 years ago 
still exist to more or less the same extent today (agreements do not contain any hard obligations, 
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even if the agreement itself is binding; limits on the exchange of confidential information; very little 
use of positive comity…)  
 
What has been the added value of dedicated competition agreements? Are they still useful today, or 
is everything possible through informal daily interactions? Would you have achieved the same level 
of cooperation without the existence of a dedicated agreement?  
 
What in your view is the biggest success in international competition law enforcement cooperation 
up to date?  
 
Does the EU have a comparable program to the Visiting International enforcer program of the US? 
What is its potential? What are the limits? What do you think of such ‘alternative’ cooperation 
methods?  
 
How would you assess the value of competition provisions in FTA’s ? 
 
Second Generation Agreements/exchange of confidential information 
 
EU-Switzerland:  
Why was opted for an agreement as the direct legal basis for the exchange of confidential 
information, and not legislation similar to the IAEAA in the US? 
 
Why is the cooperation foreseen in the EU-Switzerland agreement limited to information on the 
Commission’s file, and does it not extend to active information gathering, again in comparison to the 
US-Australia agreement?  
 
Future agreements: 
In what stage are negotiations on a second generation agreement with Canada and will the agreement 
be similar to the EU-Switzerland agreement? Can this latter agreement be considered a model for 
future cooperation? If not, why? 
 
What is the stance of the EU of a second generation agreement with the US? Are steps being taken? 
If so, which ones? Will it be modeled on the EU-Switzerland agreement? Did the Laudati Report of 
1994 prepared for this occasion ever receive any follow-up? 
 
Are you negotiating any other second generation agreements?  
 
On (confidential) information exchange: 
Where soft instruments seem to have failed, should hard international law be developed to address 
the existing limits at national level to disclosure of confidential information to foreign agencies (with 
appropriate safeguards)?   
 
Why do you think is the exchange of confidential information more successful or at least less 
controversial in areas such as tax or securities?  
 
How would you define confidential information? Should only one definition exist? Should differing 
levels of protection apply to different categories of information?  
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In what percentage of the cases you are dealing with are you confronted with the fact that relevant 
information or evidence is out of reach because it is located outside your jurisdiction and there is no 
(sufficient) exchange of confidential information?  
 
In what percentage of antitrust/merger cases respectively are waivers of confidentiality provided by 
the parties involved? Confidentiality waivers are often mentioned as the instrument to overcome 
existing legal constraints on the exchange of confidential information. Do you agree with this 
statement? Why (not)? 
 
The Canadian Competition Bureau recently explored with other agencies the possibility of creating 
an informal information sharing network. Do you think such an initiative is necessary and would it 
be successful? Which impediments would exist for an electronic platform for (non-confidential) 
information sharing? Would an automatic exchange of information (as used in tax information 
exchange agreements) be a good idea? (Automatic exchange of information (also called routine 
exchange) involves the systematic and periodic transmission of ‘bulk’ taxpayer information by the 
source country to the residence country concerning various categories of income)  
 
Could the formalized information sharing system within the ECN be transposed to an international 
context?  
 
Miscellaneous 
 
Any other interesting issues that come to mind or that you would like to draw attention on? 
 
Are there any further areas that were not touched upon that you wish to comment on?  
 
Could you refer me to other people that might be interesting to contact? Could you introduce me?  
 
Please indicate your function within DG COMP (if it has not yet become clear via previous 
interaction).   
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INTERVIEW OECD OFFICIALS 
 
Introduction/cover letter 
 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
 
I am a University of Ghent and College of Europe alumna currently pursuing a PhD at the European 
Institute (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence) of Ghent University, Belgium, under the supervision of 
professor Inge Govaere. My research pertains to international competition law enforcement. The aim 
is to investigate how the EU’s dedicated competition cooperation agreements (with the US, Canada, 
South-Korea, Japan, and very recently the second generation agreement with Switzerland, the latter 
allowing the exchange of confidential information) function in practice, while also assessing wider 
attempts towards international cooperation. It is my aim to inform rule-makers on how competition 
authorities can further improve their cooperation processes and remain at the forefront of 
international competition law enforcement by combining a theoretical academic approach with 
insights ‘from the field’, via the use of interviews.  
 
The reason I wish to engage in qualitative research is that I want to learn how different types of 
professionals experience the usefulness of the dedicated competition agreements in their 
international relations. I wish to observe how the text of the law translates in practice. I want to learn 
how the officials of competition agencies interact with their international counterparts on a day-to-
day basis and how particular legal instruments facilitate or obstruct this.  
 
As the OECD has been and still is at the forefront of developing international competition law 
enforcement instruments via e.g. its recommendations, and is a major platform for practitioners to 
engage in discussion, I would be very grateful if you would be willing to answer some questions 
regarding your experience or to distribute it to people that you consider suitable to provide certain 
insights. It would allow me to incorporate your very valuable opinions as practitioners in my 
research. Feel free to choose the form of interview that would suit you best, be it by 
phone/Skype/in person. My contact details are provided below. 
 
Your contribution would be a great added value to my research, as very little information is available 
in literature or official documents. Of course unanimity is guaranteed. No names, nor specific 
function-descriptions will be mentioned in the PhD, unless your explicit consent is given. I do not 
require case details or any form of confidential information (although suggestions of relevant case-
law are welcome of course).  
 
If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me via e-mail on 
Valerie.Demedts@Ugent.be or by telephone on xxxxxxx. In case you are interested, my CV is 
attached to this e-mail as well to provide you some background information.  
 
Looking forward to hearing from you, 
 
Valerie Demedts 
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Interview questions: 7 main themes 
 
OECD Practice 
 
How do all these OECD initiatives on international competition cooperation relate:  
1. Global forum on competition: improving international co-operation in cartel investigations. 
Resulted in: OECD Policy Roundtables: Improving international co-operation in cartel investigations 
2012 
2. Competition Committee WP 3 on Co-operation and enforcement: limitations and constraints to 
international co-operation: 
3. Competition Committee WP 3 on Co-operation and enforcement: international co-operation, 
stocktaking exercise of the competition committee’s past work.  
In preparation of: Competition Committee WP 3 on Co-operation and enforcement: Report on the 
OECD/ICN survey on international enforcement co-operation  
4. …  
 
Are the 1995 recommendations currently under review? What are/would be possible adaptations?  
 
The Competition Committee stated that it would learn from example of successful international 
cooperation in other fields, in particular with regard to confidential information exchange. Why did it 
wait until now? The Laudati report for instance dates back many years already? On a related note: in 
which ways would competition law be different from for instance tax or securities law where 
successful confidential information exchange takes place?  
 
“the Committee has never reported to the Council on the application of the 1995 Recommendation 
on International Co-operation and its previous iterations, and it has never reviewed the experiences 
of member countries with the 2005 Best Practices.” (102 icn oecd survey report)  WHY?? 
 
Do benchmarking reviews take place? Or some form of periodical self-evaluation with regard to the 
work that has been done on international cooperation and the follow-up it gets?  
 
What was in your experience the best example of international cooperation, and why?  
 
It is often said that multilateral venues promote trust between agencies because they allow for 
frequent interpersonal contact. But is this trust indeed based on personal relations, rather than 
agency-relations? 
 
Variety of legal instruments - rationale 
 
Main Q: What do you believe is the cause of the diversification of legal instruments used for 
international competition law cooperation. In other words why are political dialogues, MoUs, 
dedicated competition agreements, FTAs with competition provisions, etc. all used simultaneously to 
reach more or less the same goal?  
 
Follow-through Q’s: 
 
- In theory the OECD Recommendations could serve as a sufficient legal basis for states 
to cooperate internationally within their national legal limits. In practice, however, the 
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majority of OECD member states(endorsing the principles of the recommendations), 
that engage in international cooperation prefer to conclude bilateral agreements on the 
application of their respective competition laws even though the content is very similar to 
the recommendations. Why do you think is this the case? In other words, what is the 
added value? Especially since the obligations contained in the first generation agreements 
remain voluntary and dependent on the will of the parties, why then choose the form of a 
binding international agreement?  
- In the PhD the evolution from informal cooperation to cooperation under first 
generation agreements is analyzed. Has actual change taken place, and did cooperation in 
practice follow cooperation in theory, or did the status quo remain valid? 
- Is there a main goal of international cooperation on competition law issues and if yes, 
what do you think it is? Or do you believe that a range of different goals is pursued?  
 
Importance/relevance of international cooperation 
 
A number of quotes with regard to the relevance of international cooperation on which I would like 
your opinion: 
- The US ICPAC report (2000) stated that “[b]ased on the evidence, recent U.S. 
achievements in prosecuting international cartels suggest that while foreign assistance has 
and can facilitate antitrust enforcement efforts, only periodically does it prove crucial to 
their outcome.” Would you agree with this quote today? Why?  
- In the report following the joint OECD/ICN survey on international competition 
cooperation of 2012 the following statement appears “It must be noted at the outset of 
this discussion that a large majority of respondents reported that the absence of co-
operation has not hindered a case or an investigation, or that, although they could foresee 
difficulties, they have not encountered those difficulties in practice. Even among those 
respondents who reported instances where lack of co-operation hindered an 
investigation, one (among others) noted that “[a]lthough there have been cases in which a 
lack of international co-operation between agencies has hindered an investigation or 
prosecution, in our experience, this has rarely occurred over the past five years.”” Do you 
believe this justifies that cooperation should not be a priority? Why? 
- Or would you rather agree with the statement that “Today, more often than not, effective 
enforcement of national rules depends upon assistance granted by foreign agencies or 
states.” 
 
The way forward 
 
Main Q: Where do you think the future lies for international competition cooperation (what you 
hope)? How do you see international cooperation on competition law matters evolve (what you think 
reality will be like)? 
- Is it rather the multilateral or bilateral? Or both? Why? If both, what would the division 
of labour look like? 
 
Follow-through Qs: 
- If bilateral, do you believe that there should be an increase of dedicated competition 
agreements (in the sense of agreements dealing only with competition matters) or should 
competition provisions be more integrated in broader frameworks, such as FTA’s? Why?  
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- How do you experience the relationship between bilateral and multilateral cooperation? 
 
Main Q: How would/will the development of private antitrust litigation in Europe affect 
international cooperation between antitrust agencies? 
 
Assessment 
 
Do you think the standards for cooperation are set too low? Many problems identified 10 years ago 
are still the problems now (agreements do not contain any hard obligations, even if the agreement 
itself is binding; limits on the exchange of confidential information; very little use of positive 
comity…)  
 
Are bilateral agreements still useful today, or is everything possible through informal daily 
interactions? Would the same level of cooperation be achievable without the existence of a dedicated 
agreement?  
 
What in your view is the biggest success in international competition law enforcement cooperation 
up to date?  
 
Do you think cooperation efforts get enough publicity? Do you think there should be more/less 
information about it? Are examples of successful cooperation highlighted enough to domestic 
constituencies? Are the benefits of cooperative efforts sufficiently demonstrated?  
 
How would you assess the value of competition provisions in FTA’s ? 
 
Second Generation Agreements/exchange of confidential information 
 
Where soft instruments seem to have failed, should hard international law be developed to address 
the existing limits at national level to disclosure of confidential information to foreign agencies?   
 
Why is the exchange of confidential information more successful or less controversial at the least in 
areas such as tax or securities? Does the Committee on fiscal affairs sometimes cooperate with the 
competition committee? Are experiences exchanged? For instance with regard to the 2006 Manual 
with regard to exchange of information in tax matters? 
 
How would you define confidential information? Should only one definition exist? Should differing 
levels of protection apply? According to what factors?  
 
The Canadian delegation explained that the Canadian Competition Bureau recently explored with 
other agencies around the globe the possibility of creating an informal information sharing network. 
Do you think such an initiative is necessary and would it be successful? Which impediments would 
exist for an electronic platform for (non-confidential) information sharing? Would an automatic 
exchange of information (as used in tax information exchange agreements) be a good idea? 
(Automatic exchange of information (also called routine exchange) involves the systematic and 
periodic transmission of ‘bulk’ taxpayer information by the source country to the residence country 
concerning various categories of income)  
 
Miscellaneous 
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Any other interesting issues that come to mind or that you would like to draw attention on? Are 
there any further areas that were not touched upon that you wish to comment on?  
 
Could you refer me to other people that might be interesting to contact? Could you introduce me?  
 
Please indicate your function within the OECD (if it has not yet become clear via previous 
interaction).  
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